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Abstract 
The risk Analysis using Failure mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) technique 
has been widely used in engineering sectors for over decades. The use of Risk Priority 
Number (RPN) has received much attention in literature and numerous research efforts 
are carried out to improve its utility. Integrated approaches have been utilized with 
significant levels of achievements compared to the traditional FMEA. This research 
applied an integrated approach using RPN and grey theory to identify the critical 
components and subsystems of a concentrated solar power (CSP) system. The 
objectives of the study were to investigate the failure modes and their characteristics 
in the subsystems of CSP solar tower systems, understand the causes and the impacts 
of failures. The research started with applying FMEA to solar tower systems for 
identifying the critical failure mode on systems and subsystems. However the 
traditional FMEA exhibited certain limitations for prioritizing failure modes. Hence 
this research attempted to propose an alternative approach that can contribute and 
enhance the RPN method in traditional FMEA for providing the more realistic results 
for CSP power plants. The case study revealed that the proposed approach helps in 
identifying the most critical failure modes in components by giving better risk 
prioritization than traditional RPN.  As a result of case study, the most critical 
Component within a subsystem and the most critical subsystem within CSP solar tower 
were identified. Results show that the critical subsystem for solar tower power plants 
is the electrical power generator followed by thermal storage, support structure and 
receiver. Results confirm that the traditional FMEA overlooks some failure modes that 
can lead to the closure of solar tower power plant. Findings of the research cast doubt 
on the ability of traditional FMEA reliably to rank failure modes in solar tower power 
plants. This research has succeeded in improving the issues of RPN prioritization 
ambiguity. Another limitation with FMEA is the requirement of huge amount of data 
to determine the risk factors, which is often unavailable. Future research should focus 
to address how risk analysis can be performed with sparse data. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Background and motivation 
The predominant sources of energy that are currently depended on are unsustainable, 
as it leads to the depletion of natural resources at a faster rate. Additionally, there are many 
health and environmental concerns that revolve around the continued use of fossil fuels for 
energy generation[1]. This phenomenon has continuously pushed the modern generation to 
seek sustainable and renewable sources of energy [2]. One such sustainable source of 
energy which can be harnessed is solar power [3]. Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) 
technology can be applied to harness solar power in small & large-scale operations [4]. 
There has been significant development and improvement in the technologies used in CSP 
and it is being increasingly used to provide clean energy[5] . 
This technology has been proven successful in large-scale operations but smaller 
plants or equipment experience many losses and efficiency problems [6]. Typically, there 
are different technologies that are applicable in harnessing this power. Parabolic trough, 
solar tower, Liner Fresnel, and Stirling Dish systems are the main technologies [7]. In these 
technologies, the plants have many subcomponents which include Support Structure 
Subsystem, Receiver Subsystem, thermal-Storage Subsystem, Electrical power and 
Generator Subsystem and Master Control. Apparently, CSP plants experiences a lot failures 
which reduces their efficiency and increase downtime and maintenance cost. The 
identification of the critical failure modes occurring in solar tower CSP plants, is of major 
interest in this research.  For this study, the various failure modes in the CSP plants, and 
the risk associated with them are investigated. 
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is one of the most used  technique for 
failure analysis in engineering sectors. It can be applied to CSP plant as well. It focuses on 
identifying failure modes in the system and enables to prioritize the risk for recommending 
corrective actions[8]. However, failure data is sparse due to confidentiality control and 
short history of CSP facilities. Moreover, in FMEA, the risk priority number (RPN) for 
each failure mode is calculated by multiplying the three scores such as Severity, Occurrence 
and Detectability, and these RPNs are used to prioritize risks for potential failure mode[9]. 
The most critical disadvantage of the traditional FMEA is that it gives several failure modes 
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the same RPN value and it poses difficulty in prioritization. In fact, they might have 
different risk implication, but traditional FMEA assigns equal priority for them. This 
problem is due to the assumption used in RPN method, i.e. it assumes  the three failure 
mode indexes are equally weighted[10]. In addition, the traditional FMEA doesn’t give 
suggestion to identify the threshold value for RPN which enables to find the critical failure 
modes. This research suggests the recommended threshold value that could be used for 
classifying critical failure modes in solar tower CSP, and thereby it helps in identifying the 
critical subsystem in a CSP system. 
Consequently, this study focuses on how FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) 
methods can be introduced into these systems to assess the impacts of failures on 
subsystems and components.  For example, solar tower power plant contains elements such 
as mirror, receiver, tracking system, and the metal support structure [11]. This research 
inspects these elements in order to determine the sources of failures and the impacts of the 
identified failures to the entire system. This is important in analysing the critical failure 
mode at system and sub-system level. It highlights the failure modes that need more focus 
towards maintenance and corrective actions in CSP system.  
The motivation of this study is to improve the competence of FMEA based risk 
analysis under limited data availability. This contributes to the application of RPN method 
as it helps to refine the resulted priority. The proposed approach can also find its application 
in other engineering systems as well. 
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 Research Problem 
The efficiency of solar tower CSP plant is highly critical and the failures have huge 
impact on the company, both in terms of money and reputation. This highlights the need of 
an effective failure or risk analysis method for identifying the critical failure modes and 
their causes, which will in turn give insight into the issues that need to be primarily 
addressed. 
The problem to be solved by this research study is how to improve the capabilities of 
FMEA to accurately prioritize the failures in CSP plants. It is important to understand the 
causes and the impacts of these critical failures so that relevant strategies can be adopted to 
curb failure. In traditional FMEA, it is difficult to prioritize failure modes as this method 
results in numerous failure modes with equal priority (RPN). Another drawback with 
FMEA is that it required sufficient data in order to identify the index of risk factors 
(Severity, Occurrence and Detectability), which are often unavailable in every cases. 
However, this issue is not dealt in this study.  
This research study will be focused on the solar tower CSP plant and the following 
research problems are addressed 
 
1. How to improve the issues of RPN prioritization ambiguity in order to classify 
the critical and non-critical failure modes for CSP technology?  
2. Which are the most critical subsystems in solar tower power system?  
3. How to identify the threshold values for identification of criticality? 
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 Aims and Objectives 
Aims  
1. To investigate the characteristics in the subsystems of CSP solar tower 
systems and apply Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) for identifying 
the failure modes. 
2. To determine an alternative approach that can contribute and enhance the 
RPN method in traditional FMEA for providing the more realistic results for 
CSP power plants. 
3. To identify the most critical failure modes in components and thereby 
identifying the most critical Component within a subsystem and the most 
critical sub system within CSP solar tower. 
 
Objectives 
1. To propose an alternative approach to solve the high duplication rate problem 
in FMEA analysis. 
2. To propose an effective way in providing a justification to prioritise failure 
modes. 
3. Recommend the critical areas within CSP solar tower system which needs 
more attention with regard to maintenance actions in order to reduce the 
failures.  
________________________________________________________________________
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 Significance and Scope 
This study is significant in present world as the energy sector has reached a point 
where the capacity of renewable sources of energy needs to be improved, in order to have 
a transition from fossil fuel-based sources [12].  Even though CSP has been in use for the 
past two and half decades, it has not been expanded to a wider scale[13]. Thermal power 
plant production that relies on fossil fuels are been greatly criticized for increased carbon 
emissions[14]. Therefore, a switch to renewable energy such as solar power has gained 
significant focus towards creating a more sustainable environment  
To achieve these goals, there needs to be efficient CSP generation techniques, which 
can support world-wide energy needs, in combination with other sustainable sources [15]. 
Achieving better efficiency requires accurate analysis of the sources, characteristics, and 
impacts of failures. This is solely the reason and significance of this study being attributed 
to the solar energy sector. The study is expected to investigate and analyse the sources of 
failures and problems with CSP plants. Understanding these issues will ensure that better 
strategies and tactics can be employed in CSP solar tower power  plant to improve its 
reliability and maintainability [16]. With more reliable systems, it is possible that CSP 
plants can provide increased power output to cater the high demands of current world, 
especially in developing nations [17]. 
Regarding the scope, it is important to understand that CSP technology is wide, and 
technologies such as the parabolic trough, solar tower, Liner Fresnel, and Stirling Dish 
systems dominate the area [18]. To ensure that the study is focused and detailed enough to 
provide accurate results, this study will focus on solar tower systems. However, preliminary 
review of literature will consider other technologies to lay a foundation for the study. Such 
information is important to ensure that readers get a broader coverage of CSP technology 
and the failure modes it experiences [19]. As the study progresses, emphasis is placed on 
solar tower systems. 
Therefore, the scope in relation to FMEA analysis will be restricted to solar tower 
systems. This ensures that the investigation is focused enough to provide accurate results. 
Also, this is appropriate since consideration of all CSP technologies could consume a lot 
of time and resources. This scope is also appropriate since it sets a precedent or example 
that can be applied to investigate other CSP technologies. To ensure a narrowed focus, the 
study will consider individual subsystems of the solar tower system in analysing failure 
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modes and causes. Once these are studied, their failure modes and causes will be connected 
with the failures of the overall system[20]. This provides a clear and illustrious analysis of 
failures, their causes, and overall potential impact.  
 Thesis Outline 
 The remainder of this thesis is arranged into chapters that cover distinct aspects of 
the study. Chapter 2 covers the literature review where a background and review of topics 
related to CSP solar tower power plant and basic concepts of FMEA are presented. Chapter 
3 elaborates the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis in risk prioritization. The data collection 
conducted on CSP solar tower power plant for carrying out FMEA is also presented. It 
finally presents the FMEA worksheet for CSP solar tower power plant. Chapter 4 details 
the research methodology undertaken. This chapter discusses the limitation of traditional 
FMEA. The proposed approach and its advantages are finally outlined in this section. 
Chapter 5 illustrates the results obtained from traditional FMEA and the proposed 
approach, in application to solar tower power plant.  This case study also highlights the 
comparison of the results. Finally, it identifies the critical failure modes within the 
components, and the critical subsystem within the CSP solar tower. The final chapter, 
Chapter 6, presents the conclusions and recommendations. Areas of further studies and 
limitations of this study will also be pointed out. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1. Overview 
This chapter reviews the literature on solar tower power plants with a focus on failure 
modes. It details previous relevant research in the area of failure modes and provides a basis 
of the methodology applied in this research.  
The literature review consists of five sections: a critique of relevant literature, 
alternative approaches to risk assessment, analysis of concentrating solar power (CSP) 
technology and summary of research gaps. 
2.2. Critique of relevant literature 
The area of failure mode in solar tower power plants has received a considerable 
amount of research attention. Researchers have applied various approaches to studying risk 
of failure in solar power plants such as fuzzy logic prioritization coupled with other 
strategies [21]. Such methods that have been used with varying degrees of prioritization of 
failure combined with fuzzy weighting criteria include risk prioritization using Risk 
Prioritization Number (RPN).   
RPN, coupled by the 5-scale probability of occurrence ratings, was used by [22] to 
analyse failure modes of solar power generation system in India. The findings of the 
research showed that systematic approach to FMEA using RPN highlights system failure, 
effects of such failure and necessary remedy. The researcher recommends that the method 
could be applied in other related topologies to study more components not captured by the 
research [23]. The work, however, assumed that failure rate was fixed though in real 
situation failure rate vary with time and area of solar plant installation 
Daya [24] considered a real situation of FMEA application using time, location and 
cost considerations in his study of heat loss due to defects in absorber tubes through 
collectors of Iranian power plant. The findings of the research showed that RPN could 
better indicate and rate risk of failure in solar plants when integrated with considerations of 
cost, time and locational factors. He found out that the losses caused by the defects lead to 
a reduction of collector performance, and that losses were higher in broken glass tubes 
though research contributed to the improvement RPN and gave insights into cost 
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integration, it failed to highlight the risk of failure in other components of solar power 
plants and thus did not outline priority of the elements. This, therefore, calls for studies that 
address other elements and provide greater insight into the area already explored. 
Chang and colleagues[25] applied fuzzy ranking criterion and grey theory to 
determine RPN through the application of weight coefficients in the absence of utility 
functions. The approach was right in the evaluation of description of factors and actively 
solves weaknesses of current RPN. However, the study was not specific to solar tower 
power plants and its application should be tested in research specific to solar tower power 
plants. 
Akbari and Karimifard[26] examined failure mode effects using RPN based FMEA 
with an objective of improving the reliability of risk analysis methods for power plants. 
The findings show that RPN method used gave a clear picture of failure modes and thus 
recommended development of the method in future research. Xie[27] identify factors that 
prioritize failure modes as occurrence, severity and detection. The study notes that the high 
degree of subjectivity of RPN poses the problem of inconsistent evaluation of failure 
modes. Also argues  that it's hard to compare various RPNs, and this may lead to oversight 
of other failures. The approached proposed by the research used interval variables to 
address uncertainties that are as a result of lack of data. Though this study addressed the 
problem of uncertainties, it did not substantively address the issue of the subjectivity of 
RPN. 
Shebl, Franklin and Barber[28] in their research on the applicability of RPN noted 
that it misses fundamental aspects in prioritizing failure modes. They observe that 
calculations that multiply scores of severity of failure, its detectability and probability 
produce RPN that is in breach of mathematical scales. The findings of the research cast 
doubts into the capability of FMEA approach to correctly prioritize failure and that there is 
a need for additional precise information concerning failure and not just the knowledge the 
experts to identify potential failures.  
Sankar [29] proposed a modified approach for failure prioritization in solar system 
mode and effect analysis and found out that risk priority ranks (RPRs) using conventional 
standard RPNs have the weakness of attempting to quantify risks without necessarily 
quantifying contributing factors. The research applied the ranking standard of 1 to 1000 
and identified 1000 possible RPRs that addressed risk quantification deficiencies [30]. The 
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approach, however, did not address the multiple facets of risks associated with various parts 
of solar tower power plants. It was more focused to the FMEA method than to the subject 
of analysis. The complexity of failures in solar plants was not addressed. 
Wirth and colleagues [31]studied problems faced by organizations in the application 
of FMEA to address failure and found out that the use of FMEA is still a challenge to many 
organizations. The research examined the capacity of knowledge-based FMEA in dealing 
with challenges faced in using conventional approaches. According to them, the 
knowledge-based approach uses precise description of products and processes and thus can 
address challenges facing application of FMEA. The work gave an organizational outlook 
into the problem but did not capture with particular reference to solar power plant, how 
FMEA could be used to prioritize risk of failure effectively. 
There is the need for a better approach that addresses the multi-component nature of 
solar tower as well as taking care of the effectiveness of risk prioritization. There is the 
need for an integrative risk prioritization approach that addresses the failures of 
conventional FMEA and the gaps left by previous research. 
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2.3. Alternative approach to risk assessment 
2.3.1. Grey theory background 
Grey theory is an effective engineering tool to deal with system characterized by 
incomplete and uncertain information [32]. The grey theory is suitable for solving problems 
with complicated relationships between multiple factors and variables[33].  
The grey theory aids in assigning weights to the factors and thereby reducing high 
duplication rate in an application. Compared to other methods for assigning weights, the 
grey theory has competitive advantages and provide valuable information for evaluating 
risks [34].  The flow chart in Figure shows the application of grey theory to FMEA 
approach in order to perform risk prioritization between failure modes. The method 
involves several steps which are briefly discussed below. 
 
 
Figure 1 A diagram of grey theory process 
FMEA
The scores of severity (S), Occurrence (O) Dection (D)
Identification of compartive series
Identification of the standard series
Estimating the different between comparative series and stand series
Compute the grey relational coefficient
Determine the degree of relation
Rank the prioirty of risk
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Chang et al. (2001) proposed a model for the application of the grey theory to 
FMEA[35]. The construction of the grey theory model is as follows: 
I. Identification of comparative sets 
An information set includes values of severity (S), occurrence (O), and 
detection (D) in the comparative sets. Comparative sets applied to FMEA is 
shown as the following  
Xi =  [Si   Oi     Di] 
where Xi is comparative sets of i
th failure mode and i=1,2,3….n (n is the 
number of failure modes). Si , Oi, Di  are the scores of likelihood of the risk 
factors, severity, Occurrence and Detectability of failure modes,  
respectively. 
All the comparative sets of n failure modes are represented in a matrix 
to get the information series as shown below. 
Xi = ⌈  
X1
X2
⋮
Xn
  ⌉ = ⌈
  S1
  S2
⋮
  Sn
   
O1
O2
⋮
     On     
    
D1
D2
⋮
D3
  ⌉
= ⌈
x11
x21
⋮
xn1
   
x12
x22
⋮
    xn2     
    
x13
x23
⋮
xn3
  ⌉ 
 
(1) 
II. Identification of the standard sets 
Degree of relation can describe the relationship of two rows in the 
information set. It called as the standard sets shall be established further and 
expressed as the following; 
X0 =  [S0   O0     D0] 
where X0 is the standard sets of failure mode and S0 , O0, D0 are the lowest 
score of severity, Occurrence and Detectability in the information sets 
respectively. 
In FMEA, the smaller the score represent less risk, therefore the 
standard sets can be the lowest score of all factors in the comparative sets. An 
example standard sets is given below.  
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X0 = [S0   O0     D0] =  [1 1 1] (2) 
The purpose of defining standard sets is to estimate the relationship 
between standard and comparative sets. The magnitude of this relationship is 
called as a degree of relation which will be explained in the following steps. 
As the degree of relation goes higher the score comes closer to the desired 
value. 
III. Estimating the difference between comparative and standard sets  
To discover the degree of grey relationship, the difference between the 
score of comparative sets and score of the standard sets must be determined 
and expressed as a matrix as shown below. 
Δ = |X0 − Xi| 
where ∆i is the difference between comparative and standard sets.   
Xi is comparative sets of i
th failure modes and X0 is the standard sets of   failure 
modes 
From equation 1 and 2, the different values between comparative and 
standard sets can be identify as shown below 
Δi =  |x0j − xij| 
Δ =  ⌈  
Δ1
Δ2
⋮
Δn
  ⌉ = ⌈
∆11
∆21
⋮
∆n1
   
∆12
∆22
⋮
∆n2
 
   
∆13
∆23
⋮
  ∆n3
 ⌉ (3) 
where Δi is the values of different between comparative sets and standard sets 
of ith failure modes. j = 1, 2 and 3 that represents the risk factors of severity, 
Occurrence and Detectability of failure modes, respectively. 
IV. Compute the grey relational coefficient  
To compute the relational coefficient, the risk factors of the failure 
mode are compared with the standard sets, and the relational coefficient is 
expressed as: 
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γij = 
∆min +  ζ∆max
∆i +  ζ∆max
 (4) 
γij = ⌈
γ11
γ21
⋮
γn1
   
γ12
γ22
⋮
γn2
 
   
γ13
γ23
⋮
  γn3
⌉ 
where γij is the relational coefficient of i
th failure modes at each risk factors, 
j. ∆min is the absolute different value  between the minimum value of the 
 comparative  and standard sets. ∆max= is the absolute different value  
between the maximum value of the  comparative and standard sets. 𝜁 is an 
identifier, generally, it can be 0.5. 
V. Determine the degree of relation  
Before finding the degree of relation, the relative weight of the risk 
factors shall be first decided in order to use in the following formulation, 
Г𝑖 = βj ∑γij
3
j=1
= βj ∙ (γi1 + γi2 + γi3) (5) 
where Гi is the degree of relation of i
th failure modes. βj is the relative weight 
of the risk factors ,j, and ∑ βj = 1
3
j=1  
If all factors are equally important, the above formulation can be 
modified as: 
Гi =
1
3
 ∑γij
3
j=1
 (6) 
VI. Rank the priority of risk 
The degree of relation in grey theory denotes that the greater the degree 
of relation has less server of failure modes. Therefore, the increasing order of 
the degree of relation represents the risk priority of the identified areas that 
are to be improved. 
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2.3.2. Entropy weight analysis  
According to Shannon (1948), the weight of the index is very important and it needs 
to measure the importance factor of index[36]. The entropy weight is a useful method for 
determining the weight of risk factor. The bigger the entropy weight of the index, the more 
useful evaluation of the index[37]. In this study, the entropy weight method is adopted to 
determine the weight of the risk factors[38], which is calculated as the following;  
I. Standardization of indexes 
The standardization method is well adapted in the data of an index system 
and evaluate the indicators of risk factors in each of the failure mode. The initial 
data in the matrix is given below; 
Xij = [  xi1  xi2   xi3] =  ⌈
   x11
  x21
⋮
 xn1
   
x12
x22
⋮
    xn2     
    
x13
x23
⋮
xn3
  ⌉  (7) 
where Xij is matrix element of the initial data. i=1,2,3….n (n is the number of 
failure modes) and j = 1, 2 and 3 that represents the risk factors of severity, 
occurrence and detectability, respectively. xi1  , xi2, xi3  are the scores of 
likelihood of the risk factors, severity, Occurrence and Detectability of failure 
modes,  respectively. 
Then, normalize the matrix element of the initial data 
rij =
 max (Xij) − xij
max (Xij) − min (Xij)
 (8) 
where rij is the normalized matrix of element of ith failure modes at each risk 
factor,j. max (Xij) and min (Xij) is the maximum value and the minimum value 
of the matrix element in the initial data. xij is the scores of likelihood of the risk 
factors ,j, at ith failure modes. 
Xij = [  xi1  xi2    xi3] =  ⌈
   x11
  x21
⋮
 xi1
   
x12
x22
⋮
    xi2     
    
x13
x2n
⋮
xi3
  ⌉ 
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II. Calculation of the index’s entropy 
To calculate the proportion Pij of the risk factors, � at the ith failure 
mode.  Entropy value of each factor ej is calculated by the following equation. 
Pij =
rij
∑ rij
n
i=1
 (9) 
ej = −
1
ln n
∑ Pij lnPij
n
i=1
 (10) 
where Pij is the proportion  of the risk factors, j.  rij is the normalized matrix 
of element of ith failure modes at each risk factors and ej is the index’s entropy 
of each factor, j 
III. Calculation of the index’s entropy weight 
Next, indicator’s entropy weight wj is calculated by the following 
equation: 
dj = 1 − ej (11) 
wj =
dj
∑ dj
n
i=1
 (12) 
where dj is as the degree of diversification of risk of factors, j and wj is the 
index’s entropy weight of risk factor, j 
Thus, the entropy weight of risk factors can be obtained as following;  
 w1 is the index’s entropy weight of severity 
 w2 is the index’s entropy weight of occurrence 
 w3 is the index’s entropy weight of detectability 
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2.4. Concentrating Solar power (CSP) technologies  
As pointed out earlier, in CSP technologies, solar power is harvested through 
concentration of sun’s light to a common focal point or focal line, where the temperatures 
rise rapidly; thus water can be heated to produce steam which is in turn used to run steam 
turbines. Subsequently, the steam turbines can be used to drive electrical generators to 
produce electricity. Alternatively, the. The major types of CSP electricity generating plants 
include solar tower power plants, Fresnel reflectors, parabolic troughs, and solar dishes.  
2.4.1. Solar tower Technology 
A solar tower power plant consists of the following main components, a reflecting 
mirror system also known as heliostats, solar receiver or solar furnace, heat transfer fluid 
(HTF), control system, thermal energy storage (TES), heat exchanger, and a power block 
which comprise steam turbine, electrical generator, and transformers. The solar furnace or 
receiver is positioned on a collector tower and it receives concentrated solar power to 
produce high temperatures that can support the heating of water for the production of steam. 
A set of mirrors, known as heliostats, are used to focus sun’s rays to the collector 
tower. Specifically, the mirrors are computer-controlled, thus they can move to track 
sunlight during the day. Consequently, the collector tower receives maximum sunlight 
concentration during the day as the mirrors are able to position themselves in a position 
that they can best receive and focus sunlight to the  collector tower. The mirror system 
comprise of a set of mirrors that track and focus the sun’s sunlight to the thermal receiver. 
The mirrors may either be parabolic, flat, parabolic concave, or heliostats with the parabolic 
and heliostats being dual axis mirrors[39]. 
Specifically, the solar receiver consists of tubes made of good heat conductor 
materials such as copper, where high temperatures are produced as a result of the 
concentrated solar power. Here, a working fluid which is also known as a heat transfer fluid 
(HTF) is heated. The commonly used HTFs include water, synthetic oil, and molten salt. 
The HTFs are heated to high temperatures and flow through a thermal storage system and 
into heat exchangers or steam generators. On the other hand, heat exchangers which are 
also known as steam generators extract heat from the HTFs to generate high pressure steam 
which is used to run steam turbines. 
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Thermal energy storage systems (TES) are very crucial subsystems in a solar tower 
power plant as they allow the plant to operate beyond daytime when the sun is, obviously 
not shining. In addition, TESs also take care of the plant’s output variability as a result of 
sunlight fluctuation during daytime. A typical TES comprise two molten salt tanks; one for 
storing hot molten salt and the other for storing cold molten salt. In particular, cold molten 
salt of high thermal capacity flows from the cold molten salt storage tank and into the heat 
exchangers where it extracts heat and gets heated. In turn, the heated molten salt flows into 
the hot molten salt storage tank, where it is stored for future use; particularly beyond 
daytime when the sun is not shining[40]. 
A solar tower power plant also comprises of a control system that is divided into two 
parts; distribution control system and solar plant control system. The former is responsible 
for controlling the mirror systems, thus ensuring that it follows the sun’s position in the sky 
and focus the sunlight at the collector tower at the right angle. Therefore, the distribution 
control systems ensure that maximum heat is concentrated at the thermal collector tower 
for heating the working fluid. 
On the other hand, the solar plant control system is responsible for controlling the 
temperature of the HTF, as well as for monitoring weather conditions; thereby protecting 
the equipment from damage resulting from excessive HTF temperatures[41]. However, in 
the development of a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) model for a solar tower 
power plant which is the ultimate goal of the present study, the control systems will be 
treated as a single unit, so as to facilitate an easy analysis. 
The other major subsystem of a solar tower power plant is the power block. The 
power block comprise of a steam turbine, a generator set, and a transformer. The steam 
turbine which drives the electrical generator is run by the generated steam. In turn, the 
generated power from the generator is then fed into a transformer for stepping up before 
distribution to the national grid systems. A solar tower power plant also comprise of 
auxiliary systems such as water cooling systems, fire protection system, direct normal 
irradiance (DNI) monitoring system, weather station, and auxiliary gas-fired boilers. A 
schematic illustration of the major parts of a solar tower power plant is shown in figure 2.as 
below. 
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Figure 2 A schematic illustrations of the major parts of a solar tower power plant. 
Source: Kaltschmitt, Streicher, & Wiese (2007, p.188) 
The plant comprise of a system of mirrors known as heliostats, thermal collector or 
receiver, thermal storage, a control system, heat exchanger or a steam generator, and a 
power block system which comprise of a steam turbine, an electrical generator, and a 
transformer[42]. 
2.4.2. Solar dishes Technology 
 A solar dish based CSP comprise a parabolic concave mirror or the dish which 
concentrates the sunlight to its focal point where high temperatures are produced. Research 
has shown that the temperatures at the focal point can reach about six hundred and fifty 
degree centigrade (650 o C).The generated heat is then used to drive a Stirling engine which 
in turn drives an electrical generator to produce electricity. Technology integration allows 
the Stirling engine to be operated using fossil fuels during periods of inadequate 
sunlight[43]. A schematic illustration of a solar dish based concentrated solar power plant 
is as shown in the figure 3 below.  
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Figure 3 A schematic illustration of a solar dish CSP technology. 
Source: Breeze (2014, p.272). 
The sunlight is concentrated to a common focal point by a dual axis parabolic concave 
mirror. (b): A solar dish Stirling engine power plant. The heat generated at the focal point 
is used to drive a Stirling engine which in turn drives an electrical generator to produce 
electricity [44]. 
2.4.3. Parabolic trough Technology 
Parabolic trough (PT) CSP is considered to be the most widely applied CSP 
technology. It comprise a concave trough-like mirror which concentrates sunlight at its 
focal line. Pipes carrying the working fluid are positioned at the focal line to absorb the 
produced heat. The absorbed heat is used to heat the working fluid to generate steam which 
is used to drive steam turbines. In turn, the steam turbines drive generators that produce 
electricity[45]. A schematic illustration of a PT solar power plant is depicted in the figure 
4 below. . 
 
Figure 4 A schematic illustration of a PT solar power plant. 
Source: Kulichenko & Wirth (2012, p. 85-86) 
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The sunlight is concentrated to the focal line of a concave tough-like mirror. (b): 
schematic illustration of a PT power plant. Tubes carrying the working fluid are positioned 
at the focal line of the trough-like mirror where the resulting heat is harnessed by the 
working fluid to produce steam which runs steam turbines which in turn drives an electrical 
generator to produce electricity [42]. 
2.4.4. Fresnel reflector Technology 
A Fresnel reflector CSP technology comprise a series of long concave or flat 
mirrors that are positioned at different angles. The mirrors receive and concentrate 
sunlight to a common focal line of a receiver. To counter astigmatism which is the main 
set back of this system, a secondary concentrator is needed to redirect sunlight to the focal 
line. The heat produced at the focal line is absorbed by tubes carrying the working fluid. 
The heated working fluid generates steam to run steam turbines which in turn drive 
electrical generators to produce electrical power[46]. A schematic illustration of the 
Fresnel reflector CSP technology and a typical plant is depicted in figure 5 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 A schematic illustration of a Fresnel CSP technology, and (b): a typical Fresnel power plant. 
Source: In Vasant (2014, p.942) 
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2.5. FMEA analysis on CSP technology 
Recently, concentrating solar power (CSP) technology has attracted significant 
research and development investment in the developing nations, for instant, the United 
States of America (USA), China and Spain [47]. The majority of the solar thermal power 
plants in the world employ parabolic trough CSP technology. Because, parabolic trough 
CSP technology entail lower maintenance cost as compared to other types of CSP 
technologies, especially solar tower power plants [48]. Moreover, the capital cost of solar 
tower power plants is very high as compared to that of CSP technologies such as parabolic 
trough technologies. The PS10 solar tower power plant in Spain is a good an example that 
solar tower power plants currently stands at $US4.22 per kilowatt hour as compared to 
parabolic trough with $US2.39 per kilowatt hour (Dinçer & Zamfirescu, 2010). Lastly, the 
cost of electricity for a solar tower power plant is extremely high as compared to that of 
parabolic trough solar power plant. Specifically, research indicates that the electricity cost 
for a solar tower power plant ranges between $US0.240-0.310 per kilowatt hour, whereas 
that of a parabolic tough solar power plant ranges between $US0.24-0.29 per kilowatt hour 
[49]. Research reveals that key performance factors for a solar tower power plant are 
extremely high as compared to those of a parabolic tough solar power plants. Thus, solar 
tower power plants is greatly to improve profits due to the high cost. It also contributes 
towards to minimize the possible failures and the associated risks.  
There are various possible solar tower power plants failures, a detailed review of 
similar studies was conducted. The first study was conducted by the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) (2012). The study entitled utility scale solar power plants was conducted 
with a primary objective of providing a comprehensive guide to developers and investors 
in solar energy projects. Some of the contents covered which are of great relevance to the 
present study include the operation and maintenance of solar power plants utilizing CSP 
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technology, especially the solar tower power plants. One of the failures for solar towers 
revealed by this study is the loss of the reflective power of the reflectors. As a result, 
receiver heat losses are experienced. This is mainly caused by accumulation of dust on the 
mirror surfaces. Regular cleaning of the mirrors is recommended as a good solution to 
address the dust accumulation issue[50]. 
Possible damage of the mirror system, particularly during strong winds was also 
noted to be a major problem. For instance, in PS10 solar tower power plant in Spain, the 
heliostat mirror system had to be positioned in a horizontal manner to avoid damage by 
strong winds exceeding a speed of ten meters per second (10 m/s). Strong winds were also 
noted to cause change of shape of the mirrors, hence loss of reflective capacity of stretched 
membrane mirrors. Failure of the control system which actuates the solar tracking 
mechanism’s elevation and azimuth drives was also pointed out as a major possible failure. 
The results of this failure is the loss of efficiency for the entire system, as the mirrors are 
unable to track the sun’s movement in the sky, thus low concentration of solar power at the 
receiver. Also, the possible clogging of valves and condensation of molten salt were pointed 
out to be possible problems, especially for solar tower power plants utilizing molten salt 
thermal storage systems[50]. 
A similar study was also conducted by the International Association of Engineering 
Insurers (IMIA) (2014). The study aimed at identifying all the potential risks in solar 
thermal power plants, particularly solar tower power plants. The main subsystems, that is; 
the mirror system, power tower, heat transfer fluid system, thermal energy storage system, 
and heat exchangers of a solar tower power plant were analysed individually to identify 
their potential risks [51].  
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The study revealed that mirror systems are prone to both natural perils and possible 
mechanical breakdown. Natural perils that pose great danger to the mirror system include 
flash floods, earthquakes, lightening, hailstorms, and wind gusts. In particular, wire-
connected heliostats can suffer massive damage from lightning struck, as they provide 
conduit through which the lightening flows. Consequently, the damage is extended to the 
supporting structures. Similarly, strong winds coupled with the failure of the mirror control 
systems could also lead to great damage to the mirrors, as the mirrors would be rotated and 
stowed away from the prevailing wind. Equally, during instances of high levels of solar 
irradiation, the excessive heat could cause warping of the mirrors, thereby reducing their 
functionality in the future. On the other hand, failure of the control system to reposition the 
mirrors during instances of high solar irradiation could affect their ability to maintain the 
optimum level of flux distribution on the receiver tubes; thus, failing to protect the receiver 
tubes from damage resulting from higher than tolerated temperatures[51]. 
Other issues noted with the mirror systems include corrosion and delamination. In 
particular, the silver coating of the reflecting mirrors is prone to delamination, and the 
condition is accelerated by high temperatures and moisture. Delamination refers to the 
separation of the silver mirror coating from the mirror surface. Both corrosion and 
delamination leads to the loss of the reflective properties of the mirrors, thereby resulting 
in reduced efficiency of the entire system. Lastly, glint and glare from the solar 
concentrators and receivers was also identified as one of the health hazards associated with 
solar thermal power plants, especially the solar tower power plants. In particular, the glare 
can cause eye blindness as a result of retina injury to pilots flying overhead the tower and 
the people working around the power plant[51]. 
The major issue with the solar power tower included possible collapse as a result of 
earthquakes and interaction with strong winds. At this point, it is worth noting that most of 
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the solar towers tend to be very tall ranging between fifty to two hundred meters high (50-
200 m). In addition, they carry a lot of weight because the supported solar receivers can in 
some cases weigh up to 3500 tons[52]. Given that, it can be easily understood that a strong 
wind or a slight earthquake can lead to the collapse of the solar tower. To mitigate this 
issue, the study proposed the profound establishment of the geotechnical conditions and 
construction of a reliable foundation.  
For the heat transfer fluid (HTF) system, which mainly consists of a working fluid which 
can either be water, heavy oil, or molten salt and circulating pumps, resistance to flow was 
pointed to be a major issue. The resistance to flow could primarily be caused by failure of 
the circulating pumps or the damage of valves and clogging of filters. The resulting effect 
is the reduction of the overall plant efficiency or total shutdown. Leakage and 
contamination of the working fluid was also pointed out as another major problem for the 
HTF system. As a result, the leakage of the very hot working fluid have the potential of 
causing fire outbreak leading to complete damage of the entire system.  
Freezing of the working fluid along the sections of the tubes was also identified as a major 
issue affecting the solar tower power plants. Freezing of the working fluid is predominant 
in the power plants that utilize molten salts as the working fluids. Molten salts are known 
to freeze and become solid at temperatures below 238 o C. Consequently, freezing of the 
molten salt along the sections of the tubes and pipes could cause total blockage of the pipes 
leading to the complete breakdown of the entire system. Alternatively, if partial blockage 
results the pipes could be subjected to cyclic stress increasing the potential of failure.  
Some of the issues associated with the thermal energy storage include corrosion, leakage 
and contamination, fire outbreak, freezing of the heat transfer fluid, and risks posed by 
earthquakes. Molten salts, especially at high temperatures, tend to be very corrosive; thus 
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they can easily cause great corrosion damage to the storage tanks and pipes. On the other 
hand, the use of oil as the working fluid increases the risk of fire outbreak, bearing in mind 
that the working fluid is always subjected to extremely high temperatures. Freezing of the 
working fluid, particularly molten salts inside the cold storage tanks is also possible with 
dire consequence of total plant failure. To avoid freezing of the molten salt the temperature 
of the molten salt must be kept above 238oC. In an equal measure, the risk of fire outbreak 
can be mitigated by the fitting of fire detectors and automatic fire extinguishing systems, 
particularly foam suppression systems[51].  
Corrosion and freezing of molten salts were noted as the main issues associated with heat 
exchangers or steam generators. Ideally, as heat is extracted from the hot molten salt in the 
heat exchangers, its temperatures can fall beyond 238oC leading to the freezing of the salt. 
As a result, this would lead to total failure of the entire systems, and it would be impossible 
to re-establish the normal working conditions unless the damaged heat exchangers are 
changed. Heat exchanger failure as a result of thermal cyclic stresses was also noted as 
another common issue associated with heat exchangers. Failure of heat exchangers means 
there would be no steam generation, thus total failure of the entire system.  Other factors 
that may cause heat exchanger failure as pointed in the study include fouling, pitting 
corrosion, welding faults, and stress- corrosion cracking[51]. 
Although the studies identified the possible failures in the various subsystems of 
the solar tower power plants, efforts were not made to identify the most critical subsystems, 
components, and parts in terms of the risk priority number (RPN). However, the studies 
laid down the foundation for further studies related to the solar tower power plants’ failures. 
Kahrobaee and Asgarpoor (2011) conducted a risk-based failure mode and effect analysis 
for wind turbine power plants. By calculating the risk priority number (RPN) pointed out 
that the generator is the most critical component in a wind turbine power plant as it emerged 
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with the highest RPN. In particular, the RPN the generator in a wind turbine power plants 
were 80 [53]. Although the study focused on the wind turbine power plants, it laid down 
the foundation for the FMEA and the determination of RPN for other types of power plants, 
such as the solar thermal power plants. 
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that very few studies have focused on the failure 
modes and effects analysis, as well as the determination of either the RPN for the solar 
tower power plants. This identifies a wide gap in the existing body of knowledge that needs 
to be filled urgently. Therefore, the present study will be of great significance as it will fill 
the existing gap in literature by conducting an FMEA and determine RPN for a solar tower 
power plant. As a result, the designers and manufacturers of solar tower power plants will 
be able to improve the design of such plants, so as to minimize their risk of failure. On the 
other hand, the technical maintenance teams of solar tower power plants will be able to 
adjust their inspection, repair and maintenance procedures, particularly by paying special 
attention to the most critical components and subsystems so as to prevent minimize their 
possible failure and the associated risks. The present study will also contribute towards 
improved reliability of the solar tower power plants; thus lead to improved profits realized 
through the sale of power and reduction of the projected breakeven period. Improved 
reliability of the solar tower power plants would also result in their improved marketability 
and increased adoptability.  
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2.6. Summary of Research Gaps 
Previous research did not adequately address the application of FMEA in solar tower power 
plants. The use of conventional FMEA approaches has been widely criticized for not being 
valid in failure mode prioritization. Ranking approach that multiplies RPRs have been 
found not to be based on mathematical foundations relevant to risk levels [46]. But on 
selected team’s presumed knowledge of risks associated with the components. Researchers 
have multiple approaches and are often in disagreement concerning ranking and measures 
of causes and effects of failures [46]. What constitutes correct FMEA ranking of failure 
risks is in solar tower power plants remains and area to be investigated. This research 
attempted to address the issues of ranking by proposing and applying FMEA integrated 
with degree of relation. 
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Chapter 3: FMEA analysis 
3.1 Introduction of FMEA 
FMEA was developed in the early 1950's to evaluate design at the initial stage from 
the reliability aspect in US military systems. In general, FMEA is proactive method for 
evaluating a process to identify need for and the effects of design changes[54]. Failure 
mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is an important technique of reliability analysis that 
evaluates designs and identifies failure modes in the functioning of a system for preventive 
maintenance[55].  
 
 
Figure 6 : the steps followed in the development of the FMEA model for the solar tower power plant. 
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An FMEA can be divided into several steps as shown in Fig. 1. These steps are briefly 
explained as outlined below;  
The first step of an FMEA is to identify all of the components and divide the 
system into sub-systems or assemblies. The functions of each component describe 
briefly. 
Secondly, the possible failure modes that the components were prone to were 
identified. It should be noted that the failure mode would make the component to 
function abnormally 
Thirdly, the possible effects of the identified failure modes to the other 
components of the subsystems and the overall system were identified. It should be 
noted that a failure of one component of a system may cause the failure of other 
components of a system or even cause the failure of the entire system. 
Fourthly, the seriousness of each failure mode effect, which is normally termed 
as the severity (S) was determined. The severity of each failure mode effect was rated 
on a scale of zero to five, where a rating of one was insignificant and a rating of ten 
was catastrophic. In this line, for the failure modes with more than one effect, only 
the effect with the highest severity was considered. 
Fifthly, all the potential root causes of each failure mode were identified and 
listed down.  
Sixthly, the likelihood of occurrence (O) for each failure mode was determined 
and rated on a scale of one to five. An occurrence rating of one indicated a failure 
mode that was very unlikely to occur even once during the lifetime of the system, 
whereas an occurrence rating of five indicated a failure mode that was inevitable and 
very likely to occur severally during the lifetime of the system. 
Seventhly, for each cause of the failure modes, the control measures that have 
already put in place to prevent the failure were identified and listed down. The control 
measures included tests, procedures, and mechanisms that have already been put in 
place to prevent the cause from happening, reduce the likelihood of the failure cause 
from happening, or enable the detection of the failure after the cause has already 
happened, but before it causes liability, for instance injury to the workers. 
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The eighth point is the ability the controls to detect either the cause or its failure 
mode after they have happened, but before causing liability was determined and rated. 
The detection (D) was rated on a scale of one to five, where a rating of one indicated 
that of where the control was absolutely certain to detect the problem, whereas a 
rating of five indicated a case where the controls were certain not to detect the 
problem. A detection rating of five also indicated a case where no control measures 
had been put in place. 
Ninthly, the risk priority number (RPN) for each failure mode was calculated 
by finding the product of severity (S), occurrence (O), and detection (D). The RPN 
allowed the ranking of the potential failures in the priority order that they should be 
addressed.  The formula for the RPN is as shown in the equation 3.1 below.  
RPN = S * O * D (13) 
Lastly, the recommended actions, in particular design or process changes that 
would lead to the lowering of the severity or occurrence were identified and noted. 
The recommended actions also included additional controls that would improve the 
detection of the causes or their associated failures. The parties and the individuals 
responsible for the recommended actions were also noted. The new severity, 
occurrence, and detection were determined and the new RPNs calculated. 
In this research study, the qualitative aspects of the FMEA analysis based on a 
large amount of available literature review in the area of solar tower power plant. The 
scoring system for failure modes depends on the available data from expert opinions 
In this study, the ranking criteria has been set 1 to 5 instead of 10 to 10 because the 
limited qualitative data available[56].  
The various failure mode parameters, that is; occurrence, severity, and 
detection were rated and ranked on a scale ranging from one to five. A rank of one 
(indicated) a very remote case, whereas a rank of five (5) indicated a case with a very 
high likelihood. A summary of the assessment and rankling criterion is as outlined in 
the tables below. 
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Table 1 An example for FMEA Severity (S), Occurrence (O) and Detection Rankings. 
Rank Severity Occurrence Detectability 
1 
(Remote) 
A failure that has no effect on 
the system performance; the 
operator probably will not 
notice 
Once per 1000 year 
or more seldom 
Defect remains undetected 
until the system 
performance degrades to 
the extent that the task will 
not be completed 
2 
(Low) 
A failure that would cause 
slight annoyance to the 
operator, but that would cause 
no deterioration to the system 
Once per 100 year 
Defect remains undetected 
until system performance is 
severely reduced 
3 
(Moderate) 
A failure that would cause a 
high degree of operator 
dissatisfaction or that causes 
noticeable but slight 
deterioration in system 
performance 
Once per 10 year 
Defect remains undetected 
until system performance is 
affected 
4 
(High) 
A failure that causes significant 
deterioration in system 
performance and/or leads to 
minor injuries 
Once per a year 
Defect remains undetected 
until inspection or test is 
carried out 
5 
(Very 
High) 
A failure that would seriously 
affect the ability to complete 
the task or cause damage, 
serious injury or death 
Once per month or 
more often 
Failure remains undetected; 
such a defect would almost 
certainly be detected during 
major check-ups. 
 
The risk priority number (RPN) for each component was calculated in an excel 
spreadsheet using the formula shown in equation 3.1 above. A result is in an excel 
spreadsheet to enable an easy comparison of RPNs each failure mode. Failure modes having 
higher RPN is more important and given a higher priority than those having a lower RPN. 
[57]. These failure modes demands higher priority for corrective action.  
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3.2 Data analysis  
The data for the study was collected through an extensive review of studies focusing 
on the FMEA for concentrating solar power (CSP) technology. It should be noted that most 
types of power plants including solar tower, geothermal, and nuclear power plants operate 
on a similar principal; hence many of their subsystems have similar components.  In 
particular, in solar tower, nuclear, and geothermal power plants, steam is used to drive 
steam turbines that in turn drive electrical generators to produce electricity[58]. A review 
of the studies on the FMEA for the above mentioned types of power plants enabled the 
determination of the severity (S), occurrence (O), and detection (D) of the various solar 
tower power plant failure modes. Data from the manufacturers of the various solar tower 
power plant subsystems was also used. The use of manufacturers’ data improved the 
accuracy of the results. 
This case study is regarding to 10 MWe Solar Thermal Central Receiver Pilot Plant, 
Solar Facilities Design Integration by the United Stage Government. This data has been 
revised on April 1980 for Failure Mode and Effect Analysis propose. The study was 
collected some data from this document through an extensive review of studies focusing 
on the FMEA for tower power plants. However, data from this manufacturer were not 
completed FMEA worksheet, it is useful information in this research to understand the use 
of FMEA on solar tower power system.  
This research study has reviewed the data from this document and completed all 
causes of failure modes, but it was not accurate data. This research study will use these data 
to determine the severity ranking, occurrence ranking and detection ranking for further 
work. 
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3.3 Ethics and limitations 
The study was authorized by the academic committee of the engineering faculty. 
However, the study is limited in various ways. First, secondary data was used; hence the 
researcher was not in control of its accuracy. Secondly, the assessment criteria of the 
various parameters including occurrence, severity, and detection was developed by the 
researcher based on his field experience and knowledge from extensive literature review 
on various power plants, especially solar tower power plants, geothermal power plants, and 
nuclear power plants which have many similarities in terms of the operation principles. 
This was due to the fact that no standard assessment criteria for occurrence, detection, and 
severity have so far been developed, particularly for solar tower power plants.
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3.4 FMEA analysis for solar tower power system 
Failure Mode Effects and Analysis (FMEA) is applied to the failure analysis of solar 
tower CSP plants. This analysis would be to measure the impact of the failures on each of 
the components in the system [59]. 
 
Figure 7 An schematic Diagram of Solar Tower System [49].10 
It is comprised of five major subsystems as shown schematically in Figure 1. A solar 
tower system includes Collector subsystem (1) which solar energy is collected, 
concentrated and redirected by array of mirrors (Heliostats) onto a central receiver tower. 
Receiver subsystem (2) includes the central receiver tower. The receiver absorbs and 
transfers the energy to feedwater. Then, the receiver produces superheated steam and fed 
the turbine generator for conversion to electrical energy. The thermal storage subsystem 
(3) provide to store excess energy contain in the steam to generate electricity when the sun 
is not available. Electrical power generation subsystem (4) includes the steam turbine to 
generate electricity. The master control    system (5) includes the equipment and software 
for plant data gathering and alarm monitoring [60]. The diagram of solar tower system is 
provides in Figure 8. Also, the FMEA worksheet for solar tower power plant is shown 
in Appendix A. 
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Figure 8 The diagram of solar tower system 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
The purpose of this research study is to identify the most critical components 
and subsystem within solar tower CSP system. To achieve this, Failure Mode and 
Effect Analysis were conducted for the system. This research has identified some 
drawbacks with traditional RPN method for risk prioritization. Hence this research 
proposes an alternative approach to traditional RPN for a better prioritization of failure 
modes for identifying the critical components.  
This chapter firstly discusses the limitations of traditional FMEA to provide the 
significance of the proposed approach. The later part of this chapter provides a step-
wise methodology for the proposed approach for prioritizing failure modes and 
identifying critical components and subsystem. It finally gives a summary of the 
findings. 
4.1. Limitations of traditional FMEA  
The traditional RPN method is widely used since it is easy to understand and 
calculate. However, there exist certain drawbacks to the RPN method which is 
proposed in the literature. 
1) RPN method assigns  an equal weights to the three risk factors of 
Severity(S), Occurrence (O) and Detectability (D)  [61]. However, in real-
world cases, the risk implication may be totally different. For instance, 
consider two failure modes having different values of S, O and D but 
resulting in RPN value of both failure modes to be the same. However, the 
risk implications of these two events may not necessarily be the same [9], 
This could entail a waste of resources and time or in some cases a high risk 
event going unnoticed [62].  
2) RPN method has high duplication rate[63] which results in numerous 
failure mode with same RPN value. It pose difficulty in prioritizing failure 
modes, when two or more failure modes have the same RPN [64]. 
This research study proposes an alternative approach to address these two main 
problems of traditional RPN method which are high duplication rate and assigning of 
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equal weightage to three risk factors (Severity, Occurrence and Detectability). The 
proposed approach can improve the FMEA capability and contributes to prioritize 
failure modes. Moreover, the proposed approach can assist in determining the 
threshold values to decide which areas should receive the most attention for solar tower 
power system.  
4.2. The proposed approach  
 The proposed approach combines the grey theory and Entropy weight analysis 
for prioritizing the failure modes. A step-wise demonstration of the methodology 
which is used for identification of critical subsystem and component are shown in 
Figure 5. By comparing the results from RPN method, the proposed approach gives a 
better identification of the most critical failure modes within a component and also 
recommends a guideline for determining threshold value for RPN in solar tower CSP 
plants.  
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Figure 9 Flowchart of the research methodology procedure 
The overall methodology for carrying out risk prioritization based on proposed 
approach is as follows: 
1) FMEA worksheets 
The whole system is divided into a set of subsystem and the significant 
components within them are identified. The failure modes associated with each 
components need to be investigated for their causes and probable impact to 
system, company and environment. Based on this information, the index value 
for Severity (S), Occurrence (O) and Detectability (D) are estimated. The details 
of conducting FMEA are presented in Chapter 3. 
2) RPN Evaluation 
Based on the index value for Severity, Occurrence and Detectability of 
each failure mode, the corresponding RPN value is estimated and assigned to 
each failure mode. 
3) Applying Grey theory for finding Degree of Relation 
The proposed approach applies Grey theory to FMEA for finding the 
priority of risk by estimating  Degree of relation[65]. This approach is capable 
1)
• FMEA worksheets 
(The score of severity (S), Occurrence (O), Dectecability (D))
2)
• RPN Evaluation
3)
•Estimation of Degree of Relation
4)
•Prioritization of failure modes  
5)
•Critical and non-critical failure modes classification by using Pareto analysis
6)
•Identification of critical failure modes
7)
•Identification of critical conponent and subsystem
8)
•Guideline for determining threshold value
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of assigning relative weight to each factors and can prioritize the potential risks 
of product or process failures without any utility function, this is a breakthrough 
to overcome some of the shortcomings of traditional FMEA. The resulting 
degree of relation has a lower duplication rate. It means that fewer failure modes 
would have the same priority value for applying corrective actions[66].  
 
Figure 10 Flowchart of the proposed approach 
 The flow chart in Figure 1 shows the proposed grey theory approach to rank 
the  failure modes, which are identified in the FMEA method. The first step is to 
set up the information in FMEA framework, including severity indexes, occurrence 
indexes and detection indexes, is used to generate the comparative series, which 
represents the form of a matrix. As the same time, the standard series for the risk 
factors determine the optimal level of three factors in FMEA. Next, the difference 
between the standard and comparative series obtains and the results use to determine 
the grey relation coefficient. Using the value of the grey relation coefficient and 
introduce the weights of risk factors, the degree of grey relation of each failure mode 
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can be calculated. The degree of relation in FMEA presents the ranking order of the 
risk priority value. Thus, all failure mode can be ranked according to the ascending 
order of the degree of relation [67]. In determining the weight of factors, grey theory 
will apply the entropy weight method to calculate the index weight and make the 
evaluation result more real [67]. 
 
 
The steps for calculating the proposed approach is described as follows: 
I. Determination of Comparison Series and Reference Series  
An information series includes values of severity (S), occurrence (O), and 
detection (D), meaning x11,  x12, x13 are the scores of severity occurrence and 
detection of the first failure mode, respectively. Assume that j = 1, 2 and 3 that 
represents the risk factors of severity, occurrence and detectability, respectively. 
The number of failure modes is n  and i = 1, 2, … n). Therefore, the comparative 
sequence matrix is given as following[68], 
X = ⌈
   x11
  x21
⋮
 xi1
   
x12
x22
⋮
     xi2    
    
x13
x23
⋮
xi3
  ⌉ (14) 
where X is a reference matrix, 
II. Standardization of Index Value 
Standardizing original index value to a dimensionless value in      [0, 
1] is necessary in order to compare the numerical value of different 
indexes. [69] 
y0j = [ y01,          y02, y03] =  [1,1,1]  
where y0j is the standard series of failure mode at each risk factors. 
y01  , y02, y03  are the lowest score of severity, Occurrence and 
Detectability in the information series respectively. 
In this model, the feature indexes may be divided into value of 
factors, which makes the standardization is an inevitable process for 
fairness[70].  
___________________________________________________________________________________________
42                                                                                                               Chapter 4: Research 
Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
       Chapter 3: 
FMEA analysis                                                                                                                                                
The construction function of normalization is  
yij =
max(X) − xij
max(X) − min(X)
 (16) 
 
 
After transform, the standard matrix Y can be obtained and 
shown below: 
 Y =
⌈
⌈
⌈
 
   y
11
  y
21
⋮
 y
i1
   
y
12
y
22
⋮
y
i2
    
    
y
1j
y
2j
⋮
y
i3
  
⌉
⌉
⌉
 
 (17) 
where yij is the normalized matrix of failure mode, i at the risk factors,j. 
xij is the scores of likelihood of the risk factors, (j) at i
th the failure mode. 
max(X) is the maximum value of the reference matrix  and min(X) is the 
maximum value of the reference matrix. 
III. Calculate the relational coefficient  
According to the comprehensive evaluating decision-making matrix 
Y, Then calculate the  relational coefficient of each factor[71] 
rij = 
miniminij |y0j − yij| +  ζ ∙ maximaxij |y0j − yij|
|y
0j
− y
ij
| + ζ ∙ maximaxij |y0j − yij|
 (18) 
where rij is is the relational coefficient value of i
th failure modes at each 
risk, j. miniminij |y0j − yij| and maximaxj |y0j − yij| are respectively 
the minimum and maximum values among the absolute differences. ξ is 
a discriminate coefficient,  =0.5; 
After standardizing original index value in eq. (15), the new 
established space matrix is expressed with format as 
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R = rij = ⌈
   r11
  r21
⋮
 ri1
   
r12
r22
⋮
ri2    
    
r1j
r2j
⋮
ri3
  ⌉ (19) 
where R is the relational coefficient matrix  
IV. Determination of Index Weights Based on the Entropy theory. 
The proportion of each index value can be obtained according to the 
relational coefficient value in matrix R. By using the information entropy 
of each indicator, then calculate the entropy weight[72]. 
Entropy value of each factor ej  is calculated by the following 
equation. 
Pij =
rij
∑ rij
m
i=1
 (20) 
ej = −
1
ln 3
∑Pij ln Pij
3
i=1
 (21) 
where Pij is the proportion  of the risk factors, j. rij is is the relational 
coefficient value of ith failure modes at each risk factors,j and ej = is the 
index’s entropy of each factor,  
Next, indicator’s entropy weight wj is calculated by the following 
equation 
wj =
1 − ej
∑ 1 − ej
3
i=1
 (22) 
 
Thus, the entropy weight of risk factors can be obtained as following;  
 w1 is the index’s entropy weight of severity 
 w2 is the index’s entropy weight of occurrence 
 w3 is the index’s entropy weight of detectability 
V. Calculation of Degree of relation 
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The grey relation for each factor can be achieved by matrix R and 
the weight wj as shown in eq.(7) Considering the index system as a whole, 
the proposed grey relation should be calculated further [68]. The formula 
is: 
Г𝑖
′  =  
[
⌈
⌈
 
Г1𝑖
′
  Г2𝑖
′
⋮
Г𝑖𝑗
′
]
⌉
⌉
 
=  wj ∗ ⌈
   r11
  r21
⋮
 ri1
   
r12
r22
⋮
ri2     
    
r1j
r2j
⋮
ri3
  ⌉ (23) 
Г𝑖
′ = ∑ rij ∗ wj
n
i=1
 (24) 
A proposed grey relation is  
Г𝑖
′  =  
[
⌈
⌈
 
Г1𝑖
′
  Г2𝑖
′
⋮
Г𝑖𝑗
′
]
⌉
⌉
 
 = 
⌈
⌈
⌈
 
   Г11
  Г21
⋮
 Гi1
    
Г12
Г22
⋮
Гi2     
    
Г1j
Г2j
⋮
Гi3
  
⌉
⌉
⌉
 
 (25) 
where Г𝑖
′ is the degree of relation of ith failure modes and  wj is the index’s 
entropy weight of risk factor, j. 
4) Prioritization of failure modes  
The results from RPN and the proposed method are compared for 
generating a better prioritization of failure modes even when RPN gives same 
prioritization between failure modes. Table 2 shows an example for evaluating 
priority between RPN values, in cases where two or more failure modes have 
the same RPN.  
Table 2 an example for evaluating priority between RPN values 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
A 2 4 1 8 0.688 1 
B 2 1 4 8 0.690 2 
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C 3 2 1 6 0.722 3 
D 2 2 1 4 0.777 4 
E 2 2 1 4 0.777 4 
F 1 2 2 4 0.778 5 
G 3 1 1 3 0.800 6 
In Table 2, failure modes A and B have the same RPN value, 8, and 
failure modes D, E and F have the same RPN value, 4. The lowest RPN value in 
this example is 3 in failure mode G. However they have different index values 
for occurrence, severity and detection. In the proposed approach, for determining 
the most significant failure modes having the same RPN value, a degree of 
relation is calculated for each failure mode and based on this a new priority value 
is assigned. Failure mode A has a lower value for Degree of relation than that of 
failure mode B. Similarly failure mode D and E has lower Degree of Relation 
than that of failure mode F and G. However, failure mode D and E also have the 
same Degree of Relation value. Thus, they have the same priority number. It is 
noted that a smaller Degree of relation implies higher risk priority number. 
Hence the failure mode A is more significant than failure mode B and also the 
critical failure mode D and E are more critical than failure mode F. 
5) Critical and non-critical failure modes classification by using Pareto 
analysis 
Pareto Analysis (as known as the 80-20 rule) [73] is helpful in classifying 
the critical few from the uncritical or trivial many. This research will use Pareto 
analysis to determine the top 20 % of the highest RPN values as critical failure 
modes that requires attention in order to improve the reliability of the equipment. 
Others are non-critical failure modes. 
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Figure 11 an example to determine the top 20 % of the highest RPNs value for classifying critical and 
non-critical failure modes by using Pareto Analysis 
 
 
 
6) Identification of the most critical failure modes 
The results from RPN and the proposed method are compared to determine 
the most critical failure modes by choosing the failure modes that are common 
in both methods.  
Table 3 an example of identification of the most critical failure modes 
RPN method Proposed Approach 
 ID Value Priority   ID Value Priority  
The most critical failure modes 
 A 64 1 
SAME 
A 0.400 1  
 B 32 2 B 0.488 2  
 C 24 3 C 0.488 3  
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Critical failure modes 
 D 24 4 
DIFFERENT 
F 0.523 5  
 E 20 5 G 0.542 7  
 
From table 3, some failure modes are common in both methods and they 
can be classified as the most critical failure mode. Both methods gave the same 
result in Failure A, B and C, these are considered as the most critical failure 
modes. However, the rest do not match to each other, but these different failure 
modes are categorized as critical failure modes.  
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7) Identification of critical component and subsystem 
In order to identify the critical components and subsystem, the degree of 
relation helps in arranging significance of each critical failure mode and assigns 
a percentage of important value to decide the most critical subcomponent and 
subsystem. 
This section presents a step-wise demonstration of the methodology used 
for identification of critical subcomponent. 
I. Determine Priority value: Assign the priority number to all the ‘most 
critical failure modes’ across every subsystem based on degree of relation. 
It has to be noted that smallest degree of relation represents highest 
criticality as shown in Table 4. The priority values are assigned in 
comparison with the entire identified ‘most critical failure modes’ in the 
system. 
Table 4 an example to determine Priority value for identifying critical 
Support Structure Subsystem 
Water Riser Absorber Panels 
F
a
ilu
re m
o
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e
 
R
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P
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F
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o
d
e
 
R
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n
 
P
rio
rity
 
F
a
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re m
o
d
e 
R
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tio
n
 
P
rio
rity
 
A 0.468 4 G 0.468 5 J 0.402 1 
B 0.468 4 H 0.468 5 K 0.564 6 
C 0.449 3 I 0.419 2    
D 0.449 3       
E 0.449 3       
F 0.449 3       
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II. Determine Re-Priority value (R): Reprioritize these ranking number such 
that less significant failure has a small Re-Priority value than the most 
significant failure modes. For e.g, in Table 4, the failure mode K is the most 
critical one and hence it is given the re-priority value as 6, which is the 
maximum Priority value in the given example. Table 4 shows the re-
priority value for all failure modes shown in Table 2. 
Table 5 an example of the re-priority values for all failure modes 
Support Structure Subsystem 
Water Riser Absorber Panels 
F
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F
a
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R
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P
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R
e-P
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 (R
) 
8 
0.46
8 
4 3 34 
0.46
8 
5 2 54 
0.40
2 
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III. Determine Importance value (I): Find the maximum Re-priority value 
(M) among the failure modes. It is used to calculate the ‘Importance value’ 
for each failure mode, and is computed as follows; 
Ii = 
Ri
M 
 (25) 
where i represents ith failure mode.   
In the above example, the M is 6 and it is used to calculate the 
‘Importance value’ for every failure modes.  
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Table 6 an example ‘Importance value’ for all failure modes 
` Absorber Panels 
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e (I) 
8 
0.46
8 
4 3 0.5 34 
0.46
8 
5 2 
0.33
3 
54 
0.40
2 
1 6 
0.16
7 
9 
0.46
8 
4 3 0.5 35 
0.46
8 
5 2 
0.33
3 
59 
0.56
4 
6 1 1 
21 
0.44
9 
3 4 
0.66
7 
44 
0.41
9 
2 5 
0.83
3 
     
23 
0.44
9 
3 4 
0.66
7 
          
28 
0.44
9 
3 4 
0.66
7 
          
29 
0.44
9 
3 4 
0.66
7 
          
 
IV. Normalize the ‘Importance value’: Normalize the ‘Importance value’ of 
every failure mode such that it falls between 0 and 1. In order to normalize 
the ‘Importance value’, find the total sum of the values (SIV) of every 
failure modes, which is the normalizing constant. Divide each ‘Importance 
value’ with the normalizing constant and express it in percentage to get 
final normalized Importance value for each failure mode. 
SIV = ∑Ii
i
 
 
(26) 
Normalized Importance valuei =
Ii
SIV
 
(27) 
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Table 7 an example ‘Importance value’ for all failure modes in percentage 
Support Structure Subsystem 
Water Riser Absorber Panels 
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0.44
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0.66
7 
10.53
% 
   
 
    
 
 
57.89% 23.68% 18.42% 
 
V. Determine the ‘Importance value’ for Components: The normalized 
value (in percentage) of all the identified failure modes in a component is 
summed up to find the ‘Importance value’ of a component. The component 
with highest ‘Importance value’ is the most critical component. For e.g. 
from Table 3, the component ‘Water Riser’ has the highest ‘Importance 
value’, 57.89%, and hence it is the most critical component in subsystem 
‘Support Structure’, in the example shown in Table 6 as above. 
 
4) Recommended a guideline for determining threshold value 
There is no definitive threshold value for RPNs to decide which areas should 
receive the most attention, depending on industry standards. Hence, this research study 
recommends a guideline requiring action for this solar tower power system. The 
absolute value of the RPN and Degree of relation value can be used as the threshold 
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values to decide which areas should receive the most attention for solar tower power 
system in the case study. 
 
4.3. Summary 
This chapter discussed the proposed approach for risk prioritization which is an 
improvement on the traditional method to provide better results. The Degree of 
Relation used in proposed approach generates three-point scales in prioritization of a 
failure mode to give the ranking result more appropriate. The RPN method give equal 
priority to risk factors, however, the failure modes might be having different risk 
implications. By assigning the Degree of Relation to FMEA, it is possible to determine 
the most significant failure mode among those that have the same RPN value. The 
proposed approach also includes the methodology to identify the critical components 
and subsystem within a system.  
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Chapter 5: Case study 
In this chapter, Section 4.1 presents that the proposed approach can solve the major 
limitation of RPN method, i.e. the high duplication rate problem.  Additionally, this section 
provides the recommended corrective action plan for subcomponents that should be based 
on the weighting of risk factor to perform corrective action in the shortest time. Section 4.2 
provides an effective and easy way to identify the priority of failure modes. Section 4.3 
determines the most critical failure modes and a threshold value in providing a justification 
for corrective action on each failure mode. Section 4.4 is to determine the critical 
subcomponent and subsystem for solar tower power system. Lastly, Section 4.5 is the result 
of an identification of critical subcomponent and subsystem and recommends the threshold 
values to decide which areas should receive the most attention for solar tower power 
system. 
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5.1. FMEA analysis using the proposed approach to solar tower power plant 
The proposed approach can provide an effective and easy way to identify the priority 
of failure modes. Table 8 is the summary of the weighting of risk factor and duplication 
rate for solar tower power system that shows a comparison between the RPN method and 
the proposed approach with the analysis of case study.  
 
Table 8 the summary of the weighting of risk factor and duplication rate for solar tower power system. 
System Subcomponent 
The weightings of 
risk factors 
Duplication rate 
S O D RPN Proposed 
S
u
p
p
o
r
t 
S
tr
u
c
tu
r
e Raw service water system 0.186 0.266 0.548 80.39% 66.67% 
Demineralized water system 0.334 0.334 0.332 70.83% 58.33% 
Compressed-air system 0.329 0.205 0.466 79.69% 57.81% 
Cooling Distribution system 0.501 0.122 0.377 82.86% 67.14% 
Power Distribution system 0.409 0.017 0.575 81.82% 79.55% 
R
e
c
ei
v
e
r 
Water Riser 0.558 0.189 0.253 58.62% 55.17% 
Absorber 0.583 0.099 0.318 54.55% 45.45% 
Panels 0.615 0.313 0.072 40% 30% 
Steam Downcomer 0.539 0.117 0.343 50% 50% 
Support Structure 0.733 0.219 0.047 52.59% 52.59% 
Control Components 0.386 0.327 0.287 75.61% 68.29% 
T
h
e
r
m
a
l 
S
to
r
a
g
e 
Thermal-Storage Tank Unit 0.460 0.233 0.308 87.80% 75% 
Thermal-Storage Unit 0.366 0.267 0.366 87.07% 78.23% 
Ullage Maintenance Unit 0.327 0.338 0.336 44.44% 44.44% 
E
le
c
tr
ic
a
l 
p
o
w
e
r 
a
n
d
 G
e
n
e
ra
to
r Receiver Feed Pump 0.442 0.247 0.311 84.87% 67.50% 
Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed Pump 0.293 0.335 0.372 80% 62.12% 
Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump 0.377 0.233 0.390 93.88% 83.24% 
Turbine Generator 0.372 0.315 0.313 83.10% 66.67% 
Mater Control 0.324 0.309 0.367 77.42% 75% 
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From Table 1, it can be seen that the proposed approach has a lower duplication rate 
in comparison with the tradition method, it means that fewer failure modes would have the 
same priority values for applying corrective action.  Thus, the proposed approach can be 
prioritized accurately the risk of failure modes and distinguished the actual risk levels. 
The weights of risk factors are considered to be equal with each other in the traditional 
FMEA. It is obviously unreasonable because some risk criteria may be overestimated or 
underestimated. The proposed approach can determine the weights of risk in each factor. 
The detailed calculation of the weighting of risk factors and duplication rate for solar 
tower system are shown in appendix B.   
5.2. Comparison of RPN and the proposed approach results for prioritization of 
Failure Modes 
The results from RPN and the proposed method are shown in Appendix B. It shows 
that there exist inconsistencies between the rankings of failure modes by 2 methods, 
especially for the failure modes that have the same RPN value. It can be seen that the 
proposed approach has a lower duplication rate than the traditional RPN. The proposed 
approach considers a weighted criterion which can generate more ideal ranking results.  
This section presents an example to demonstrate the advantage of proposed approach 
over traditional RPN. The RPN value gives same result or priority to some failure modes, 
if they have the same values for Severity, Occurrence and detection or when the values are 
same but in different order. The proposed approach contributes to RPN value for generating 
a better prioritization of failure modes even when RPN gives same prioritization between 
failure modes. Table 2 shows an example for evaluating priority between RPN values, in 
cases where two or more failure modes have the same RPN. 
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Table 9 an example for prioritization of failure modes with having the same RPN 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
1 2 4 4 32 0.489 1 
2 2 2 4 16 0.578 2 
3 2 2 4 16 0.578 2 
4 3 1 5 15 0.612 3 
5 2 4 1 8 0.688 4 
6 2 1 4 8 0.690 5 
7 3 2 1 6 0.722 6 
8 2 2 1 4 0.777 7 
9 2 2 1 4 0.777 7 
10 1 2 2 4 0.778 8 
11 4 1 1 4 0.800 9 
12 3 1 1 3 0.833 10 
 
In Table 2, failure modes with Id-5 and 6 have the same RPN value, 8,  and failure 
modes  with ID-9, 10 and 11 have the same RPN value, 4. However they have different 
index values for occurrence, severity and detection. In the proposed approach, for 
determining the most significant failure modes having the same RPN value, a degree of 
relation is calculated for each failure mode and based on this a new priority value is 
assigned. Failure mode ID-4 has a lower value for Degree of relation than that of failure 
mode ID- 5. Similarly failure mode ID-9 has lower Degree of Relation than that of failure 
mode ID- 10 and 11. However, a smaller Degree of relation implies higher risk priority 
number. Hence the failure mode 4 is more significant than failure mode 5 and also the 
critical failure mode 9 is more critical than failure mode 10, which in turn is more critical 
than failure mode 11.  
As a matter of fact, we can say that the proposed approach can provide a more detailed 
prioritization of failure modes which is more related to real-world situations. The overall 
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prioritization of failure modes for solar tower power system using the proposed 
approach is shown in appendix C. 
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5.3. Comparison of RPN and the proposed approach results for identifying the most 
critical failure mode 
There is no definite threshold value for RPNs to decide which components should 
receive the most attention. It usually depends on industry standards, legal or safety 
requirements, and quality control. Some industry and organizations have guidelines for 
determining critical failure modes based on an absolute value of the RPN. For example, 
Boeing recommends that RPN has to be less than 120 [74]. If an industry has set a threshold 
RPN value, the critical failure modes are the ones with RPN greater than that. However, 
most of the industries do not have a set threshold value or guidelines to estimate that. Pareto 
principle (as known as the 80-20 rule) [73] can be used to classify  the critical and the non-
critical failure modes. With Pareto, we can identify the threshold value which will be the 
lowest RPN in the top 20% of the system failure modes. It helps in identifying the critical 
components that requires attention in order to improve the reliability of the equipment[75]. 
The principle of Pareto analysis is known as the 80-20 rule which means 80 % of the total 
RPN for the FMEA comes from just 20 % of potential failure modes[76].  
This section demonstrates how a threshold value can be determined for a solar tower 
CSP plant using Pareto analysis.  The Pareto analysis is helpful in classifying the critical 
few from the uncritical or trivial many. Hence, this research used Pareto analysis to 
determine the top 20 % of the highest RPN value for traditional FMEA and proposed 
approach. Then, the results are compared to determine the most critical failure modes by 
choosing the failure modes that are common in both methods.  
Table 2 shows an example of comparison of results between the RPN method and the 
proposed approach.  
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Table 10 Comparison of critical failure modes between the RPN method and the proposed approach for 
Compressed-Air System in Support Structure Subsystem 
RPN method Proposed Approach 
 ID 
RPN 
Value 
Priority   ID 
Degree 
of 
Relation 
Priority  
The most critical failure modes 
 106 64 1 
S 
 A 
M 
E 
 106 0.400 1  
 82 32 2  82 0.488 2  
 105 24 3  105 0.488 3  
 118 24 4  118 0.508 4  
 125 24 4  125 0.508 4  
 131 24 4  131 0.508 4  
 139 24 4  139 0.508 4  
 123 24 4  123 0.534 6  
Critical failure modes 
 102 24 4 
D 
I 
F 
F 
E 
R 
E 
N 
T 
 107 0.523 5  
 135 20 5  80 0.542 7  
 136 20 5  81 0.542 7  
 141 20 5  104 0.542 7  
 142 20 5  133 0.542 7  
     134 0.542 7  
     86 0.542 7  
 
From table 2, some failure modes are common in both methods and they can be 
classified as the most critical failure mode. The probability that these failure modes to be 
most critical are high since both methods gave the same result. However, the rest do not 
match to each other, but these different failure modes are categorized as critical failure 
modes as they are resulted from top 20% in Pareto analysis and may not require immediate 
focus. The detailed results for identification of the most critical and critical failure 
modes for solar tower power system are shown in appendix D. 
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5.4. Identification of critical subcomponents and subsystem  
The most critical failure modes identified in accordance with Pareto analysis 
(Appendix D) are used to identify the critical subcomponents and subsystem for solar tower 
power system. The degree of relation from the proposed approach helps in arranging 
significance of each critical failure mode and assigns a percentage of important value to 
decide the most critical subcomponent and subsystem.  
This section shows (Table 4) the computed importance value for the components in 
all subsystem in solar tower power system. The detailed calculation of the percentage of 
important value of each subsystem is shown in Appendix E  
Table 11 the summary of percentage of important value for each subcomponent  
for solar tower power system 
Subsystem Subcomponent 
% of important 
value 
Support Structure  
Raw service water system 9.68% 
Demineralized water system 5.56% 
Compressed-air system 16.51% 
Cooling Distribution system 21.11% 
Power Distribution system 47.17% 
Receiver 
Water Riser 26.94% 
Absorber 12.95% 
Panels 7.77% 
Steam Downcomer 8.81% 
Support Structure 25.91% 
Control Components 17.62% 
Thermal Storage 
Thermal-Storage Tank Unit 45.80% 
Thermal-Storage Unit 53.05% 
Ullage Maintenance Unit 1.15% 
Electrical power and Generator  
Receiver Feed Pump 16.58% 
Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed 
Pump 
3.35% 
Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump 73.35% 
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Turbine Generator 6.71% 
Master Control - 100% 
 
 
As can be observed from the percentage column in the table, the highest percentage 
each subcomponent indicates the most critical subcomponent for each subsystem. So, 
Power Distribution system is the most critical subcomponent in support Structure 
subsystem. Followed by water riser in Receiver subsystem and thermal-storage unit in 
thermal storage subsystem.  Lastly, Thermal-Storage Feedwater pump in Electrical power 
and Generator. Master control subsystem has no subcomponent, but it will consider for 
critical subsystem only. 
Similarly, it is enable to identify the critical subsystem in solar tower power system. 
Thus, the critical subsystem identified are presented in Table 12. 
Table 12 the result of importance value in percentage for identifying critical subsystem 
Subsystem Subcomponent 
Important 
value 
 
Total 
Support Structure  
Raw service water system 1.830% 
19.15% 
Demineralized water system 1.049 
Compressed-air system 3.229% 
Cooling Distribution system 4.116% 
Power Distribution system 8.926% 
Receiver 
Water Riser 3.336% 
12.03% 
Absorber 1.695% 
Panels 0.868% 
Steam Downcomer 1.191% 
Support Structure 2.892% 
Control Components 2.045% 
Thermal Storage 
Thermal-Storage Tank Unit 10.089% 
22.28% Thermal-Storage Unit 11.993% 
Ullage Maintenance Unit 0.0202% 
Electrical power and 
Generator  
Receiver Feed Pump 7.8565 
46.38% 
Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed Pump 1.930% 
Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump 33.201% 
Turbine Generator 3.390% 
Master Control - 0.161% 0.16% 
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It can be seen that the most critical system for this solar tower power system is 
Electrical power and Generator subsystem with 46.38%. Followed by thermal storage 
subsystem, support structure subsystem and  receiver subsystem, 22.28%, 19.15% and 
12.03%. The lowest percentage is Master control subsystem with 0.16%. 
5.5. Results and Discussion 
This research study has identified the critical components and subsystems in solar 
tower CSP. The results are detailed as follows: 
1) The most critical subsystem for solar tower power plant. 
In this research study, the most critical subsystem for this solar tower power 
system is Electrical Power and Generator subsystem. It is related to economic 
perspective in Solar-Hybrid Gas Turbine-based Power Tower Systems. The result 
from this study can be verified from the literature. In literature, we can see that Heat 
transfer system and steam generator have higher cost of total investment and annual 
O&M than other subsystems [77], and if these areas are given high attention in terms 
of maintenance actions, it can reduce considerably the operational cost of solar tower 
areas. This subsystem is followed by the power block[77] in terms of criticality.   
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Figure 12 Summary of the critical failure modes for solar tower power plant 
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2) The most critical subcomponent in each subsystem for Solar power plant 
The most critical component for Support Structure Subsystem is Power 
Distribution system. Water Riser and Thermal-Storage Tank are the most 
critical components for Receiver and Thermal Storage Subsystem, respectively. 
The most critical component in Electrical Power and Generator is Receiver 
Feed Pump. The summary of percentage of important values in each subsystem 
is shown in Figure 12 as below. 
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Figure 13 summary of the percentage of important value of each subsystem. 
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3) The most critical failure modes in Solar tower power plant. 
The most critical failure modes identified for the critical component within a 
subsystem are outlined in Table as below. The detailed results of the most critical failure 
modes identified for the critical component for solar tower power plant is shown in 
Appendix F. 
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Table 13 Result of the most critical failure modes for Power Distribution System in Support Subsystem 
No Component Function 
Failure 
mode 
Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
219 Solar One Generator Output Circuit Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
224 4KV Well-water Output Circuit Breaker 
Provides system overvoltage 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
228 
Heliostat Interface Power Cabinet Input 
Circuit Breakers 
Provides system overvoltage 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
230 
Station Service Transfer Input Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
234 
Station Service Transformer Output Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
238 
Cooling tower Transformer Input Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
242 
Cooling Tower Transformer Output Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
244 
Motor Control Centre L Input Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
236 Receiver Feed Pump Circuit Breaker 
Provides equipment 
overcurrent protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection at pump input; 
plant shutdown due to tripping other breakers 
20 0.413 2 
248 
Motor Control Centre A Input Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection; plant shutdown 
due to tripping of other circuit breakers 
20 0.413 2 
250 
Motor Control Centre C Input Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection; plant shutdown 
due to tripping of other circuit breakers 
20 0.413 2 
252 
Motor Control Centre B Input Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection; plant shutdown 
due to tripping of other circuit breakers 
20 0.413 2 
254 Receiver PPA Input Circuit Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection; plant shutdown 
due to tripping of other circuit breakers 
20 0.413 2 
 
 
  
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
68                                                                                                                                                       Chapter 5: Case Study 
Table 14 Result of the most critical failure modes for Control components in Receiver Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
107 
Control Valve Control nitrogen flow to preheater panels 
Fails to operate when 
required 
Loss of nitrogen backfill capability 18 0.548 1 
108 Leakage 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater panels; this leads to 
potential freezing which causes loss of the receiver 
18 0.548 1 
113 
Control Valve 
Control low-pressure nitrogen flow to the 
receiver preheater panels 
Fails to open or remain open 
during venting operation 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater panels; this leads to 
potential freezing which causes loss of the receiver 
18 0.548 1 
114 Blockage 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater panels; this leads to 
potential freezing which causes loss of the receiver 
18 0.548 1 
128 
Air control valve Controls air to valve operators 
Fails to open or remain open Loss of air flow, resulting in loss of receiver subsystem 18 0.548 1 
129 Leakage Loss of air flow, resulting in loss of receiver subsystem 18 0.548 1 
130 
Check Valves Prevents back flow into air supply 
Fail closed Loss of air flow, resulting in loss of receiver subsystem 18 0.548 1 
131 Leakage Loss of air flow, resulting in loss of receiver subsystem 18 0.548 1 
105 
Pressure Control 
Regulate nitrogen pressure to the receiver 
preheater panels 
Fails closed 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater panels; this leads to 
potential freezing which causes loss of the receiver 
12 0.602 2 
106 Leakage 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater panels; this leads to 
potential freezing which causes loss of the receiver 
12 0.602 2 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Chapter 5: Case Study                                                                                                                                                  69 
Table 15 Result of the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Tank Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
44 
Flow Rate Transmitters Measure system pressure 
Fail to operate 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in an alarm and 
shutdown 
64 0.400 1 
45 False output 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in an alarm and 
shutdown 
64 0.400 1 
57 
Thermal Storage 
Heaters 
Transfer heat from incoming steam to 
thermal-storage heat transfer fluid 
Structural failure 
Potential safety hazard; reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability 
40 0.431 2 
112 Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation of thermal storage 
unit 
Leakage or 
Blockage 
Loss of thermal-storage oil flow; potential safety hazard 
due to escaping fluid 
32 0.462 3 
158 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for the thermal-
storage heaters 
Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability, 
leading to potential inability to fulfil total energy 
requirements 
32 0.462 3 
55 Relief Valves Provide protection from overpressure 
Fail to operate 
when required 
Potential safety hazard; reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability 
30 0.475 4 
139 Bypass Control Valve 
Enables cross-over from one charging 
loop to the other 
Leakage or 
Blockage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability, 
leading to possible inability to fulfil total energy 
requirements 
27 0.500 5 
116 Output Valve 
Controls Fluid output of thermal 
Storage unit 
Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage oil flow; potential safety hazard 
due to escaping fluid 
24 0.493 6 
14 
Water-Flow Control 
Valve 
Controls the flow of cooling water to 
the DE superheater 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Inability to reduce steam temperature resulting in 
potential degradation of thermal-storage fluid and or 
damage to thermal storage heaters 
24 0.505 7 
15 Leakage 
Inability to reduce steam temperature resulting in 
potential degradation of thermal-storage fluid and or 
damage to thermal storage heaters 
24 0.505 7 
56 Relief Valves Provide protection from overpressure Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability, 
leading to possible inability to fulfil total energy 
requirement 
24 0.505 7 
62 
Shutoff valves 
Provide for isolation of the thermal-
storage heater 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability, 
leading to possible inability to fulfil total energy 
requirement 
24 0.505 7 
63 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability, 
leading to possible inability to fulfil total energy 
requirement 
24 0.505 7 
111 Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation of thermal storage 
unit 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage oil flow 24 0.508 8 
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1 Thermal-Storage unit 
Containment for thermal-energy 
storage media 
Tank rupture Potential safety hazard; loss of thermal capability 20 0.509 9 
3 De-superheater 
Acts  as a buffer to thermal-storage 
subsystem by reducing the temperature 
of the steam being supplied 
Structural failure 
Potential safety hazard; failure would result in loss of 
thermal-storage charging capability 
20 0.509 9 
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Table 15 (Continued). Result of the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Tank Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
25 Steam-Flow Control 
Valve 
Controls flow of receiver steam to DE 
superheater 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage charging capability 18 0.551 10 
26 Leakage Loss of thermal-storage charging capability 18 0.551 10 
48 
Pressure Regulators 
Maintains system in a hot standby 
condition 
Fail to regulate Loss of hot standby capability 18 0.551 10 
50 Fail to closed Loss of hot standby capability 18 0.551 10 
52 Leakage 
Inability to reduce steam temperature resulting in 
potential degradation of thermal-storage fluid and or 
damage to thermal storage heaters 
18 0.551 10 
5 
De-super 
heater Water-input 
shutoff valve 
Provides subsystem isolation 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Inability to reduce steam temperature resulting in 
potential degradation of thermal-storage fluid and or 
damage to thermal storage heaters 
16 0.544 11 
6 Leakage 
Inability to reduce steam temperature resulting in 
potential degradation of thermal-storage fluid and or 
damage to thermal storage heaters 
16 0.544 11 
58 
Thermal Storage 
Heaters 
Transfer heat from incoming steam to 
thermal-storage heat transfer fluid 
Internal leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability; 
potential mixing of heat transfer fluid and steam which 
would result in degradation of the fluid and damage to 
the heater 
16 0.544 11 
59 
Restricted or no 
flow 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability, 
leading to possible inability to fulfil total energy 
requirement 
16 0.544 11 
157 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for the thermal-
storage heaters 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability, 
leading to potential inability to fulfil total energy 
requirements 
16 0.544 11 
16 
Flow-Rate Transmitter Measures input-water flow rate 
Fails to operate 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in an alarm and 
shutdown 
16 0.585 12 
17 False output 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in an alarm and 
shutdown 
16 0.585 12 
29 
Flow-Rate Transmitter 
Measure steam flow rate to the DE 
superheater 
Fails to operate 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in an alarm and 
shutdown 
16 0.585 12 
30 False output 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in an alarm and 
shutdown 
16 0.585 12 
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Table 16 Result of the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical Power and Generator 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
410 Control Valve Control recirculation flow to the condenser Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow control resulting in 
plant shutdown 
60 0.398 1 
200 Control Valve 
Controls the output flow from the thermal-
storage feed water pump 
Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage extraction capability 
which could result in plant shutdown 
48 0.423 2 
297 
3-way Valve Allows flow to the deaerator level glass 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of flow to level glass leading to deaerator and 
subsequent plant shutdown 
48 0.423 2 
298 Leakage 
Loss of flow to level glass leading to deaerator and 
subsequent plant shutdown 
48 0.423 2 
441 
Desuperheater Input 
Control Valve 
Controls flow of cooling water to the 
desuperheater from turbine seal valve train 
Leakage 
May cause improper system flows resulting in 
plant shutdown 
48 0.423 2 
449 
Desuperheater Input 
Control Valve 
Controls flow from down comer crossover 
to the desuperheater 
Leakage 
Improper system startup flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
48 0.423 2 
521 Control valve 
Controls flow between thermal-storage flash 
tank and the condenser 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
48 0.423 2 
527 Control Valve 
Controls flow between thermal-storage flash 
tank and the condenser or deaerator 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
48 0.423 2 
510 Flow Orifice Reduces flow in the condenser input line 
Blockage or 
leakage 
Loss of proper system flow control resulting in 
plant shutdown 
48 0.438 3 
306 Level Switches 
Provides alarm points for turbine exaust 
ports 
False alarm 
Unnecessary shutdown of turbine exhaust port; 
system should balance itself, resulting in no effect 
on system performance 
45 0.435 4 
212 
Chemical-Feed 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide interface and isolation from the 
amonia and hydrazine inputs 
Leakage 
Potential safety hazard due to chemical spill; 
unable to properly adjust water quality, resulting 
in plant shutdown 
40 0.437 5 
299 Level Glass Measures water level within the deaerator 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of measurement capability; no effect on 
system performance 
40 0.437 5 
301 Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in deaerator 
desuperheater input line 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 40 0.437 5 
400 Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation from chemical feed 
system 
Fails to open when 
required 
Unable to adjust water purity 40 0.437 5 
412 Shutoff Valve 
Provide isolation for recirculation flow 
control valve 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow control resulting in 
plant shutdown 
40 0.437 5 
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487 Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation at the desuperheater 
output 
Leakage 
Loss of proper startup flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
40 0.437 5 
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Table 16 (Continued). Result of the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical Power and Generator 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
492 Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation in the low pressure heater 
to condenser line 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
40 0.437 5 
331 Flow Orifice 
Reduces flow in the low pressure heater 
output line 
Leakage or 
blockage 
Loss of proper system drain control resulting in 
plant shutdown 
40 0.479 6 
217 Control Valve 
Controls drain flow high-pressure heaters to 
the condenser 
Leakage Loss of proper drain control 36 0.461 7 
222 Control Valve 
Controls flow from the high-pressure to low-
pressure heaters 
Leakage Loss of proper drain control 36 0.461 7 
226 Control Valve 
Controls the flow from the high-pressure 
heater to the deaerator 
Leakage Loss of proper drain control 36 0.461 7 
296 Angle Valve Allows flow to the deaerator level glass Leakage Loss of flow to level glass 36 0.461 7 
313 Control valve 
Controls flow from deaetator desuperheater 
to the low pressure heater 
Leakage Loss of proper system drain control 36 0.461 7 
337 Control Valve 
Controls low pressure heater output flow to 
the condenser 
Leakage Loss of proper system drain control 36 0.461 7 
352 Angle Valve 
Allows flow to low pressure heater level 
glass 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 36 0.461 7 
354 3-way Valve 
Allows flow to low pressure heater level 
glass 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 36 0.461 7 
494 Control Valve 
Controls system flow from the receiver flash 
tank to the condenser 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 36 0.461 7 
498 Control Valve 
Controls system liquid flow between the 
receiver flash tank and the condenser 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 36 0.461 7 
505 Control Valve 
Controls flow between thermal storage flash 
tank and the condenser 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow control resulting in 
plant shutdown 
36 0.461 7 
202 Shutoff Valve Provides bypass path around control valve Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage extraction capability 
which could result in plant shutdown 
32 0.462 8 
443 Shutoff Valves 
Provides isolation for the desuperheater 
input control valve 
Leakage 
Improper system startup flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
32 0.462 8 
524 Shutoff Valves 
Provide system isolation for the control 
valve 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
32 0.462 8 
529 Shutoff Valves 
Provide system isolation for the control 
valve 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
32 0.462 8 
548 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for condenser level 
switches and controller 
Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to switches and controller 
resulting in plant shutdown 
32 0.462 8 
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Table 16 (Continued). Result of the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical Power and Generator 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
502 Flow Orifice Reduces flow in the condenser input line 
Blockage or 
leakage 
Loss of proper system flow 32 0.501 9 
403 
Flow Rate Transmitter Measures system flow rate 
Fails to operate Improper drain control may shutdown plant 32 0.504 10 
404 False output Improper drain control may shutdown plant 32 0.504 10 
365 Level Controller Provide control of system drain lines False alarm 
Unnecessary shutdown of turbine exhaust port; 
system should balance itself, resulting in no effect 
on system performance 
30 0.474 11 
551 Level Switches 
Provide alarm points for turbine exhaust 
ports 
False alarm Unnecessary shutdown of system 30 0.474 11 
325 Shutoff Valve 
Isolates the low pressure heater from the 
turbine exhaust 
Leakage 
Loss of proper drain control resulting in plant 
shutdown 
30 0.476 12 
327 Relief Valves Prevent low pressure heater overpressure Leakage 
Loss of proper system drain control resulting in 
plant shutdown 
30 0.502 13 
407 Check Valve Prevents backflow from low pressure heater Fails to check 
Backflow not prevented in failure mode condition. 
No effect on system performance 
25 0.489 14 
490 Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in the low pressure heater 
to condenser line 
Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection. 
No effect on system performance. 
25 0.489 14 
219 Shutoff Valves 
Provide system isolation for high-pressure 
heater to condenser control valve 
Leakage Loss of proper drain control 24 0.500 15 
224 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for high-pressure to low-
pressure heater control valve 
Leakage Loss of proper drain control 24 0.500 15 
228 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for the high-pressure 
heater to deaerator control valve 
Leakage Loss of proper drain control 24 0.500 15 
315 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for deaetator desuperheater 
to low pressure heater control valve 
Leakage Loss of proper system drain control 24 0.500 15 
339 Shutoff Valves 
Provide system isolation for low pressure 
heater to condenser control valve 
Leakage Loss of proper system drain control 24 0.500 15 
377 Shutoff Valves 
Provide system isolation at condensate 
hotwell pump output 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 24 0.500 15 
389 Shutoff Valves Isolate demineralozer input Leakage Loss of proper system flow 24 0.500 15 
401 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation from chemical feed 
system 
Fails to close when 
required or internal 
leakage 
Potential water of improper purity in system. 
Additional system damage may result. 
24 0.500 15 
402 External leakage Potential safety hazard due to chemical spill 24 0.500 15 
________________________________________________________________________________________________
76                                                                                                                                                      Chapter 5: Case Study 
4) Recommended threshold values for solar tower power system 
 As discussed in Section 5.3, there is no definitive threshold value for RPNs 
to decide which areas should receive the most attention, depending on industry 
standards. Hence, this research study recommends a guideline for determining 
threshold value for each subsystem of solar tower power system. The absolute value 
of the RPN and Degree of relation value can be used as the threshold values to 
decide which areas should receive the most attention for solar tower power system. 
The table 5 is the recommended threshold value for solar tower power system in the 
case study. 
Table 17 the recommended threshold value for solar tower power system 
Subsystem 
Recommended threshold value 
RPN Degree of relation 
Support Structure Subsystem 8 0.667 
Receiver Subsystem 12 0.602 
Thermal Storage Subsystem 9 0.620 
Electrical power and Generator Subsystem 12 0.611 
Master Control Subsystem 4 0.747 
 
The table 5 is the recommended threshold value for solar tower power system in the 
case study. A starting point for requiring actions is to consider the failure modes with 
greatest RPN and should be ended with RPN value as 8. Then apply degree of relation to 
identify the most critical failure modes which is lower than or equal to 0.067 for Support 
Structure subsystem. Receiver subsystem recommends that action be required if RPN ≥ 12 
and Degree of relation ≤ 0.602 for the failure modes. Considering thermal storage 
subsystem, failure modes with RPN ≥ 9 and Degree of relation≤ 0.620 needs more 
attention. For Electrical power and Generator subsystem, the threshold value for RPN is 12 
and that of Degree of Relation is 0.611.   
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion  
6.1. Conclusion 
It is concluded that RPN value and degree of relation are guidelines that defines 
the prioritization of failure modes in a system. It is an alternative way for 
implementation of FMEA for a better prioritization of failure modes. The research has 
succeeded in addressing the ambiguity of RPN prioritization by proposing and 
applying a comprehensive method of prioritization. 
This research analysed failure mode and effects on solar tower power plants. It 
identified failure modes and their characteristics in the subsystems of CSP solar 
tower systems. The study examined RPN method and other alternative approaches 
that enhance traditional RPN method. The proposed method used in the research was 
the application of the degree of relation values in the prioritization of the potential 
risks failures without any utility function. The findings show that the identified the 
critical subsystem for solar tower power plants, the electrical power generator 
(46.38%) as the most critical, followed by thermal storage (22.28%), the support 
structure (19.15%) and receiver (12.03%). 
This research finds out that failure due to leakage is highly prioritized failure 
mode in most components of the subsystems of solar tower power plant. Failure due 
leakage is prioritized topmost for most components. Failures in the power 
distribution system in support subsystem are critical and can lead to shutdown. These 
are however prioritized low with varied RPNs in the conventional FMEA. It is clear 
that conventional FMEA overlooks some failure modes that can result in shutdown 
of solar tower power plant.  
Results of this research cast doubt on the ability of conventional FMEA 
reliably to rank failure modes in solar tower power plants. Severe failure modes are 
listed with widely varied RPNs in the conventional FMEA while the prioritization 
used in this research give close ranges of degrees of relation among components 
whose risk of failure are similar. 
Combined use of RPNs with the degree of relation result into more accurate 
failure mode analysis compared to conventional FMEA.  It is concluded that the 
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utilization of RPN and degree of association is an alternative way for implementation 
of FMEA in a more efficient real world situations. The research has succeeded to 
address the ambiguity of RPN prioritization by proposing and applying a 
comprehensive method of prioritization. 
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6.2. Recommendations for future works 
 Elimination of Ambiguity in RPN Prioritization   
Future research should consider RPN prioritization to contribute to 
research efforts in eliminating ambiguity in the process. Future research should 
examine the applicability of RPN in different forms of solar tower power plant 
designs and integrate it with cost aspects into the RPN values. A better tool to 
address the limitations of the degree of relatedness should be used. For 
example, a comparative study between the proposed approach and new 
approaches should be done to address risks and improve the effectiveness of 
FMEA using improved RPN. 
 
 Determination of Critical and Non-Critical Failure Modes  
Though this research proposed and applied integrated RPN to determine 
both critical and non-critical failure modes in solar tower power plants, there 
is still need to establish a conclusive prioritization approach. The question of 
whether this proposed method is the most applicable in determining the 
criticality of the failure mode or there could be other better ways should be 
addressed in future research. Future research should identify if the degree of 
relation is substantive in that determination. The research should also be more 
analytical to determine the levels of confidence in the reported values and 
mathematically determine possible error limits involved. 
 
 Identification of the Threshold Values  
Future research should examine the process of identifying threshold 
values and compare proposed approach to other approaches. The aim here is to 
improve the research in the area and to subject previous efforts to analysis in 
the different scenario and hence confirm validity and reproducibility of the 
research findings. 
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 Recommendation for Solar Power Plants Sector 
This study identified various failure modes that should receive the 
attention of stakeholders in the solar power sector. The subsystems should be 
designed and installed in a way that addresses the priority areas identified in 
this research. This means that throughout the design, production, operation and 
maintenance of the solar tower power plants, there should be measures 
cognizant of priority subsystems. The greatest attention should be focused on 
electrical power and generator, followed by thermal storage, support structure, 
and receiver, in that order. 
 
 Policy Recommendations 
Future solutions to solar tower power plant prioritization problems 
should focus on policy requirements of ensuring systems and subsystems 
adhere to green energy requirements. Apart from economic factor integration 
in the RPN, future work in the area should consider more environmentally 
friendly aspects in developing better RPN prioritization approaches. 
The solar tower power plants should be prioritized based on their cost-
effectiveness, efficiency, and reliability. The prioritization approach should 
take into account energy policies concerning renewability of the energy and 
environmental requirements for subsystems including storage and receivers.  
Procedures require that measures should be put in place to minimize solar 
tower power plant system failures. All parts of the system should be well 
engineered and reasonably durable. The performance of each subsystem should 
be to the required standard and attention given to the priority of their failure 
modes in the process of design, manufacturing, installation and maintenance. 
A policy framework to guide this should be put in place. 
 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Bibliography                                                                                                                                                           81 
Bibliography 
[1] G. Shaffer, S. M. Olsen, and J. O. P. Pedersen, "Long-term ocean oxygen 
depletion in response to carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels," Nature 
Geoscience, vol. 2, pp. 105-109, 2009. 
[2] W. P. Nel and C. J. Cooper, "Implications of fossil fuel constraints on 
economic growth and global warming," Energy Policy, vol. 37, pp. 166-180, 
2009. 
[3] H. Von Blottnitz and M. A. Curran, "A review of assessments conducted on 
bio-ethanol as a transportation fuel from a net energy, greenhouse gas, and 
environmental life cycle perspective," Journal of cleaner production, vol. 15, 
pp. 607-619, 2007. 
[4] J. J. Burkhardt III, G. A. Heath, and C. S. Turchi, "Life cycle assessment of a 
parabolic trough concentrating solar power plant and the impacts of key 
design alternatives," Environmental science & technology, vol. 45, pp. 2457-
2464, 2011. 
[5] D. Kraemer, B. Poudel, H.-P. Feng, J. C. Caylor, B. Yu, X. Yan, et al., 
"High-performance flat-panel solar thermoelectric generators with high 
thermal concentration," Nature materials, vol. 10, pp. 532-538, 2011. 
[6] J. J. Burkhardt, G. Heath, and E. Cohen, "Life cycle greenhouse gas 
emissions of trough and tower concentrating solar power electricity 
generation," Journal of Industrial Ecology, vol. 16, pp. S93-S109, 2012. 
[7] S. Kuravi, J. Trahan, D. Y. Goswami, M. M. Rahman, and E. K. Stefanakos, 
"Thermal energy storage technologies and systems for concentrating solar 
power plants," Progress in Energy and Combustion Science, vol. 39, pp. 285-
319, 2013. 
[8] F. Dinmohammadi and M. Shafiee, "A fuzzy-FMEA risk assessment 
approach for offshore wind turbines," IJPHM Special Issue on Wind Turbine 
PHM (Color), p. 59, 2013. 
[9] R. K. Sharma, D. Kumar, and P. Kumar, "Systematic failure mode effect 
analysis (FMEA) using fuzzy linguistic modelling," International Journal of 
Quality & Reliability Management, vol. 22, p. 989, 2005. 
[10] S. Narayanagounder and K. Gurusami, "A new approach for prioritization of 
failure modes in design FMEA using ANOVA," World Academy of Science, 
Engineering and Technology, vol. 49, p. 77, 2009. 
[11] P. Viebahn, Y. Lechon, and F. Trieb, "The potential role of concentrated solar 
power (CSP) in Africa and Europe—a dynamic assessment of technology 
development, cost development and life cycle inventories until 2050," Energy 
Policy, vol. 39, pp. 4420-4430, 2011. 
[12] M. Z. Jacobson and M. A. Delucchi, "Providing all global energy with wind, 
water, and solar power, Part I: Technologies, energy resources, quantities and 
areas of infrastructure, and materials," Energy Policy, vol. 39, pp. 1154-1169, 
2011. 
[13] M. Z. Jacobson, "Review of solutions to global warming, air pollution, and 
energy security," Energy & Environmental Science, vol. 2, pp. 148-173, 
2009. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________
82                                                                                                                                                             Bibliography 
[14] A. Ummadisingu and M. Soni, "Concentrating solar power–technology, 
potential and policy in India," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 
vol. 15, pp. 5169-5175, 2011. 
[15] G. R. Timilsina, L. Kurdgelashvili, and P. A. Narbel, "Solar energy: Markets, 
economics and policies," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 
16, pp. 449-465, 2012. 
[16] K. Lovegrove and W. Stein, Concentrating solar power technology: 
principles, developments and applications: Elsevier, 2012. 
[17] J. Macknick, R. Newmark, G. Heath, and K. Hallett, "Operational water 
consumption and withdrawal factors for electricity generating technologies: a 
review of existing literature," Environmental Research Letters, vol. 7, p. 
045802, 2012. 
[18] I. Dincer, C. O. Colpan, O. Kizilkan, and M. A. Ezan, Progress in Clean 
Energy: Springer, 2015. 
[19] J. M. Pedraza, Electrical Energy Generation in Europe: The Current 
Situation and Perspectives in the Use of Renewable Energy Sources and 
Nuclear Power for Regional Electricity Generation: Springer, 2015. 
[20] H. Zhang, J. Baeyens, J. Degrève, and G. Cacères, "Concentrated solar power 
plants: review and design methodology," Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews, vol. 22, pp. 466-481, 2013. 
[21] E. Nasri, "Risk management for utility scale solar photovoltaic power plants 
in the State of Florida," 2013. 
[22] N. Belu, D. C. Anghel, and N. Rachieru, "Application of Fuzzy Logic in 
Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis," in Applied Mechanics and 
Materials, 2013, pp. 832-836. 
[23] J. B. Basu, "Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of a Rooftop PV 
System," International Journal of Scientific Engineering and Research 
(IJSER), vol. 3, pp. 51-55, Sep. 2015. 
[24] M. Ben-Daya and A. Raouf, "A revised failure mode and effects analysis 
model," International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management, vol. 13, 
pp. 43-47, 1996. 
[25] C.-L. Chang, C.-C. Wei, and Y.-H. Lee, "Failure mode and effects analysis 
using fuzzy method and grey theory," Kybernetes, vol. 28, pp. 1072-1080, 
1999. 
[26] M. Akbari, P. Khazaee, P. K. Sabetghadam, and P. Karimifard, "Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for Power Transformers," in Power 
Transmission & Distribution Research Center Niroo Research Institute (NRI) 
Tehran, Iran. 28th international power system conference, iran, 
November2013. 
[27] L. Xie, "A new method for failure modes and effects analysis and its 
application in a hydrokinetic turbine system," 2013. 
[28] N. A. Shebl, B. D. Franklin, and N. Barber, "Failure mode and effects 
analysis outputs: are they valid?," BMC health services research, vol. 12, p. 
1, 2012. 
[29] H. Lu, H. Pan, L. He, and J. Zhang, "Importance analysis of off-grid wind 
power generation systems," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 
60, pp. 999-1007, 2016. 
[30] N. Ravi Sankar and B. S. Prabhu, "Modified approach for prioritization of 
failures in a system failure mode and effects analysis," International Journal 
of Quality & Reliability Management, vol. 18, pp. 324-336, 2001. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Bibliography                                                                                                                                                           83 
[31] R. Wirth, B. Berthold, A. Krämer, and G. Peter, "Knowledge-based support 
of system analysis for the analysis of failure modes and effects," Engineering 
Applications of Artificial Intelligence, vol. 9, pp. 219-229, 1996. 
[32] A. Lesmerises and D. Crowley, "Effect of different workscope strategies on 
wind turbine gearbox life cycle repair costs," IJPHM Special Issue on Wind 
Turbine PHM (Color), p. 64, 2013. 
[33] D. Julong, "Introduction to grey system theory," The Journal of grey system, 
vol. 1, pp. 1-24, 1989. 
[34] Y. Geum, Y. Cho, and Y. Park, "A systematic approach for diagnosing 
service failure: Service-specific FMEA and grey relational analysis 
approach," Mathematical and Computer Modelling, vol. 54, pp. 3128-3120, 
2011. 
[35] C.-L. Chang, P.-H. Liu, and C.-C. Wei, "Failure mode and effects analysis 
using grey theory," Integrated Manufacturing Systems, vol. 12, pp. 212-214, 
2001. 
[36] D. Shi-fei and S. Zhong-zhi, "Studies on incidence pattern recognition based 
on information entropy," Journal of Information Science, vol. 31, pp. 498-
499, 2005. 
[37] X. Li, K. Wang, L. Liu, J. Xin, H. Yang, and C. Gao, "Application of the 
entropy weight and TOPSIS method in safety evaluation of coal mines," 
Procedia Engineering, vol. 26, pp. 2087-2089, 2011. 
[38] A. Hafezalkotob and A. Hafezalkotob, "Extended MULTIMOORA method 
based on Shannon entropy weight for materials selection," Journal of 
Industrial Engineering International, pp. 4-5. 
[39] M. Kaltschmitt, Streicher, W., & Wiese, A., Renewable energy: Technology, 
economics, and environment. Berlin: Springer, 2007. 
[40] I. Dincer, & Rosen, M., Thermal energy storage systems and applications. 
Chichester: Wiley, 2001. 
[41] E. F. Camacho, Control of solar energy systems. London: Springer, 2011. 
[42] F. Ekardt and H. von Bredow, Managing the ecological and social 
ambivalences of bioenergy: sustainability criteria versus extended carbon 
markets: Springer, 2011. 
[43] P. A. P. g. t. Breeze, Power generation technologies. London: Springer, 2014. 
[44] G. Gloyer, Albania: Bradt Travel Guides, 2015. 
[45] N. Kulichenko, & Wirth, J., Concentrating Solar Power in Developing 
Countries: Regulatory and Financial Incentives for Scaling Up. Washington: 
World Bank Publications, 2012. 
[46] P. In Vasant, Handbook of research on novel soft computing intelligent 
algorithms: Theory and practical applications. London: Springer, 2014. 
[47] P. G. Jordan, Solar energy markets: An analysis of the global solar industry. 
London: Elsevier, 2014. 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Support Structure Subsystem 
Subsystem: Raw service water system 
Sheet 1 of 4 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
1 
Well Water 
Pumps 
Provide output flow 
from water wells 
Fail to operate 
Loss of output flow from well;  Failure of 
any single pump will have no effect on 
system performance  
Hydraulic or mechanical failure [78]  0.11 
System flow is monitored by a 
flow indicator 
2 2 1 4 
2 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
pump output line 
Fail to remain 
open  
Loss of output flow from well; Failure of 
any single pump  will have no effect on 
system performance  
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
System flow is monitored by a 
flow indicator 
2 1 1 2 
3 Leakage 
Loss of output flow from well;  Failure of 
any single pump  will have no effect on 
system performance 
0.04 
System flow is monitored by a 
flow indicator 
2 1 1 2 
4 Fails to check 
Backflow would not be prevented, 
leading to potential pump damage;  no 
effect on system performance 
Contamination has occurred even when 
backflow-prevention devices have been 
installed. It was the failure of a backflow 
check valve that allowed water stored for 
fire protection [80] 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event  2 1 5 10 
5 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation for 
each water well pump 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow from well; failure of any 
single line will have no effect on system 
performance 1 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
System flow is monitored by a 
flow indicator 
2 2 1 4 
6 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow from well; failure of 
any single line will performance 
0.083 
System flow is monitored by a 
flow indicator 
2 2 1 4 
7 
Shutoff 
Valve 
Provide isolation 
between water well 
pumps and storage 
tank 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of water flow to the storage tank; no 
effect on system performance  
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
System flow is monitored by a 
flow indicator 
2 2 1 4 
8 Leakage 
Loss of water flow to the storage tank; no 
effect on system performance  
0.083 
System flow is monitored by a 
flow indicator 
2 2 1 4 
9 
Flow 
Indicator  
Measure flow in the 
raw-water input line 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance  
The wear indicator is coloured to contrast 
with the transfer material and indicates 
wear by an eroded area which can be 
visually observed through the outer 
translucent layer.[82] 
0.067 
Failure will be noted by visual 
inspection 
1 2 4 8 
10 Fail output No effect on system performance  0.067 
Failure will be noted by visual 
inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 3 6 
11 
Control 
Valve 
Controls well-water 
input to raw water 
storage tank 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of water flow to the storage tank; no 
effect on system performance  
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Flow in the output line is 
monitored as well as the water 
level within the tank 
2 3 1 6 
12 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to the storage tank;  
no effect on system performance 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients,  
 Products of corrosive, 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.133 
Water level within the tank is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
13 
Shutoff 
Valves  
Provide isolation for 
well-water input 
control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of water flow to the storage tank;  no 
effect on system performance 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Flow in the output line is 
monitored as well as the water 
level within the tank 
2 2 1 4 
14 Leakage 
Loss of flow to the storage tank; no 
effect on system performance 
0.083 
Water level within the tank is 
monitored 
2 2 1 4 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Support Structure Subsystem 
Subsystem: Raw service water system 
Sheet 2 of 4 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
15 Bypass Valve 
Acts as a bypass path 
around the well-
water input control 
valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of well-water input flow 
control; no effect on system 
performance 
The leakage characteristics of a closed valve 
determine whether or not a pressure 
disturbance will cause it to vibrate[84] 
0.033 
Water level within the tank is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
16 
Level 
Controller 
Controls the well-
water input control 
valve 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of proper input water flow 
control; no effect on system 
performance 
It has been mainly caused by ineffective 
feedwater control.[85] 
0.095 Water level within the tank is 
monitored 
2 2 1 4 
17 
Level Gauge 
Measures tank 
interval water level 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The water level in the upstream tank is used 
to provide the flow conditions at the pipe 
inlet, while the downstream tank water level 
always remains below the pipe outlet and 
therefore does not affect the flow.[86] 
0.09 
Water level monitored by other 
sensors 
1 2 2 4 
18 False output No effect on system performance 0.09 
Water level monitored by other 
sensors 
1 2 2 4 
19 
Raw-water 
Storage Tank 
Container used to 
store system raw 
water 
Structural 
failure 
Loss if makeup water source 
leading to potential plant shut-
down; potential loss of fire 
protection 
For quantity failure to occur all raw water 
sources must be unavailable for at least one 
treatment plant and the treatment and 
distribution systems must fail to 
compensate. [87] 
0.01 
Visual inspection as well as water 
level monitoring 
3 1 1 3 
20 Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation between the 
raw-water storage 
tank and the fire-
protection pumps 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to fire protection 
system;  no effect on system 
performance 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Fire protection system input pressure 
is monitored 
2 2 1 4 
21 Level Sensor 
Provides input signal 
to pump controller 
Fails to operate 
No input signal to pumps resulting 
in no raw/service water in system; 
no effect on system performance 
The engine was virtually destroyed. Also, 
there have been numerous incidents of 
sensor failures which caused component 
damage, unnecessary shutdowns and delays 
of the program.[88]. 
0.067 
Tank water level is sensed by other 
monitors 
2 2 1 4 
22 
Water Pump 
Controller 
Controls the flow of 
raw/service water 
from the storage tank 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Improper pump control resulting 
in improper raw/service water-
control; no effect on system 
performance 
The pump did not fail for the first few 
months of operation when operating 
pressure was kept below 70 bar, problems 
began to appear as soon as pressure 
increased to 90-100 bar. The repeated 
failure of this pump has delayed high-
pressure testing [89]. 
0.067 
Erratic performance will be sensed 
by pump monitors as well as level 
sensors 
2 2 1 4 
23 
Shutoff Valve 
Isolates raw/service 
water storage-tank 
output 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of raw/service water flow; no 
effect on system performance; 
may cause pump damage 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients. Products 
of corrosive, Mechanical wear [81]. 
0.083 
Loss of system flow will be sensed 
by pump monitors 
2 2 1 4 
24 Leakage 
Loss of proper raw/service water 
effect on system performance; 
may cause pump damage  
0.083 
Visual inspection plus pump 
monitors 
2 2 1 4 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
94                                                                                                                                                                          Appendices 
System: Support Structure Subsystem 
Subsystem: Raw service water system 
Sheet 3 of 4 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
25 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation for 
raw/service water 
pumps 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
No effect on system performance; 
may cause pump damage 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive mechanical wear 
[81]. 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by pump 
monitors 
2 2 1 4 
26 Leakage 
No effect on system performance;  
may cause pump damage 
0.083 
Visual inspection and pump 
monitors 
2 2 1 4 
27 
Raw/Service 
Water Pumps 
Provide raw/service 
water system flow 
Fail to operate 
properly 
No effect on system performance 
The pump did not fail for the first few 
months of operation when operating 
pressure was kept below 70 bar, problems 
began to appear as soon as pressure 
increased to 90-100 bar. The repeated 
failure of this pump has delayed high-
pressure testing [89]. 
0.057 
Condition will be sensed by pump 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
28 
Check Valves 
Prevent backflow in 
the raw/service 
water output lines 
Fail to remain 
open 
No effect on system performance Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79]. 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by pump 
monitors 
1 1 1 1 
29 Leakage No effect on system performance 0.04 Visual inspection 1 1 4 4 
30 fail to check 
Backflow not prevented; 
may cause bump damage  
Contamination has occurred even when 
backflow-prevention devices have been 
installed. It was the failure of a backflow 
check valve that allowed water stored for 
fire protection [80]. 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 3 1 5 15 
31 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation for 
raw/service water 
pumps 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
No effect on system performance  Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive, Mechanical wear 
[81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by pump 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
32 Leakage No effect on system performance  0.083 Visual inspection 1 2 4 8 
33 
Check Valves 
Prevent backflow in 
the raw/service 
water output lines 
Fail to remain 
open 
Loss of bypass flow leading to 
improper pump operation; 
no effect on system performance  
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by pump 
monitors 
2 1 1 2 
34 Leakage 
Some less of water; 
no effect on system performance  
0.04 Visual inspection 2 1 4 8 
35 Fail to check 
Backflow not prevented which 
may lead to improper pump 
operation; no effect on system 
performance  
0.04 Sensed by pump monitors 2 1 1 2 
36 
Flow Orifices 
Reduce flow in the 
raw/service water 
pump bypass line 
Blockage or 
restricted flow 
Loss of bypass flow leading to 
improper pump operation; 
no effect on system performance Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 
0.25 
Condition will be sensed by pump 
monitors 
2 4 1 8 
37 Leakage 
Some less of water; no effect on 
system performance 
0.25 Visual inspection 2 4 4 32 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendices                                                                                                                                                                               95 
System: Support Structure Subsystem 
Subsystem: Raw service water system 
Sheet 4 of 4 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
38 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation  
between pump 
bypass line and the 
raw-water storage 
tank 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of bypass flow leading to improper 
pump operation;  
no effect on system performance 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by pump 
monitors 
2 2 1 4 
39 Leakage 
Some less of water;  
no effect on system performance 
0.083 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
40 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation 
between the raw-
water pump house 
and the raw/service 
water pumps 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to the pump house;  
no effect on system performance 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Pump house service water 
inoperative 
2 2 2 8 
41 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to the pump house;  
no effect on system performance 
0.083 
Administration building plumping 
inoperative 
2 2 2 8 
42 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation 
between the 
administration 
building and the 
raw/service water 
pumps 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to administration building;  
no effect on system performance 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Administration building plumping 
inoperative 
2 2 2 8 
43 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to administration 
building;  
no effect on system performance1 
0.083 
Administration building plumping 
inoperative 
2 2 2 8 
44 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation 
between the TSS 
service area and the 
raw/service water 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to TSS area;  
no effect on system performance1 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 TSS area service water inoperative 2 2 2 8 
45 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to TSS area;  
no effect on system preformance1 
0.083 TSS area service water inoperative 2 2 2 8 
46 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation 
between the EPGS 
area and the 
raw/service water 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to the EPGS area and 
cooling-tower makeup;  
no effect on system performance1 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 EPGS-area service water inoperative 2 2 2 8 
47 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to the EPGS are and 
cooling-tower makeup;  
no effect on system performance1 
0.083 EPGS-area service water inoperative 2 2 2 8 
48 
Level Control 
Valve 
Controls the flow of 
cooling-tower 
makeup water 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow for cooling-tower makeup;  
no effect on system performance1 Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage. [83] 
0.05 
Cooling-tower water-basin level 
monitored  
2 2 1 4 
49 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow for cooling-tower 
makeup;  
no effect on system performance1 
0.05 
Cooling-tower water-basin level 
monitored  
2 2 1 4 
50 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation 
between cooling-
tower area and the 
raw/service water 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper flow cooling-tower 
makeup;  
no effect on system performance1 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Cooling-tower service water 
inoperative 
2 2 2 8 
51 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to cooling-tower area;  
no effect on system pe4formance1 
0.083 
Cooling-tower service water 
inoperative 
2 2 2 8 
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52 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation for 
the demineralized 
water tank 
Fails to open 
or remain 
open 
Loss of water flow to tank;  
no effect on system performance 1 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Tank water level is monitored 2 2 1 4 
53 Leakage 
Loss of water flow to tank;  
no effect on system performance 1 
0.083 Tank water level is monitored 2 2 1 4 
54 
Level Gauge 
Measures 
demineralized water-
tank water level 
Fails to 
operate 
No effect on system performance1 
The water level in the upstream tank is used 
to provide the flow conditions at the pipe 
inlet, while the downstream tank water level 
always remains below the pipe outlet and 
therefore does not affect the flow.[86] 
0.09 
Water level monitored by other 
sensors  
1 2 2 4 
55 False output  No effect on system performance1 0.09 
Water level monitored by other 
sensors  
1 2 2 4 
56 
Demineralize
d Water Tank  
Storage medium for 
makeup water 
Structural 
failure 
Loss of makeup water leading to 
potential plant shutdown 11 
For quantity failure to occur all raw water 
sources must be unavailable for at least one 
treatment plant and the treatment and 
distribution systems must fail to 
compensate. [87] 
0.01 Tank water level is monitored 4 1 1 4 
57 
Level Sensor 
Provides input signal 
to pump controller 
Fails to 
operate 
No input to pump resulting in loss 
of water flow  
The engine was virtually destroyed. Also, 
there have been numerous incidents of  
0.067 
Tank water level is sensed by other 
monitors 
2 2 1 4 
58 False output  
Improper signal to pump resulting 
in improper system water flow  
sensor failures which caused component 
damage, unnecessary shutdowns and delays 
of the program.[88] 
0.067 
Tank water level is sensed by other 
monitors 
2 2 1 4 
59 
Demineralize
d Water Pump 
Control 
Controls water-tank 
output pump 
Fail to operate 
properly 
Improper pump control resulting 
in improper makeup water control 
The pump did not fail for the first few months 
of operation when operating pressure was 
kept below 70 bar, problems began to appear 
as soon as pressure increased to 90-100 bar. 
The repeated failure of this pump has delayed 
high-pressure 1testing[89] 
0.055 
Sensed by pump monitors as well as 
water-tank level 
2 2 1 4 
60 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation 
between the feed pump 
and the water storage 
tank 
Fails to open 
or remain 
open 
Loss of water flow; no effect on 
system performance; may damage 
pump 1 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Tank water level is monitored 3 2 1 6 
61 Leakage 
Loss of proper water flow; no 
effect on system performance; 
may damage pump 1 
0.083 Sensed by pump monitors 3 2 1 6 
62 
Demineralize
d Condensate 
Feed Pump 
Provides system water 
flow 
Fails to 
operate 
properly 
Loss of system water flow; no 
effect on system performance 1 
Insufficient suction pressure to avoid 
cavitation. Excessively high flow rate for the 
net positive suction head available Prolonged 
operation at lower than acceptable flow rates. 
Operation of the pump at zero or near zero 
flow rate. 
Improper operation of pumps in parallel. 
Failure to maintain adequate lubrication for 
the bearings.Failure to maintain satisfactory 
flushing to mechanical seals.[91] 
0.067 Sensed by pump monitors 2 2 1 4 
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63 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
pump output line 
Fails to remain 
open  
Loss of system water flow; no effect on 
system performance; may cause pump 
damage 1 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that 
design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by pump 
monitors 
3 1 1 3 
64 Leakage 
Loss of proper system water flow; no 
effect on system performance 1 
0.04 Visual inspection 2 1 4 8 
65 Fails to check 
Backflow protection lost; may cause 
pump damage 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event  3 1 5 15 
66 
Shutoff Valve Isolates pump output 
Fails to open 
or remain open 
Loss of system water flow; no effect on 
system  performance 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Pump monitors as well as tank water 
level sensors 
2 2 1 4 
67 Leakage 
Loss of proper system water flow; no 
effect on system performance 
0.083 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
68 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation 
between the feed 
pump bypass line and 
the demineralized 
water tank 
Fails to open 
or remain open 
Loss of bypass flow leading to improper 
pump operation; no effect on system 
performance 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by pump 
monitors 
2 2 1 4 
69 Leakage 
Some less of water; no effect on system 
performance 
0.083 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
70 
Flow Orifice 
Reduces flow in the 
feed pump bypass line 
Blockage or 
restricted flow 
Loss of bypass flow leading to improper 
pump operation; no effect on system 
performance Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 
0.25 
Condition will be sensed by pump 
monitors 
2 4 1 8 
71 Leakage 
Some less of water; no effect on system 
performance 
0.25 Visual inspection 2 4 4 32 
72 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation 
between 
demineralized-water 
tank and condensate 
tank 
Fails to open 
or remain open 
Loss of flow to the condensate tank; no 
effect on system performance 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 System water levels are monitored  2 2 1 4 
73 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to the condensate 
tank; no effect on system performance 
0.083 System water levels are monitored  2 2 1 4 
74 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation 
between 
demineralized water 
tank and the mirror 
washing station  
Fails to open 
or remain open 
Loss of flow for mirror washing; no 
effect on system performance 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
75 Leakage 
Loss of flow for mirror washing; no effect 
on system performance 
0.083 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
98                                                                                                                                                                          Appendices 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Support Structure Subsystem 
Subsystem: Compressed Air-System 
Sheet 1 of 4 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
79 
Service and 
Instrument air 
Compressors 
equipment used to 
compress air for 
use in remainder of 
system 
Fail to operate 
properly 
Loss of single air compressor will have 
no effect on system performance 
The energy wasted in compressed-air 
systems because of poor installation and 
maintenance can account for up to 50% 
of the energy consumed by the 
compressor. [92] 
0.2 
Output pressure of the 
compressor is monitored  
2 4 1 8 
80 
Shutoff 
Valves  
Provide isolation 
for compressor 
drain trap 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Unable to drain removed moisture; no 
effect on system performance; trap can 
be bypassed 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
81 Leakage 
No effect on system performance; may 
cause loss of air from one compressor 
0.083 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
82 Traps 
Tubes that prevent 
the loss of 
compressed air to 
moisture drain 
Leakage 
May cause loss of air from one 
compressor; no effect on system 
performance 
In one case the traps are introduced by 
impurities and in one case the traps are 
introduced by bond breaking during 
high-voltage stress[93] 
0.25 Visual inspection 2 4 4 32 
83 
Bypass 
Valves 
Allow for 
bypassing the drain 
traps 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
May cause loss of air from one 
compressor; no effect on system 
performance 
The leakage characteristics of a closed 
valve determine 
whether or not a pressure disturbance 
will cause it to vibrate[84] 
0.033 
 
Visual inspection and loss of 
compressor output pressure 
2 1 4 8 
84 
High 
Temperature 
Sensors 
Provide trip signals 
for high 
compressor air-
output temperature 
Fail to operate 
Compressor would not shut down if the 
output temperature goes high; may cause 
compressor damage; no effect on system 
performance 
Environments will make the shift to 
higher temperatures occur 
incrementally.[94] 
0.1 Output temperature is 
monitored by other sensors 
2 3 2 12 
85 False output  
May cause inadvertent shutdown of 
compressor; no effect on system 
performance 
0.1 
Output temperature is 
monitored by other sensors 
2 3 2 12 
86 
Temperature 
Indicators 
Measure 
compressor output 
temperature 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance  
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.057 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
87 False output  No effect on system performance 0.057 
Periodic calibration and 
comparison to other sensors 
1 2 2 4 
88 
Pressure 
Indicators  
Measure 
compressor output 
pressure  
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.08 Visual inspection 1 2 4 8 
89 False output  No effect on system performance  0.08 
Periodic calibration and 
comparison to other sensors 
1 2 2 4 
90 
Relief Valves 
Prevent system 
overpressure 
Fail to operate 
when required 
Potential safety hazard; loss of single 
compressor will have no effect on 
system performance 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.133 System pressure is monitored 2 3 1 6 
91 Leakage 
Loss of compressed air from a single 
compressor will have no effect on system 
performance 
0.133 System pressure is monitored 2 3 1 6 
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92 
Check 
Valves 
Prevent backflow 
in air-compressor 
output lines 
Fail to remain 
open  
Loss of compressed air from a 
single compressor will have no 
effect on system performance 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 System pressure is monitored 2 1 1 2 
93 Leakage 
Loss of compressed air from a 
single compressor will have no 
effect on system performance 
0.04 System pressure is monitored 2 1 1 2 
94 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection; may 
result in compressor damage; no 
effect on system performance 
Contamination has occurred even when 
backflow-prevention devices have been 
installed. It was the failure of a backflow check 
valve that allowed water stored for fire 
protection [80] 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event  2 1 5 10 
95 
Shutoff 
Valve 
Provides isolation 
between 
compressor output 
and air-tank input 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of compressed air flow which 
will lead to plant shutdown 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Sensed as reduced pressure in 
air tank 
2 2 2 8 
96 Leakage 
Reduced compressed air flow which 
will lead to plant shutdown 
0.083 
Sensed as reduced pressure in 
air tank 
4 2 2 16 
97 
Service and 
instrument 
air receiver 
Tank used to 
compressed air 
storage 
Structural failure 
Loss of compressed air flow which 
will lead to plant shutdown 
The energy wasted in compressed-air systems 
because of poor installation and maintenance 
can account for up to 50% of the energy 
consumed by the compressor. [92] 
0.05 Sensed as reduced pressure 4 2 2 16 
98 
Relief Valve 
Prevents air-tank 
overpressure 
Fail to open 
when required 
Potential safety hazard; loss of 
compressed air resulting in plant 
shutdown 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug small 
openings, or abrade the mating surfaces until a 
valve leaks.[96] 
0.133 
System pressure is monitored 5 3 1 15 
99 Leakage 
Loss of compressed air resulting in 
plant shutdown 
0.133 System pressure is monitored 5 3 1 15 
100 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measure air-tank 
internal pressure 
fails to operate No effect on system performance  
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.08 Visual inspection 1 2 4 8 
101 False output  No effect on system performance 0.08 
Periodic calibration and 
comparison to other sensors 
1 2 3 6 
102 
Pressure 
Sensor 
Provides trip signal 
for high air-tank 
internal pressure  
Fails to operate 
Compressor would not shut down if 
the internal pressure goes high; 
could cause plant shutdown if relief 
valve is activated 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.125 
Internal pressure measured 
by other sensors 
4 3 2 24 
103 False output  
Could cause inadvertent shutdown 
of a compressor; no effect on system 
performance 
0.125 
Compressor shutdown will 
be sensed by loss of output 
pressure 
2 3 2 12 
104 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation 
for air-receiver 
drain trap 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Unable to drain removed moisture; 
no effect on system performance; 
trap can be bypassed 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Visual inspection  2 2 4 16 
105 Leakage May cause loss air  0.083 
Visual inspection and 
reduced internal pressure 
3 2 4 24 
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106 Trap 
Tube that prevents 
the loss of 
compressed air to 
moisture drain 
Leakage 
Loss of compressed air which would 
lead to plant shutdown 
In one case the traps are introduced by 
impurities and in one case the traps are 
introduced by bond breaking during high-
voltage stress[93] 
0.25 Visual inspection 4 4 4 64 
107 
Bypass 
Valve 
Allow for 
bypassing the 
moisture drain 
Leakage or 
inaddvertently 
open 
Loss of compressed air resulting in 
plant shutdown 
The leakage characteristics of a closed valve 
determine whether or not a pressure 
disturbance will cause it to vibrate[84] 
0.133 Reduced tank pressure  4 1 4 16 
108 
Shutoff 
Valve 
Provides isolation 
for air-tank output 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of compressed air resulting in 
plant shutdown 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
System output pressure are 
monitored  
5 2 1 10 
109 Leakage 
Loss of compressed air resulting in 
plant shutdown 
0.083 
System output pressure are 
monitored  
5 2 1 10 
110 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation 
for system pre 
filters 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Failure in a single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
System output pressure are 
monitored  
2 2 1 4 
111 Leakage 
May cause loss of compressed air 
and potential plant shutdown 
0.083 
System output pressure are 
monitored  
4 2 1 8 
112 
Refilters 
Provide initial 
filtering of system 
compressed air 
Blockage or 
leakage 
Failure in a single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
There are two types of leakages 
Internal or cross-port leakage at the piston 
seal and, External leakage at the shaft seal or 
the connecting pipes.[97] 
0.133 
System output pressure are 
monitored  
2 3 1 6 
113 Fail to filter  
No effect on system performance 
since other filters are in system 
0.133 
Filters subjected to periodic 
maintenance 
1 3 3 9 
114 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation 
for system 
refrigerated dryers 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Failure in a single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
System output pressure are 
monitored  
2 2 1 4 
115 Leakage 
May cause loss of compressed air 
and potential plant shutdown 
0.083 
System output pressure are 
monitored  
4 2 1 8 
116 
Refrigerated 
Air Dryers 
Dry system 
compressed air 
Blockage or 
leakage 
Failure in a single loop will have no 
effect on system performance The improper design and specification of 
ozone systems.[98] 
0.04 
System output pressure are 
monitored  
2 1 1 2 
117 
Fail to operate 
properly 
Failure in a single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
0.04 
Visual inspection and 
periodic maintenance 
2 1 3 6 
118 
Drain Valves  
Provide isolation 
for system coalesce 
air filters 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Failure in a single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
Control circuit failure 
Loss of electric power to motor 
Electric motor failure[99] 
0.154 Visual inspection 2 3 4 24 
119 Leakage 
No effect on system performance; 
valve is normally open 
0.154 Visual inspection 1 3 4 12 
120 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation 
for system coalesce 
air filters 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Failure in a single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
System output pressure are 
monitored  
2 2 1 4 
121 Leakage 
May cause loss of compressed air 
and potential plant shutdown 
0.083 
System output pressure are 
monitored  
4 2 1 8 
122 
Coalesce Air 
Filters 
Provide final 
system filtering 
Blockage or 
leakage 
Failure in a single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
There are two types of leakages 
Internal or cross-port leakage at the piston 
seal and, External leakage at the shaft seal or 
the connecting pipes.[97] 
0.2 
System output pressure are 
monitored  
2 4 1 8 
123 
fail to operate 
properly  
Failure in a single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
0.2 
System output pressure and 
periodic maintenance 
2 4 3 24 
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124 
Drain Valves  
Allow for draining 
of output air filters 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Failure in a single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
Control circuit failure 
Loss of electric power to motor 
Electric motor failure[99] 
0.154 
System output pressures are 
monitored  
2 3 1 6 
125 
Fail to open 
when required 
Failure in a single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
0.154 Visual inspection 2 3 4 24 
126 
Pressure 
regulator  
Regulators pressure 
in the service air 
line 
Fails to remain 
open  
Loss of service air only; no effect on 
system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.105 Output pressure is monitored 2 3 1 6 
127 Leakage 
Loss of service air only; no effect on 
system performance 
0.105 Output pressure is monitored 2 3 1 6 
128 Fails to regulate 
Improper service air pressure; no effect 
on system performance 
0.105 Output pressure is monitored 2 3 1 6 
129 
Shutoff 
Valve 
Provides isolation 
for service air 
system 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of service air only; no effect on 
system performance 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive  
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Output pressure is monitored 2 2 1 4 
130 Leakage 
Loss of service air only; no effect on 
system performance 
0.083 Output pressure is monitored 2 2 1 4 
131 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measures service-
air-system output 
pressure  
Fails to operate 
May result in false system alarm; no 
effect on system performance Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.1 
Visual inspection and 
monitored of system alarms 
2 3 4 24 
132 False output  
May result in false system alarm; no 
effect on system performance 
0.1 System alarms are monitored  2 3 1 6 
133 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide system 
isolation along the 
service-air hydrant 
line 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of service air at individual stations; 
no effect on system performance 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
134 Leakage 
Loss of service air at individual stations; 
no effect on system performance 
0.083 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
135 
Shutoff 
Valve 
Provides system 
isolation between 
the plant 
subsystems and 
instrument air 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of instrument air to subsystems 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Loss of air will be sensed at 
the subsystem level 
5 2 2 20 
136 Leakage 
Loss of instrument air to subsystems 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 
Loss of air will be sensed at 
the subsystem level 
5 2 2 20 
137 
Shutoff 
Valve 
Provides isolation 
for instrument air 
system 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to instrument air hydrant 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive  
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 System pressure is monitored 5 2 1 10 
138 Leakage 
Loss of flow to instrument air hydrant 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 System pressure is monitored 5 2 1 10 
139 
Pressure 
transmitter 
Measures pressure 
in instrument air 
hydrant line 
Fails to operate 
May result in false system alarm; no 
effect on system performance Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.1 
Visual inspection and 
monitored of system alarms 
2 3 4 24 
140 False output  
May result in false system alarm; no 
effect on system performance 
0.1 System alarms are monitored  2 3 1 6 
141 
shutoff 
Valves 
Provide system 
isolation along the 
service-air hydrant 
line 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of instrument air resulting in plant 
shutdown 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Loss of air will be sensed at 
usage point 
5 2 2 20 
142 Leakage 
Loss of instrument air resulting in plant 
shutdown 
0.083 
Loss of air will be sensed at 
usage point 
5 2 2 20 
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143 
Temperature 
Indicators  
Measure input 
temperatures to 
cooling-water surge 
tank 
Fail to  operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
144 False output  No effect on system performance 0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
145 
Pressure 
Indicator  
Measure thermal-
storage feedline 
pressure  
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.08 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
146 False output  No effect on system performance 0.08 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
147 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation 
in feedline from 
thermal storage 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
No effect on system performance; 
more than single input employed  
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Line pressure is monitored  1 2 1 2 
148 Leakage 
No effect on system performance; 
more than single input employed  
0.083 Line pressure is monitored  1 2 1 2 
149 
Control Valve 
Controls input flow 
in feedline 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
No effect on system performance; 
more than single input employed  
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 Tank level is monitored 1 3 1 3 
150 Leakage 
No effect on system performance; 
more than single input employed  
0.133 Tank level is monitored 1 3 1 3 
151 
Temperature 
Indicator 
Measures return 
water temperature 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
152 False output  No effect on system performance 0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
153 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measures return 
water pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.08 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
154 False output  No effect on system performance  0.08 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
155 
Level 
Controller 
Controls position of 
input control valve 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Improper input flow; no effect on 
system performance; more than 
single input employed  
It has been mainly caused by 
ineffective feedwater control.[85] 
0.095 Tank level is monitored 2 2 1 4 
156 
Level 
Transmitter 
Measure tank water 
level and provides 
input signal to level 
controller 
Fails to operate 
Loss of input control; no effect on 
system performance; more than 
single input employed It has been mainly caused by 
ineffective feedwater control.[85] 
0.15 
Tank level is monitored by other 
sensors 
2 3 2 12 
157 False output  
Improper input flow; no effect on 
system performance; more than 
single input employed  
0.15 
Tank level is monitored by other 
sensors 
2 3 2 12 
158 
Butterfly 
Valve 
Provides an 
interface at surge 
tank input 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of cooling-water flow leading 
to plant shutdown 
Butterfly valve closes abruptly during 
operation of the reactor, the coolant 
flow decreases.[100] 
0.05 Tank level is monitored  4 2 1 8 
159 leakage 
Loss of cooling-water flow leading 
to plant shutdown 
0.05 Tank level is monitored  4 2 1 8 
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160 
Cooling water 
surge Tank 
Provides 
containment for 
system cooling 
water 
Structural failure 
Loss of cooling water leading to 
plant shutdown 
For quantity failure to occur all raw 
water sources must be unavailable for at 
least one treatment plant and the 
treatment and distribution systems must 
fail to compensate. [87] 
0.033 Tank level is monitored 4 1 1 4 
161 Drain Valve 
Allows for draining 
of cooling-water 
surge tank 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper cooling-water flow 
leading to potential plant shutdown; 
some fluid loss can be made up 
Control circuit failure 
Loss of electric power to motor 
Electric motor failure[99] 
0.154 Tank level is monitored 4 3 1 12 
162 
Level 
Indicator 
Measures cooling-
water surge tank 
water level 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance The engine was virtually destroyed. 
Also, there have been numerous 
incidents of sensor failures which caused 
component damage, unnecessary 
shutdowns and delays of the 
program.[88] 
0.285 Level monitored by other sensors 1 4 2 8 
163 False output No effect on system performance 0.285 Level monitored by other sensors 1 4 2 8 
164 
Level 
Transmitter 
Monitors cooling-
water surge tank 
water level 
Fails to operate 
may cause false system alarm; no 
effect on system performance 
The engine was virtually destroyed. 
Also, there have been numerous 
incidents of sensor failures which caused 
component damage, unnecessary 
shutdowns and delays of the 
program.[88] 
0.15 Level monitored by other sensors 2 3 2 12 
165 False output 
may cause false system alarm; no 
effect on system performance 
0.15 Level monitored by other sensors 2 3 2 12 
166 
Butterfly 
Valve 
Provides an 
interface at the 
cooling-water 
surge-tank output 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of cooling flow leading to 
plant shutdown 
Butterfly valve closes abruptly during 
operation of the reactor, the coolant 
flow decreases.[100] 
0.05 Tank level is monitored 4 2 1 8 
167 Leakage 
Loss of cooling flow leading to 
plant shutdown 
0.05 
Visual inspection and pump 
monitors 
4 2 3 24 
168 
Speed 
Indicators 
Measure system 
flow rate 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.1 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 3 4 12 
169 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 3 4 12 
170 
Butterfly 
Valves 
Provide an 
interface at 
cooling-water 
pump input 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
Butterfly valve closes abruptly during 
operation of the reactor, the coolant 
flow decreases.[100] 
0.05 Pump output pressure is monitored 2 2 1 4 
171 Leakage 
Loss of single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
0.05 Pump output pressure is monitored 2 2 1 4 
172 
Cooling water 
Pumps 
Provide system 
cooling-water flow 
Fail to operate 
Loss of single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
The pump did not fail for the first few 
months of operation when operating 
pressure was kept below 70 
bar, problems began to appear as soon as 
pressure increased to 90-100 bar. The 
repeated failure of this pump has delayed 
high-pressure testing[89] 
0.35 Pump output pressure is monitored 2 1 1 2 
173 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measure cooling-
water pump output 
pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.08 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
174 False output  No effect on system performance 0.08 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
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175 
Butterfly 
Valves 
Provide an interface 
at cooling-water 
pump input  
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
Butterfly valve closes abruptly during 
operation of the reactor, the coolant flow 
decreases.[100] 
0.05 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 2 1 4 
176 Leakage 
Loss of single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
0.05 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 2 1 4 
177 
Check Valves 
Prevent backflow at 
cooling-water 
pump output 
Fail to remain 
open  
Loss of single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
 Improper seating  
 inherent characteristics of that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
178 Leakage 
Loss of single loop will have no 
effect on system performance 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
179 Fail to check 
Loss of backflow protection; no 
effect on system performance; may 
cause pump damage 
Contamination has occurred even when 
backflow-prevention devices have been 
installed. It was the failure of a backflow 
check valve that allowed water stored for fire 
protection [80] 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event  3 1 5 15 
180 
Pressure 
Sensor 
Provides control 
signal for cooling-
water pump  
Fails to operate  
Loss of cooling-water flow 
resulting in plant shutdown Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.125 
Line pressure is monitored by 
other sensors 
5 3 2 30 
181 False output  
Improper cooling-water flow 
which may lead to plant shutdown 
0.125 
Line pressure is monitored by 
other sensors 
4 3 2 24 
182 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measure cooling-
water pump system 
output pressure 
Fails to operate 
No effect on system performance; 
may cause false system alarm Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.1 
Line pressure is monitored by 
other sensors 
1 3 2 6 
183 False output  
No effect on system performance; 
may cause false system alarm 
0.1 
Line pressure is monitored by 
other sensors 
1 3 2 6 
184 
Butterfly 
Valve  
Provides an 
interface at the 
cooling-water heat-
exchanger input 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of cooling-water flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Butterfly valve closes abruptly during 
operation of the reactor, the coolant flow 
decreases.[100] 
0.05 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
5 2 1 10 
185 Leakage 
Loss of cooling-water flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.05 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
5 2 1 10 
186 
Temperature 
Indicator 
Measure cooling-
water heat-
exchanger input 
temperature 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.057 
Downstream temperature is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
187 False output  No effect on system performance 0.057 
Downstream temperature is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
188 
Shutoff Valve 
Isolates pressure 
indicator 319 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of pressure reading; no effect 
on system performance 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 No pressure indication 2 2 2 8 
189 Leakage 
Loss of pressure reading; no effect 
on system performance 
0.083 Improper pressure indication 2 2 2 8 
190 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measure cooling-
water heat-
exchanger input 
temperature 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.125 
Downstream pressure in 
monitored  
1 3 1 3 
191 Fails to output No effect on system performance 0.125 
Downstream pressure in 
monitored  
1 3 1 3 
192 
Blockage or 
leakage 
Loss of cooling-water flow 
resulting in plant shutdown  
The failure was caused by pits on the tube 
outside surface developing until its perforation 
0.056 Output pressure in monitored  5 2 1 10 
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193 
Cooling Water 
Heat 
Exchanger 
Provides the means 
for cooling the 
cooling water 
Fails to operate 
properly  
Degraded cooling water which 
may lead to plant shutdown 
Long-term overheating is a major cause of 
failures in boiler tubes of different designs and 
operation conditions.[101] 
0.056 Output pressure in monitored  4 2 1 8 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Support Structure Subsystem 
Subsystem: Cooling water Distribution System 
Sheet 4 of 4 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
194 
Shutoff Valves 
Allow for draining/ 
venting of cooling-
water heat exchanger 
Leakage or 
inadvertently open 
Reduced cooling-water heat exchanger 
efficiency which could result in plant 
shutdown 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear 
[81] 
0.083 Output pressure in monitored 5 2 1 10 
195 
Fail to open when 
required 
Unable to vent/ drain heat exchanger 
leading to possible plant shutdown 
0.083 Visual inspection 4 2 4 32 
196 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measures cooling-
water heat-
exchanger output 
pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.08 
Line pressure monitored by other 
sensors 
1 2 2 4 
197 False output  No effect on system performance 0.08 
Line pressure monitored by other 
sensors 
1 2 2 4 
198 
Temperature 
Indicator 
Measures cooling-
water heat-
exchanger output 
temperature 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.057 
Temperature monitored by other 
sensors 
1 2 2 4 
199 False output  No effect on system performance 0.057 
Line pressure monitored by other 
sensors 
1 2 2 4 
200 
Butterfly Valve 
Provides an interface 
at the cooling-water 
heat-exchanger 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of cooling-water flow resulting in 
plant shutdown 
Butterfly valve closes abruptly during 
operation of the reactor, the coolant flow 
decreases.[100] 
0.05 
Upstream pressure is monitored as 
well as downstream pressure 
5 2 1 10 
201 Leakage 
Loss of cooling-water flow resulting in 
plant shutdown 
0.05 
Visual inspection and downstream 
temperature 
5 2 3 30 
202 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measures cooling-
water heat-
exchanger output 
temperature 
Fails to operate  
May result in false system alarm; no 
effect on system performance Short circuit of the panel failure of the 
temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Temperature monitored by other 
sensors 
2 2 2 8 
203 False output  
May result in false system alarm; no 
effect on system performance 
0.057 
Temperature monitored by other 
sensors 
2 2 2 8 
204 
Chemical 
Feeder 
Allows for  the 
introduction of 
chemicals into the 
cooling-water 
system 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Improper injection of chemicals into 
the system leading to potential 
equipment damage and subsequent 
plant shutdown  
The leak was from a circumferential 
crack in a pipe-to-fitting weld that joined 
a coupling to a reducer.[103] 
0.142 Visual inspection 4 3 4 48 
205 
Shutoff Valves  
Provide isolation in 
the individual air-
cooler lines 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of cooling flow to individual 
cooler resulting in plant shutdown 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Individual line pressure and/ or 
temperatures are monitored 
5 2 1 10 
206 Leakage 
Loss of proper cooling-water flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 
Individual line pressure and/ or 
temperatures are monitored 
5 2 1 10 
207 
Air coolers  
Equipment used for 
the cooling of 
individual pump, etc  
Blockage or 
leakage 
Loss of flow in individual cooler 
leading to plant shutdown  The improper design and specification of 
ozone systems.[98] 
0.118 
Individual line pressure and/ or 
temperatures are monitored 
4 3 1 12 
208 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of proper equipment cooling 
leading to plant shutdown 
0.118 
Individual line pressure and/ or 
temperatures are monitored 
4 3 1 12 
209 
Temperature 
Indicators 
Measure Individual 
cooler line 
temperature 
Fails to operate  No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.057 
Visual inspection as well as 
downstream temperature 
1 2 3 6 
210 False output  No effect on system performance 0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration; downstream temperature 
is also monitored 
1 2 4 8 
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211 
Shutoff valve 
Provide isolation in 
the individual air-
cooler lines 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of cooling flow to individual 
cooler resulting in plant shutdown 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Individual line temperature and/ or 
pressure are monitored 
5 2 1 10 
212 Leakage 
Loss proper cooling water flow which 
may lead to plant shutdown 
0.083 
Visual inspection as well as 
downstream pressure indication 
4 2 3 24 
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213 
33KV Input 
Power Line  
Grid provided for 
plant electrical 
usage 
Loss of power 
Generator power output may have 
to be reduced considerably since 
only auxiliary system loads can be 
fed  
Defects or insulation deterioration in the 
cables or their accessories (joints, 
terminations) can cause electrical partial 
discharges and can lead to total failure. 
[104] 
0.01 
System power levels are 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
214 
Main 
Transformer 
Reduces 33KV input 
to 13.8KV to match 
turbine output 
Fails open 
Loss of output load resulting in 
plant shutdown It would be overstressed repeatedly, 
which is a certain recipe for early 
failure[105] 
0.02 
System power levels are 
monitored; protective relaying 
provided 
5 1 1 5 
215 Fails short  
Loss of output load resulting in 
plant shutdown 
0.02 
System power levels are 
monitored; protective relaying 
provided 
5 1 1 5 
216 
Auxiliary 
Transformer  
Reduces 13.8KV 
input to 4160V to 
match switch gear 
input requirements 
Fails open 
Loss of prime resulting in plant 
shutdown It would be overstressed repeatedly, 
which is a certain recipe for early 
failure[105] 
0.027 
System power levels are 
monitored 
5 1 1 5 
217 Fails short  
Input circuit breaker will trip 
causing loss of proine power and 
subsequent plant shutdown 
0.027 
System power levels are 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
218 
Solar One 
Generator 
Output 
Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system 
overcurrent 
protection 
False transfer 
Loss of output load resulting in 
turbine shutdown 
Deterioration failure which is a long 
term-accumulated fault. It can happen 
mostly due to deterioration of contacts 
and oil, and break down of insulating 
materials such as bushings etc.[106] 
0.034 
System power levels are 
monitored 
5 1 1 5 
219 Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may 
result in other equipment damage, 
plant shutdown 
0.034 Undetectable prior to event  5 1 5 25 
220 
Auxiliary 
Transformer 
Output 
Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system 
overvoltage 
protection 
False transfer 
Loss of prime power resulting in 
plant shutdown Deterioration failure which is a long 
term-accumulated fault. It can happen 
mostly due to deterioration of contacts 
and oil, and break down of insulating 
materials such as bushings etc.[106] 
0.025 
System power levels are 
monitored 
5 1 1 5 
221 Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may 
result in other equipment damage; 
system will shut down due to 
tripping of other breakers, loss of 
output load  
0.025 Undetectable prior to event  3 1 5 15 
222 
4KV Well-
water Power 
Line 
Provides backup 
power for system 
shutdown 
Loss of power Loss of backup power 
Deterioration failure which is a long 
term-accumulated fault. It can happen 
mostly due to deterioration of contacts 
and oil, and break down of insulating 
materials such as bushings etc.[106] 
0.033 
System power levels are 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
223 4KV Well-
water Output 
Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system 
overvoltage 
protection 
False transfer Loss of backup power 
Deterioration failure which is a long 
term-accumulated fault. It can happen 
mostly due to deterioration of contacts 
and oil, and break down of insulating 
materials such as bushings etc.[106] 
0.04 
System power levels are 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
224 Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may 
result in other equipment damage, 
plant shutdown 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event  5 1 5 25 
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225 
Heliostat Interface 
Power Cabinet 
Switchgear 
Provides automatic 
emergency 
switchover for 
heliostat power 
requirements 
Fails to closed  
Collectors can be operated from 
backup power only Inadequate dc control power prevented the 
circuit breaker from operating to clear the 
fault.[107] 
0.0167 
System power levels are 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
226 Fails to open 
Loss of emergency 
 power to heliostat field  
0.0167 
System power levels are 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
227 
Heliostat Interface 
Power Cabinet Input 
Circuit Breakers 
Provides system 
overvoltage 
protection 
False transfer 
Loss of collector until backup 
system is switched in  
Deterioration failure which is a long term-
accumulated fault. It can happen mostly due 
to deterioration of contacts and oil, and 
break down of insulating materials such as 
bushings etc.[106] 
0.033 
System power levels are 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
228 Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may 
result in other equipment damage, 
plant shutdown 
0.033 Undetectable prior to event  5 1 5 25 
229 
Station Service 
Transfer Input Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system 
overcurrent 
protection 
False transfer 
Loss of power to 480V switchgear 
leading to plant shutdown 
Deterioration failure which is a long term-
accumulated fault. It can happen mostly due 
to deterioration of contacts and oil, and 
break down of insulating materials such as 
bushings etc.[106] 
0.04 
System power levels are 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
230 Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may 
result in other equipment damage, 
plant shutdown 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event  5 1 5 25 
231 
Station Service 
Transformer 
Reduces 4160V 
input to 480V to 
match subsystem 
input requirements 
Fails to open 
Loss of power to 480V switchgear 
leading to plant shutdown 
It would be overstressed repeatedly, which 
is a certain recipe for early failure[105] 
0.01 
System power levels are 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
232 Fails to short 
Input circuit breaker will trip causing 
loss of 480V power and subsystem 
plant shutdown 
0.01 
System power levels are 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
233 
Station Service 
Transformer Output 
Circuit Breaker 
Provides system 
overcurrent 
protection 
False transfer Loss of power to 480V switchgear 
leading to plant shutdown 
Deterioration failure which is a long term-
accumulated fault. It can happen mostly due 
to deterioration of contacts and oil, and 
break down of insulating materials such as 
bushings etc.[106] 
0.04 
System power levels are 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
234 
Fails to open Loss of overcurrent protection may 
result in other equipment damage, 
plant shutdown 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 5 1 5 25 
235 
Receiver Feed Pump 
Circuit Breaker 
Provides 
equipment 
overcurrent 
protection 
False transfer 
Loss of 4160V input power to 
receiver feed pump leading to 
receiver subsystem shutdown 
Deterioration failure which is a long term-
accumulated fault. It can happen mostly due 
to deterioration of contacts and oil, and 
break down of insulating materials such as 
bushings etc.[106] 
0.033 
System power level and pump 
monitored  
4 1 1 4 
236 Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection at 
pump input; plant shutdown due to 
tripping other breakers 
0.033 Undetectable prior to event  4 1 5 20 
237 
Cooling tower 
Transformer Input 
Circuit Breaker 
Provides system 
overcurrent 
protection 
False transfer 
Loss of 480V input power to cooling 
tower; plant may shutdown after 
period of time 
Deterioration failure which is a long term-
accumulated fault. It can happen mostly due 
to deterioration of contacts and oil, and 
break down of insulating materials such as 
bushings etc.[106] 
0.03 
System power levels are 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
238 Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may 
result in other equipment damage, 
plant shutdown 
0.03 Undetectable prior to event  5 1 5 25 
239 
Cooling Tower 
Transformer 
Reduces 4160V 
input to 480V for 
subsystem usage 
Fails to open 
Loss of 480V input power leading to 
plant shutdown 
It would be overstressed repeatedly, which 
is a certain recipe for early failure[105] 
0.044 
System power levels are 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
240 Fails to short 
Input circuit breaker will trip causing 
loss of 480V input and subsequent 
plant shutdown 
0.044 
System power levels are 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
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241 
Cooling Tower 
Transformer Output 
Circuit Breaker 
Provides system 
overcurrent protection 
False transfer 
Loss of 480V input power leading to 
plant shutdown 
Deterioration failure which is a long term-
accumulated fault. It can happen mostly due to 
deterioration of contacts and oil, and break down 
of insulating materials such as bushings etc.[106] 
0.03 
System power level and 
pump monitored  
4 1 1 4 
242 Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may 
result in other equipment damage, 
plant shutdown 
0.03 Undetectable prior to event  5 1 5 25 
243 
Motor Control 
Center L Input 
Circuit Breaker 
Provides system 
overcurrent protection 
False transfer 
Loss of 480V input power to cooling 
tower, possible plant shutdown 
Deterioration failure which is a long term-
accumulated fault. It can happen mostly due to 
deterioration of contacts and oil, and break down 
of insulating materials such as bushings etc.[106] 
0.025 
System power level and 
pump monitored  
4 1 1 4 
244 Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may 
result in other equipment damage, 
plant shutdown 
0.025 Undetectable prior to event  5 1 5 25 
245 
Warehouse Load 
Input Circuit Breaker  
Provides system 
overcurrent protection 
False transfer 
Loss power to warehouse; no effect on 
system performance 
Deterioration failure which is a long term-
accumulated fault. It can happen mostly due to 
deterioration of contacts and oil, and break down 
of insulating materials such as bushings etc.[106] 
0.033 
Warehouse circuitry 
inoperative 
2 1 2 4 
246 Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection; loss of 
warehouse power 
0.033 Undetectable prior to event  2 1 5 10 
247 
Motor Contrl Center 
A Input Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system 
overcurrent protection 
False transfer 
Loss of power to Power Block and 
Remote Station #4, leading to 
probable plant shutdown 
Deterioration failure which is a long term-
accumulated fault. It can happen mostly due to 
deterioration of contacts and oil, and break down 
of insulating materials such as bushings etc.[106] 
0.025 
System power levels are 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
248 Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection; plant 
shutdown due to tripping of other 
circuit breakers 
0.025 Undetectable prior to event  4 1 5 20 
249 
Motor Control 
Center C Input 
Circuit Breaker 
Provides system 
overcurrent protection 
False transfer 
Loss of power to water treatment; no 
effect on system performance 
Deterioration failure which is a long term-
accumulated fault. It can happen mostly due to 
deterioration of contacts and oil, and break down 
of insulating materials such as bushings etc.[106] 
0.025 
System power levels are 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
250 Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection; plant 
shutdown due to tripping of other 
circuit breakers 
0.025 Undetectable prior to event  4 1 5 20 
251 
Motor Control 
Center B Input 
Circuit Breaker 
Provides system 
overcurrent protection 
False transfer 
Loss of power to Thermal storage, 
leading to probable plant shutdown 
Deterioration failure which is a long term-
accumulated fault. It can happen mostly due to 
deterioration of contacts and oil, and break down 
of insulating materials such as bushings etc.[106] 
0.0.25 
System power levels are 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
252 Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection; plant 
shutdown due to tripping of other 
circuit breakers 
0.025 Undetectable prior to event  4 1 5 20 
253 
Receiver PPA Input 
Circuit Breaker 
Provides system 
overcurrent protection 
False transfer 
Loss of power to receiver, plant may 
operate from thermal storage 
Deterioration failure which is a long term-
accumulated fault. It can happen mostly due to 
deterioration of contacts and oil, and break down 
of insulating materials such as bushings etc.[106]  
0.0285 
System power levels are 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
254 Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection; plant 
shutdown due to tripping of other 
circuit breakers 
0.0258 Undetectable prior to event  4 1 5 20 
255 
Uninterrupted Power 
Supply 
Provides backup 
control and logic power 
for plant shut down in 
case of power loss 
Fails to operate 
Unable to provide backup power for 
system shutdown; potential equipment 
damage 
Inadequate dc control power prevented the circuit 
breaker from operating to clear the fault.[107] 
0.0714 
Battery levels and system 
status are monitored 
4 2 1 8 
256 
Motor Control 
Center  and Power 
Panels 
Provides interface 
points for specific 
equipment electrical 
power needs 
Internal failure 
causing loss of 
power 
Power loss will cause system 
shutdown; battery backup provides 
emergency power 
Inadequate dc control power prevented the circuit 
breaker from operating to clear the fault.[107] 
0.0714 
System power levels are 
monitored 
4 2 1 8 
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1 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measures receiver 
input water 
temperature 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Temperature and Pressure sensors and 
specific field operation strategy and 
control system will be tried to overcome 
the well-known problem of superheating 
in this pilot central receiver system [108] 
0.057 
Downstream temperature is 
monitored  
1 2 1 2 
2 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Downstream temperature is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
3 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measures receiver 
input water 
pressure 
Fails to operate  No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel failure of the 
temperature sensor.[102] 
0.1 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored  
1 3 1 3 
4 False output No effect on system performance   0.1 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored  
1 3 1 3 
5 
Receiver 
Water Input 
Valve 
Provides isolation 
of receiver 
subsystem 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of input water flow to receiver 
panels, causing shut down2 
Water level value input error from remote 
multiplex unit [109] 
 
0.05 
Loss of water flow will be 
sensed as loss of differential 
pressure reading  
4 2 2 16 
6 Leakage 
Loss of input water flow to receiver 
panels, causing shut down2 
There is a power failure either during or 
after the valve closure due to a water leak 
condition, the valve will once again open 
allowing the water leak to continue [110] 
0.05 
Loss of water flow will be 
sensed as loss of differential 
pressure reading  
4 2 2 16 
7 
Filter  
Provides filtration 
of receiver input 
water 
Fails to filter  
Potential impure water in system 
could plug tube orifices3 
Washing the filter failed to reduce the 
background significant; it was thought that 
the background might be due to a strongly 
adsorbed impurity[111] 
0.2 
Sensed as incorrect 
differential  pressure reading 
3 4 2 24 
8 Clogged  
Loss of input water flow to receiver 
panels, causing shut down2 
 The presence of dirt on the wall of 
the column or a clogged filter at the 
top of the column of mercury can 
cause excessive bouncing of the 
column leading to a false increase in 
the blood pressure reading. 
 Wear or damage to the external 
gradation of the column can result in 
an erroneous reading [112] 
 The fluid pressure increases due to a 
clogged filter element [113] 
0.2 
Sensed as incorrect 
differential  pressure reading 
4 4 2 32 
9 Leakage 
Loss of input water flow to receiver 
panels, causing shut down2 
0.2 
Sensed as incorrect 
differential  pressure reading 
4 4 2 32 
10 
Receiver 
Water Inlet 
Valve  
Controls the flow 
of receiver 
feedwater to the 
preheater panels 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of input water flow to receiver 
panels, causing shut down2 
Water level value input error from remote 
multiplex unit [109] 
0.05 Loss of water flow will be 
sensed as loss of panel 
pressure 
4 2 2 16 
11 Leakage 
Loss of input water flow to receiver 
panels, causing shut down2 
0.05 
Loss of water flow will be 
sensed as loss of panel 
pressure 
4 2 2 16 
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12 
Inlet Check 
Value 
Prevent backflow 
in the receiver 
feedwater line 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of input water to receiver 
panels, causing shutdown of 
receiver 
The excess flow check valve fails [114]. 0.04 
 Loss of water flow will be 
sensed as loss of panel 
pressure 
4 1 2 8 
13 Leakage 
Loss of input water to receiver 
panels, causing shutdown of 
receiver 
Improper seating Inherent characteristics 
of that design Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
0.04 
Loss of water flow will be 
sensed as loss of panel 
pressure 
4 1 2 8 
14 Fails to check 
Would not prevent backflow of 
water from panels in the event of 
failure-mode condition 
This is because leakage increases with 
decreasing evaporation temperature for a 
given valve opening. The implication of 
the ambient dependence is that a check 
valve leakage fault should be easier to 
detect at lower ambient conditions when 
its effect is more significant (even causing 
shutting down at higher fault levels) [115] 
0.04 
 
 
 
 
 
Undetectable prior to event  2 1 5 10 
15 Differential 
Pressure 
Transmitter  
Measures pressure 
drop across input 
filter 
Fails to operate  No effect on system performance Diaphragm does not bear uniformly 
against the cavity surface during 
overpressure conditions.[116]  
0.1 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration  
1 3 4 12 
16 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration  
1 3 4 12 
17 
Receiver 
Water 
Preheater 
Drain Valves 
Provides for the 
draining of the 
receiver preheater 
panels 
Fail to lose or 
remain closed 
during operation 
Loss of input water flow to receiver 
boiler panels, causing shutdown of 
receiver Control circuit failure 
Loss of electric power to motor 
Electric motor failure[99] 
0.154 
Loss of water flow will be 
sensed as loss of panel 
pressure 
4 3 2 24 
18 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
during draining 
Inability to drain panel could result 
in freezing during could night which 
would result in shut down of 
receiver 
0.154 Valve position is monitored  5 3 1 15 
19 
Receiver 
Preheater 
Panels  
Provides for initial 
heating of receiver 
water  
Blockage or 
restricted flow of 
single tube 
No effect on system performance 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.167 IR scanning system  1 3 2 6 
20 Leakage No effect on system performance 0.167 Visual inspection  1 3 4 12 
21 Overheating 
Potential permanent damage to 
panel, resulting in shutdown of 
receiver 
0.167 Output temperature is sensed 5 3 2 30 
22 
Preheater 
Panel Relief 
Valves 
Prevent preheater 
overpressure 
Fail to operate 
when required 
Potential safety hazard due to 
overpressure Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
panel pressure monitors  
3 3 1 9 
23 Leakage 
Reduced flow of water in system, 
resulting in shutdown of receiver 
0.133 
Loss of water flow will be 
sensed by panel pressure 
monitors  
5 3 2 30 
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24 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measures preheater 
panel water 
temperature 
Fails to operate  No effect on system performance  
Temperature and Pressure sensors and 
specific field operation strategy and 
control system will be tried to overcome 
the well-known problem of superheating 
in this pilot central receiver system [108] 
0.057 
Downstream temperature is 
monitored   
1 2 1 2 
25 False output No effect on system performance  0.057 
Downstream temperature is 
monitored   
1 2 1 2 
26 
Differential 
Pressure 
Transmitter  
Measures the 
differential 
pressure across the 
receiver preheater 
panels 
Fails to operate  No effect on system performance  
Temperature and Pressure sensors and 
specific field operation strategy and 
control system will be tried to overcome 
the well-known problem of superheating 
in this pilot central receiver system [108] 
0.1 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration  
1 3 4 12 
27 False output No effect on system performance  0.1 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
1 3 4 12 
28 
Preheater 
panel Output 
Valve 
Provides isolation 
of preheater panels 
from boiler panels 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of receiver water flow, causing 
shutdown of receiver 
Vent valve failures, post seal or jar/cover 
seal leaks; water or hydrogen loss through 
the plastic jar or cover; or performance 
problems, such as poor recombination, 
with direct loss of hydrogen and oxygen 
through the vent; or the more subtle loss of 
water by positive grid corrosion with 
consequent hydrogen evolution all should 
result in an decrease in conductance as the 
cell loses water[117] 
0.167 
Loss of water flow will be 
sensed by monitors such as 
boiler-panel flow rate 
5 3 2 30 
29 Leakage 
Loss of receiver water flow to boiler 
panels, causing shutdown of receiver 
0.167 
Loss of water flow will be 
sensed by monitors such as 
boiler-panel flow rate 
5 3 2 30 
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30 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measures preheater 
panel output water 
temperature 
Fails to operate  No effect on system performance Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature 
sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Downstream temperature is 
monitored  
1 2 1 2 
31 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Downstream temperature is 
monitored  
1 2 1 2 
32 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measures preheater 
panel output water 
pressure 
Fails to operate  No effect on system performance  Diaphragm does not bear uniformly 
against the cavity surface during 
overpressure conditions.[116] 
0.1 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored  
1 3 1 3 
33 False output No effect on system performance  0.1 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored  
1 3 1 3 
34 
Flow Rate 
Transmitters 
Measures boiler 
panel input water 
flow rate 
Fails to operate 
Failure of a flow meter will result in 
an alarm and/or RS shutdown  Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.2 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration  
3 4 4 48 
35 False output 
Failure of a flow meter will result in 
an alarm and/or RS shutdown 
0.2 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration  
3 4 4 48 
36 
Boiler Panel 
Control 
Valves 
Provides for 
individual boiler 
panel water flow 
rate control 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of receiver water flow to boiler 
panels, causing shutdown of receiver 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Loss of water flow will be sensed 
by flowmeter 
4 3 2 24 
37 Leakage 
Loss of receiver water flow to boiler 
panels, causing shutdown of receiver 
Packing seal or gasket failures.[118] 0.133 
Loss of water flow will be sensed 
by flowmeter 
4 3 2 24 
38 
Fails to provide 
proper control 
Potential loss of proper water flow to 
boiler panel, resulting in shutdown of 
receiver  
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
Packing seal or gasket failures.[118] 
0.133 
Loss of proper water flow will be 
sensed by flowmeter  
5 3 2 30 
39 
Filter 
Provide for 
filtration of boiler 
panel input water 
Fails to filter  
Possibility of impure water entering 
boiler panel leading to plugged orifice  
Washing the filter failed to reduce 
the background significant; it was 
thought that the background might 
be due to a strongly adsorbed 
impurity[111] 
0.2 
May be sensed as improper 
differential pressure 
3 4 3 36 
40 Clogged  
Loss of receiver water flow to boiler 
panels, causing shutdown of receiver 
0.2 
Sensed as improper differential 
pressure 
4 4 2 32 
41 Leakage 
Loss of receiver water flow to boiler 
panels, causing shutdown of receiver 
0.2 
Sensed as improper differential 
pressure 
4 4 2 32 
42 Differential 
Pressure 
Transmitter  
Measure pressure 
drop across boiler 
panel input filter 
Fails to operate  No effect on system performance  Diaphragm does not bear uniformly 
against the cavity surface during 
overpressure conditions.[116]  
0.1 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration  
1 3 4 12 
43 False output No effect on system performance  0.1 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration  
1 3 4 12 
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44 
Boiler Panel 
Input Stop 
Check Valves 
Provides for 
isolation of boiler 
panels 
Fails to open or 
remain open  
Loss of water flow to boiler panel, 
resulting in shutdown of receiver 
Obturator guide wear, erosion, corrosion 
Equalizer plugged Obturator wear, 
erosion, corrosion Seat corrosion 
Foreign material [119] 
 
0.133 
 
Loss of water flow will be 
sensed by flowmeter 
5 3 3 45 
45 Leakage 
Loss of water flow to boiler panel, 
resulting in shutdown of receiver2 
body wear, erosion, corrosion 
Body rupture, Fastener loosening, 
breakage. Cap or bonnet seal 
deterioration [119] 
 
0.133 
Loss of water flow will be 
sensed by flowmeter 
5 3 2 30 
46 Fails to check  
Would not prevent backflow of 
water from panels in the event of 
failure-mode condition 
Obturator guide wear, erosion, corrosion 
Body wear, erosion, corrosion 
Obturator wear, erosion, corrosion 
Seat wear, erosion, corrosion [119] 
0.133 Undetectable prior to event 2 3 5 30 
47 
Boiler Panel 
Drain Valves 
Provides for the 
draining of the 
receiver boiler 
panels 
Fail to close or 
remain closed 
during operation 
Loss of input water flow to boiler 
panel, resulting in shutdown of 
receiver 
Ice or hydrate formation[120] 
0.154 
Loss of water flow will be 
sensed by panel pressure 
monitors  
5 3 2 30 
48 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
during draining 
Inability to drain panel could result 
in freezing during could night which 
would result in shut down of 
receiver 
0.154 Valve position is monitored 4 3 1 12 
49 
Boiler Panels  
Provides for the 
draining of the 
receiver boiler 
panels 
Blockage or 
restricted flow of 
single tube 
No effect on system performance  
Contaminants or debris in the boilers 
system that ingress into the heat 
exchanger will often be deposited on its 
surface and intensify corrosion which 
can lead to a leakage. 
0.154 IR scanning system  1 3 2 6 
50 Leakage No effect on system performance  0.154 Visual inspection  1 3 4 12 
51 Overheating 
Potential permanent damage to 
panel, resulting in shutdown of 
receiver 
Quantity and fashion of counter-flow in 
the operation The pressure difference in 
the air box Downward inclination of the 
secondary air injection.[121] 
0.154 
 
Incorrect output temperature 
sensed 
5 3 2 30 
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52 Temperature 
Transmitter  
Measure boiler 
panel wall 
temperature 
Fails to operate  No effect on system performance  Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature 
sensor.[102] 
0.057 Downstream temperature is monitored  1 2 1 2 
53 False output No effect on system performance  0.057 Downstream temperature is monitored 1 2 1 2 
54 Flow Orifices  
Provide flow 
stability within 
each receiver boiler 
panel 
Blockage or 
restricted flow of 
single tube 
Reduced flow of water in system, 
resulting in shutdown of receiver  
Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 0.25 Panel temperatures are monitored 5 4 1 20 
55 Heat Flux 
Sensors 
Sense the heat flux 
in the receiver 
panels 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance Environments will make the shift to 
higher temperatures occur 
incrementally.[94] 
0.167 Panel temperatures are monitored 1 3 1 3 
56 Fail output No effect on system performance  0.167 Panel temperatures are monitored 1 3 1 3 
57 
Moisture 
Separator 
Removes any 
residual water in 
the superheated 
steam leaving the 
boiler panels 
Clogged or 
leakage 
Reduced steam flow to 
downcomer, causing shutdown of 
receiver  
Air is normally passed through a 
moisture separator which filters 
water and other contaminants out of 
the air flow[122] 
0.04 
Loss of flow will be sensed by 
flowmeter 
4 1 2 8 
58 Fail to operate 
Potential for water into 
downcomer 
0.04 Downstream pressure is monitored  3 1 1 3 
59 
Moisture 
separator to 
receiver 
Accumulator 
Input Valve  
Provides for 
isolation of the 
moisture separator 
manifold 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Inability to drain any removed 
water to the accumulator leading 
to potential low quality steam in 
system 
Water level value input error from 
remote multiplex unit [109] 
 
0.05 
Valve is normally open: inadvertent 
closure will be sensed by level 
transmitter.  
3 2 2 12 
60 
Moisture 
Separator 
Vent Valve 
Provides capability 
to vent both the 
moisture separators 
and the receiver 
boiler panels 
Fails to close or 
remain closed 
during operation  
Loss of steam flow, resulting in 
shut down of receiver  
Vent valve failures, post seal or 
jar/cover seal leaks; water or 
hydrogen loss through the plastic jar 
or cover; or performance problems, 
such as poor recombination, with 
direct loss of hydrogen and oxygen 
through the vent; or the more subtle 
loss of water by positive grid 
corrosion with consequent hydrogen 
evolution all should result in an 
decrease in conductance as the cell 
loses water[117] 
0.0285 Downstream pressure is monitored  5 1 1 5 
61 
Fails to open or 
remain open when 
required 
Unable to vent system in normal 
manner; system can be vented 
through start-up loop 
0.0285 Valve position is monitored 3 1 1 3 
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62 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measure output 
steam temperature 
and provide boiler-
panel output water 
flow control 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Incorrect output will be sensed by 
other temperature monitors 
1 2 2 4 
63 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Incorrect output will be sensed by 
other temperature monitors 
1 2 2 4 
64 
Receiver 
controllers 
Controls position 
by sensing 
temperature of 
boiler output steam 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Improper water flow to boiler, 
resulting in shutdown of receiver 
Transmission errors in the design of such 
applications because the consequences of 
such disturbances are potentially 
disastrous. [123] 
 
0.043 
 
Loss of flow will be sensed by 
flowmeter 
5 2 2 20 
65 
Liquid Level 
transmitter 
Provides means to 
drain receiver 
accumulator 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The engine was virtually destroyed. Also, 
there have been numerous incidents of 
sensor failures which caused component 
damage, unnecessary shutdowns and 
delays of the program.[88] 
 
0.15 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 3 4 12 
66 False output No effect on system performance 
0.15 
 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 3 4 12 
67 
Receiver 
Accumulator 
Drain Valve 
Restricts flow in 
receiver 
accumulator drain 
line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Inability to drain any water 
contained in the accumulator Control circuit failure 
Loss of electric power to motor 
Electric motor failure[99] 
0.154 Water level is monitored 3 3 1 9 
68 Fails to check No effect on system performance 0.154 Water level is monitored 1 3 1 3 
69 Leakage No effect on system performance 0.154 Visual inspection 1 3 4 12 
70 
Receiver 
Accumulator 
Drain Orifice 
Restricts flow in 
receiver 
accumulator drain 
line 
Blockage No effect on system performance Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 0.111 Water level is monitored 1 3 1 3 
71 
Downcomer 
Manifold Vent 
Valves 
Allows for venting 
of manifold 
Fails to close or 
remain closed during 
operation 
Loss of steam flow, resulting in shut 
down of receiver 
Vent valve failures, post seal or jar/cover 
seal leaks; water or hydrogen loss through 
the plastic jar or cover; or performance 
problems, such as poor recombination, 
with direct loss of hydrogen and oxygen 
through the vent; or the more subtle loss of 
water by positive grid corrosion with 
consequent hydrogen evolution all should 
result in an decrease in conductance as the 
cell loses water[117] 
0.167 
Loss of flow will be sensed by 
output pressure transmitter 
5 3 2 30 
72 
Fails to open or 
remain open during 
venting operation 
Unable to vent system in normal 
manner; system can be vented 
through start-up loop 
0.167 
Condition will be sensed by 
output pressure transmitter 
3 3 2 18 
73 
Downcomer 
Manifold 
Relief Valves 
Prevent manifold 
overpressure 
Fails to operate when 
required 
Potential safety hazard due to 
overpressure Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
output pressure transmitter 
3 3 2 18 
74 
Leakage 
Loss of flow will be sensed by output 
pressure transmitter 
0.133 
Loss of flow will be sensed by 
output pressure transmitter 
3 3 2 18 
75 No effect on system performance 0.133 Water level is monitored 1 3 1 3 
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76 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measure manifold 
output pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance  Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over time.[124] 
 
0.1 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored  
1 3 1 3 
77 Fails to output No effect on system performance  0.1 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored  
1 3 1 3 
78 
Temperature 
Transmitter  
Measure manifold 
output 
temperature  
Fails to operate No effect on system performance  
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by other temperature monitors 
1 2 2 4 
79 Fails to output No effect on system performance  0.057 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by other temperature monitors 
1 2 2 4 
80 
Downcomer 
Input Valve 
Controls flow of 
superheated steam 
to downcomer 
Fails to open or 
remain open during 
venting operation 
Loss of steam flow, resulting in 
shut down of receiver 
Water level value input error from 
remote multiplex unit [109] 
 
0.05 
Valve position is monitored 5 2 1 10 
81 Leakage 
Loss of steam flow, resulting in 
shut down of receiver 
0.05 Valve position is monitored 5 2 1 10 
82 
Fails to close or 
remain closed 
during operation  
Potential ingestion of low-quality 
steam by turbine  
0.05 Valve position is monitored 3 2 1 6 
83 
Flash Tank 
Input Valve 
Controls flow of 
low-temperature 
steam to flash 
tank 
Fails to open or 
remain open during 
venting operation 
Unable to start system, resulting 
in loss of receiver usage; potential 
ingestion of low quality steam by 
turbine  
The major failures of the storage tanks 
are due to over- filling, over-
pressurization, sucking in, 
explosion/fires, floating roof accidents 
etc. [125] 
0.05 Tank conditions are monitored 3 2 1 6 
84 
Fails to close or 
remain closed 
during operation  
Reduced steam flow to 
downcomer, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver 
0.05 Tank conditions are monitored 5 2 1 10 
85 
Flash Tank 
Input Valve 
Provides low of 
flow pressure 
differential for 
control system 
Fails to open or 
remain open during 
venting operation 
Reduced control of flow to 
downcomer, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver  
The main cause of the rupture of the 
tank could be attributed to over-
pressurization[125]. 
0.05 
Input valve performance 
monitored 
5 2 1 10 
86 
Fails to close or 
remain closed 
during operation  
Reduced steam flow to 
downcomer, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver  
0.05 
Input valve performance 
monitored 
5 2 1 10 
87 Flash Tank 
Input Flow 
orifice 
Restricts the flow 
in the flash tank 
input line 
Blockage  
Reduce control of flash tank input 
valve  
Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 
0.25 
Input valve performance 
monitored 
3 4 1 12 
88 Leakage 
Reduced control of flash tank 
input value  
0.25 
Input valve performance 
monitored 
3 4 1 12 
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89 
Receiver 
Flash tank 
Provides for 
draining of low-
temperature steam 
Structural failure  No effect on system performance   The major failures of the 
storage tanks are due to over- 
filling, over-pressurization, 
sucking in, explosion/fires, 
floating roof accidents etc.  
 The main cause of the rupture of 
the tank could be attributed to 
over-pressurization[125]. 
0.033 Tank conditions are monitored 
1
1 
1
1 
1
1 
1
1 
90 Blockage 
Inability to drain low temperature 
steam during start-up, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver  
0.033 Tank conditions are monitored 
5
5 
1
1 
1
1 
5
5 
91 
Flash Tank 
Relief Valve  
Prevent flash tank 
overpressure 
Fails to operate 
when required 
Potential safety hazard due to 
overpressure  
Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.133 Tank conditions are monitored 
3
3 
3
3 
1
1 
9
9 
92 Leakage No effect on system performance  0.133 Tank conditions are monitored 
1
1 
3
3 
1
1 
3
3 
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93 
Pressure 
Transmitters  
Measure flash tank 
pressure and provide 
for control system 
during start-up 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 Dual sensors 1 3 2 6 
94 False output No effect on system performance  0.1 Dual sensors 1 3 2 6 
95 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measure flash 
tank steam 
temperature 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance  
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration  
1 2 4 8 
96 False output No effect on system performance  0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration  
1 2 4 8 
97 
Liquid Level 
transmitter 
Measure flash 
tank water level  
Fail to operate No effect on system performance  The engine was virtually destroyed. Also, 
there have been numerous incidents of 
sensor failures which caused component 
damage, unnecessary shutdowns and 
delays of the program.[88] 
0.15 Valve position is monitored 1 3 1 3 
98 False output No effect on system performance  0.15 Valve position is monitored 1 3 1 3 
99 
Flash Tank 
Pressure 
Control Valve 
Provides receiver 
back pressure 
control for start-
up  
Fails closed Difficulty in start-up  
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 Valve position is monitored 3 3 1 9 
100 Leakage No effect on system performance  0.133 Valve position is monitored 1 3 1 3 
101 Fails open Unable to start up receiver  0.133 Valve position is monitored 3 3 1 9 
102 
Flash Tank 
Output Valve 
Provides low flow 
pressure 
differential for 
control system 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Reduced control of flash tank output 
valve  
The major failures of the storage tanks are 
due to over- filling, over-pressurization, 
sucking in, explosion/fires, floating roof 
accidents etc. [125] 
0.05 
Condition will be sensed by 
monitors 
2 2 1 4 
103 Blockage No effect on system performance  0.05 
Condition will be sensed by 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
104 
Pressure 
Control 
Regulate nitrogen 
pressure to the 
receiver preheater 
panels 
Fails to regulate  No effect on system performance   
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.043 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure gauge 
1 2 2 4 
105 Fails closed 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater 
panels; this leads to potential freezing 
which causes loss of the receiver  
0.043 
Loss of nitrogen flow will be 
sensed by pressure gauge 
3 2 2 12 
106 Leakage 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater 
panels; this leads to potential freezing 
which causes loss of the receiver  
0.043 
Loss of nitrogen flow will be 
sensed by pressure gauge 
3 2 2 12 
107 
Control Valve  
Control nitrogen 
flow to preheater 
panels 
Fails to operate 
when required 
Loss of nitrogen backfill capability  
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.033 
Condition will be sensed by 
downstream pressure gauge 
3 3 2 18 
108 Leakage 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater 
panels; this leads to potential freezing 
which causes loss of the receiver  
Packing seal or gasket failures.[118] 0.033 
Loss of nitrogen flow will be sensed 
by downstream pressure gauge 
3 3 2 18 
109 
Pressure 
Sensor 
Measure nitrogen 
line pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance  
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.125 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by other pressure sensors 
1 3 2 6 
110 False output No effect on system performance  0.15 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by other pressure sensors 
1 3 2 6 
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111 
Pressure 
Gauge 
Measure nitrogen 
line pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance  
Extreme temperatures cause sweating 
and loosening in metal joints and 
eventually can cause them to crack. 
Vibration from pumps, motors, and 
other rotating equipment accelerate wear 
and premature failure of internal 
working parts of a pressure gauge, 
Pulsation rapidly cycling medium within 
a pressure system can make a gauge 
pointer move erratically and eventually 
can lead to breakdown of internal 
parts[126] 
 
0.077 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by other pressure sensors 
1 2 2 4 
112 False output No effect on system performance  0.077 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by other pressure sensors 
1 2 2 4 
113 
Control Valve  
Control low-
pressure nitrogen 
flow to the 
receiver preheater 
panels 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
during venting 
operation 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater 
panels; this leads to potential freezing 
which causes loss of the receiver  
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
 
0.133 
Loss of nitrogen flow will be 
sensed by pressure gauge 
3 3 2 18 
114 Blockage  
Unable to backfill receiver preheater 
panels; this leads to potential freezing 
which causes loss of the receiver 
Incorrect supply pressure fault[83] 0.133 
Loss of nitrogen flow will be 
sensed by pressure gauge 
3 3 2 18 
115 
Check Valves 
Prevent backflow 
of water into 
nitrogen lines 
Fails closed 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater 
panels; this leads to potential freezing 
which causes loss of the receiver  Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination[79] 
0.04 
Loss of nitrogen flow will be 
sensed by pressure gauge 
3 1 2 6 
116 Leakage 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater 
panels; this leads to potential freezing 
which causes loss of the receiver  
0.04 
Loss of nitrogen flow will be 
sensed by pressure gauge 
3 1 2 6 
117 Fail to check No effect on system performance  0.04 Undetectable  1 1 5 5 
118 
Panel Vent 
Valve 
Provides for 
venting of 
preheater panels 
during fill 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Unable to vent preheater panels, 
resulting in loss of receiver  
Vent valve failures, post seal or 
jar/cover seal leaks; water or hydrogen 
loss through the plastic jar or cover; or 
performance problems, such as poor 
recombination, with direct loss of 
hydrogen and oxygen through the vent; 
or the more subtle loss of water by 
positive grid corrosion with consequent 
hydrogen evolution all should result in 
an decrease in conductance as the cell 
loses water[117] 
0.0285 
Condition will be sensed by 
panel pressure measurement 
3 1 2 6 
119 
Leakage during 
nitrogen purge 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater 
panels; this leads to potential freezing 
which causes loss of the receiver  
0.0285 
Loss of nitrogen flow will be 
sensed by pressure gauge 
3 1 2 6 
120 
Leakage during 
normal 
operation 
Loss of proper water flow through 
panels, causing shutdown of receiver 
0.0285 
Loss of proper water flow will 
be sensed by flowmeter  
5 1 2 10 
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121 
Pressure 
Sensor 
Measures nitrogen 
line pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Incidents of sensor failures which 
caused component damage, unnecessary 
shutdowns and delays of the 
program[88] 
0.125 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by other pressure sensors 
1 3 2 6 
122 False output No effect on system performance 0.125 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by other pressure sensors 
1 3 2 6 
123 
Pressure 
Gauge 
Measure nitrogen 
system output 
pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Extreme temperatures cause sweating and 
loosening in metal joints and eventually 
can cause them to crack. Vibration from 
pumps, motors, and other rotating 
equipment accelerate wear and premature 
failure of internal working parts of a 
pressure gauge, Pulsation rapidly cycling 
medium within a pressure system can make 
a gauge pointer move erratically and 
eventually can lead to breakdown of 
internal parts[126] 
0.077 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by other pressure sensors 
1 2 2 4 
124 False output No effect on system performance 0.077 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by other pressure sensors 
1 2 2 4 
125 
Check Valves 
Prevent backflow 
into nitrogen 
system 
Fail closed 
Unable to backfill receiver boiler 
panels; this leads to potential freezing 
which causes loss of the receiver Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination[79] 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure gauge 
3 1 2 6 
126 Leakage 
Unable to backfill receiver boiler 
panels; this leads to potential freezing 
which causes loss of the receiver 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure gauge 
3 1 2 6 
127 Fail to check No effect on system performance1 0.04 Undetectable  1 1 5 5 
128 
Air control 
valve 
Controls air to 
valve operators 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of air flow, resulting in loss of 
receiver subsystem 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure sensor 
3 3 2 18 
129 Leakage 
Loss of air flow, resulting in loss of 
receiver subsystem 
Packing seal or gasket failures.[118] 0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure sensor 
3 3 2 18 
130 
Check Valves 
Prevents back 
flow into air 
supply 
Fail closed 
Loss of air flow, resulting in loss of 
receiver subsystem 
Improper seating Inherent characteristics 
of design Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination[79] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure sensor 
3 3 2 18 
131 Leakage 
Loss of air flow, resulting in loss of 
receiver subsystem 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure sensor 
3 3 2 18 
132 
Pressure 
Sensor  
Measure air 
system line 
pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Incidents of sensor failures which 
caused component damage, unnecessary 
shutdowns and delays of the 
program[88] 
0.125 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration  
1 3 3 9 
133 False output No effect on system performance 0.125 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration  
1 3 3 9 
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1 
Thermal-
Storage unit 
Containment for 
thermal-energy 
storage media 
Tank rupture 
Potential safety hazard; loss of thermal 
capability 
Poor Soldering, Shell Distortion, Poor 
Fabrication, Corrosion [127]  
0.025 Visual inspection 5 1 4 20 
2 Loss of fluid 
Decreased thermal-storage capability 
could lead to inability of system to meet 
energy requirements 
Environment attack such as corrosion, 
pitting and oxidation of heater[128] 
0.025 Fluid level within the tank is 
monitored  
4 1 1 4 
3 
De-
superheater 
Acts  as a buffer to 
thermal-storage 
subsystem by 
reducing the 
temperature of the 
steam being supplied  
Structural failure 
Potential safety hazard; failure would 
result in loss of thermal-storage 
charging capability  Vibration at full load 
 Pitting corrosion 
 Contamination [129] 
0.02 
Visual inspection41 5 1 4 20 
4 
Water injection 
nozzles clogged  
Inability to reduce steam temperature 
resulting in potential degradation of 
thermal-storage fluid and or damage to 
thermal storage heaters 
0.02 
Output temperature is 
monitored  
4 1 1 4 
5 
De-super 
heater Water-
input shutoff 
valve 
Provides subsystem 
isolation 
Fails to open or 
remain open  
Inability to reduce steam temperature 
resulting in potential degradation of 
thermal-storage fluid and or damage to 
thermal storage heaters 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear[81] 
0.083 Loss of flow will be sensed 
by flowmeter 
4 2 2 16 
6 Leakage 
Inability to reduce steam temperature 
resulting in potential degradation of 
thermal-storage fluid and or damage to 
thermal storage heaters 
0.083 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by flowmeter  
4 2 2 16 
7 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measure input water 
temperature 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Downstream temperature is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
8 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Downstream temperature is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
9 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measure input water 
temperature 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
sensors 
1 3 2 6 
10 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
sensors 
1 3 2 6 
11 
Pressure 
Gauge 
Measure de-
superheater input 
water pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
 Extreme temperatures cause sweating 
and loosening in metal joints and 
eventually can cause them to crack. 
 Vibration from pumps, motors, and 
other rotating equipment accelerate 
wear and premature failure of internal 
working parts of a pressure gauge. 
 Pulsation rapidly cycling medium 
within a pressure system can make a 
gauge pointer move erratically and 
eventually lead to breakdown of 
internal parts.[126] 
0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
sensors 
1 2 2 4 
12 False output No effect on system performance 0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
sensors 
1 2 2 4 
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13 Shutoff Valve 
Provides interface to 
drain system for the 
desuperheater 
Fails open or 
leakage 
Loss of proper system flow, resulting 
in loss of thermal-storage charging 
capability 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear[81] 
0.083 
Loss of proper system flow 
will be sensed by 
downstream pressure 
gauge21 
3 2 2 12 
14 
Water-Flow 
Control Valve 
Controls the flow of 
cooling water to the 
desuperheater 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Inability to reduce steam temperature 
resulting in potential degradation of 
thermal-storage fluid and or damage to 
thermal storage heaters 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage. 
 
0.133 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by flowmeter21 
4 3 2 24 
15 Leakage 
Inability to reduce steam temperature 
resulting in potential degradation of 
thermal-storage fluid and or damage to 
thermal storage heaters 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
flowmeter21 
4 3 2 24 
16 
Flow-Rate 
Transmitter 
Measures input-water 
flow rate 
Fails to operate 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in 
an alarm and shutdown Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.2 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored11 
4 4 1 16 
17 False output 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in 
an alarm and shutdown 
0.2 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored11 
4 4 1 16 
18 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow of 
cooling water 
Fails closed 
Inability to reduce steam temperature 
resulting in potential degradation of 
thermal-storage fluid and or damage to 
thermal storage heaters Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
 
0.04 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by flowmeter 21 
3 1 2 6 
19 Leakage 
Inability to reduce steam temperature 
resulting in potential degradation of 
thermal-storage fluid and or damage to 
thermal storage heaters 
0.04 
 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored11 
3 1 1 3 
20 Fails to check 
will not prevent backflow of water in a 
failure-mode condition 
 
Undetectable prior to 
event51 
2 1 5 10 
21 
Desuper 
heater Steam-
Input Shutoff 
Valve 
Provides subsystem 
isolation 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage charging 
capability 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear[81] 
0.083 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by flowmeter 21 
3 2 2 12 
22 Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage charging 
capability 
0.083 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by flowmeter 21 
3 2 2 12 
23 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
Measure input steam 
pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors11 
1 3 1 3 
24 False output 
False high output could cause 
decreased capability and shutdown 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors11 
4 3 1 12 
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25 Steam-Flow 
Control Valve 
Controls flow of 
receiver steam to 
desuperheater 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage charging 
capability Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by flowmeter  
3 3 2 18 
26 Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage charging 
capability 
0.133 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by flowmeter  
3 3 2 18 
27 
Steam-Flow 
Input Valve 
Used during start up 
to warm up the 
system 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
No effect on system performance 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear[81] 
0.05 
Input valve performance 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
28 Leakage 
Reduced thermal-storage charging 
capability due to input reduction 
 
0.05 
Input valve performance 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
29 
Flow-Rate 
Transmitter 
Measure steam flow 
rate to the 
desuperheater 
Fails to operate 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in 
an alarm and shutdown Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.2 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
4 4 1 16 
30 False output 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in 
an alarm and shutdown 
0.2 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
4 4 1 16 
31 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measure 
desuperheater output 
temperature 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Sensed by other temperature 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
32 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Sensed by other temperature 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
33 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measure 
desuperheater input 
temperature 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Sensed by other temperature 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
34 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Sensed by other temperature 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
35 
Thermal-
Storage Heater 
Shutoff Valves 
Provides isolation for 
thermal storage 
heaters 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability 
to fulfil total energy requirements 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear[81] 
 
0.083 
Flow in each loop is 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
36 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability 
to fulfil total energy requirements 
0.083 
Flow in each loop is 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
37 
Y-Type 
strainers 
Allows for system 
flush 
Leakage or 
Blockage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability 
to fulfil total energy requirements 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear[81] 
 
0.033 
 
 
Flow in each loop is 
monitored 
3 1 1 3 
38 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
Measure thermal-
storage heater input 
pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
39 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
126                                                                                                                                                                                                       Appendices 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Thermal Storage Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Tank unit 
Sheet 4 of 13 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
40 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measure thermal-
storage heater input 
pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Sensed by other temperature 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
41 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Sensed by other temperature 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
42 
Pressure 
Gauges 
Measure system 
pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
 Extreme temperatures cause sweating and 
loosening in metal joints and eventually 
can cause them to crack. 
 Vibration from pumps, motors, and other 
rotating equipment accelerate wear and 
premature failure of internal working 
parts of a pressure gauge. 
 Pulsation rapidly cycling medium within 
a pressure system can make a gauge 
pointer move erratically and eventually 
lead to breakdown of internal parts.[126] 
0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
43 False output No effect on system performance 0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
44 
Flow Rate 
Transmitters 
Measure system 
pressure 
Fail to operate 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in 
an alarm and shutdown Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.2 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
4 4 4 64 
45 False output 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in 
an alarm and shutdown 
0.2 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
4 4 4 64 
46 
Thermal 
Storage Heater 
Input Valves 
Control input to 
thermal-storage heaters 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability 
to fulfil total energy requirements 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear[81] 
 
0.05 
Loss of flow will be sensed by 
flowmeter  
3 2 2 12 
47 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability 
to fulfil total energy requirements 
0.05 
Downstream pressure 
measurement 
3 2 2 12 
48 
Pressure 
Regulators 
Maintains system in a 
hot standby condition 
Fail to regulate 
Loss of hot standby capability Sensor failures which caused component 
damage, unnecessary shutdowns and delays 
of the program.[130] 
0.105 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure gauge 
3 3 2 18 
49 No effect on system performance 0.105 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure gauge 
1 3 2 6 
50 
Fail to closed 
Loss of hot standby capability Sensor failures which caused component 
damage, unnecessary shutdowns and delays 
of the program.[130] 
0.105 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure gauge 
3 3 2 18 
51 No effect on system performance 0.105 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure gauge 
1 3 2 6 
52 Leakage 
Inability to reduce steam temperature 
resulting in potential degradation of 
thermal-storage fluid and or damage to 
thermal storage heaters 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.105 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure gauge 
3 3 2 18 
53 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
Measure input pressure 
to thermal-storage 
heater 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working environment 
degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
54 False output 
False high output could cause decreased 
capability and shutdown 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
4 3 1 12 
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55 
Relief Valves 
Provide protection 
from overpressure 
Fail to operate 
when required 
Potential safety hazard; reduction in 
thermal-storage charging capability 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, 
plug small openings, or abrade the 
mating surfaces until a valve 
leaks.[96] 
 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure gauge 
5 3 2 30 
56 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfil total energy requirement 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure gauge 
4 3 2 24 
57 
Thermal 
Storage 
Heaters 
Transfer heat from 
incoming steam to 
thermal-storage heat 
transfer fluid 
Structural failure 
Potential safety hazard; reduction in 
thermal-storage charging capability 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, 
plug small openings, or abrade the 
mating surfaces until a valve 
leaks.[96] 
 
0.067 
 
Visual inspection 5 2 4 40 
58 Internal leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging 
capability; potential mixing of heat 
transfer fluid and steam which would 
result in degradation of the fluid and 
damage to the heater 
The engine was virtually destroyed. 
Also, there have been numerous 
incidents of sensor failures which 
caused component damage, 
unnecessary shutdowns and delays of 
the program.[88] 
 
 
0.067 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal pressure monitors 
4 2 2 16 
59 
Restricted or no 
flow 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfil total energy requirement 
0.067 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal pressure monitors 
4 2 2 16 
60 
Liquid Level 
Transmitters 
Measure the amount 
of moisture within the 
thermal-storage 
heaters and control 
flash tank input valve 
Fail to operate 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfil total energy requirement 
The engine was virtually destroyed. 
Also, there have been numerous 
incidents of sensor failures which 
caused component damage, 
unnecessary shutdowns and delays of 
the program.[88] 
 
 
0.15 
Monitoring system alarm 4 3 1 12 
61 False output 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfil total energy requirement 
0.15 Monitoring system alarm 4 3 1 12 
62 
Shutoff valves 
Provide for isolation 
of the thermal-storage 
heater 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfill total energy requirement 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear[81] 
 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
flowmeter 
4 3 2 24 
63 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfill total energy requirement 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
steam-trap liquid level 
transmitter 
4 3 2 24 
64 
Seal Steam 
Inlet Valves 
Provide for control of 
seal steam to the 
thermal-storage 
heaters 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
No effect on system performance 
Water level value input error from 
remote multiplex unit [109] 
 
0.0625 
Valve position is monitored 1 2 1 2 
65 
Failure of thermal-storage heater 
required before system problem would 
occur 
0.0625 Valve position is monitored 1 2 1 2 
66 
Leakage 
No effect on system performance 
Water level value input error from 
remote multiplex unit [109] 
0.0625 System pressure monitored 1 2 1 2 
67 
Failure of thermal-storage heater required 
before system problem would occur 
0.0625 System pressure monitored 1 2 1 2 
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68 
Stop Check 
Valves 
Prevent reverse flow 
in seal steam line 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
No effect on system performance 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that 
design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 Valve position is monitored 1 1 1 1 
69 
Failure of thermal-storage heater 
required before system problem 
would occur 
0.04 Valve position is monitored 2 1 1 2 
70 
Leakage 
No effect on system performance 0.04 System pressure monitored 1 1 1 1 
71 
Failure of thermal-storage heater 
required before system problem 
would occur 
0.04 System pressure monitored 2 1 1 2 
72 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
Measure pressure in 
blanket steam line 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working environment 
degrade over time.[124] 
 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
73 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
74 
Temperature 
Transmitters 
Measure temperature 
in blanket steam line 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Sensed by other temperature 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
75 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Sensed by other temperature 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
76 Steam traps 
Removes any residual 
steam that any exist in 
thermal-storage 
charging line 
Structural failure 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
capability, leading to possible 
inability to fulfill total energy 
requirements 
In one case the traps are introduced by 
impurities and in one case the traps are 
introduced by bond breaking during high-
voltage stress[93] 
 
 
0.25 
 
Internal liquid level 
monitored 
3 4 1 12 
77 
Liquid Level 
Transmitters 
Measure water level 
within steam trap 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
The engine was virtually destroyed. Also, 
there have been numerous incidents of 
sensor failures which caused component 
damage, unnecessary shutdowns and 
delays of the program.[88] 
0.15 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
1 3 4 12 
78 False output No effect on system performance 0.15 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
1 3 4 12 
79 
Vent Valves 
Allow for venting of 
steam traps to the 
thermal-storage flash 
tank 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Unable to vent steam trap 
Vent valve failures, post seal or jar/cover 
seal leaks; water or hydrogen loss through 
the plastic jar or cover; or performance 
problems, such as poor recombination, with 
direct loss of hydrogen and oxygen through 
the vent; or the more subtle loss of water by 
positive grid corrosion with consequent 
hydrogen evolution all should result in an 
decrease in conductance as the cell loses 
water[117] 
0.0285 Valve position is monitored 3 1 1 3 
80 Leakage No effect on system performance 0.0285 Visual inspection 1 1 4 4 
81 
Flow Orifices 
Control vent flow 
from steam trap 
Blockage Unable to vent steam trap 
Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 
0.25 Trap level is monitored11 3 4 1 12 
82 Leakage No effect on system performance 0.25 Visual inspection 41 1 4 4 16 
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83 
Check Valves 
Prevent Backflow into 
steam trap 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfill total energy requirement 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of 
that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
 
0.04 
 
Trap level is monitored 3 1 1 3 
84 Leakage No effect on system performance 0.04 Visual inspection 1 1 4 4 
85 Fail to check No effect on system performance 0.04 Undetectable prior to event 1 1 5 5 
86 Flash Tank 
Control Valves 
Control the flow from 
the steam trap to the 
thermal-storage flash 
tank 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduce in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfill total energy requirements 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and 
diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 Valve position is monitored 3 3 1 9 
87 Leakage No effect on system performance 0.133 Valve position is monitored 1 3 1 3 
88 
Bypass valves 
Provide a bypass to 
the flash tank for the 
termal-storage heaters 
Fail open 
Reduce in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfill total energy requirements 
The engine was virtually destroyed. 
Also, there have been numerous 
incidents of sensor failures which 
caused component damage, 
unnecessary shutdowns and delays 
of the program.[88] 
 
 
0.033 
 
Heater and flash tank 
pressure are monitored 
3 1 1 3 
89 
Fail closed when 
required 
Potential startup instability, leading to 
possible equipment damage and reduction in 
thermal storage charging capability 
Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 0.033 
Heater and flash tank 
pressure are monitored 
3 1 1 3 
90 
Flow orifices  
Control flow in 
bypass line 
Blockage 
Potential startup instability, leading to 
possible equipment damage and reduction in 
thermal storage charging capabiltiy Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 
0.25 
Heater and flash tank 
pressure are monitored 
3 4 1 12 
91 Leakage No effect on system performance 0.25 Visual inspection 1 4 4 16 
92 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation 
between steam traps 
and thermal-storage 
flash tank 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging 
capability, leading to possible inability 
tofulfill total energy requirement 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
 
0.083 
Tank level is monitored 3 2 1 6 
93 Leakage No effect on system performance 0.083 
Visual inspection and flash 
tank level 
1 2 4 8 
94 
Thermal 
Storage Flash 
Tank 
Provide for draning of 
low thermal energy 
water or steam 
Structural failure 
Potential safety hazard; failure would result 
in loss of thermal-storage charging capability 
The engine was virtually destroyed. 
Also, there have been numerous 
incidents of sensor failures which 
caused component damage, 
unnecessary shutdowns and delays 
of the program.[88] 
 
 
0.033 
 
Internal level is monitored 3 1 1 3 
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95 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measure thermal-
storage flash tank 
pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working environment 
degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 
Pressure also measured 
with a gauge 
1 3 2 6 
96 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Pressure also measured 
with a gauge 
1 3 2 6 
97 
Liquid Level 
Transmitter  
Measure water level 
within the thermal-
storage flash tank and 
controls output valve 
Fails to operate 
Could result in loss of thermal-
storage charging capability 
The engine was virtually destroyed. Also, there 
have been numerous incidents of sensor failures 
which caused component damage, unnecessary 
shutdowns and delays of the program.[88] 
0.15 Monitoring system alarm 2 3 1 6 
98 False output 
Could result in loss of thermal-
storage charging capability 
0.15 Monitoring system alarm 2 3 1 6 
99 
Shutoff Valve 
Provide drain of flash 
tank to condenser 
Fails to open or 
remain open  
Loss of system drain; could result 
in loss of thermal-storage 
charging capability 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Monitoring system alarm 3 2 1 6 
10
0 
Leakage No effect on system performance 0.083 Visual inspection 1 2 4 8 
10
1 
Pressure 
Gauge 
Measure flash tank 
pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
 Extreme temperatures cause sweating and 
loosening in metal joints and eventually can 
cause them to crack. 
 Vibration from pumps, motors, and other 
rotating equipment accelerate wear and 
premature failure of internal working parts of a 
pressure gauge. 
 Pulsation rapidly cycling medium within a 
pressure system can make a gauge pointer move 
erratically and eventually lead to breakdown of 
internal parts.[126] 
0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
10
2 
False output No effect on system performance 0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
10
3 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides interface 
between the thermal-
storage flash tank and 
system drain 
Fails to open or 
remain open  
Unable to drain flash tank 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Flash tank water level 
monitors 
3 2 1 6 
10
4 
No effect on system performance 0.083 
Flash tank water level 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
10
5 
Leakage No effect on system performance 0.083 Visual inspection 1 2 4 8 
10
6 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation for 
thermal storage flash 
tank from drain lines 
to high and low-
pressure heaters 
Fails to open or 
remain open  
Loss of high and low-pressure 
input from flash tank  Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Flash tank water level 
monitors 
3 2 1 6 
10
7 
No effect on system performance 0.083 
Flash tank water level 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
10
8 
Leakage No effect on system performance 0.083 Visual inspection 1 2 4 8 
10
9 
Relief Valves 
Provides protection 
against thermal-
Fails to operate 
when required 
Potential safety hazzard due to 
tank rupture; thermal-storage 
charging capability would be lost 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug small 
openings, or abrade the mating surfaces until a 
valve leaks.[96] 
0.133 
Tank pressure is 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
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0 
storage flash tank 
overpressure  
Leakage No effect on system performance 0.133 
Tank pressure is 
monitored 
1 3 1 3 
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11
1 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation of 
thermal storage unit 
Fails to open or 
remain open  
Loss of thermal-storage oil flow 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
11
2 
Leakage or 
Blockage 
Loss of thermal-storage oil flow; 
potential safety hazard due to 
escaping fluid 
0.083 
Reduced line pressure and 
visual inspection 
4 2 4 32 
11
3 Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measure thermal-
storage unit fluid 
temperature bottom 
manifold 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
11
4 
False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
11
5 
Output Valve 
Controls Fluid output 
of thermal Storage 
unit 
Fails to open or 
remain open  
Loss of  thermal-storage oil flow 
Water level value input error from remote 
multiplex unit [109] 
 
0.05 
Valve position is monitored 3 2 1 6 
11
6 
Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage oil flow; 
potential safety hazard due to 
escaping fluid 
0.05 
Visual inspection and reduce 
line pressure 
4 2 3 24 
11
7 
Isolation 
Valves 
Provide isolation for 
fluid filters  
Fail to open or 
remain open 
No effect on system performance 
Water level value input error from remote 
multiplex unit [109] 
0.047 Line pressure is sensed  1 2 1 2 
11
8 
Leakage 
Potential loss of some fluid  
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.047 
Reduced line pressure and 
visual inspection 
2 2 3 12 
11
9 
No effect on system performance 
Water level value input error from remote 
multiplex unit [109] 
0.047 
Reduced line pressure and 
visual inspection 
1 2 3 6 
12
0 
Filters 
Filter thermal-storage 
fluid 
Fail to filter 
Potential particulates in system 
which could lead to a reduction in 
thermal-storage charging capability 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.2 
Differential pressures across 
the filters are monitored 
2 4 2 16 
12
1 
Clogged No effect on system performance 
There are two types of leakages 
Internal or cross-port leakage at the piston 
seal and, External leakage at the shaft seal 
or the connecting pipes.[97] 
0.2 
Differential pressures across 
the filters are monitored 
1 4 2 8 
12
2 
Leakage 
Potential loss of some fluid  
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive  
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.2 
Differential pressures across 
the filters are monitored 
2 4 2 16 
12
3 
No effect on system performance 0.2 
Differential pressures across 
the filters are monitored 
1 4 2 8 
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124 
Differential 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
and Pressure 
Gauges 
Measure pressure drop 
across fluid filters 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
 Extreme temperatures cause 
sweating and loosening in metal 
joints and eventually can cause 
them to crack. 
 Vibration from pumps, motors, 
and other rotating equipment 
accelerate wear and premature 
failure of internal working parts of 
a pressure gauge. 
 Pulsation rapidly cycling medium 
within a pressure system can make 
a gauge pointer move erratically 
and eventually lead to breakdown 
of internal parts.[126] 
0.077 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
125 False output No effect on system performance 0.077 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
126 
Shutoff valves 
Provide for isolation of 
the thermal-transfer-
media pumps 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfill total 
energy requirement; may starve 
pump 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
 
 
0.083 
Line pressure is monitored 3 2 1 6 
127 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfill total 
energy requirements; may starve 
pump; potential loss of some fluid  
0.083 Line pressure is monitored 3 2 1 6 
128 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
Measure thermal-
transfer-media pumps 
inlet pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 3 1 3 
0129 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Downstream pressure 
measurement 
1 3 1 3 
130 
Charging Loop 
Thermal 
Transfer media 
pumps 
Pump thermal-storage 
transfer fluid through 
the charging loop 
Fail to operate 
when required  
Reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfil total 
energy requirements 
The pump did not fail for the first few 
months of operation when operating 
pressure was kept below 70 bar, 
problems began to appear as soon as 
pressure increased to 90-100 bar. The 
repeated failure of this pump has 
delayed high-pressure testing[89] 
0.111 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
131 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfil total 
energy requirement; potential loss 
of some fluid 
0.111 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
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132 
Stop Check 
Valves 
Prevent backflow of 
thermal-storage 
transfer fluid 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfil total 
energy requirement; potential pump 
damage 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
 
0.04 
 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 1 1 3 
133 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfil total 
energy requirement; potential loss 
of some fluid 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 1 1 3 
134 
Fail to check 
Backflow of fluid would not be 
prevent 
Water level value input error from 
remote multiplex unit [109] 
 
 
 
0.04 
 
Undetectable prior to event51 2 1 5 10 
135 No effect on system performance 0.04 Undetectable prior to event51 1 1 5 5 
136 
Pressure 
Gauges 
Measure thermal-
storage transfer media 
line pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
 Extreme temperatures cause 
sweating and loosening in metal 
joints and eventually can cause them 
to crack.  
 Vibration from pumps, motors, and 
other rotating equipment accelerate 
wear and premature failure of 
internal working parts of a pressure 
gauge.  
 Pulsation rapidly cycling medium 
within a pressure system can make a 
gauge pointer move erratically and 
eventually lead to breakdown of 
internal parts.[126] 
0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors11 
1 2 1 2 
137 False output No effect on system performance 0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors11 
1 2 1 2 
138 
Bypass Control 
Valve 
Enables cross-over 
from one charging 
loop to the other 
Fails to open or 
remain open when 
required  
Loss of crossover capability and 
therefore a reduction in thermal-
storage charging capability 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 Valve position is monitored11 3 3 1 9 
139 
Leakage or 
Blockage 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfil total 
energy requirements 
The engine was virtually destroyed. Also, 
there have been numerous incidents of 
sensor failures which caused component 
damage, unnecessary shutdowns and 
delays of the program.[88] 
0.133 
Visual inspection and 
monitoring of downstream 
pressure31 
3 3 3 27 
140 No effect on system performance 
There are two types of leakages 
Internal or cross-port leakage at the piston 
seal and, External leakage at the shaft seal 
or the connecting pipes.[97] 
0.133 
Visual inspection and 
monitoring of downstream 
pressure31 
1 3 3 9 
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141 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation  
Fails to open or 
remain open when 
required  
Loss of crossover capability and 
therefore a reduction in thermal-
storage charging capability 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored11 
3 2 1 6 
142 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfil total 
energy requirement; potential loss 
of some fluid 
0.083 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored11 
4 2 1 8 
143 
Inlet Valves 
Control inlet flow rate 
of thermal-storage 
transfer fluid to the 
thermal storage heaters 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfill total 
energy requirements 
Water level value input error from remote 
multiplex unit [109] 
0.0625 System flow rate monitored 4 2 1 8 
144 Lekage 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfill total 
energy requirement; potential loss 
of some fluid 
0.0628 System flow rate monitored 4 2 1 8 
145 
Pressure 
transmitters 
Measure thermal-
storage heater  input 
pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working environment 
degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
146 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
147 
Temperature 
transmitters 
Measure thermal-
storage heater input 
temperature 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
148 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
149 
Flow rate 
transmitters 
Measure thermal-
storage heater input 
flow rate 
Fail to operate 
Failure of a flowmeter would result 
in an alarm and shutdown Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.2 Output temperature is moitored 2 4 1 8 
150 False output 
Failure of a flowmeter would result 
in an alarm and shutdown 
0.2 Output temperature is moitored 2 4 1 8 
151 
Pressure Gauges 
Measure thermal-
storage heater input 
pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
 Extreme temperatures cause sweating 
and loosening in metal joints and 
eventually can cause them to crack. 
 Vibration from pumps, motors, and 
other rotating equipment accelerate 
wear and premature failure of internal 
working parts of a pressure gauge. 
  Pulsation rapidly cycling medium 
within a pressure system can make a 
gauge pointer move erratically and 
eventually lead to breakdown of 
internal parts.[126] 
0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
152 False output No effect on system performance 0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
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153 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
Measure thermal-
storage heater output 
vent pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
154 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
155 
Relief Valves 
Prevent tank 
overpressure 
Fail to operate 
when required  
Potential safety hazard; reduction 
in thermal-storage charging 
capability 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure monitors11 
5 3 1 15 
156 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capabiltiy 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure monitors11 
3 3 1 9 
157 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for 
the thermal-storage 
heaters 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability, leading to 
potential inability to fulfil total 
energy requirements 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear 
[81] 
0.083 
Loss of flow will be sensed by 
flowmeter 21 
4 2 2 16 
158 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability, leading to 
potential inability to fulfil total 
energy requirements 
There are two types of leakages 
Internal or cross-port leakage at the 
piston seal and, External leakage at the 
shaft seal or the connecting pipes.[97] 
0.083 
Visual inspection and tank 
level41 
4 2 4 32 
159 
Temperature 
Transmitters 
Measure thermal-
storage heater oil 
output temperature 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors11 
1 2 1 2 
160  False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors11 
1 2 1 2 
161 Measure thermal-
storage unit input oil 
temperature 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over time.[124] 
0.057 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors11 
1 2 1 2 
162 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors11 
1 2 1 2 
163 
Charging Loop 
Controller  
Controls the flow of 
thermal-storage 
transfer fluid and 
steam through the 
charging loop 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Partial to complete loss of 
thermal-storage charging 
capability 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear[81] 
0.043 
System operation completely 
monitored11 
3 2 1 6 
164 
Extraction-
Loop Controller 
Controls the flow of 
thermal-storage 
transfer fluid and 
steam through the 
extraction loop 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Partial to complete loss of 
thermal-storage extraction 
capability 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical 
wear[81] 
0.043 
System operation completely 
monitored11 
3 2 1 6 
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165 
Thermal-Storage 
Unit Fluid-Control 
Valve 
Controls the flow of 
thermal-storage 
transfer fluid to or from 
the thermal-storage 
tank 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage charging 
capability or extraction capability, 
depending on mode of operation 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 Valve position monitored 3 3 1 9 
166 Leakage 
Loss or reduced thermal-storage 
charging or extraction capability, 
depending on mode of operation 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Visual inspection and tank 
level  
3 3 3 27 
167 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides for system 
isolation 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage charging 
capability or extraction capability, 
depending on mode of operation 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Tank level monitored 3 2 1 6 
168 Leakage 
Loss or reduced thermal-storage 
charging or extraction capability, 
depending on mode of operation 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
169 
Strain Gauges 
Measure thermal-
storage unit strain 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
 Extreme temperatures cause sweating 
and loosening in metal joints and 
eventually can cause them to crack. 
Vibration from pumps, motors, and 
other rotating equipment accelerate 
wear and premature failure of internal 
working parts of a pressure gauge. 
 Pulsation rapidly cycling medium 
within a pressure system can make a 
gauge pointer move erratically and 
eventually lead to breakdown of 
internal parts.[126] 
0.05 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 3 6 
170 False output No effect on system performance 0.05 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 3 6 
171 
Temperature 
Transmitters 
Measure fluid 
temperature within the 
thermal-storage tank 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 3 6 
172 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 3 6 
173 
Liquid level 
transmitter 
Measure fluid level 
within thermal-storage 
tank 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
The engine was virtually destroyed. Also, 
there have been numerous incidents of 
sensor failures which caused component 
damage, unnecessary shutdowns and 
delays of the program.[88] 
0.15 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 3 3 9 
174 False output No effect on system performance 0.15 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 3 3 9 
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175 
Control Valve 
Controls thermal-
storage heater-fluid 
return line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage charging 
capability Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Loss of system will be 
sensed by monitors 
3 3 2 18 
176 Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage charging 
capability 
0.133 
Loss of system will be 
sensed by monitors 
3 3 2 18 
177 
Upper and lower 
Tank Manifolds 
Provide interface 
between tank and 
plumbing 
Blockage 
Loss of thermal-storage subsystem 
use capability 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.033 System flow rate monitored 3 1 1 3 
178 
Seal Steam 
Manifold 
Provides interface 
between tank and seal 
steam plumbing 
Black age 
Loss of seal steam which could 
result in equipment damage 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.1428 System flow rate monitored 3 3 1 9 
179 
Shutoff valve 
Provides for system 
isolation in blacket-
steam line 
Fails to open or 
remove open 
when required 
Loss of blanket steam which could 
result in equipment damage. Can 
be made up by other loop. 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive  
 wear [81] 
0.083 Line pressure monitored 3 2 1 6 
180 
Leakage during 
operation 
Loss of blanket steam which could 
result in equipment damage.  
Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.083 Line pressure monitored 3 2 1 6 
181 
Leakage when 
not in operation 
Loss of thermal-storage fluid 
resulting in reduced system 
efficiency 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination[79] 
0.083 Visual inspection4 3 2 4 24 
182 
Control valve 
Control fluid in 
thermal-storage tank-
bypass line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of bypass capability; unable 
to maintain hot standby 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 Valve position monitored 3 3 1 9 
183 
Leakage 
Some loss of thermal-storage fluid Water level value input error from remote 
multiplex unit [109] 
0.133 Visual inspection 2 3 4 24 
184 No effect on system performance 0.133 Visual inspection  1 3 4 12 
185 
Shutoff valve 
Allows for dumping of 
bypassed thermal-
storage fluid 
Fails to open 
when required 
Unable to provide fluid dump, 
resulting in possible system 
shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Valve position is monitored 5 2 1 10 
186 Leakage 
Some loss of fluid when using 
tank-bypass loop 
0.083 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
187 Fail to check No effect on system performance 0.083 Visual inspection 1 2 4 8 
188 
shutoff valve 
Provides isolation for 
auxiliary 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of blanket steam which could 
result in equipment damage. Can be 
made up by other loop. 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Line pressure monitored 3 2 1 6 
189 Leakage 
Loss of blanket steam which could 
result in equipment damage 
0.083 Line pressure monitored 3 2 1 6 
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190 
Control Valve 
Provides fluid control 
in auxiliary pump line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow in auxiliary pump 
line from main extraction line, 
could result in loss of blacket 
steam unless fluid is obtained from 
tank seal-steam manifold 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 Valve position monitored 3 3 1 9 
191 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow in auxiliary 
pump line; could result in loss of 
blanket steam 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive  
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.133 Visual inspection 3 3 4 36 
192 
3-way valve 
Provides fluid control 
in auxiliary pump line 
from seal steam 
manifold 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of blanket steam which could 
result in equipment damage Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.1 Valve position is monitored 3 3 1 9 
193 Leakage 
Partial to total loss of blanket seam 
which  could result in equipment 
damage 
0.1 Line pressure monitored 3 3 1 9 
194 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measure auxiliary 
pump line 
Fails to operate  No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working environment 
degrade over time.[124] 
0.4 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
1 3 1 3 
195 False output No effect on system performance 0.4 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
1 3 1 3 
196 Y-type strainer 
Provides for system 
flush 
Leakage or 
Blockage 
Loss of black steam which could 
result in equipment damage 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.45 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
197 Auxiliary Pump  
Pumps fluid for seal-
steam production 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of black steam which could 
result in equipment damage 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.45 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
198 
Pressure Gauge 
Measure auxiliary 
pump output pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
 Extreme temperatures cause sweating 
and loosening in metal joints and 
eventually can cause them to crack. 
 Vibration from pumps, motors, and 
other rotating equipment accelerate 
wear and premature failure of internal 
working parts of a pressure gauge. 
 Pulsation rapidly cycling medium 
within a pressure system can make a 
gauge pointer move erratically and 
eventually lead to breakdown of 
internal parts.[126] 
0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
199 False output No effect on system performance 0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
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200 
Control Valve 
Control pump output 
pressure in auxiliary 
pump line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of blanket steam which could 
result in equipment damage Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
201 Leakage 
Loss of blanket steam which could 
result in equipment damage 
0.133 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
202 
Flow rate 
transmitter 
Measure auxiliary line 
flow rate 
Fail to operate 
Failure of flowmeter will result in 
an alarm and shutdown Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.2 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
4 4 4 64 
203 False output 
Failure of flowmeter will result in 
an alarm and shutdown 
0.2 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
4 4 4 64 
204 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measure blanket-
steam line pump 
output pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working environment 
degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
205 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
206 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measure blacked-
steam line pump 
output temperature 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
1 2 4 8 
207 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
1 2 4 8 
208 
Stop Check 
Prevent backflow of 
fluid in auxiliary pump 
line 
Fail to remove 
open  
Loss of flow in one seal-steam 
line, no effect on system 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.263 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by flowmeter  
2 4 2 16 
209 Leakage 
Loss of flow in one seal-steam 
line, no effect on system 
This is because leakage increases with 
decreasing evaporation temperature for a given 
valve opening. The implication of the ambient 
dependence is that a check valve leakage fault 
should be easier to detect at lower ambient 
conditions when its effect is more significant 
(even causing shutting down at higher fault 
levels) [115] 
0.263 
Loss of proper system flow 
will be sensed by flowmeter 
2 4 2 16 
210 Fail to check 
Would not prevent back flow of 
fluid in a failure condition 
0.263 Undetectable prior to event 2 4 5 40 
211 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide system 
isolation 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
extraction capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfil total 
energy requirements, potential low-
quality steam to turbine 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
212 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
extraction capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfil total 
energy requirements, potential low-
quality steam to turbine 
0.083 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
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213 Y-type strainer 
Provide for system 
flush 
Leakage or 
Blockage 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
extraction capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfil total 
energy requirements, potential 
low-quality steam to turbine 
Water level value input error from remote 
multiplex unit [109] 
0.45 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
214 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measure extraction 
pump input pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working environment 
degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
215 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
216 Extraction pumps 
Provide for flow of 
thermal-storage 
transfer fluid through 
the extraction loops 
Fail to operate 
properly 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
extraction capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfil total 
energy requirements, potential 
low-quality steam to turbine 
The pump did not fail for the first few 
months of operation when operating pressure 
was kept below 70 bar, problems began to 
appear as soon as pressure increased to 90-
100 bar. The repeated failure of this pump 
has delayed high-pressure testing[89] 
0.111 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
217 
Pressure Gauges 
Measure extraction 
pump output pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Extreme temperatures cause sweating and 
loosening in metal joints and eventually can 
cause them to crack. Vibration from pumps, 
motors, and other rotating equipment 
accelerate wear and premature failure of 
internal working parts of a pressure gauge. 
Pulsation rapidly cycling medium within a 
pressure system can make a gauge pointer 
move erratically and eventually lead to 
breakdown of internal parts.[126] 
0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
218 False output No effect on system performance 0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
219 
Stop Check 
Valves 
Prevent back flow into 
extraction pump 
Fail to remain 
open 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
extraction capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfil total 
energy requirements, potential 
low-quality steam to turbine 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
3 1 1 3 
220 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
extraction capability, leading to 
possible inability to fulfil total 
energy requirements, potential 
low-quality steam to turbine 
0.04 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
3 1 1 3 
221 Fail to check 
Backflow of fluid would not be 
prevent, could result in pump 
damage 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 3 1 5 15 
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222 
Control Valve 
Provide control for 
crossover of one pump 
to other extraction 
loop plumbing 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Unable to provide crossover which could 
leak to total loss of thermal-storage 
extraction capability Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
223 Leakage 
partial or total loss of thermal storage 
extration capability  
0.133 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
224 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide for system 
isolation 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage extraction 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfil total energy requirements, potential 
low-quality steam to turbine 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
225 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage extraction 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfil total energy requirements, potential 
low-quality steam to turbine 
0.083 
Downstream pressure 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
226 
Pressure Gauges 
Measure pressure in 
superheater bypass 
lines 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Extreme temperatures cause 
sweating and loosening in metal 
joints and eventually can cause 
them to crack. 
Vibration from pumps, motors, and 
other rotating equipment accelerate 
wear and premature failure of 
internal working parts of a pressure 
gauge. 
Pulsation rapidly cycling medium 
within a pressure system can make 
a gauge pointer move erratically 
and eventually lead to breakdown of 
internal parts.[126] 
0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
227 False output No effect on system performance 0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
228 
Control Valves 
Control the flow of 
thermal-storage fluid 
in the superheater 
bypass lines for 
mixing at the boilers 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of fluid flow in superheater bypass 
line, causing reduced fluid temperature at 
the boiler, potential low quality steam to 
turbine 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
System monitored by 
flowmeter 
3 3 1 9 
229 Leakage 
Loss of fluid flow in superheater bypass 
line, causing reduced fluid temperature at 
the boiler, potential low quality steam to 
turbine 
0.133 
System monitored by 
flowmeter 
3 3 1 9 
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230 
Check Valves 
Prevent backflow in 
superheater bypass 
line 
Fail to remain 
open 
Loss of fluid flow in superheater 
bypass line, causing reduced fluid 
temperature at the boiler, potential low 
quality steam to turbine 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
 
0.04 
System monitored by 
flowmeter 
3 1 1 3 
231 Leakage 
Loss of fluid flow in superheater 
bypass line, causing reduced fluid 
temperature at the boiler, potential low 
quality steam to turbine 
0.04 
System monitored by 
flowmeter 
3 1 1 3 
232 Fail to check 
Backflow of fluid would not be 
prevented, no effect on system 
performance 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
233 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
Measure superheater 
bypass line pressure 
Fails to operate 
Failure will result in an alarm and 
shut down Exposed to a harsh working environment 
degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
4 3 1 12 
234 False output 
Failure will result in an alarm and 
shut down 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitor 
4 3 1 12 
235 
Temperature 
Transmitters 
Measure superheater 
bypass line 
temperature 
Fails to operate 
Failure will result in an alarm and 
shut down Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
4 2 4 32 
236 False output 
Failure will result in an alarm and 
shut down 
0.057 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
4 2 4 32 
237 
Flow rate 
Transmitters 
Measure superheater 
bypass line flow rate 
Fails to operate 
Failure will result in an alarm and 
shut down Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.2 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
4 4 4 64 
238 False output 
Failure will result in an alarm and 
shut down 
0.2 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
4 4 4 64 
239 
Pressure Gauges 
Measure pressure in 
superheater fluid input 
lines 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
 Extreme temperatures cause 
sweating and loosening in metal 
joints and eventually can cause 
them to crack. 
 Vibration from pumps, motors, 
and other rotating equipment 
accelerate wear and premature 
failure of internal working parts of 
a pressure gauge. 
 Pulsation rapidly cycling medium 
within a pressure system can make 
a gauge pointer move erratically 
and eventually lead to breakdown 
of internal parts.[126] 
0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
240 False output No effect on system performance 0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
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241 
Control Valves 
Control the flow of 
fluid in the thermal-
storage extraction 
loops 
Fails to open or 
remain in open 
Loss of fluid flow in superheater bypass line, 
causing reduced fluid temperature at the boiler, 
potential low quality steam to turbine 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that 
design 
 Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
0.133 System flowrate monitored  3 3 1 9 
242 Leakage 
Loss of fluid flow in superheater bypass line, 
causing reduced fluid temperature at the boiler, 
potential low quality steam to turbine 
0.133 System flowrate monitored  3 3 1 9 
243 
Check Valves 
Prevent backflow in 
fluid extraction lines 
Fail to remain 
open 
Loss of fluid flow in superheater bypass line, 
causing reduced fluid temperature at the boiler, 
potential low quality steam to turbine 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that 
design 
 Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
0.04 System flowrate monitored  3 1 1 3 
244 Leakage 
Loss of fluid flow in superheater bypass line, 
causing reduced fluid temperature at the boiler, 
potential low quality steam to turbine 
0.04 
System monitored by 
flowmeter 
3 1 1 3 
245 Fail to check 
Backflow of fluid would not be prevented, no 
effect on system performance 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that 
design  
 Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
246 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
Measure superheater 
fluid input pressure 
Fails to operate Failure will result in an alarm and shut down Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over 
time.[124] 
0.1 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
4 3 4 48 
247 False output Failure will result in an alarm and shut down 0.1 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
4 3 4 48 
248 
Temperature 
Transmitters 
Measure superheater 
fluid input temperature 
Fails to operate Failure will result in an alarm and shut down Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature 
sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
4 2 4 32 
249 False output Failure will result in an alarm and shut down 0.057 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
4 2 4 32 
250 
Flow rate 
Transmitters 
Measure superheater 
fluid input flow rate 
Fails to operate Failure will result in an alarm and shut down 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.2 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
4 4 4 64 
251 False output Failure will result in an alarm and shut down 0.2 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
4 4 4 64 
252 
Thermal storage 
superheaters 
Provide heat exchange 
capability to produce 
superheated steam 
Structural failure 
Reduction in thermal-storage extraction 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfil total energy requirements 
In one case the traps are introduced by 
impurities and in one case the traps are 
introduced by bond breaking during 
high-voltage stress[93] 
0.05 
System line pressures 
monitored 
3 1 1 3 
253 Internal leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage extraction 
capability, potential for mixing of heat-
transfer fluid and steam 
There are two types of leakages 
Internal or cross-port leakage at the 
piston seal and, 
External leakage at the shaft seal or 
the connecting pipes.[97] 
0.05 
System line pressures is 
monitored 
3 1 1 3 
254 
Restricted or no 
flow 
Reduction in thermal-storage extraction capability, 
leading to possible inability to fulfil total energy 
requirements 
Water level value input error from 
remote multiplex unit [109] 
0.05 System flowmeter is monitored 3 1 1 3 
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255 
Thermal Storage 
boilers 
Provide heat exchange 
capability for boiling 
Structural failure 
Reduction in thermal-storage extraction 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfil total energy requirements 
In one case the traps are introduced by 
impurities and in one case the traps are 
introduced by bond breaking during high-
voltage stress[93] 
0.045 
System line pressures are 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
256 Internal leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage extraction 
capability, potential for mixing of heat-
transfer fluid and steam 
 There are two types of leakages 
 Internal or cross-port leakage at the 
piston seal and, 
 External leakage at the shaft seal or the 
connecting pipes.[97] 
0.045 
System line pressures  are 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
257 
Restricted or no 
flow 
Reduction in thermal-storage extraction 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfil total energy requirements 
Water level value input error from remote 
multiplex unit [109] 
0.045 
System flowmeter  is 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
258 
Thermal Storage 
Preheats 
Provide heat exchange 
capability for 
preheating 
Structural failure 
Reduction in thermal-storage extraction 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfil total energy requirements 
In one case the traps are introduced by 
impurities and in one case the traps are 
introduced by bond breaking during high-
voltage stress[93] 
0.05 
System line pressures  are 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
259 Internal leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage extraction 
capability, potential for mixing of heat-
transfer fluid and steam 
 There are two types of leakages 
 Internal or cross-port leakage at the 
piston seal and, 
 External leakage at the shaft seal or 
the connecting pipes.[97] 
0.05 
System line pressures  are 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
260 
Restricted or no 
flow 
Reduction in thermal-storage extraction 
capability, leading to possible inability to 
fulfil total energy requirements 
Water level value input error from remote 
multiplex unit [109] 
0.05 
System flowmeter is 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
261 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation of 
heaters from thermal-
storage tank 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of fluid flow in superheater bypass 
line, causing reduced fluid temperature at 
the boiler, potential low quality steam to 
turbine 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
System flowmeter is 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
262 Leakage 
Some loss of thermal-storage fluid which 
would lead to loop shutdown 
Exposed to a harsh working environment 
degrade over time.[124] 
0.083 Visual inspection 41 2 2 4 16 
263 
Pressure Gauges 
Measure extraction 
loop-input water 
pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Extreme temperatures cause sweating and 
loosening in metal joints and eventually can 
cause them to crack. Vibration from pumps, 
motors, and other rotating equipment 
accelerate wear and premature failure of 
internal working parts of a pressure gauge. 
Pulsation rapidly cycling medium within a 
pressure system can make a gauge pointer 
move erratically and eventually lead to 
breakdown of internal parts.[126] 
0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
264 False output No effect on system performance 0.077 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
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265 
Stop Check 
Valves  
Provide for isolation in 
the water loop 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
extraction capability, leading to 
potential inability to fulfil total energy 
requirements 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
System flow rate 
monitored 
3 1 1 3 
266 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
extraction capability, leading to 
potential inability to fulfil total energy 
requirements  
0.04 
System flow rate 
monitored 
3 1 1 3 
267 Fail to check  
Backflow of water not prevented in 
failure condition  
Water level value input error from 
remote multiplex unit [109] 
0.04 Undetectable prior to even 2 1 5 10 
268 
Temperature 
Transmitters 
Measure extraction-
loop input water 
temperature 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
1 2 3 6 
269 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
1 2 3 6 
270 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
Measure extraction-
loop input water 
pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 1 1 1 
271 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors 
1 1 1 1 
272 
Flow Rate 
Transmitters 
Measure extraction-
loop input water flow 
rate 
Fail to operate 
Failure of a flowmeter will result in an 
alarm and/or TSS loop shutdown Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.2 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
4 4 3 48 
273 False output 
Failure of a flowmeter will result in an 
alarm and/or TSS loop shutdown 
0.2 
Incorrect output will be 
sensed by monitors 
4 4 1 16 
274 
Control Valves 
Control the flow of 
water in the extraction 
loops 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
extraction capability, leading to 
potential inability to fulfil total energy 
requirements Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
System flow rate is 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
275 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
extraction capability, leading to 
potential inability to fulfil total energy 
requirements 
0.133 
System flow rate is 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
276 
Relief Valves 
Provide preheaters 
with over-pressure 
protection  
Fail to operate 
when required  
Potential safety hazard; reduction in 
thermal-storage charging capability 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.2 
Condition will be sensed 
by pressure monitors 
3 4 1 12 
277 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
extraction capability, leading to 
potential inability to fulfil total energy 
requirements  
0.2 
Condition will be sensed 
by pressure monitors 
3 4 1 12 
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278 
Liquid Level 
Transmitters 
Measure water level 
within thermal-storage 
boilers 
Fail to operate  No effect on system performance 
The engine was virtually destroyed. Also, 
there have been numerous incidents of 
sensor failures which caused component 
damage, unnecessary shutdowns and 
delays of the program.[88] 
0.15 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration31 
1 3 3 9 
279 False output No effect on system performance 0.15 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration31 
1 3 3 9 
280 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
Measure boiler output 
pressure 
Fail to operate  No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors11 
1 3 1 3 
281 False output 
False high output could cause 
decreased capability and/or TSS loop 
shutdown 
0.1 
Sensed by other pressure 
monitors11 
4 3 1 12 
282 
Bypass valves  
Provide for dumping 
of water to the 
thermal-storage flash 
tank  
Fail to open 
when required  
Unable to pump boiler water to flash 
tank causing  shutdown of loop 
The engine was virtually destroyed. Also, 
there have been numerous incidents of 
sensor failures which caused component 
damage, unnecessary shutdowns and 
delays of the program.[88] 
0.033 Tank level monitored11 4 1 1 4 
283 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Reduction in thermal-storage extraction 
capability, leading to potential inability to 
potential inability to fulfil total energy 
requirements 
0.033 Tank level monitored11 3 1 1 3 
284 
Flow Orifices  
Reduce flow in boiler 
to flash tank lines  
Blockage 
Unable to dump boiler water to flash tank 
causing  shutdown of loop 
Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 
0.25 Tank level monitored11 4 4 1 16 
285 Provide protection 
from thermal-storage 
superheater 
overpressure  
Fail to operate 
when required  
Potential safety hazard; reduced thermal-
storage extraction capability 
0.25 
System pressure are 
monitored11 
3 4 1 12 
286 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage extraction 
capability, leading to potential inability to 
fullfill total energy requirements 
0.25 
System pressure are 
monitored11 
3 4 1 12 
287 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
Measure superheater 
output steam pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over time.[124] 
0.1 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored11 
1 3 1 3 
288 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored11 
1 3 1 3 
289 
Temperature 
Transmitters 
Measure superheater 
output steam 
temperature 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Sensed by other 
temperature monitors11 
1 2 1 2 
290 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Sensed by other 
temperature monitors11 
1 2 1 2 
291 
Control Valves 
Control flow of 
superheater steam of 
turbine 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in steam flow to turbine 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Valve Position is 
monitored  
2 3 1 6 
292 
Leakage when in 
operation 
Reduced steam flow to turbine 0.133 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
293 
Leakage or f ail 
open during start 
up 
Reduced steam flow to turbine 0.133 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
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294 
Check Valves 
Prevent backflow in 
steam line leading to 
turbine 
Flow to remain open Reduction in steam flow to turbine 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
295 Leakage Reduction in steam flow to turbine 0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
296 Fail to check 
Backflow of steam not prevented; 
no effect system performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
297 
Pressure Gauges 
Measure superheater 
output steam pressure 
Fail to operate no effect system performance 
Extreme temperatures cause sweating and 
loosening in metal joints and eventually can 
cause them to crack. Vibration from pumps, 
motors, and other rotating equipment 
accelerate wear and premature failure of 
internal working parts of a pressure gauge. 
Pulsation rapidly cycling medium within a 
pressure system can make a gauge pointer 
move erratically and eventually lead to 
breakdown of internal parts.[126] 
0.077 
Condition will be sensed by 
other pressure monitors 
1 2 1 2 
298 False output no effect system performance 0.077 
Condition will be sensed by 
other pressure monitors 
1 2 1 2 
299 
Control Valves 
Provide bypass to flash 
tank during system 
start up 
F ail to open when 
required 
Unable to s tart loop, resulting in 
reduced steam flow to turbine Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 Valve position is monitored 3 3 1 9 
300 
Leakage or 
inadvertently open 
Reduction in steam flow to turbine 0.133 Visual inspection 2 3 4 24 
301 
Check Valves 
Prevent backflow from 
the thermal storage 
flash tank 
Fail to remain open 
Unable to s tart loop, resulting in 
reduced steam flow to turbine 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 Flash tank level monitored 3 1 1 3 
302 Leakage 
Loss of  water flow to flash tank; 
no effect on system performance 
0.04 
Visual inspection and flash 
tank level 
2 1 3 6 
303 Fail to check 
Backflow from flash tank not 
prevented during failure condition 
; no effect on system performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
304 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide system 
isolation 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of blanket steam input to 
superheater 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
305 
Leakage when in 
operation 
Loss of blanket steam input to 
superheater 
0.083 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
306 
Leakage or fail open 
during start up 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
extraction  capability , leading to 
potential in ability to fulfil total 
energy requirements 
0.083 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
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307 
Control Valves 
Control flow of seal 
steam 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of blanket steam input to 
superheater 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Valve position is 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
308 
Leakage when in 
operation 
Loss of blanket steam input to 
superheater 
0.133 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
309 
Leakage o r f ail 
open during start up 
Reduction in thermal-storage 
extraction  capability , leading to 
potential in ability to fulfil total 
energy requirements 
0.133 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
310 
Check Valves 
Prevent backflow in 
blanket-steam line 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of blanket steam input to 
superheater 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 1 1 3 
311 
Leakage when in 
operation 
Loss of blanket steam input to 
superheater 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 1 1 3 
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312 
Air Control 
Valve 
Controls air to valve 
operators 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of air flow , resulting in loss of 
thermal-storage system 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
313 
Leakage Loss of air flow , resulting in loss of 
thermal-storage system 
0.133 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
314 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
instrument air line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of air flow , resulting in loss of 
thermal-storage system Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
315 
Leakage Loss of air flow , resulting in loss of 
thermal-storage system 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
316 Fail to check No effect on system performance 0.04 Undetectable prior to event 1 2 1 2 
317 
Pressure Sensor 
Measures instrument 
air pressure 
Fail to operate 
 
No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over time.[124] 
0.125 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
1 3 1 3 
318 
F ail to output 
 
No effect on system performance 
0.125 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
1 3 1 3 
319 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation to 
individual valves 
and/or skids 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of air flow , resulting in loss of 
thermal-storage system 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Individual valves 
inoperative 
3 2 2 12 
320 
Leakage Loss of air flow , resulting in loss of 
thermal-storage system 0.083 
Individual valves 
inoperative 
3 2 2 12 
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1 
Receiver Feed 
Pump 
Provides receiver 
subsystem water flow 
Fails to operate 
Loss of water flow, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver subsystem 
Insufficient suction pressure to avoid 
cavitation. Excessively high flow rate for 
the net positive suction head available 
Prolonged operation at lower than 
acceptable flow rates. 
Operation of the pump at zero or near 
zero flow rate. Improper operation of 
pumps in parallel. Failure to maintain 
adequate lubrication for the bearings. 
Failure to maintain satisfactory flushing 
to mechanical seals.[91] 
0.111 
Loss of system flow will be 
sensed by pump monitors 
3 3 2 18 
2 Leakage 
Loss of water flow, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver subsystem 
0.111 
Loss of system flow will be 
sensed by pump monitors 
5 2 2 20 
3 
Pressure Indicator  
Measures receiver feed 
pump output pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
The wear indicator is colored to 
contrast with the transfer material and 
indicates wear by an eroded area 
which can be visually observed 
through the outer translucent 
layer.[82] 
0.08 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
4 Fail to output No effect on system performance 0.08 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
5 
Control Valve 
Allows feed water by 
pass to deaerator 
Inadvertently 
open  
Loss of proper system water flow, resulting 
in shutdown of receiver subsystem 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Meater input pressure is 
monitored 
5 3 1 15 
6 
In advantently 
closed  
Loss of bypass capability; no effect on 
system performance 
0.133 
Loss of flow sensed by 
flowmeter 
2 3 2 12 
7 Leakage 
Loss of proper system water flow, resulting 
in shutdown of receiver subsystem 
0.133 
Heater input pressure is 
monitored 
5 3 1 15 
8 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measures receiver feed 
pump output water 
temperature 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature 
sensor.[102] 
0.1 
Downstream temperature is 
monitored 
1 3 1 3 
9 False to output No effect on system performance 0.1 Periodic calibration 1 3 3 9 
10 Flow Orifice 
Reduces flow in the 
bypass line to the 
deaerator 
Blockage or 
leakage 
Loss of bypass capability; no effect on 
system performance 
Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 0.25 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors 
2 4 2 16 
11 
Flow Rate 
Transmitter 
Measure flow rate of 
water from the feed 
pump 
Fails to operate System shutdown 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.2 Plant alarm 5 4 1 20 
12 False output System shutdown 0.2 Plant alarm 5 4 1 20 
13 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation for feed 
pump 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of water flow, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver subsystem; may 
starve pump 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Loss of system flow will be 
sensed by flowmeter 
4 2 2 16 
14 Leakage 
Loss of proper system water flow, 
resulting in shutdown of receiver 
subsystem; may starve pump 
0.083 
Loss of proper system flow 
will be sensed by flowmeter 
4 2 2 16 
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15 
Cleanout 
Strainer 
Allows for system 
flush 
Leakage or 
blockage 
Loss of proper system water flow, 
resulting in shutdown of receiver 
subsystem may starve pump 
At these much lower pressures a 
new balance was set up between air 
in leakage into the system 
(dominated by the main pump 
packing) and the withdrawal at the 
downstream stand-pipe[131] 
0.033 
Loss of proper system flow will 
be sensed by flowmeter 
3 1 2 6 
16 
Check valve 
Prevents backflow 
of water to the feed 
pump 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of proper system water flow, resulting 
in shutdown of receiver subsystem 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that 
design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
 
0.04 
Heater input pressure is 
monitpred 
5 1 1 5 
17 Leakage 
Loss of proper system water flow, resulting 
in shutdown of receiver subsystem 
0.04 
Heater input pressure is 
monitpred 
5 1 1 5 
18 Fails to check 
would not prevent backflow of water in a 
failure condition  
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
19 
Control Valve  
Controls feed water 
flow to high-
pressure heater 
number 2 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system water flow, resulting 
in shutdown of receiver subsystem 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Loss of proper system flow will 
be sensed by flowmeter 
5 3 2 30 
20 Leakage 
Loss of pepper system water flow, resulting 
in shutdown of receiver subsystem 
0.133 
Loss of proper system flow will 
be sensed at the heater input 
5 3 2 30 
21 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides bypass 
path around control 
valve 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
No effect on system performance 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive  
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
flowmeter 
1 2 2 4 
22 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper system water flow, 
resulting in shutdown of receiver 
subsystem 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed at 
heater input 
5 2 2 20 
23 
Temperature 
Indicator 
Measures water 
temperature at input 
to high-pressure 
heater number 2 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes 
0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
24 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
25 
Pressure 
Indicator  
Measures water 
pressure at input to 
high-pressure heater 
number 2 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The wear indicator is colored to 
contrast with the transfer material 
and indicates wear by an eroded 
area which can be visually observed 
through the outer translucent 
layer.[82] 
0.105 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 3 4 12 
26 False output No effect on system performance 0.105 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 3 4 12 
27 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation for high-
pressure heater 
number 2 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system water heating; no 
effect on system performance 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Loss of proper system flow will 
be sensed by heater monitors 
2 2 2 8 
28 Leakage 
Loss of proper system water flow, 
resulting in shutdown of receiver 
subsystem 
0.083 
Loss of proper system flow  
will be sensed by heater 
monitors 
5 2 2 20 
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29 
High Pressure 
Heaters 
Provides ability to 
preheat feed water 
for admission for 
receiver subsystem 
Structural failure 
or leakage 
Loss of proper system water flow; heater 
can be bypassed; however, proper drain 
control may be lost 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that 
design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.06 
Internal heater characteristics 
are measured 
3 2 1 6 
30 
Blockage or 
restricted flow 
Loss of proper system water flow; heater 
can be bypassed; however, proper drain 
control may be lost 
0.06 
Internal heater characteristics 
are measured 
3 2 1 6 
31 
Pressure 
Sensors 
Measure pressures 
internal to high-
pressure heaters 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Incidents of sensor failures which 
caused component damage, 
unnecessary shutdowns and delays 
of the program[88] 
0.125 
Measured by other internal 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
32 False output No effect on system performance 0.125 
Measured by other internal 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
33 
Pressure 
transmitters 
Measure pressures 
internal to high-
pressure heaters 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working environment 
degrade over time.[124] 
Physical damage to the isolator 
diaphragms, process fluid freezing, 
isolator corrosion due to an incompatible 
process fluid [132] 
0.1 
Measured by other internal 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
34 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Measured by other internal 
monitors 
1 3 1 3 
35 
Pressure 
Indicators 
Measure pressures 
internal to high-
pressure heaters 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
The wear indicator is colored to contrast 
with the transfer material and indicates 
wear by an eroded area which can be 
visually observed through the outer 
translucent layer.[82] 
0.08 
Measured by other internal 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
36 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 
Measured by other internal 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
37 
Relief Valves 
Prevent high-
pressure heater 
overpressure 
condition  
Fail to operate 
when required  
Potential safety hazard; loss of proper 
system flow; heater can be bypassed, 
resulting in no effect on system 
performance 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, 
plug small openings, or abrade the 
mating surfaces until a valve 
leaks.[96] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure monitors 
2 3 2 12 
38 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow, heater can 
be bypassed, resulting in no effect on 
system performance 
0.133 
Loss of proper system flow will 
be sensed by pressure monitors 
2 3 2 12 
39 
Drain Valves 
Allow for draining 
of high-pressure 
heaters 
Inadvertently 
open or leakage 
Loss of proper system water flow; heater 
can be bypassed, resulting in no effect 
on system performance  
Control circuit failure 
Loss of electric power to motor 
Electric motor failure[99] 
0.111 
Loss of proper system flow will 
be sensed by pressure monitors 
2 3 2 12 
40 
Fail to open 
when required  
unable to vent heater resulting in 
shutdown; heater can be bypassed, 
resulting in no effect on system 
performance 
0.111 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure monitors 
2 3 2 12 
41 Leakage  
Reduced heater effectiveness leading to 
shut down; heater can be bypassed, 
resulting in no effect on system 
performance 
0.111 
Condition will be sensed by 
pressure monitors 
2 3 2 12 
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42 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation in 
the heater return 
lines to the 
deaerator 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of water return to the deaerator, 
leading to improper drain control 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors 
3 2 2 12 
43 Leakage 
Loss of water return to the deaerator, 
leading to improper drain control 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors 
3 2 2 12 
44 Flow Orifices 
Restrict flow in the 
heater return lines 
to condenser 
Blockage or 
leakage 
Loss of water return to the deaerator, 
leading to improper drain control 
Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 0.25 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors 
3 4 2 24 
45 
Temperature 
Indicator 
Measures 
temperature of 
heater return steam 
to condenser 
Fail to operate  No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes [95] 
0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
46 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
47 Pressure 
Indicator 
Measures pressure 
of heater return 
steam to condenser 
fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.08 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
48 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
49 
Pressure 
transmitter 
Measures pressure 
in heater input line 
from thermal-
storage flash tank 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over 
time.[124] Physical damage to the 
isolator diaphragms, process fluid 
freezing, isolator corrosion due to 
an incompatible process fluid [132] 
0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
50 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Visual inspection and periodic 
calibration 
1 2 4 8 
51 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow 
in heater input line 
from thermal-
storage flash tank 
Fails to remain 
open 
No thermal-storage flash tank input, 
leading to plant shutdown due to 
improper drain control 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that 
design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Loss of flow will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
4 1 3 12 
52 Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage flash tank input, 
leading to plant shutdown due to 
improper drain control 
0.04 
Visual inspection and internal 
heater monitors 
4 1 3 12 
53 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection in failure mode 
condition; no effect on system performance  
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
54 
Bypass Valve 
Provide path to 
bypass thermal-
storages heaters 
Fail to open 
when required  
Loss of water flow in system. Resulting in 
shutdown of receiver subsystem 
Factors causing low-temperature-
related failures occurred during the 
manufacturing of processors. In one 
test, 50 out of 20000 dies (chips) 
failed unique low-temperature tests at 
0C. Many of these fails were timing-
related; that is, the device slowed as 
the temperature decreased.[133] 
0.033 
Receiver input pressure 
monitored 
5 1 1 5 
55 
Inadvertently 
open 
Reduced heater effectiveness ; no effect 
on system performance 
0.033 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
2 1 2 4 
56 Leakage 
Loss of water flow in system, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver subsystem 
0.033 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
5 1 2 10 
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57 
Output Valves 
Provide isolation 
for high-pressure 
heaters 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of heater effectiveness, resulting in 
heater shutdown; heater can be bypassed, 
resulting in no effect on system performance Water level value input error 
from remote multiplex unit [109] 
 
0.05 
Receiver input pressure 
monitored 
2 2 1 4 
58 Leakage 
Weather shutdown to reduce water loss; 
heater can be bypassed resulting in no effect 
on performance  
0.05 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
2 2 2 8 
59 
Input Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation of 
high-pressure heater 
inputs 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of input, resulting in in proper drain 
control, loss of blanketing capability 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Loss of flow will be sensed by 
receiver input pressure 
monitors 
3 2 3 18 
60 Leakage  
Loss of input, resulting in in proper drain 
control, loss of blanketing capability 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
receiver internal heater 
monitors 
3 2 3 18 
61 
Check Valves 
Prevent backflow in 
blanket-steam lines 
Fail to remain 
open 
Loss of blanket-steam flow to high-
pressure heaters; no effect on system 
performance 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of 
that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
0.04 
Loss of blanket steam will be 
sensed by internal heater 
monitors 
2 1 3 6 
62 Leakage 
Loss of blanket-steam flow to high-
pressure heaters; no effect on system 
performance 
0.04 
Loss of blanket steam will be 
sensed by internal heater 
monitors 
2 1 3 6 
63 Fail to check 
Loss of backflow protection; no effect on 
system performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
64 
Control Valves 
Provide control for 
blanketing steam to 
high-pressure 
heaters 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of blanketing steam flow to high-
pressure heaters; no effect on system 
performance 
Incorrect supply pressure, 
actuator vent blockage, and 
diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Loss of blanket steam will be 
sensed by internal heater 
monitors 
2 3 3 18 
65 Leakage 
Loss of blanketing steam flow to high-
pressure heaters; no effect on system 
performance 
0.13 
Loss of blanket steam will be 
sensed by internal heater 
monitors 
2 3 3 18 
66 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide system 
isolation in blanket-
steam lines to high-
pressure heaters 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of blanketing steam flow to high-
pressure heaters; no effect on system 
performance 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Loss of blanket steam will be 
sensed by internal heater 
monitors 
2 2 3 12 
67 Leakage  
Loss of blanketing steam flow to high-
pressure heaters; no effect on system 
performance 
0.083 
Loss of blanket steam will be 
sensed by internal heater 
monitors 
2 2 3 12 
68 
Check Valves 
Prevents backflow 
from high-pressure 
heater number 2 to 
the thermal-storage 
flash tank 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of flow to heater, resulting in plant 
shutdown due to improper drain control 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of 
that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
5 1 2 10 
69 Leakage 
Loss of flow to heater, resulting in plant 
shutdown due to improper drain control 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
5 1 2 10 
70 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection in failure-mode 
condition; no effect on system performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
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71 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow 
from high-pressure 
heater number 2 to 
the receiver flash 
tank 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of flow to heater, resulting in in 
proper drain control  Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that 
design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 1 2 6 
72 Leakage 
Loss of flow to heater, resulting in in 
proper drain control 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 1 2 6 
73 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection in 
failure-mode condition; no effect on 
system performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
74 
Check Valve  
Prevents backflow 
from high-pressure 
heater number 2 to 
high-pressure heater 
number 1  
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of flow between heaters, 
resulting in in proper drain control  Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that 
design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 1 2 6 
75 Leakage 
Loss of flow between heaters, 
resulting in in proper drain control 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 1 2 6 
76 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection in 
failure-mode condition; no effect on 
system performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
77 
Pressure 
Transmitters 
Measure output 
pressure of high-
pressure number 2 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working environment 
degrade over time.[124] 
Physical damage to the isolator diaphragms, 
process fluid freezing, isolator corrosion due 
to an incompatible process fluid [132] 
0.1 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by redundant unit 
1 3 2 6 
78 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by redundant unit 
1 3 2 6 
79 
Temperature 
Transmitters 
Measure output 
temperature of high-
pressure heater 
number 2 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by redundant unit 
1 2 2 4 
80 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by redundant unit 
1 2 2 4 
81 
Angle Valve  
Allows flow to high-
pressure heater level 
glass 
Fail to remain 
open 
Loss of flow to level glass; no effect 
on system performance 
From the frictional failure criterion, one can 
envisage a range of scenarios between end-
members of purely stress-driven failure at 
constant fluid-pressure and purely fluid-
driven failure under constant stress. In 
general, however, failure may be induced by 
some combination of increasing fluid-
pressure as well as tectonic shear stress[134] 
0.1 Visual inspect of level glass 2 3 4 24 
82 Leakage 
Loss of flow to level glass leading to 
heater shutdown; heater can be 
bypassed, resulting in no effect on 
system performance 
0.1 Visual inspection 2 3 4 24 
83 
3-way Valves 
Allow flow to high-
pressure heater level 
glass 
Fail to remain 
open 
Loss of flow to level glass; no effect 
on system performance 3 way-valve that is functioning below its 
design specifications may result in fugitive 
emissions, unexpected valve failure causing 
plant-shutdown, or poor quality end products 
due to inadequate process control[135] 
0.1 Visual inspection of level glass 2 3 4 24 
84 Leakage 
Loss of flow to level glass leading to 
heater shutdown; heater can be 
bypassed, resulting in no effect on 
system performance 
0.1 Visual inspection 2 3 4 24 
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85 Level Glasses 
Measure water level 
within high-pressure 
heater 
Fail to operate 
properly 
Loss of measurement capability; no 
effect on system performance 
The failure wave process could occur as 
the stress grows above the failure 
threshold up to the stress level at which 
plastic deformation starts.[136] 
0.0174 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
86 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation for 
level controllers and 
switches 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to controllers or 
switches; because these control a 
number of plant drains, a resulting 
system shutdown would occur 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Plant alarm 5 2 1 10 
87 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to controllers or 
switches; because these control a 
number of plant drains, a resulting 
system shutdown would occur 
0.083 Visual inspection 5 2 4 40 
88 
Vent Valves 
Allow for venting of 
controller/switch 
piping system 
Fail to open 
Unable to vent controller/switch 
system; because these control a 
number of plant drains, a resulting 
system shutdown would occur 
Vent valve failures, post seal or jar/cover 
seal leaks; water or hydrogen loss through 
the plastic jar or cover; or performance 
problems, such as poor recombination, 
with direct loss of hydrogen and oxygen 
through the vent; or the more subtle loss 
of water by positive grid corrosion with 
consequent hydrogen evolution all should 
result in an decrease in conductance as the 
cell loses water[117] 
0.0285 Plant alarm 5 1 1 5 
89 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to controllers or 
switches; because these control a 
number of plant drains, a resulting 
system shutdown would occur 
0.0285 Plant alarm 5 1 1 5 
90 
Level 
Controllers 
Provide control of 
system drain lines 
Fail to operate 
properly 
Loss of control of several plant 
drains, resulting in system shutdown 
It has been mainly caused by ineffective 
feedwater control.[85] 
0.095 Plant alarm 5 2 1 10 
91 
Level 
Switches 
Provide alarm points 
for turbine exhaust 
ports 
Fail to operate 
when required  
Potential turbine damage due to 
improper exhaust flow; turbine is 
protected by a check valve at 
preclude system change 
Switch failure is reported to the control 
application, the latencies involved in 
disseminating the failure-related state 
updates throughout the Onix cluster 
become essential; they define the absolute 
minimum time the control application will 
take to react to the failure throughout the 
network[137] 
0.111 Plant alarm 3 3 1 9 
92 False alarm 
Unnecessary shutdown of turbine 
exhaust port; system should balance 
itself, resulting in no effect on system 
performance 
0.111 Undetectable prior to event 2 3 5 30 
93 
Control Valve 
Controls flow from 
the receiver flash 
tank to high-pressure 
heater number 2 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Unable to drain receiver flash-tank, 
leading to system shutdown 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Loss of flow will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
4 3 3 36 
94 Leakage 
Unable to maintain proper system 
flow, resulting in system shutdown 
0.133 
Loss of proper system flow 
will be sensed by internal 
heater monitors 
4 3 3 36 
  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
158                                                                                                                                                                                                       Appendices 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Receiver Feed Pump 
Sheet 8 of 9 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
95 Shutoff Valve 
Provide isolation for 
receiver flash-tank 
control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Unable to drain receiver flash-
tank 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.08
3 
Loss of flow will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 2 3 18 
96 Bypass Valve 
Provides a bypass 
path for maintenance 
Leakage or 
inadertently open 
Unable to maintain proper system 
flow 
Factors causing low-temperature-related failures 
occurred during the manufacturing of processors. 
In one test, 50 out of 20000 dies (chips) failed 
unique low-temperature tests at 0C. Many of 
these fails were timing-related; that is, the device 
slowed as the temperature decreased.[133] 
0.03
3 
Loss of proper system flow will be 
sensed by internal heater monitors 
3 1 2 6 
97 
Control Valve  
Controls the water 
flow between high-
pressure heaters 
number 1 and 2 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow, 
resulting in improper drain control Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent blockage, 
and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.13
3 
Loss of proper system flow will be 
sensed by internal heater monitors 
3 3 2 18 
98 Leakage 
unable to maintain proper system 
flow 
0.13
3 
Loss of proper system flow will be 
sensed by internal heater monitors 
3 3 2 18 
99 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation for 
inter heater control 
valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow, 
resulting in improper drain control  
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.08
3 
Loss of proper system flow will be 
sensed by internal heater monitors 
3 2 2 12 
100 Leakage 
Unable to maintain proper system 
flow 
0.08
3 
Loss of proper system flow will be 
sensed by internal heater monitors 
3 2 2 12 
101 Bypass Valve 
Provides a bypass 
path for maintenance 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Unable to maintain proper  system 
flow 
Factors causing low-temperature-related failures 
occurred during the manufacturing of processors. 
In one test, 50 out of 20000 dies (chips) failed 
unique low-temperature tests at 0C. Many of 
these fails were timing-related; that is, the device 
slowed as the temperature decreased.[133] 
0.03
3 
Loss of proper system flow will be 
sensed by internal heater monitors 
3 1 2 6 
102 
Control Valve 
Controls the water 
flow between high-
pressure heaters and 
the condenser 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow, 
resulting in improper drain control  Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent blockage, 
and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.13
3 
Loss of proper system flow will be 
sensed by internal heater monitors 
3 3 2 18 
103 Leakage 
Unable to maintain proper system 
flow 
0.13
3 
Visual inspection and condenser 
monitors 
3 3 3 27 
104 
Shutoff Valve 
Provide isolation for 
condenser control 
valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss or proper system flow, 
resulting in improper drain control 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.08
3 Loss of proper system flow will be 
sensed by internal heater monitors 
3 2 2 12 
105 Leakage 
Unable to maintain proper system 
flow 
0.08
3 
Loss of proper system flow will be 
sensed by internal heater monitors 
3 2 2 12 
106 Bypass Valve 
Provides bypass path 
for maintenance 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Unable to maintain proper system 
flow 
Factors causing low-temperature-related failures 
occurred during the manufacturing of processors. 
In one test, 50 out of 20000 dies (chips) failed 
unique low-temperature tests at 0C. Many of 
these fails were timing-related; that is, the device 
slowed as the temperature decreased.[133] 
0.03
3 
Loss of proper system flow will be 
sensed by internal heater monitors 
3 1 2 6 
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Sheet 9 of 9 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
107 
Control Valve 
Controls flow from 
the thermal-storage 
flash tank to the 
number 2 high-
pressure heater 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow, 
resulting in plant shutdown due to 
improper drain control Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Loss of proper system flow 
will be sensed by internal 
heater monitors 
5 3 2 30 
108 Leakage 
Unable to maintain proper system 
flow, resulting in plant shutdown 
0.133 
Loss of proper system flow 
will be sensed by internal 
heater monitors 
5 3 2 30 
109 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation for 
flash-tank control 
valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow, 
resulting in plant shutdown due to 
improper drain control 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Loss of proper system flow 
will be sensed by internal 
heater monitors 
5 2 2 20 
110 Leakage 
Unable to maintain proper system 
flow, resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 
Loss of proper system flow 
will be sensed by internal 
heater monitors 
5 2 2 20 
111 Bypass Valve 
Provides a bypass 
path for maintenance 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Unable to maintain proper system 
flow, resulting in plant shutdown 
Factors causing low-temperature-related 
failures occurred during the manufacturing 
of processors. 
In one test, 50 out of 20000 dies (chips) 
failed unique low-temperature tests at 0C. 
Many of these fails were timing-related; that 
is, the device slowed as the temperature 
decreased.[133] 
0.033 
Loss of proper system flow 
will be sensed by internal 
heater monitors 
5 1 2 10 
112 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measures tower-riser 
input pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes 
0.08 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
1 2 3 6 
113 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
1 2 3 6 
114 
Temperature 
Indicator 
Measures tower-riser 
input temperature 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes 
0.057 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
1 2 3 6 
115 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 
Visual inspection and 
periodic calibration 
1 2 3 6 
116 Turbidity 
Indicator 
Measures system 
turbidity 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes 
0.085 Visual inspection 1 2 4 8 
117 False output No effect on system performance 0.085 Visual inspection 1 2 4 8 
118 
Control Valve 
Provides feed water 
bypass 
Fails to open 
Unable to bypass, preventing 
receiver usage 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed be 
at the condenser 
3 3 2 18 
119 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper flow to receiver 
panels, causing shutdown of 
receiver 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed at 
receiver input 
3 3 2 18 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Auxiliary Steam Generator 
Sheet 1 of 5 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
120 
Auxiliary 
Steam 
Generator 
Feed Pump 
Provides water flow 
in the auxiliary 
steam generator loop 
Fails to operate 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam 
generator, resulting in loss of 
blanket-steam production; no 
effect on system performance 
 Insufficient suction pressure to avoid 
cavitation. 
 Excessively high flow rate for the net 
positive suction head available 
 Prolonged operation at lower than 
acceptable flow rates. 
 Operation of the pump at zero or near 
zero flow rate. 
 Improper operation of pumps in parallel. 
 Failure to maintain adequate lubrication 
for the bearings. 
 Failure to maintain satisfactory flushing 
to mechanical seals.[91] 
0.111 Output pressure is monitored  2 2 1 4 
121 Leakage 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam 
generator, resulting in loss of 
blanket-steam production; no 
effect on system performance 
0.111 Output pressure is monitored  2 2 1 4 
122 
Pressure 
Indicator  
Measures auxiliary 
feed pump input 
pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The wear indicator is colored to contrast with 
the transfer material and indicates wear by an 
eroded area which can be visually observed 
through the outer translucent layer.[82] 
0.08 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
123 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
124 
Cleanout 
Strainer 
Allows for system 
flush 
Leakage or 
blockage 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam 
generator, resulting in loss of 
blanket-steam production; no 
effect on system performance 
At these much lower pressures a new balance 
was set up between air in leakage into the 
system (dominated by the main pump 
packing) and the withdrawal at the 
downstream stand-pipe[131] 
0.033 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by pressure monitors 
2 1 2 4 
125 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation for 
auxiliary steam 
generation loop 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam 
generator, resulting in loss of 
blanket-steam production; no 
effect on system performance 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by pressure monitors 
2 2 2 8 
126 Leakage 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam 
generator, resulting in loss of 
blanket-steam production; no 
effect on system performance 
0.083 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by pressure monitors 
2 2 2 8 
127 
Pressure 
Indicator  
Measures auxiliary 
pump output 
pressure  
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The wear indicator is colored to contrast with 
the transfer material and indicates wear by an 
eroded area which can be visually observed 
through the outer translucent layer.[82] 
0.08 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
128 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
129 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measures water 
temperature at the 
auxiliary pump 
output 
fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 Monitoring system error 1 2 2 4 
130 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 Periodic calibration 1 2 4 8 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Auxiliary Steam Generator 
Sheet 2 of 5 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
131 
Control Valve 
Controls auxiliary 
steam loop water 
flow to the deaerator  
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to the deaerator; no effect on 
system performance 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by deaerator monitors 
2 3 2 12 
132 Leakage 
Loss of flow to the deaerator; no effect on 
system performance 
0.133 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by deaerator monitors 
2 3 2 12 
133 Flow Orifice 
Reduces flow in the 
deaerator input line 
Leakage or 
blockage 
Loss  of flow to the deaerator; no effect 
system performance 
Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 0.25 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by deaerator monitors 
2 4 2 16 
134 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow at 
the auxiliary steam 
pump outlet 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam generator, 
resulting in loss of blanket-steam production; 
no effect on system performance 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that 
design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
135 Leakage 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam generator, 
resulting in loss of blanket-steam production; 
no effect on system performance 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
136 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection in failure-mode 
condition; no effect on system performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
137 
Control Valve 
Controls flow of 
water in auxiliary 
steam generation 
loop 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam generator, 
resulting in loss of blanket-steam production; 
no effect on system performance 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
138 Leakage 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam generator, 
resulting in loss of blanket-steam production; 
no effect on system performance 
0.133 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
139 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides bypass path 
around the control 
valve 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
No effect on system performance 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
140 Leakage  
Loss of proper flow in auxiliary steam 
generation loop 
0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
141 Pressure 
Indicator 
Measures pressure in 
auxiliary steam 
generation loop 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.08 Visual inspection  1 2 4 8 
142 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
143 Pressure 
Transmitter  
Measures pressure in 
auxiliary steam 
generation loop 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over 
time.[124] 
0.1 Visual inspection 1 3 4 12 
144 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 Periodic calibration 1 3 3 9 
145 
Shutoff Valve 
Controls flow to 
thermal-stage unit 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of water flow to thermal storage 
causing loss of power production loop 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
thermal storage monitors 
3 2 2 12 
146 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow in auxiliary steam 
generation loop 
0.083 
Condition will be sednsed by 
thermal storage monitors 
3 2 2 12 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Auxiliary Steam Generator 
Sheet 3 of 5 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D 
RP
N 
147 
Check Valve 
Provents backflow in 
the auxiliary ateam 
generation loop 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of water flow to thermal storage, 
causing loss of power production 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of 
that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 1 1 3 
148 Leakage 
Loss of water flow to thermal storage, 
causing loss of power production 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 1 1 3 
149 Fails to check 
Backflow not prevented in failure mode 
condition; no effect on system performance 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
150 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measure system 
pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.08 
Upstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
151 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 
Upstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
152 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measures system 
pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over 
time.[124] Physical damage to the 
isolator diaphragms, process fluid 
freezing, isolator corrosion due to 
an incompatible process fluid [132] 
0.1 
Upstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 3 1 3 
153 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Upstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 3 1 3 
154 Flow 
Transmitter 
Measure system 
water flow to 
thermal storage 
Fails to operate System shutdown Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.2 Plant alarm 5 4 1 20 
155 False output System shutdown 0.2 Plant alarm 5 4 1 20 
156 
Flow 
Transmitter 
Measures system 
water flow to 
auxiliary steam 
generator 
Fails to operate System shutdown 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.2 Plant alarm 5 4 1 20 
157 False output System shutdown 0.2 Plant alarm 5 4 1 20 
158 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provides isolation for 
auxiliary steam 
generator input 
control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam generator, 
resulting in loss of blanket-steam production; 
no effect on system performance 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by flowmeter 
2 2 2 8 
159 Leakage 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam generator, 
resulting in loss of blanket-steam production; 
no effect on system performance 
0.083 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
160 
Control Valve 
Controls water flow 
to the auxiliary 
steam generator 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam generator, 
resulting in loss of blanket-steam production; 
no effect on system performance 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Loss of system flow will be 
sensed by flowmeter 
2 3 2 12 
161 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam generator, 
resulting in loss of blanket-steam production; 
no effect on system performance 
0.133 Visual inspection 2 3 4 24 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Auxiliary Steam Generator 
Sheet 4 of 5 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
162 Bypass Valve 
Provides a bypass 
path around the 
control valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of flow control to auxiliary 
steam gender, resulting in 
shutdown; no effect on system 
performance 
Factors causing low-temperature-related failures 
occurred during the manufacturing of 
processors. In one test, 50 out of 20000 dies 
(chips) failed unique low-temperature tests at 
0C. Many of these fails were timing-related; that 
is, the device slowed as the temperature 
decreased.[133] 
0.03
3 
Visual inspection 2 1 4 8 
163 
Auxiliary 
Steam 
Generator 
Electric generator 
used for the 
production of 
blanket steam 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of auxiliary steam 
production; no effect on system 
performance 
 Insufficient suction pressure to avoid 
cavitation. 
 Excessively high flow rate for the net positive 
suction head available 
 Prolonged operation at lower than acceptable 
flow rates. 
 Operation of the pump at zero or near zero 
flow rate. 
 Improper operation of pumps in parallel. 
 Failure to maintain adequate lubrication for 
the bearings. 
 Failure to maintain satisfactory flushing to 
mechanical seals.[91] 
0.03
3 
Condition will be sensed by 
plant monitors 
2 1 2 4 
164 Drain Valve 
Provides drain for 
auxiliary steam 
generator 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of auxiliary steam 
production; no effect on system 
performance 
Control circuit failure 
Loss of electric power to motor 
Electric motor failure[99] 
0.15
4 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
165 
Level 
Controller 
Controls water level 
in the auxiliary 
steam generator 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of auxiliary steam 
production; no effect on system 
performance 
It has been mainly caused by ineffective 
feedwater control.[85] 
0.09
5 
Condition will be sensed by 
plant monitors 
2 2 2 8 
166 
Pressure 
Indicator  
Measures auxiliary 
steam generator 
output pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The wear indicator is colored to contrast with 
the transfer material and indicates wear by an 
eroded area which can be visually observed 
through the outer translucent layer.[82] 
0.08 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
167 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
168 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measures system 
pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working environment 
degrade over time.[124] Physical damage to the 
isolator diaphragms, process fluid freezing, 
isolator corrosion due to an incompatible 
process fluid [132] 
0.1 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 3 1 3 
169 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 3 1 3 
170 Relief Valves 
Prevent system 
overpressure 
Fail to operate 
when required  
Potential safety hazard due to 
explosion and/or escaping steam 
0.13
3 
Condition will be sensed 
pressure measurements 
3 3 2 18 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendices                                                                                                                                                                                165 
171 Leakage 
Loss of blanket-steam from 
auxiliary generator; no effect on 
system performance 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug small 
openings, or abrade the mating surfaces until a 
valve leaks.[96] 
0.13
3 
Condition will be sensed 
pressure measurements 
2 3 2 12 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Auxiliary Steam Generator 
Sheet 5 of 5 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
172 
Stop Check 
Valve 
isolates output of the 
auxiliary steam 
generator 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of blanket-steam from auxiliary 
generator; no effect on system performance 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of 
that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
173 Leakage 
Loss of blanket-steam from auxiliary 
generator; no effect on system performance 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
174 Fails to check No effect on system performance 0.04 Undetectable prior to event 1 1 5 5 
175 
Control Valve 
Provides an interface 
to the nitrogen purge 
system 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Unable to purge system; no effect on system 
performance 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
176 Leakage 
Unable to purge system; no effect on system 
performance 
0.133 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
177 
Pressure 
Regulator 
Regulates pressures 
in the nitrogen purge 
line 
Fails to remain 
open 
Unable to purge system; no effect on system 
performance 
Presser Regulator failure have 
demonstrated significant increases 
in resistance between new 
defective valves, however, opening 
pressures are similar [138] 
0.105 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
178 Leakage 
Unable to purge system; no effect on system 
performance 
0.105 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
179 Fails to regulate 
Unable to control purge system pressure; no 
effect on system performance 
0.105 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
180 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
nitrogen purge 
system 
Fails to remain 
open 
Unable to purge system; no effect on system 
performance 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of 
that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
181 Leakage 
Unable to purge system; no effect on system 
performance 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
182 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection; no effect on 
system performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
183 
Relief Valve 
Prevents system 
overpressure  
fails to operate 
when required 
Potential safety hazard due to explosion  
Contaminants cause valve to stick, 
plug small openings, or abrade the 
mating surfaces until a valve 
leaks.[96] 
0.133 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
184 Leakage 
Unable to purge system; no effect on system 
performance 
0.133 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
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System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 1 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
185 
Thermal-
Storage Feed 
water Pump 
Provides water flow 
in support of the 
thermal-storage 
subsystem 
Fails to operate 
Loss of thermal-storage extraction 
capability which could result in plant 
shutdown 
Insufficient suction pressure to avoid 
cavitation. Excessively high flow rate 
for the net positive suction head 
available Prolonged operation at 
lower than acceptable flow rates. 
Operation of the pump at zero or near 
zero flow rate. Improper operation of 
pumps in parallel. Failure to maintain 
adequate lubrication for the bearings. 
Failure to maintain satisfactory 
flushing to mechanical seals.[91] 
0.111 
Pump output pressure is 
monitored  
3 2 1 6 
186 Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage extraction 
capability which could result in plant 
shutdown 
0.111 
Pump output pressure is 
monitored  
3 2 1 6 
187 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measures feed water 
pump input pressure  
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
 
0.08 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
188 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
189 
Cleanout 
Strainer 
Allows for system 
flush 
Blockage or 
leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage extraction 
capability which could result in plant 
shutdown 
At these much lower pressures a 
new balance was set up between air 
in leakage into the system 
(dominated by the main pump 
packing) and the withdrawal at the 
downstream stand-pipe[131] 
0.033 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
190 
Shutoff 
Valve 
Provides isolation for 
thermal-storage feed 
water pump 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage extraction which 
could result in plant shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
4 2 1 8 
191 Leakage  
Loss of thermal-storage extraction 
capability which could result in plant 
shutdown 
0.083 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
4 2 1 8 
192 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measures feed water 
pump output pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.08 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
193 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
194 Temperature 
Transmitters 
Measures system 
water temperature 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature 
sensor.[102] 
0.057 Monitoring system error 1 2 1 2 
195 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
196 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
thermal-storage feed 
water loop 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of thermal-storage extraction 
capability which could result in plant 
shutdown 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of 
that design 
0.04 
Loss of system flow will be 
sensed by flowmeter 
4 1 2 8 
197 Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage extraction capability 
which could result in plant shutdown 
0.04 Visual inspection  4 1 4 16 
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198 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection; no effect on 
system performance 
 Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 2 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
199 
Control 
Valve 
Controls the output 
flow from the 
thermal-storage feed 
water pump 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage extraction 
capability which could result in plant 
shutdown 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Loss of system flow will be 
sensed by flowmeter 
4 3 2 24 
200 Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage extraction 
capability which could result in plant 
shutdown 
0.133 Visual inspection 4 3 4 48 
201 
Shutoff 
Valve 
Provides bypass path 
around control valve 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
No effect on system performance 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
flowmeter 
1 2 2 4 
202 Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage extraction 
capability which could result in plant 
shutdown 
0.083 Visual inspection 4 2 4 32 
203 
Control 
Valve 
Controls bypass flow 
of thermal-storage 
feed water to the 
deaerator 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of bypass capability to deaerator; no 
effect on system performance 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors 
2 3 2 12 
204 Leakage 
Loss of bypass capability to deaerator; no 
effect on system performance 
0.133 Visual inspection 2 3 4 24 
205 Flow Orifice  
Reduction flow at 
input to deaerator  
Blockage or 
leakage 
Loss of bypass capability to deaerator; no 
effect on system performance 
Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 0.25 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors 
2 4 2 16 
206 
Control 
Valve 
Control the water 
flow from the 
thermal-storage feed 
water pump to the 
auxiliary steam 
generator 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to auxiliary generator, leading 
to loss of blanket-steam production 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
flow meter 
3 3 2 18 
207 Leakage 
Loss of flow to auxiliary generator, leading 
to loss of blanket-steam production 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
flow meter 
3 3 2 18 
208 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
the auxiliary steam 
generator line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to auxiliary generator, leading 
to loss of blanket-steam production  Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of 
that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
flow meter 
3 1 2 6 
209 Leakage 
Loss of flow to auxiliary generator, leading 
to loss of blanket-steam production 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
flow meter 
3 1 2 6 
210 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection; no effect on 
system performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
211 
Chemical-
Feed Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide interface and 
isolation from the 
amonia and hydrazine 
inputs 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Unable to properly adjust water quality, 
resulting in plant shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Loss of water flow will be 
sensed at chemical feed  
5 2 2 20 
212 Leakage 
Potential safety hazard due to chemical 
spill; unable to properly adjust water 
quality, resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 Visual inspection 5 2 4 40 
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213 
Temperature
s Recording 
Equipment 
Allows for analysis of 
water temperature 
profile at the input to 
the feed water pump 
Fails to operate 
properly 
No effect on system performance 
`Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature 
sensor.[102] 
0.125 
Condition will be sensed by 
monitoring system 
1 3 2 6 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 3 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
214 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measures feed water 
pump system input 
pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
 
0.08 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
215 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
216 
Control 
Valve 
Controls drain flow 
high-pressure heaters 
to the condenser 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper drain control 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
condenser monitors 
3 3 2 18 
217 Leakage Loss of proper drain control 0.133 Visual inspection 3 3 4 36 
218 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide system 
isolation for high-
pressure heater to 
condenser control 
valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper drain control  Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive  
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
condenser monitors 
3 2 2 12 
219 Leakage  Loss of proper drain control 0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
220 
Bypass 
Valve 
Provides bypass for 
for high-pressure 
heater to condenser 
control valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper drain control 
Factors causing low-temperature-related 
failures occurred during the manufacturing 
of processors. In one test, 50 out of 20000 
dies (chips) failed unique low-temperature 
tests at 0C. Many of these fails were timing-
related; that is, the device slowed as the 
temperature decreased.[133] 
0.033 Visual inspection 3 1 4 12 
221 
Control 
Valve 
Controls flow from 
the high-pressure to 
low-pressure heaters 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper drain control 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
heater monitors 
3 3 2 18 
222 Leakage Loss of proper drain control 0.133 Visual inspection 3 3 4 36 
223 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation for 
high-pressure to low-
pressure heater 
control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper drain control 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
heater monitors 
3 2 2 12 
224 Leakage Loss of proper drain control 0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
225 
Control 
Valve 
Controls the flow 
from the high-
pressure heater to the 
deaerator 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper drain control 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors 
3 3 2 18 
226 Leakage Loss of proper drain control 0.133 Visual inspection 3 3 4 36 
227 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation for 
the high-pressure 
heater to deaerator 
control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper drain control 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors 
3 2 2 12 
228 Leakage Loss of proper drain control 0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 4 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
229 Bypass Valve 
Provides a bypass for 
the high-pressure 
heater to deaerator 
control valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper drain control 
Factors causing low-temperature-related 
failures occurred during the 
manufacturing of processors. In one test, 
50 out of 20000 dies (chips) failed unique 
low-temperature tests at 0C. Many of 
these fails were timing-related; that is, the 
device slowed as the temperature 
decreased.[133] 
0.033 
Visual inspection 2 1 4 8 
230 Desuperheater 
Provides for cooling 
at input to deaerator 
and low-pressure 
heater 
Clogged or 
blockage 
Loss of flow to the deaerator 
and low-pressure heater 
Vibration at full load, Pitting corrosion 
and Contamination [129] 
0.222 Output pressure is monitored  2 2 1 4 
231 
Relief Valve 
Prevents system 
overpressure  
fails to operate 
when required 
Potential safety hazard Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
desuperheater input pressure 
3 3 2 18 
232 Leakage Loss of proper drain control 0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
desuperheater input pressure 
2 3 2 12 
233 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measures 
desuperheater input 
pressure 
Fails to operate  
No effect on system 
performance 
 Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over 
time.[124] 
 Physical damage to the isolator 
diaphragms, process fluid freezing, 
isolator corrosion due to an 
incompatible process fluid [132] 
0.1 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 3 1 3 
234 False output 
No effect on system 
performance 
0.1 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
1 3 1 3 
235 
temperature 
Transmitter 
Measures 
desuperheater output 
temperature 
Fails to operate 
No effect on system 
performance Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Incorrect output will be sensed 
by monitoting system 
1 2 1 2 
236 False output 
No effect on system 
performance 
0.057 Periodic calibration 1 2 4 8 
237 
Control Valve 
Control flow of 
cooling water to 
deaerator 
desuperheater 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Output would not be desuper-
heated , leading to potential 
deaerator and/or low-pressure 
heater damage Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed as 
increased output temperature 
3 3 2 18 
238 Leakage 
Output would not be desuper-
heated , leading to potential 
deaerator and/or low-pressure 
heater damage 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed as 
increased output temperature 
3 3 2 18 
239 Shutoff Valve 
Controls flow of 
cooling water to 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of input flow control to 
the deaerator 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed as 
increased output temperature 
2 2 2 8 
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240 
deaerator 
desuperheater 
Leakage 
Loss of input flow control to 
the deaerator 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed as 
increased output temperature 
2 2 2 8 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 5 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
241 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
deaerator input line 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of input flow to deaerator 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed as 
increased output temperature 
2 1 2 4 
242 Leakage Loss of input flow to deaerator 0.04 
Condition will be sensed as 
increased output temperature 
2 1 2 4 
243 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection in 
failure-mode condition; no 
effect on system performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 1 1 5 5 
244 
Check Valves  
Prevents backflow in 
the deaerator input 
lines from high-
pressure heaters 
Fail to remain 
open 
Loss of input flow to deaerator 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Conditions will be sensed by 
heater monitors 
2 1 2 4 
245 Leakage Loss of input flow to deaerator 0.04 Visual inspection 2 1 4 8 
246 Fail to check 
Loss of backflow protection in 
failure-mode condition; no 
effect on system performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 1 1 5 5 
247 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide deaerator 
input isolation 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of input flow to deaerator 
 Serving in aggressive media 
and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors 
2 2 2 8 
248 Leakage Loss of input to deaerator  0.083 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
249 
Flow 
Transmitter 
Measures deaerator 
output flow  
Fails to operate 
No effect on system 
performance Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.2 Monitoring system error 1 4 1 4 
250 False output 
No effect on system 
performance 
0.2 Periodic calibration 1 4 4 16 
251 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measures deaerator 
output pressure 
Fails to operate 
No effect on system 
performance 
The wear indicator is colored to 
contrast with the transfer material and 
indicates wear by an eroded area 
which can be visually observed 
through the outer translucent 
layer.[82] 
0.08 Monitoring system error 1 1 1 1 
252 False output 
No effect on system 
performance 
0.08 Periodic calibration 1 1 4 4 
253 
Temperature 
Indicator 
Measures deaerator 
output temperature 
Fails to operate 
No effect on system 
performance Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes 
0.057 Monitoring system error 1 2 1 2 
254 False output 
No effect on system 
performance 
0.057 Periodic calibration 1 2 4 8 
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255 
Control Valve 
Control  flow from the 
receiver flash tank to 
the deaerator  
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper drain control 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by flash 
tank and deaerator monitors 
2 3 2 12 
256 Leakage Loss of proper drain control 0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors and visual 
inspection  
2 3 2 12 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 6 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
257 
Shutoff Valves 
 
Provide isolation for 
receiver flash tank to 
deaerator control 
valve 
 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper drain control 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
flash tank and deaerator 
monitors 
3 2 2 12 
258 Leakage Loss of proper drain control 0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors and visual 
inspection  
3 2 2 12 
259 Bypass Valve 
Provides bypass for 
receiver flash tank to 
deaerator control 
valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper drain control 
Factors causing low-temperature-related 
failures occurred during the 
manufacturing of processors. In one test, 
50 out of 20000 dies (chips) failed unique 
low-temperature tests at 0C. Many of 
these fails were timing-related; that is, the 
device slowed as the temperature 
decreased.[133] 
0.033 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors and visual 
inspection  
3 1 2 6 
260 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
the receiver flash tank 
to deaerator line 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of proper drain control 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors 
3 1 2 6 
261 Leakage Loss of proper drain control 0.04 Visual inspection 3 1 4 12 
262 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection 
in failure-mode condition; 
no effect on system 
performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
263 
Vent Valves 
Allow for venting of 
deaerator 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
No effect on system 
performance 
Vent valve failures, post seal or jar/cover 
seal leaks; water or hydrogen loss through 
the plastic jar or cover; or performance 
problems, such as poor recombination, 
with direct loss of hydrogen and oxygen 
through the vent; or the more subtle loss 
of water by positive grid corrosion with 
consequent hydrogen evolution all should 
result in an decrease in conductance as the 
cell loses water[117] 
0.0285 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors 
1 1 2 2 
264 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Reduction in deaerator 
pressure, leading to plant 
shutdown 
0.0285 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors 
4 1 2 8 
265 Flow Orifice 
Restricts flow in one 
deaerator vent line 
Blockage 
No effect on system 
performance 
Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 0.25 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors 
1 4 2 8 
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266 
Relief Valve 
Prevents deaerator 
overpressure 
fails to operate 
when required 
Potential safety hazard 
Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.133 Condition will be sensed by  3 3 2 18 
267 Leakage 
Reduction in deaerator 
pressure, leading to plant 
shutdown 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal deaerator pressure 
4 3 2 24 
 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 7 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D 
R
P
N 
268 Pressure 
Transmitter 
 
Measures deaerator 
pressure  
 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Exposed to a harsh working 
environment degrade over time.[124] 
Physical damage to the isolator 
diaphragms, process fluid freezing, 
isolator corrosion due to an 
incompatible process fluid [132] 
 
0.1 
 
Monitoring system error 1 3 1 3 
269 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 Periodic calibration 1 3 3 9 
270 
pressure 
Indicator  
Measures deaerator 
pressure  
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The wear indicator is colored to 
contrast with the transfer material and 
indicates wear by an eroded area which 
can be visually observed through the 
outer translucent layer.[82] 
0.08 Monitoring system error 1 2 3 6 
271 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
272 
Temperature 
Indicator  
Measures deaerator 
input temperature  
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes 
0.057 Monitoring system error 1 2 1 2 
273 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 Periodic calibration 1 2 2 4 
274 Deaerator 
Deaerators system 
feed water 
Leakage, blockage, 
or fails to operate 
properly 
Improper drain control 
Deaerator Control circuit failure 
Loss of electric power to motor 
Electric motor failure[99] 
0.025 
Condition will be sensed 
by internal dewater 
monitors 
3 1 2 6 
275 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation between 
deaerator and the 
turbine returns 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Plant shutdown due to improper 
drain control. Turbine is 
protected by check valve at 
exhaist port. 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
exhaust port pressures are 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
276 Leakage 
Loss of deaerator input leading to 
plant shutdown 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed 
by internal deaerator 
monitors 
4 2 2 16 
277 Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
the deaerator to 
Fails to remain open 
Loss of proper drain control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
 Improper seating 0.04 
Condition will be sensed 
by flash tank and deaerator 
monitors 
4 1 2 8 
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278 
thermal-storage flash 
tank line 
Leakage 
Loss of proper drain control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
 Inherent characteristics of that 
design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 Visual inspection 4 1 4 16 
279 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection in 
failure-mode condition; no effect 
on system performance 
0.04 
Undetectable prior to 
event 
2 1 5 10 
280 
Temperature 
Recording 
Equipment 
Allows for analysis of 
water temperature 
profile at deaerator 
input  
Fails to operate 
properly 
No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[18] 
0.125 
Condition will be sensed 
by monitoring system 
1 3 2 6 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 8 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
281 
Control Valve 
Controls flow from 
the low pressure 
heater to the deaerator  
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of input flow to deaerator 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
heater monitors 
3 3 2 18 
282 Leakage 
Loss of input flow to deaerator 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors and 
visual inspection  
3 3 2 18 
283 
Shutoff Valves 
Provides system 
isolation for low 
pressure heater to 
deaerator control 
valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of input flow to deaerator 
resulting in plant shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
heater monitors 
3 2 2 12 
284 Leakage  
Loss of input flow to deaerator 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors and 
visual inspection  
3 2 2 12 
285 Bypass Valve 
Provide a bypass for 
the low pressure 
heater to deaerator 
control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of input flow control to the 
deaerator resulting in plant 
shutdown 
Factors causing low-temperature-related 
failures occurred during the 
manufacturing of processors. In one test, 
50 out of 20000 dies (chips) failed unique 
low-temperature tests at 0C. Many of 
these fails were timing-related; that is, the 
device slowed as the temperature 
decreased.[133] 
0.033 
Condition will be sensed by 
deaerator monitors and 
visual inspection  
3 1 2 6 
286 
Pressure 
Indicator  
Measures low 
pressure heater output 
pressure  
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The wear indicator is colored to contrast 
with the transfer material and indicates 
wear by an eroded area which can be 
visually observed through the outer 
translucent layer.[82] 
0.08 Monitoring system error 1 2 1 2 
287 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
288 
Temperature 
Indicator  
Measures low 
pressure heater output 
temperature  
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes 
0.057 Monitoring system error 1 2 1 2 
289 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
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290 Deaerator 
Allows deaerator to be 
drained 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Reduction in deaerator 
effectiveness 
Deaerator Control circuit failure 
Loss of electric power to motor 
Electric motor failure[99] 
0.025 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal deaerator monitors 
3 1 2 6 
291 
Control Valve 
Controls flow 
between the deaerator 
and condenser 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow  
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal deaerator monitors 
2 3 2 12 
292 Leakage Loss of proper system flow 0.133 Visual inspection 2 3 4 24 
293 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of flow to level glass. No 
effect on system performance 
0.133 
Visual inspection of level 
glass 
1 3 4 12 
294 Leakage Loss of flow to level glass 0.133 Visual inspection 2 3 4 24 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 9 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
295 
Angle Valve  
Allows flow to the 
deaerator level glass 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of flow to level glass. No 
effect on system performance 
From the frictional failure criterion, one can 
envisage a range of scenarios between end-members 
of purely stress-driven failure at constant fluid-
pressure and purely fluid-driven failure under 
constant stress. In general, however, failure may be 
induced by some combination of increasing fluid-
pressure as well as tectonic shear stress[134] 
0.1 
Visual inspection 
of level glass 
2 3 4 24 
296 Leakage Loss of flow to level glass 0.1 Visual inspection 3 3 4 36 
297 
3-way Valve 
Allows flow to the 
deaerator level glass 
Fails to remain 
open Loss of flow to level glass 
leading to deaerator and 
subsequent plant shutdown 
3 way-valve that is functioning below its design 
specifications may result in fugitive emissions, 
unexpected valve failure causing plant-shutdown, or 
poor quality end products due to inadequate process 
control[135] 
0.1 
Visual inspection 
of level glass 
4 3 4 48 
298 Leakage 0.1 Visual inspection 4 3 4 48 
299 Level Glass 
Measures water level 
within the deaerator  
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of measurement capability; 
no effect on system performance 
The failure wave process could occur as the stress 
grows above the failure threshold up to the stress 
level at which plastic deformation starts.[136] 
0.0174 Visual inspection 5 2 4 40 
300 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide system 
isolation for level 
switches 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to level switches 
resulting in plant shutdown Serving in aggressive media and under significant 
temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Plant alarm 5 2 1 10 
301 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to level 
switches resulting in plant 
shutdown 
0.083 Visual inspection 5 2 4 40 
302 Vent Valves 
Allow for venting of 
level switches system 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper flow to level 
switches resulting in plant 
shutdown 
Vent valve failures, post seal or jar/cover seal leaks; 
water or hydrogen loss through the plastic jar or cover; 
or performance problems, such as poor recombination, 
with direct loss of hydrogen and oxygen through the 
vent; or the more subtle loss of water by positive grid 
corrosion with consequent hydrogen evolution all should 
result in an decrease in conductance as the cell loses 
water[117] 
0.0285 Plant alarm 5 1 1 5 
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303 
Level Glass 
Measures deaerator 
water level 
Fails to operate 
No effect on system performance The failure wave process could occur as the stress grows 
above the failure threshold up to the stress level at which 
plastic deformation starts.[136] 
0.0174 Visual inspection 1 2 4 8 
304 No effect on system performance 0.0174 Visual inspection 1 2 4 8 
305 
Level Switches 
Provides alarm points 
for turbine exaust 
ports 
Fail to operate 
when required  
Potential turbine damage due to 
improper exaust flow; turbine is 
protected by a check valve at the 
exaust port which should preclude 
system damage 
Switch failure is reported to the control application, 
the latencies involved in disseminating the failure-
related state updates throughout the Onix cluster 
become essential; they define the absolute minimum 
time the control application will take to react to the 
failure throughout the network[137] 
0.111 Plant alarm 3 3 1 9 
306 False alarm 
Unnecessary shutdown of turbine 
exhaust port; system should balance 
itself, resulting in no effect on 
system performance 
0.111 
Undetectable prior 
to event 
3 3 5 45 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 10 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
307 
Control Valve 
Controls flow from 
turbine seal to the 
deaerator 
desuperheater 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow  Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
desuperheater input pressure 
3 3 2 18 
308 Leakage Loss of proper system flow 0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
desuperheater input pressure 
3 3 2 18 
309 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
deaerator 
desuperheater input 
line 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of proper system flow  
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
desuperheater input pressure 
3 1 2 6 
310 Leakage Loss of proper system flow  0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
desuperheater input pressure 
3 1 2 6 
311 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection in 
failure-mode condition; no effect 
on system performance 
0.04 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by internal heater monitors 
2 1 2 4 
312 
Control valve 
Controls flow from 
deaetator 
desuperheater to the 
low pressure heater 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system drain control Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by internal heater monitors 
3 3 2 18 
313 Leakage Loss of proper system drain control 0.133 Visual inspection 3 3 4 36 
314 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for 
deaetator 
desuperheater to low 
pressure heater 
control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system drain control 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Loss of flow will be sensed 
by internal heater monitors 
3 3 2 18 
315 Leakage  Loss of proper system drain control 0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
316 
Pressure 
Regulator  
Regulates pressure 
across the deaerator 
desuperheater to low 
pressure heater 
control valve 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of proper system drain control 
The wear indicator is colored to 
contrast with the transfer material and 
indicates wear by an eroded area 
which can be visually observed 
through the outer translucent 
layer.[82] 
0.105 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 3 2 18 
317 Leakage Loss of proper system drain control 0.105 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 3 2 18 
318 Fails to regulate Loss of proper system drain control 0.105 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 3 2 18 
319 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation for pressure 
regulator 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system drain control 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical 
wear [81] 
0.082 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 2 2 12 
320 Leakage Loss of proper system drain control 0.082 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 2 2 12 
321 
Check Valve 
prevents backflow in 
the low pressure 
heater input line 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of proper system drain control 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 1 2 6 
322 Leakage Loss of proper system drain control 0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 1 2 6 
323 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection in 
failure-mode condition; no effect 
on system performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
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System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 12of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
324 
Shutoff Valve 
Isolates the low 
pressure heater from 
the turbine exhaust 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper drain control 
resulting in plant shutdown. 
Turbine is protected by check valve 
at the exhaust port 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
  Mechanical wear [81] 
 
0.083 
Plant alarm 3 2 1 6 
325 Leakage 
Loss of proper drain control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 
Visual inspection and heater 
monitors 
5 2 3 30 
326 
Relief Valves 
Prevent low pressure 
heater overpressure 
Fail to operate 
when required  
Potential safety hazard Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 3 2 18 
327 Leakage 
Loss of proper system drain control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
5 3 2 30 
328 
Vent and Drain 
valves 
Allow for 
venting/draining of 
low pressure heater 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper system drain control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Control circuit failure 
Loss of electric power to motor 
Electric motor failure[99] 
0.0285 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
5 1 2 10 
329 
Output Valve 
Interfaces low 
pressure heater output 
to condenser 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system drain control 
resulting in plant shutdown Water level value input error from 
remote multiplex unit [109] 
0.05 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
5 2 2 20 
330 Leakage  
Loss of proper system drain control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.05 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
5 2 2 20 
331 Flow Orifice 
Reduces flow in the 
low pressure heater 
output line  
Leakage or 
blockage 
Loss of proper system drain control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 0.25 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors and 
visual inspection 
5 4 2 40 
332 Temperature 
Indicator 
Measures low 
pressure heater output 
temperature  
Fails to operate No effect on system performance Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[18] 
0.057 Monitoring system error 1 2 1 2 
333 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
334 
Pressure 
Indicator  
Measures low 
pressure heater output 
flow to the condenser 
Fails to operate  No effect on system performance The wear indicator is colored to contrast 
with the transfer material and indicates 
wear by an eroded area which can be 
visually observed through the outer 
translucent layer.[82] 
0.08 Monitoring system error 1 2 1 2 
335 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
336 
Control Valve 
Controls low pressure 
heater output flow to 
the condenser 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system drain control  Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 3 2 18 
337 Leakage Loss of proper system drain control 0.133 Visual inspection 3 3 4 36 
338 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide system 
isolation for low 
pressure heater to 
condenser control 
valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system drain control 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
internal heater monitors 
3 2 2 12 
339 Leakage Loss of proper system drain control 0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendices                                                                                                                                                                                179 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 13 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
340 Bypass Valve 
Provides bypass path 
around low pressure 
heater to condenser 
control valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper system drain 
control 
Factors causing low-temperature-related failures 
occurred during the manufacturing of processors. In 
one test, 50 out of 20000 dies (chips) failed unique 
low-temperature tests at 0C. Many of these fails 
were timing-related; that is, the device slowed as the 
temperature decreased.[133] 
0.033 
 
Visual inspection 2 1 4 8 
341 
Temperature 
Recording 
Equipment 
Allows for analysis of 
water temperature 
profile at low pressure 
heater input 
Fails to operate 
properly 
No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[18] 
0.123 
Condition will be 
sensed monitoring 
system  
1 3 2 6 
342 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measures input 
pressure to the low 
pressure heater 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The wear indicator is colored to contrast with the 
transfer material and indicates wear by an eroded 
area which can be visually observed through the 
outer translucent layer.[82] 
0.08 
Monitoring system 
error 
1 2 1 2 
343 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
344 
Input Shutoff 
Valve 
Isolates the low 
pressure heater input 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of input flow to heater 
resulting in plant shutdown Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be 
sensed by internal 
heater monitors 
4 2 2 16 
345 Leakage 
Loss of input flow to heater 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 
Condition will be 
sensed by internal 
heater monitors 
4 2 2 16 
346 
Output Shutoff 
Valve 
Isolates the low 
pressure heater output 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of system flow from heater 
resulting in plant shutdown Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Output pressure is 
sensed 
4 2 1 8 
347 Leakage  
Loss of proper system flow from 
heater resulting in plant 
shutdown 
0.083 
Output pressure in 
sensed 
4 2 1 8 
348 
Bypass Valve 
Provides a bypass 
path around the low 
pressure heater 
Inadvertently 
Open 
No effect on system performance 
Factors causing low-temperature-related failures 
occurred during the manufacturing of processors. In 
one test, 50 out of 20000 dies (chips) failed unique 
low-temperature tests at 0C. Many of these fails 
were timing-related; that is, the device slowed as the 
temperature decreased.[133] 
0.033 
Output temperature is 
sensed  
1 1 1 1 
349 Leakage  
Loss of proper system flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.033 
Output pressure is 
sensed 
4 1 1 4 
350 
Low Pressure 
Heater 
Provides means for 
preheating system 
water 
Leakage or 
blockage 
Loss of flow proper system flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.06 
Condition will be 
sensed by internal 
monitors 
4 2 2 16 
351 
Angle Valve  
Allows flow to low 
pressure heater level 
glass 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to level glass. No 
effect on system performance 
From the frictional failure criterion, one can 
envisage a range of scenarios between end-members 
of purely stress-driven failure at constant fluid-
pressure and purely fluid-driven failure under 
constant stress. In general, however, failure may be 
0.1 
Visual inspection of 
level glass 
2 3 4 24 
352 Leakage Loss of proper system flow 0.1 Visual inspection 3 3 4 36 
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induced by some combination of increasing fluid-
pressure as well as tectonic shear stress[134] 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 14 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
353 
3-way Valve 
Allows flow to low 
pressure heater level 
glass 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to level glass. No 
effect on system performance 
3 way-valve that is functioning below its design 
specifications may result in fugitive emissions, 
unexpected valve failure causing plant-shutdown, or 
poor quality end products due to inadequate process 
control[135] 
0.1 Visual inspection of 
level glass 
2 3 4 24 
354 Leakage Loss of proper system flow 0.1 Visual inspection  3 3 4 36 
355 Level Glass 
Measures low 
pressure heater water 
level 
Fails to operate 
properly 
No effect on system performance 
The failure wave process could occur as the stress grows 
above the failure threshold up to the stress level at which 
plastic deformation starts.[136] 
0.0174 Visual inspection 1 2 4 8 
356 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measures low 
pressure heater 
pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance Exposed to a harsh working environment degrade over 
time.[124] Physical damage to the isolator diaphragms, 
process fluid freezing, isolator corrosion due to an 
incompatible process fluid [132] 
0.1 
Downstream pressure 
is monitored 
1 3 1 3 
357 False output  No effect on system performance 0.1 
Downstream pressure 
is monitored 
1 3 1 3 
358 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measures low 
pressure heater 
pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance The wear indicator is colored to contrast with the 
transfer material and indicates wear by an eroded area 
which can be visually observed through the outer 
translucent layer.[82] 
0.08 
Downstream pressure 
is monitored 
1 2 1 2 
359 False to output No effect on system performance 0.08 
Downstream pressure 
is monitored 
1 2 1 2 
360 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide system 
isolation for switches 
and controllers 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to switches and/or 
controller resulting in heater and 
subsequent plant shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Plant alarm 4 2 1 8 
361 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to switches 
and/or controller resulting in heater 
and subsequent plant shutdown 
0.083 
Plant alarm 4 2 1 8 
362 Vent Valve 
Allows for venting of 
level switch system 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper flow to switches 
and/or controller resulting in 
heater and subsequent plant 
shutdown 
Vent valve failures, post seal or jar/cover seal leaks; 
water or hydrogen loss through the plastic jar or cover; 
or performance problems, such as poor recombination, 
with direct loss of hydrogen and oxygen through the 
vent; or the more subtle loss of water by positive grid 
corrosion with consequent hydrogen evolution all should 
result in an decrease in conductance as the cell loses 
water[117] 
0.0285 Plant alarm 4 1 1 4 
363 
Level 
Controller  
Provide control of 
system drain lines 
Fail to operate 
properly 
Loss of control of plant drains 
It has been mainly caused by ineffective 
feedwater control.[85] 
0.095 Plant alarm 3 2 1 6 
364 
Fail to operate 
when required  
Potential turbine damage due to 
improper exhaust flow; turbine is 
protected by a check valve at the 
exhaust post which should preclude 
system damage 
0.095 Plant alarm 3 2 1 6 
365 False alarm 
Unnecessary shutdown of turbine 
exhaust port; system should balance 
0.095 
Undetectable prior to 
event 
3 2 5 30 
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itself, resulting in no effect on system 
performance 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 15 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D 
RP
N 
366 
condensate 
Hotwell Pumps 
produces flow from 
the condenser hotwell 
to the remainder of 
the system 
Fail to operate 
properly 
Failure of a single pump will 
have no effect on system 
performance 
 Insufficient suction pressure to 
avoid cavitation. 
 Excessively high flow rate for the 
net positive suction head available  
 Prolonged operation at lower than 
acceptable flow rates. Operation of 
the pump at zero or near zero flow 
rate. 
  Improper operation of pumps in 
parallel. Failure to maintain 
adequate lubrication for the 
bearings. Failure to maintain 
satisfactory flushing to mechanical 
seals.[91] 
 
0.011 
Condition will be sensed by 
monitors such as pump output 
pressure  
2 2 2 8 
367 
Cleanout 
Strainers 
Allow for system 
flush 
Blockage 
Loss of flow in single loop will 
have no effect on system 
performance 
At these much lower pressures a new 
balance was set up between air in leakage 
into the system (dominated by the main 
pump packing) and the withdrawal at the 
downstream stand-pipe[131] 
0.033 
Condition will be sensed by 
monitors such as pump output 
pressure  
2 1 2 4 
368 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow  
0.033 
Visual inspection 
3 1 4 12 
369 
shutoff valves 
Isolate condensate 
hotwell pump inputs 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss flow in single loop will 
have no effect on system 
performance 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant 
 temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
monitors such as pump output 
pressure  
2 2 2 8 
370 Leakage Loss of proper system flow  0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
monitors such as pump output 
pressure 
3 2 2 12 
371 
Pressure 
Indicators 
Measure condensate 
hotwell pump output 
pressure 
Fail to operate No effect on system performance 
The wear indicator is colored to contrast 
with the transfer material and indicates 
wear by an eroded area which can be 
visually observed through the outer 
translucent layer.[82] 
0.08 Monitoring system error 1 2 1 2 
372 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
373 
Check Valves 
Prevent backflow in 
condensate hotwell 
pump lines  
Fail to remain 
open 
Loss of flow in a single loop will 
have no effect on system 
performance 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that 
design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Condition will be sensed by 
increased desuperheater output 
temperature 
2 1 2 4 
374 Leakage Loss of proper system flow 0.04 Visual inspection 3 1 4 12 
375 Fail to check 
Will not prevent backflow in 
failure-mode condition. Could 
cause pump damage 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 3 1 5 15 
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Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 16 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D 
RP
N 
376 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide system 
isolation at 
condensate hotwell 
pump output 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow in a single loop will 
have no effect on system 
performance 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant 
 temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condition will be sensed by 
increased desuperheater output 
temperature 
2 2 2 8 
377 Leakage Loss of proper system flow  0.083 Visual inspection  3 2 4 24 
378 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measures 
demineralizer input 
pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The wear indicator is colored to 
contrast with the transfer material and 
indicates wear by an eroded area 
which can be visually observed 
through the outer translucent 
layer.[82] 
0.08 Monitoring system error 1 2 2 4 
379 False to output No effect on system performance 0.08 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
380 
Temperature 
Indicator 
Measures 
demineralizer input 
temperature 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes [18] 
0.057 Monitoring system error 1 2 2 4 
381 False to output No effect on system performance 0.057 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
382 
Pressure Sensor  
Measures 
demineralizer input 
pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Incidents of sensor failures which 
caused component damage, 
unnecessary shutdowns and delays of 
the program[88] 
0.125 Monitoring system error 1 3 2 6 
383 False to output No effect on system performance 0.125 Periodic calibration 1 3 3 9 
384 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measures 
demineralizer input 
system pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The wear indicator is colored to 
contrast with the transfer material and 
indicates wear by an eroded area 
which can be visually observed 
through the outer translucent 
layer.[82] 
0.057 Monitoring system error 1 2 2 4 
385 False to output No effect on system performance 0.057 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
386 
Temperature 
Indication  
Measures 
demineralizer input 
system pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes 
0.08 Monitoring system error 1 2 2 4 
387 False to output No effect on system performance 0.08 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
388 
Shutoff Valves 
Isolate demineralozer 
input 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow in a single loop will 
have no effect on system 
performance 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 2 1 4 
389 Leakage Loss of proper system flow 0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
390 Shutoff Valve 
Provide isolation from 
the water surge tank 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper system flow 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
3 2 1 6 
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Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 17 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
391 
Demineralizers 
provide capability for 
water purification 
Fail to operate 
properly 
Potential low quality water in system 
Demineralizer’s failures happen partly 
because of impure steam. The system 
shutdown wastes a lot of heat energy 
in restarts. 
0.033 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
392 Blockage 
Loss of flow on a single loop will 
have no effect on system 
performance 
0.033 
System flow os monitored by 
flowmeter 
2 1 1 2 
393 Leakage Loss of proper system flow 0.033 
System flow os monitored by 
flowmeter 
3 1 1 3 
394 
Shutoff Valves 
Isolate demineralozer 
outputs 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow in a single loop will 
have no effect on system 
performance 
 Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
System flow os monitored by 
flowmeter 
2 2 1 4 
395 Leakage Loss of proper system flow 0.083 
System flow os monitored by 
flowmeter 
3 2 1 6 
396 
Pressure 
Indicator 
Measures 
demineralizer output 
pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance The wear indicator is colored to 
contrast with the transfer material and 
indicates wear by an eroded area 
which can be visually observed 
through the outer translucent 
layer.[82] 
0.08 Monitoring system error 1 2 2 4 
397 false output No effect on system performance 0.08 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
398 Temperature 
Indicator 
Measures 
demineralizer output 
temperature 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes [18] 
0.057 Monitoring system error 1 2 2 4 
399 False output No effect on system performance 0.057 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
400 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation 
from chemical feed 
system  
Fails to open 
when required 
Unable to adjust water purity 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Visual inspection 5 2 4 40 
401 
Fails to close 
when required 
or internal 
leakage 
Potential water of improper purity in 
system. Additional system damage 
may result. 
0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
402 
External 
leakage 
Potential safety hazard due to 
chemical spill 
0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
403 
Flow Rate 
Transmitter 
Measures system flow 
rate 
Fails to operate 
Improper drain control may 
shutdown plant Ageing modes inevitably lead to 
failure modes[95] 
0.2 Monitoring system error 4 4 2 32 
404 False output 
Improper drain control may 
shutdown plant 
0.2 Monitoring system error 4 4 2 32 
405 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow 
from low pressure 
heater 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of system flow resulting in 
plant shutdown 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Sensed by internal heater 
monitors 
5 1 1 5 
406 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting 
in plant shutdown 
0.04 Visual inspection 5 1 4 20 
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407 Fails to check 
Backflow not prevented in failure 
mode condition. No effect on system 
performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 5 1 5 25 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 18 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
408 
Control Valve 
Control recirculation 
flow to the condenser 
Fails to open 
when required 
Loss of recirculation flow control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 Valve position is monitored  5 3 1 15 
409 
Fails to close 
when required 
Loss of proper system flow resulting 
in plant shutdown 
0.133 Valve position is monitored  5 3 1 15 
410 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.133 Visual inspection  5 3 4 60 
411 
Shutoff Valve 
Provide isolation for 
recirculation flow 
control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of recirculation flow resulting 
in plant shutdown 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Sensed by internal condenser 
monitors 
5 2 1 10 
412 Leakage  
Loss of proper system flow control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 Visual inspection 5 2 4 40 
413 Bypass Valve 
Provides a bypass for 
the recirculation flow 
control valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper system flow control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Factors causing low-temperature-related 
failures occurred during the manufacturing 
of processors. In one test, 50 out of 20000 
dies (chips) failed unique low-temperature 
tests at 0C. Many of these fails were 
timing-related; that is, the device slowed as 
the temperature decreased.[133] 
0.033 Visual inspection 5 1 4 20 
414 
Condensate 
Storage Tank 
Provides for storage 
of system makeup 
water 
Structural 
failure  
Loss of makeup storage capability. 
No effect on system performance. 
Insufficient suction pressure to avoid 
cavitation. Excessively high flow rate for 
the net positive suction head available 
Prolonged operation at lower than 
acceptable flow rates. Operation of the 
pump at zero or near zero flow rate. 
Improper operation of pumps in parallel. 
Failure to maintain adequate lubrication for 
the bearings. Failure to maintain 
satisfactory flushing to mechanical 
seals.[91] 
0.133 
Visual inspection and level 
indicators 
2 1 4 8 
415 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for 
condensate tank input 
valve from makeup 
demineralizer 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of makeup capability only. No 
effect on system performance. 
Serving in aggressive media and 
under significant temperature 
gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Tank level is monitored 2 2 1 4 
416 Leakage 
Loss of makeup capability only. No 
effect on system performance. 
0.083 Visual inspection  2 2 4 16 
417 Control Valve 
Control input flow 
from makeup 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of makeup capability only. No 
effect on system performance. 
0.133 Tank level is monitored 2 3 1 6 
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418 
demineralizer to 
condensate tank 
Inadvertently 
Open or 
internal leakage 
No effect on system performance. 
Excess input can be drained off. 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator 
vent blockage, and diaphragm 
leakage.[83] 
0.133 Tank level is monitored 2 3 1 6 
419 
External 
leakage 
Loss of makeup capability. No effect 
on system performance. 
0.133 Visual inspection 2 3 4 24 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 19 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
420 
Bypass valve 
Provides a bypass 
path around input 
control valve 
Inadvertently 
open 
Excess makeup flow can be 
drained. No effect on system 
performance. 
Factors causing low-temperature-related 
failures occurred during the manufacturing of 
processors. In one test, 50 out of 20000 dies 
(chips) failed unique low-temperature tests at 
0C. Many of these fails were timing-related; 
that is, the device slowed as the temperature 
decreased.[133] 
 
0.033 
Tank level is monitored 2 1 1 2 
421 Leakage 
Loss of makeup capability. No 
effect on system performance. 
0.033 Tank level is monitored 2 1 1 2 
422 
Level Indicator 
Measures condensate 
tank water level 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The engine was virtually destroyed. Also, there 
have been numerous incidents of sensor 
failures which caused component damage, 
unnecessary shutdowns and delays of the 
program.[88] 
0.285 
Tank level also monitored 
by level sensor 
1 4 1 4 
423 False output No effect on system performance 0.285 
Tank level also monitored 
by level sensor 
1 4 1 4 
424 
Level Sensor 
Measures condensate 
tank water level 
Fails to operate 
Loss of makeup capability. No 
effect on system performance. 
The engine was virtually destroyed. Also, there 
have been numerous incidents of sensor 
failures which caused component damage, 
unnecessary shutdowns and delays of the 
program.[88] 
0.067 
Tank level also monitored 
by level sensor 
2 2 1 4 
425 False output 
Excess makeup flow can be 
drained. No effect on system 
performance. 
0.067 
Tank level also monitored 
by level sensor 
2 2 1 4 
426 Drain Valve 
Allows for the 
draining of the 
condensate storage 
tank 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of makeup capability. No 
effect on system performance. 
Control circuit failure 
Loss of electric power to motor 
Electric motor failure[99] 
0.157 Tank level is monitored 2 3 1 6 
427 
Shutoff Valve 
Isolates tank from 
output valve train 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of makeup capability. No 
effect on system performance. 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Tank level is monitored 2 2 1 4 
428 Leakage 
Loss of makeup capability. No 
effect on system performance. 
0.083 Tank level is monitored 2 2 1 4 
429 
Shutoff Valves 
Isolate condensate 
tank output makeup 
control valve 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of makeup capability. No 
effect on system performance. 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Tank level is monitored 2 2 1 4 
430 Leakage 
Loss of makeup capability. No 
effect on system performance. 
0.083 Tank level is monitored 2 2 1 4 
431 
Control Valve 
Controls makeup flow 
between the 
condensate storage 
tank and the 
condenser 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of makeup capability. No 
effect on system performance. 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 Tank level is monitored 2 3 1 6 
432 
Inadvertently 
open 
Excess water may enter 
condenser. System should 
balance itself and result in no 
adverse effects. 
0.133 
Condenser levels are 
monitored 
2 3 2 12 
433 Leakage 
Loss of makeup capability. No 
effect on system performance. 
0.133 Tank levels are monitored 2 3 1 6 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 20 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
434 
Bypass valve 
Provides bypass path 
around makeup 
control valve 
Inadvertently 
open 
Excess water may enter 
condenser. System should 
balance itself and result in no 
adverse effects. 
Factors causing low-temperature-related failures 
occurred during the manufacturing of processors. In 
one test, 50 out of 20000 dies (chips) failed unique 
low-temperature tests at 0C. Many of these fails were 
timing-related; that is, the device slowed as the 
temperature decreased.[133] 
0.033 
Condenser levels are 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
435 Leakage 
Loss of makeup capability. No 
effect on system performance. 
0.033 Visual inspection 2 1 4 8 
436 
Recirculation 
Control Valve 
Allows recirculation 
to the condenser 
through the makeup 
loop 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of recirculation flow. No 
effect on system performance. 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Condenser levels are 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
437 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow 
which could lead to plant 
shutdown 
0.133 
Flow to low pressure 
heater is monitored  
2 3 1 6 
438 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation  
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of recirculation capability. 
No effect on system 
performance. 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Condenser levels are 
monitored 
2 2 1 4 
439 Leakage 
Loss of recirculation capability. 
No effect on system 
performance. 
0.083 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
440 
Desuperheater 
Input Control 
Valve 
Controls flow of 
cooling water to the 
desuperheater from 
turbine seal valve 
train 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
May cause improper system 
flows resulting in plant shutdown 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
4 3 1 12 
441 Leakage 
May cause improper system 
flows resulting in plant shutdown 
0.133 Visual inspection 4 3 4 48 
442 
Shutoff Valves 
Provides isolation for 
the desuperheater 
input control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Improper system startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
4 2 1 8 
443 Leakage 
Improper system startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 Visual inspection 4 2 4 32 
444 bypass Valve 
Provides a bypass 
path around the 
desuperheater input 
control valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Improper system startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Factors causing low-temperature-related failures 
occurred during the manufacturing of processors. In 
one test, 50 out of 20000 dies (chips) failed unique 
low-temperature tests at 0C. Many of these fails were 
timing-related; that is, the device slowed as the 
temperature decreased.[133] 
0.033 Visual inspection 4 1 4 16 
445 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
the desuperheater 
input line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Improper system startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
4 1 1 4 
446 Leakage 
Improper system startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.04 Visual inspection 4 1 4 16 
447 Fails to check 
Backflow not prevented. 
Probable no effect on system 
performance 
0.04 
Undetectable prior to 
event 
2 1 5 10 
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448 Desuperheater 
Input Control 
Valve 
Controls flow from 
down comer 
crossover to the 
desuperheater 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Improper system startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
4 3 1 12 
449 Leakage 
Improper system startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.133 Visual inspection  4 3 4 48 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 21 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
450 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for 
the desuperheater input 
control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Improper system startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive  
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
3 2 1 6 
451 Leakage 
Improper system startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 Visual inspection  3 2 4 24 
452 Bypass Valve 
provides bypass path 
around the 
desuperheater input 
control valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Improper system startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Factors causing low-temperature-related failures 
occurred during the manufacturing of processors. In 
one test, 50 out of 20000 dies (chips) failed unique 
low-temperature tests at 0C. Many of these fails 
were timing-related; that is, the device slowed as 
the temperature decreased.[133] 
0.033 
Visual inspection 3 1 4 12 
453 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
the desuperheater input 
line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Improper system startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown  Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
3 1 1 3 
454 Leakage 
Improper system startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.04 Visual inspection 3 1 4 12 
455 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection. Should 
not effect system performance. 
0.04 
Undetectable prior to 
event 
1 1 5 5 
456 
Gear Valves 
Valve train provides 
crossover from 
receiver down comer 
to desuperheater 
Fail to operate 
properly 
Loss of crossover causing improper 
system flow 
Improper valve gear functioning which 
causes noisy operation, excessive spring 
surge, valve seat pounding and burning.[139] 
0.05 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
2 2 1 4 
457 Leakage Loss of crossover flow to turbine 0.05 System alarm 2 2 1 4 
458 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measures pressure in 
the receiver flash tank 
to condenser line 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance Physical damage to the isolator diaphragms, 
process fluid freezing, isolator corrosion due 
to an incompatible process fluid [132] 
0.08 Monitoring system error 1 2 1 2 
459 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 Periodic calibration 1 2 2 4 
460 
Condenser 
Dump 
Desuperheater 
Provides for cooling at 
input to condenser 
Clogged or 
blockage 
Loss of startup flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
Vibration at full load Pitting corrosion 
Contamination [129] 
0.111 
Output temperature is 
sensed  
3 2 1 6 
461 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Monitors 
desuperheater input 
temperature from the 
receiver down comer 
Fails to operate No effect system performance 
Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 
Output temperature is also 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
462 False output  No effect system performance 0.057 
Output temperature is also 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
463 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Monitors 
desuperheater input 
pressure from the 
receiver downcomer 
Fails to operate No effect system performance Physical damage to the isolator diaphragms, 
process fluid freezing, isolator corrosion due 
to an incompatible process fluid [132] 
0.1 
Output pressure is also 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
464 False output No effect system performance 0.1 
Output pressure is also 
monitored 
1 2 1 2 
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465 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation in 
the desuperheater input 
line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper startup flow leading to 
plant shutdown 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083. 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
3 2 1 6 
466 Leakage 
Loss of proper startup flow leading to 
plant shutdown 
0.083 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
3 2 1 6 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 22 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
467 
Throttling 
Angle Valve 
Provides an interface 
for the desuperheater 
input 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of proper startup flow 
leading to plant shutdown 
From the frictional failure criterion, one can 
envisage a range of scenarios between end-
members of purely stress-driven failure at constant 
fluid-pressure and purely fluid-driven failure under 
constant stress. In general, however, failure may be 
induced by some combination of increasing fluid-
pressure as well as tectonic shear stress[134] 
0.1 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
4 1 1 4 
468 Leakage 
Loss of proper startup flow 
leading to plant shutdown 
0.1 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
4 1 1 4 
469 
Input Control 
Valve 
Controls flow from 
receiver down comer 
line to desuperheater 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow  
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent blockage, 
and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
3 1 1 3 
470 Leakage Loss of proper system flow  0.133 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
3 1 1 3 
471 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for 
input control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow 
Serving in aggressive media and under significant 
temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
3 2 1 6 
472 Leakage Loss of proper system flow  0.083 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
3 2 1 6 
473 Flow Orifice 
Restricts flow in input 
control valve line 
Blockage or 
leakage 
Loss of proper system flow Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 0.25 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
3 4 1 12 
474 Bypass Valve 
Provides a bypass 
path around the input 
control valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper system flow 
Factors causing low-temperature-related failures 
occurred during the manufacturing of processors. In 
one test, 50 out of 20000 dies (chips) failed unique 
low-temperature tests at 0C. Many of these fails 
were timing-related; that is, the device slowed as 
the temperature decreased.[133] 
0.033 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
3 1 1 3 
475 
Control Valve 
Controls flow from 
hotwell pumps to the 
desuperheater 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent blockage, 
and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
4 3 1 12 
476 Leakage 
Loss of proper startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.133 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
4 3 1 12 
477 
Shutoff Valve 
Provide isolation for 
control valve 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Serving in aggressive media and under significant 
temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
4 2 1 8 
478 Leakage 
Loss of proper startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
4 2 1 8 
479 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
the desuperheater 
input line 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of proper startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material contamination 
[79] 
0.04 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
4 1 1 4 
480 Leakage 
Loss of proper startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.04 
Desuperheater output 
temperature is monitored 
4 1 1 4 
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481 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection. 
No effect on system 
performance. 
0.04 
Undetectable prior to 
event 
2 1 5 10 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 23 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D 
RP
N 
482 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measures 
desuperheater output 
pressure 
Fails to operate 
properly 
May cause turbine trip 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Physical damage to the isolator diaphragms, 
process fluid freezing, isolator corrosion due to 
an incompatible process fluid [132] 
0.1 System alarm 4 3 1 12 
483 False output 
May cause turbine trip 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.1 System alarm 4 3 1 12 
484 
Temperature 
Transmitter 
Measures 
desuperheater output 
temperature 
Fails to operate 
properly 
May cause turbine trip 
resulting in plant shutdown Short circuit of the panel 
Failure of the temperature sensor.[102] 
0.057 System alarm 4 2 1 8 
485 False output 
May cause turbine trip 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.057 System alarm 4 2 1 8 
486 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation at 
the desuperheater 
output 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 System alarm 5 2 1 10 
487 Leakage 
Loss of proper startup flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 Visual inspection 5 2 4 40 
488 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
the low pressure 
heater to condenser 
line 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of proper system flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Sensed by internal heater 
monitors 
5 1 2 10 
489 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.04 Visual inspection 5 1 4 20 
490 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection.  
No effect on system 
performance. 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 5 1 5 25 
491 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation in 
the low pressure heater 
to condenser line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Sensed by internal heater 
monitors 
5 2 2 20 
492 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 Visual inspection 5 2 4 40 
493 
Control Valve 
Controls system flow 
from the receiver flash 
tank to the condenser 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow  Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent blockage, 
and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 Sensed by flash tank 3 3 2 18 
494 Leakage Loss of proper system flow  0.133 Visual inspection 3 3 4 36 
495 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for 
receiver flash tank to 
deaerator control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Sensed by flash tank 3 2 2 12 
496 Leakage Loss of proper system flow 0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
497 
Control Valve 
Controls system liquid 
flow between the 
receiver flash tank and 
the condenser 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow  Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent blockage, 
and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 Sensed by flash tank 3 3 2 18 
498 Leakage Loss of proper system flow 0.133 Visual inspection 3 3 4 36 
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499 
Shutoff Valve 
Provide isolation for 
receiver flash tank to 
deaerator control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Sensed by flash tank 3 2 2 12 
500 Leakage Loss of proper system flow 0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 24 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
501 Bypass valve 
provides a bypass 
path around the 
control valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper system flow 
Factors causing low-temperature-related failures 
occurred during the manufacturing of processors. 
In one test, 50 out of 20000 dies (chips) failed 
unique low-temperature tests at 0C. Many of 
these fails were timing-related; that is, the device 
slowed as the temperature decreased.[133] 
0.033 Visual inspection 2 1 4 8 
502 Flow Orifice 
Reduces flow in the 
condenser input line 
Blockage or 
leakage 
Loss of proper system flow  Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 0.25 Visual inspection 2 4 4 32 
503 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation in the 
deaerator to 
condenser input line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Sensed at deaerator 3 2 2 12 
504 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
505 
Control Valve 
Controls flow 
between thermal 
storage flash tank and 
the condenser 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow control 
resulting in plant shutdown Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 Sensed at the flash tank 3 3 4 36 
506 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.133 Visual inspection 3 3 2 18 
507 
Shutoff Valves 
Provides isolation for 
condenser input 
control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive  
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Sensed at the flash tank 3 2 2 12 
508 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
509 Bypass valve 
provides a bypass 
path around the 
control valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
Loss of proper system flow control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Factors causing low-temperature-related failures 
occurred during the manufacturing of processors. 
In one test, 50 out of 20000 dies (chips) failed 
unique low-temperature tests at 0C. Many of 
these fails were timing-related; that is, the device 
slowed as the temperature decreased.[133] 
0.033 Visual inspection 3 1 4 12 
510 Flow Orifice 
Reduces flow in the 
condenser input line 
Blockage or 
leakage 
Loss of proper system flow control 
resulting in plant shutdown 
Hydrates, waxing and freezing.[90] 0.25 Visual inspection 3 4 4 48 
511 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measure condenser 
input pressure 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance Physical damage to the isolator diaphragms, 
process fluid freezing, isolator corrosion due 
to an incompatible process fluid [132] 
0.08 
Flash tank pressure is 
measured 
1 2 1 2 
512 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 
Flash tank pressure is 
measured 
1 2 1 2 
513 Control Valve 
Controls system flow 
between the high 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Unable to bypass flow from high 
pressure heater 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Heater output conditions 
are monitored 
2 3 1 6 
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514 
pressure heater #1 
bypass and the 
condenser 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow to the 
condenser 
0.133 Visual inspection 2 3 4 24 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 25 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
515 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Unable to bypass flow from high 
pressure heater 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Heater output conditions 
are monitored 
3 2 1 6 
516 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow to the 
condenser 
0.083 Visual inspection 3 2 4 24 
517 
Check valve 
Prevents backflow in 
the condenser input 
line 
Fails to remain 
open 
Unable to bypass flow from high 
pressure heater  Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Heater output conditions 
are monitored 
3 1 1 3 
518 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow to the 
condenser 
0.04 Visual inspection 3 1 4 12 
519 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection. No 
effect on system performance. 
0.04 
Undetectable prior to 
event 
2 1 5 10 
520 
Control valve 
Controls flow 
between thermal-
storage flash tank and 
the condenser 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow resulting 
in plant shutdown 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 Sensed at the flash tank 4 3 2 24 
521 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting 
in plant shutdown 
0.133 Visual inspection 4 3 4 48 
522 
Inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper system flow to 
deaerator resulting in plant shutdown 
0.133 Sensed at the deaerator  4 3 2 24 
523 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide system 
isolation for the 
control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow resulting 
in plant shutdown 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Sensed at the flash tank 4 2 2 16 
524 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting 
in plant shutdown 
0.083 Visual inspection 4 2 4 32 
525 Bypass Valve 
provides a bypass 
path around the 
control valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper system flow resulting 
in plant shutdown 
Factors causing low-temperature-related failures occurred 
during the manufacturing of processors. In one test, 50 
out of 20000 dies (chips) failed unique low-temperature 
tests at 0C. Many of these fails were timing-related; that 
is, the device slowed as the temperature decreased.[133] 
0.033 Visual inspection 4 1 4 16 
526 
Control Valve 
Controls flow 
between thermal-
storage flash tank and 
the condenser or 
deaerator 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow resulting 
in plant shutdown 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 Sensed at the flash tank 4 3 2 24 
527 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting 
in plant shutdown 
0.133 Visual inspection 4 3 4 48 
528 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide system 
isolation for the 
control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow resulting 
in plant shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
 significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Sensed at the flash tank 4 2 2 16 
529 Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting 
in plant shutdown 
0.083 Visual inspection 4 2 4 32 
530 Bypass Valve 
provides a bypass 
path around the 
control valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper system flow resulting 
in plant shutdown 
Factors causing low-temperature-related failures occurred 
during the manufacturing of processors. In one test, 50 
out of 20000 dies (chips) failed unique low-temperature 
0.033 Visual inspection 4 1 4 16 
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tests at 0C. Many of these fails were timing-related; that 
is, the device slowed as the temperature decreased.[133] 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 26 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
531 
Vacuum 
Breaker shutoff 
valve 
Allows for breaking 
of condenser vacuum 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper system vacuum 
resulting in reduced efficiency and 
subsequent shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Output flow is 
monitored 
2 2 1 4 
532 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation in the 
condenser vacuum 
line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system vacuum 
resulting in reduced efficiency and 
subsequent shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Output flow is 
monitored 
2 2 1 4 
533 Leakage 
Loss of proper system vacuum 
resulting in reduced efficiency and 
subsequent shutdown 
0.083 
Output flow is 
monitored 
2 2 1 4 
534 
Control Valve 
Controls output flow 
in condenser vacuum 
line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system vacuum 
resulting in reduced efficiency and 
subsequent shutdown Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Output flow is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
535 Leakage 
Loss of proper system vacuum 
resulting in reduced efficiency and 
subsequent shutdown 
0.133 
Output flow is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
536 Vacuum Pump 
Means for pumping 
condenser vacuum 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of proper system vacuum 
resulting in reduced efficiency and 
subsequent shutdown 
The pump did not fail for the first few months 
of operation when operating pressure was kept 
below 70 bar, problems began to appear as 
soon as pressure increased to 90-100 bar. The 
repeated failure of this pump has delayed 
high-pressure testing[89] 
0.111 
Output flow is 
monitored 
2 2 1 4 
537 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow at 
vacuum pump output 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of proper system vacuum 
resulting in reduced efficiency and 
subsequent shutdown  Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination[79] 
0.04 
Output flow is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
538 Leakage No effect on system performance 0.04 
Output flow is 
monitored 
1 1 1 1 
539 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection. No 
effect on system performance. May 
cause pump damage 
0.04 
Undetectable prior to 
event 
1 1 5 5 
540 Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation at 
vacuum pump output 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system vacuum 
resulting in reduced efficiency and 
subsequent shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Output flow is 
monitored 
2 2 1 4 
541 
Flow Indicator 
Measures condenser 
vacuum line flow 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance The wear indicator is colored to contrast with 
the transfer material and indicates wear by an 
eroded area which can be visually observed 
through the outer translucent layer.[82] 
0.067 Monitoring system error 1 2 1 2 
542 False output No effect on system performance 0.067 Periodic calibration 1 2 2 4 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 27 of 28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
543 
Condenser 
Condenses steam into 
liquid  
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of condensing function 
resulting in plant shutdown 
 Vibration at full load 
 Pitting corrosion 
 Contamination [129] 
0.067 
Hotwell conditions are 
monitored 
4 2 1 8 
544 Tank leakage 
Loss of proper system flow 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.067 
Hotwell conditions are 
monitored 
4 2 1 8 
545 
Cooling Tower 
Provides condenser 
cooling capability 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of condensing function 
resulting in plant shutdown 
 Vibration at full load 
 Pitting corrosion 
 Contamination [129] 
0.05 
Hotwell conditions are 
monitored 
4 2 1 8 
546 Structural failure  
Loss of condensing function 
resulting in plant shutdown 
0.05 
Hotwell conditions are 
monitored 
4 2 1 8 
547 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for 
condenser level 
switches and 
controller 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to switches and 
controller resulting in plant 
shutdown 
 Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Plant alarm 4 2 1 8 
548 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to switches 
and controller resulting in plant 
shutdown 
0.083 Visual inspection 4 2 4 32 
549 
Level 
Controller  
Provides control of 
system drains through 
the condenser 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of proper system flow 
control resulting in plant 
shutdown 
It has been mainly caused by ineffective 
feedwater control.[85] 
0.095 Plant alarm 4 2 1 8 
550 
Level Switches 
Provide alarm points 
for turbine exhaust 
ports 
Fail to operate 
when required  
Loss of proper system flow 
control resulting in plant 
shutdown 
Switch failure is reported to the control 
application, the latencies involved in 
disseminating the failure-related state updates 
throughout the Onix cluster become essential; 
they define the absolute minimum time the 
control application will take to react to the 
failure throughout the network[137] 
0.111 Plant alarm 4 2 1 8 
551 False alarm Unnecessary shutdown of system 0.111 Undetectable prior to event 3 2 5 30 
552 
Angle Valve 
Allows flow to 
condenser level glass 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of flow to level glass; no 
effect on system performance 
From the frictional failure criterion, one can 
envisage a range of scenarios between end-
members of purely stress-driven failure at 
constant fluid-pressure and purely fluid-driven 
failure under constant stress. In general, 
however, failure may be induced by some 
combination of increasing fluid-pressure as 
well as tectonic shear stress[134] 
0.1 
Visual inspection of level 
glass 
2 3 4 24 
553 Leakage 
Loss of flow to level glass; no 
effect on system performance 
0.1 Visual inspection 2 3 4 24 
554 
3-way Valve 
Allows flow to 
condenser level glass 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of flow to level glass; no 
effect on system performance 
3 way-valve that is functioning below its 
design specifications may result in fugitive 
emissions, unexpected valve failure causing 
plant-shutdown, or poor quality end products 
due to inadequate process control[135] 
0.1 
Visual inspection of level 
glass 
2 3 4 24 
555 
Leakage 
Loss of flow to level glass; 
should not affect system 
performance 
0.1 Visual inspection 2 3 4 24 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermal-Storage Feed water Pump 
Sheet 28 of 
28 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
556 Level glass 
Measures water level 
within condenser 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of measurement capability; no effect 
on system performance 
The failure wave process could occur as 
the stress grows above the failure 
threshold up to the stress level at which 
plastic deformation starts.[136] 
0.0174 Visual inspection 2 2 4 16 
557 
Temperature 
Indicator  
Measures hotwell 
temperature  
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[18] 
0.057 Monitoring system error 1 2 2 4 
558 False output  No effect on system performance 0.057 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
559 Temperature 
Recording 
Equipment 
Allows for analysis of 
water temperature 
profile of the 
condenser hotwell 
Fails to operate 
properly 
No effect on system performance 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[18] 
0.125 Monitoring system error 1 3 2 6 
560 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of electrical power production and 
subsequent plant shutdown  
0.125 Plant alarm 4 3 1 12 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Turbine Generator 
Sheet 1 of 5 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
561 
Control Valves 
Control turbine 
exhaust flow to the 
condenser 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of properly system drain control 
leading to probable plant shutdown Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Sensed by condenser 
level monitors 
4 3 1 12 
562 Leakage 
Loss of proper system drain control 
leading to plant shutdown 
0.133 Visual inspection 4 3 4 48 
563 
Pressure 
Indicators 
Measure turbine 
exhaust pressures 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The wear indicator is colored to 
contrast with the transfer material and 
indicates wear by an eroded area which 
can be visually observed through the 
outer translucent layer.[82] 
0.08 
Pressure also 
monitored by pressure 
transmitter 
1 2 1 2 
564 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
565 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measure turbine 
exhaust pressures 
Fail to operate 
Turbine exhaust port will shut down; 
system should balance itself resulting in 
no effect on system performance 
Physical damage to the isolator 
diaphragms, process fluid freezing, 
isolator corrosion due to an 
incompatible process fluid [132] 
0.1 
Monitoring system 
error 
2 3 2 12 
566 False output 
Unnecessary shutdown of turbine 
exhaust port; system should balance 
itself, resulting in no effect on system 
performance 
0.1 
Monitoring system 
error 
2 3 2 12 
567 
Control Valves 
Control turbine 
exhaust flow to 
system heaters 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Turbine exhaust port will shut down; 
system should balance itself resulting in 
no effect on system performance 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Monitoring system 
error 
2 3 2 12 
568 Leakage 
Improper system drain control resulting 
in probable plant shutdown 
0.133 Visual inspection 4 3 4 48 
569 
Check Valves 
Prevent backflow into 
individual turbine 
exhaust ports 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Turbine exhaust port will shut down; 
system should balance itself resulting in 
no effect on system performance 
 Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that 
design 
 Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
0.04 
Monitoring system 
error 
2 1 2 4 
570 Leakage 
Improper system drain control resulting 
in probable plant shutdown 
0.04 Visual inspection 5 1 4 20 
571 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measures pressure in 
the thermal storage 
flash tank deaerator 
line 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Physical damage to the isolator 
diaphragms, process fluid freezing, 
isolator corrosion due to an 
incompatible process fluid [132] 
0.08 
Sensed by deaerator 
monitors 
1 2 1 2 
572 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 Periodic calibration 1 2 3 6 
573 
Modulating 
Control Valve 
Controls the flow of 
steam to thermal-
storage 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of stream input flow to thermal-
storage charging loop 
Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Downstream flow is 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
574 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Potential improper stream flow to 
turbine or thermal-storage charging 
loop 
0.133 
Downstream flow is 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
575 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for 
modulating control 
valve 
Leakage 
External leakage of valve nearest input 
stream would lead to potential improper 
steam flow to turbine or thermal-
storage charging loop 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Downstream input 
flows are monitored 
3 2 1 6 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Turbine Generator 
Sheet 2 of 5 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
576 
Temperature 
Equipment 
Sets turbine alarm 
point for turbine input 
steam  
Fails to operate 
properly 
Turbine input port will shutdown 
Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[18] 
0.125 Monitoring system error 4 3 2 24 
577 False output 
Unnecessary shutdown of turbine input 
port 
0.125 Monitoring system error 3 3 2 18 
578 Vent Valve 
Allows venting of 
receiver steam turbine 
input line 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper receiver steam flow to 
the turbine resulting in plant port 
shutdown 
Vent valve failures, post seal or 
jar/cover seal leaks; 
water or hydrogen loss through the 
plastic jar or cover; or performance 
problems, such as poor recombination, 
with direct loss of hydrogen and 
oxygen through the vent; or the more 
subtle loss of water by positive grid 
corrosion with consequent hydrogen 
evolution all should result in an 
decrease in conductance as the cell 
loses water[117] 
0.0285 
Turbine input flow is 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
579 
Electro-
Hydraulic 
Control Valve 
Provides control of 
turbine receiver steam 
input port 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of receiver steam input flow to the 
turbine resulting in port shutdown Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
 
0.133 
Turbine input flow is 
monitored 
4 3 1 12 
580 Leakage 
Loss of proper receiver steam input 
flow to the turbine resulting in port 
shutdown 
0.133 
Turbine input flow is 
monitored 
3 3 1 9 
581 
Pressure 
Indicators 
Measures internal 
turbine pressures  
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The wear indicator is colored to 
contrast with the transfer material and 
indicates wear by an eroded area which 
can be visually observed through the 
outer translucent layer.[82] 
 
0.08 
Monitoring system error 1 2 2 4 
582 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 Monitoring system error 1 2 2 4 
583 Flow 
Transmitter 
Measure turbine flow 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance Ageing modes inevitably lead to failure 
modes[95] 
0.2 Monitoring system error 1 4 2 8 
584 False output  No effect on system performance 0.2 Monitoring system error 1 4 2 8 
585 Temperature 
Sensor 
Sets high temperature 
alarm point for seal 
steam 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance Environments will make the shift to 
higher temperatures occur 
incrementally.[94] 
0.1 Monitoring system error 1 3 2 6 
586 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 Monitoring system error 1 3 2 6 
587 Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation in 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss pf bypass flow to desuperheater 
probable no effect on system 
performance 
Serving in aggressive media and under 
significant temperature gradients 
Products of corrosive 
0.083 
Desuperheater output 
condition monitored 
2 2 1 4 
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588 
desuperheater input 
line Leakage 
Loss of bypass flow to desuperheater 
probable no effect on system 
performance 
Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 
Desuperheater output 
condition monitored 
2 2 1 4 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Turbine Generator 
Sheet 3 of 5 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
589 Drain Valve 
Provides system 
interface with turbine 
drain tank input 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper receiver steam flow 
to the turbine resulting in plant port 
shutdown 
Control circuit failure 
Loss of electric power to motor 
Electric motor failure[99] 
0.154 
Turbine input flow is 
monitored 
4 3 1 12 
590 
Control Valve 
Controls bypass flow 
from desuperheater to 
turbine seal line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of bypass flow; should have 
no effect on system performance Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
591 Leakage 
Loss of bypass flow; should have 
no effect on system performance 
0.133 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 3 1 6 
592 
Check valve 
Prevents backflow on 
desuperheater line 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of bypass flow; should have 
no effect on system performance Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
593 Leakage 
Loss of bypass flow; should have 
no effect on system performance 
0.04 
Downstream pressure is 
monitored 
2 1 1 2 
594 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection; no 
effect on system performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
595 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measure pressure in 
turbine seal line 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
physical damage to 
the isolator diaphragms, process fluid 
freezing, isolator corrosion due to an 
incompatible process fluid [132] 
0.08 Monitoring system error 1 2 2 4 
596 False output No effect on system performance 0.08 Monitoring system error 1 2 2 4 
597 
Relief Valve 
Prevents line 
overpressure 
fails to operate 
when required 
Potential safety hazard and 
equipment damage Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.133 Line pressure is monitored  3 3 1 9 
598 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of bypass flow; should have 
no effect on system performance 
0.133 Line pressure is monitored  2 3 1 6 
599 
Gear Valves  
Provides system 
crossover between 
thermal-storage steam 
input to the turbine 
and desuperheater 
bypass 
Fail to operate 
properly 
Loss of crossover capability 
leading to plant shutdown Improper valve gear functioning which 
causes noisy operation, excessive spring 
surge, valve seat pounding and 
burning.[139] 
0.05 
Line pressures are 
monitored 
4 2 1 8 
600 Leakage 
Improper system flows leading to 
plant shutdown 
0.05 
Line pressures are 
monitored 
4 2 1 8 
601 
Temperature 
Sensor 
Measures turbine 
input steam 
temperature from 
thermal-storage 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance Environments will make the shift to 
higher temperatures occur 
incrementally.[94] 
0.1 Monitoring system error 1 3 2 6 
602 False output No effect on system performance 0.1 Monitoring system error 1 3 2 6 
603 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
physical damage to the isolator 
diaphragms, process fluid freezing, 
0.08 Monitoring system error 1 2 2 4 
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604 
Measures turbine 
input steam pressure 
from thermal-storage 
False output No effect on system performance 
isolator corrosion due to an incompatible 
process fluid [132] 0.08 Monitoring system error 1 2 2 4 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Turbine Generator 
Sheet 4 of 5 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
605 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
turbine input line 
from thermal-storage 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of steam input flow from 
thermal-storage; probable plant 
shutdown Improper seating 
Inherent characteristics of that design 
Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 
Turbine input flow is 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
606 Leakage 
Loss of proper input steam flow from 
thermal-storage; probable plant 
shutdown 
0.04 
Turbine input flow is 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
607 Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection; no 
effect on system performance 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 2 1 5 10 
608 Vent Valve 
Allows venting of 
thermal-storage steam 
turbine input line 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of proper input steam flow from 
thermal-storage; probable plant 
shutdown 
Vent valve failures, post seal or 
jar/cover seal leaks; water or hydrogen 
loss through the plastic jar or cover; or 
performance problems, such as poor 
recombination, with direct loss of 
hydrogen and oxygen through the vent; 
or the more subtle loss of water by 
positive grid corrosion with consequent 
hydrogen evolution all should result in 
an decrease in conductance as the cell 
loses water[117]. 
0.0285 
Turbine input flow is 
monitored 
4 1 1 4 
610 
Electro-
Hydraulic 
Control Valve 
Provides control of 
turbine thermal-
storage steam input 
flow 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage steam input 
flow to the turbine resulting in 
probable plant shutdown Incorrect supply pressure, actuator vent 
blockage, and diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 
Turbine input flow is 
monitored 
4 3 1 12 
611 Leakage 
Loss of proper thermal-storage steam 
input flow to the turbine resulting in 
probable plant shutdown 
0.133 
Turbine input flow is 
monitored 
4 3 1 12 
612 
Relief Valve 
Prevents overpressure 
in auxiliary boiler 
blanket steam input 
line 
fails to operate 
when required 
Potential safety hazard and 
equipment damage Contaminants cause valve to stick, plug 
small openings, or abrade the mating 
surfaces until a valve leaks.[96] 
0.133 
Auxiliary boiler output 
pressure is monitored 
5 3 1 15 
613 
Leakage or 
inadvertently 
open 
Loss of auxiliary blanket steam flow 0.133 Internal turbine sensors 2 3 2 12 
614 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
auxiliary boiler 
blanket steam line 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of auxiliary blanket steam flow  Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of that 
design 
0.04 Internal turbine sensors 3 1 2 6 
615 Leakage Loss of auxiliary blanket steam flow 0.04 Internal turbine sensors 3 1 2 6 
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617 Fails to check Loss of backflow protection 
 Corrosion due to foreign material 
contamination [79] 
0.04 Undetectable prior to event 3 1 5 15 
  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendices                                                                                                                                                                                203 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Electrical Subsystem 
Subsystem: Thermos Storage Feed Water 
Sheet 5 of 5 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause λ Detection S O D RPN 
618 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation in auxiliary 
boiler blanket steam 
line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of auxiliary blanket steam flow 
 Serving in aggressive 
media and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Internal turbine sensors 3 2 2 12 
619 Leakage Loss of auxiliary blanket steam flow 0.083 Internal turbine sensors 3 2 2 12 
620 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
receiver blanket steam 
line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of receiver blacket steam flow  Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of 
that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
0.04 Internal turbine sensors 3 1 2 6 
621 Leakage Loss of receiver blacket steam flow 0.04 Internal turbine sensors 3 1 2 6 
622 Fails to check Loss of backflow protection 0.04 
Undetectable prior to 
event 
3 1 5 15 
623 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation in receiver 
blanket steam line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of receiver blanket steam flow 
 Serving in aggressive 
media and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Internal turbine sensors 3 2 2 12 
624 Leakage Loss of receiver blanket steam flow 0.083 Internal turbine sensors 3 2 2 12 
625 
Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in 
thermal-storage 
blanket steam line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage blanket steam flow  Improper seating 
 Inherent characteristics of 
that design 
 Corrosion due to foreign 
material contamination [79] 
0.04 Internal turbine sensors 3 1 2 6 
626 Leakage Loss of thermal-storage blanket steam flow 0.04 Internal turbine sensors 3 1 2 6 
627 Fails to check Loss of backflow protection 0.04 
Undetectable prior to 
event 
3 1 5 15 
628 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system 
isolation in thermal-
storage blanket steam 
line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage blanket steam flow 
 Serving in aggressive 
media and under significant 
temperature gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Internal turbine sensors 3 2 2 12 
629 Leakage Loss of thermal-storage blanket steam flow 0.083 Internal turbine sensors 3 2 2 12 
630 
Control Valve 
Controls blanket 
steam flow to the 
turbine 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of blanket steam flow; could result in 
turbine damage 
Incorrect supply pressure, 
actuator vent blockage, and 
diaphragm leakage.[83] 
0.133 Internal turbine sensors 3 3 2 18 
631 Leakage 
Loss of blanket steam flow; could result in 
turbine damage 
0.133 Internal turbine sensors 3 3 2 18 
632 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide system 
isolation for control 
valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of blanket steam flow; could result in 
turbine damage 
 Serving in aggressive 
media and under 
significant temperature 
gradients 
 Products of corrosive 
 Mechanical wear [81] 
0.083 Internal turbine sensors 3 2 2 12 
633 Leakage 
Loss of blanket steam flow; could result in 
turbine damage 
0.083 Internal turbine sensors 3 2 2 12 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Master Control Subsystem 
Subsystem: - 
Sheet 1 of 3 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause Detection S O D RPN 
1 
 
Operational 
Control System 
Computer 
Provides central 
control for entire 
MCS function 
No output 
Failure of a single computer will 
have no effect on system 
performance 
The failure of control system computer causes system 
disturbance, the process variables can move out of the 
nominal control region. However, the control system 
does not necessarily lead to system failure. [140] 
System includes built 
- in software alarms 
2 1 1 22 
2 
False or constant 
output 
Failure of a single computer will 
have no effect on system 
performance 
System failures occur when the components break or 
misbehave and system faults, which include improper 
design.[141] 
System includes built 
- in software alarms 
2 1 1 22 
3 
Loss of time-of-
day data 
No effect on system performance; 
data provided as a check function 
All of these applications are extensively computerized, 
and computer failure can and does lead to extensive 
loss of service with consequent disruption of normal 
activities. In some cases, the disruption can be very 
serious. Widespread loss of water or electricity supply 
has obvious implications for health and safety[142] 
System includes built 
- in software alarms 
1 1 1 11 
4 Loss of grid data 
Loss of grid interface information 
leading to possible in ability to bring 
plant online ; will not affect system 
operation 
System includes built 
- in software alarms 
2 2 1 44 
5 
Loss of weather 
data 
Potential for plant unbalance; 
plant can still be operated in a manual 
mode 
System includes built 
- in software alarms 
3 3 1 99 
6 
Loss of electrical 
power 
Failure o f a single computer will 
have no effect on system 
performance 
System includes built 
- in software alarms 
2 1 1 22 
7 Software failure 
Potential for MCS shutdown; plant 
can still be operated in a manual 
mode 
Fault-tolerant hardware designs are expected to be 
correct. The tolerance applies to component failures 
rather than design inadequacies, although the dividing 
line between the two may on occasion be difficult to 
define. But all software faults result from design 
error[143] 
System includes built 
- in software alarms 
4 1 1 44 
8 
Peripheral 
Tape Units 
Provide means for 
recording information 
on magnetic tape 
Fail to operate 
No effect on system performance; 
used for data recording only 
Main memory is a volatile storage device. It loses its 
contents in the case of system failure.[144] 
User identified 1 1 4 44 
9 
Peripheral Line 
Printer 
Provides means for 
hard-copy data 
production 
Fails to operate 
No effect on system performance; 
used for data gathering only 
No conclusive evidence at this stage can be established 
as to what causes the failure. It is uncommon for 
adjacent 
short-circuit in Peripheral Line Printer may result in 
failure and reliability problem in Peripheral Line 
Printer 
unless it is an intermittent failure.[145] 
User identified 1 1 4 44 
10 
Peripheral 
Printer/Loggers 
Provide means for 
hard-copy 
data production 
Fails to operate 
No effect on system performance; 
used for data gathering only 
Short-circuit may cause in failure and reliability 
problem in Peripheral Line Printer.[145] 
User identified 1 1 4 44 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Master Control Subsystem 
Subsystem: - 
Sheet 2 of 3 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause Detection S O D RPN 
11 
Peripheral Control 
System Computer 
Acts as an OCS backup 
as well as providing a 
general-purpose 
computing function 
No output 
Loss of general-purpose computing 
and OCS backup capability ; no 
effect on system performance 
The failure of control system computer causes 
system disturbance, the process variables can 
move out of the nominal control region. 
However, the control system does not 
necessarily lead to system failure. [140] 
System includes built 
- in software alarms 
2 2 1 4 
12 
False or constant 
output 
Loss of general-purpose computing 
and OCS backup capability ; no 
effect on system performance 
Main memory is a volatile storage device. It 
loses its contents in the case of system 
failure.[144] 
System includes built 
- in software alarms 
2 2 1 4 
13 
Peripheral Tape 
Units 
Provide means for 
recording information 
on magnetic tape 
Fail to operate 
No effect on system performance; 
used for data recording 
Main memory is a volatile storage device. It 
loses its contents in the case of system 
failure.[144] 
User identified 1 1 4 4 
14 
Peripheral Colour 
Graphics 
Provide colour data 
presentation 
Fail to operate 
No effect on system performance; 
multiple units 
The failure of graphics to perform more 
impressively in research settings may be due to 
experimental artefacts which act to contaminate 
the conclusions.[146] 
User identified 1 1 4 4 
15 Hard-Copy Unit 
Allows for hard-copy 
reproduction 
from color graphics unit 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Mechanical damage at the edges can cause a 
mechanical failure in the system [147] 
User identified 1 1 4 4 
16 
Peripheral Card 
Reader 
Provides means for 
interpreting data cards 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
The effectiveness of software, such as key 
boards, card reader, in recovering from hardware 
errors and, indeed, hardware failures.[148] 
User identified 1 1 4 4 
17 
Peripheral 
Keyboards 
Provides means for 
interfacing with PCS 
computer 
Fails to operate 
No effect on system performance; 
multiple units 
The effectiveness of software, such as key 
boards, card reader, in recovering from hardware 
errors and, indeed, hardware failures.[148] 
User identified 1 1 4 4 
18 
Peripheral Line 
Printer 
Provides means for 
hard-copy data 
production 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 
Short-circuit may cause in failure and reliability 
problem in Peripheral Line Printer.[145] 
User identified 1 1 4 4 
19 Dual-Port Disks 
Provide memory 
interface with both the 
OCS and PCS 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Failure o f a single unit will have 
no effect on system performance 
Disk failures are much more complex in reality, 
the root cause of a problem to a particular 
hardware component.[149] 
System includes built 
- in software alarms 
2 1 1 2 
20 
Process Control 
Display Terminals 
Provide means for plant 
control 
from a single console 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Failure of a single unit will have no 
effect on system performance 
The failure of control system computer causes 
system disturbance, the process variables can move 
out of the nominal control region. However, the 
control system does not necessarily lead to system 
failure. [140] 
Built-in system alarms 
as well 
as user identification 
2 1 1 2 
21 
Process Control 
Peripheral S trip-C 
hart Recorders 
Provide ability to record 
process 
control system events 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Data recording only; no effect 
on system performance 
Failures included hardware errors, transmission 
errors, resource and load dependent errors. [150] 
User identified 2 1 4 8 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Worksheet 
System: Master Control Subsystem 
Subsystem: - 
Sheet 3 of 3 
ID Component Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure cause Detection S O D RPN 
22 
Process Control 
Peripheral Tape Units 
Provide ability to 
input/output 
data from /to magnetic 
tape 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Failure of one unit will have no 
effect on system performance 
Main memory is a volatile storage device. 
It loses its contents in the case of system 
failure.[144] 
User identified 2 1 4 8 
23 
Process Control 
Peripheral Color 
Graphics 
Allow outputting of data 
from 
any or all subsystems 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Failure of one unit will have no 
effect on system performance 
The failure of graphics to perform more 
impressively in research settings may be 
due to experimental artifacts which act to 
contaminate the conclusions.[146] 
User identified 2 1 4 8 
24 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of data hiway resulting in 
loss of control from central 
console 
Internal system alarm 3 2 1 6 
25 
Data Acquisition 
System Computer 
Provides means for 
compiling 
plant performance 
information 
No output 
No effect on system 
performance; 
data gathering function only 
The failure of control system computer 
causes system disturbance, the process 
variables can move out of the nominal 
control region. However, the control 
system does not necessarily lead to 
system failure. [140] 
Internal system alarm 1 1 1 1 
26 
False or constant 
output 
No effect on system 
performance; 
data gathering function only 
Internal system alarm 1 1 1 1 
27 
Peripheral Color 
Graphics 
Provides color-data 
presentation 
Fails to operate 
properly 
 
No effect on system 
performance; 
data gathering only 
The failure of graphics to perform more 
impressively in research settings may be 
due to experimental artifacts which act to 
contaminate the conclusions.[146] 
User identified 1 1 4 4 
28 
Peripheral 
Hard-Copy Unit 
Provides for making 
permanent 
copy of output data 
Fails to operate 
properly 
 
No effect on system 
performance; 
data gathering only 
Mechanical damage at the edges can 
cause a mechanical failure in the system 
[147] 
User identified 1 1 1 1 
29 
Peripheral 
Disk Unit 
Provides for recording of 
data 
on magnetic disk 
F ails to operate 
properly 
 
No e ffect on system 
performance; 
data gathering only 
Disk failures are much more complex in 
reality, the root cause of a problem to a 
particular hardware component.[149] 
User identified 1 1 1 1 
30 
Peripheral 
Tape Units 
Provide means for 
inputting / 
outputting data on 
magnetic tape 
between the DAS and PCS 
computer 
Fails to operate 
properly 
 
No effect on system performance  
Main memory is a volatile storage device. 
It loses its contents in the case of system 
failure.[144]1 
Built- in software alarms 1 1 1 1 
31 
Peripheral 
Dual-Port Disk 
Provide means for 
inputting g / 
outputting data on 
magnetic tape 
between the DAS and PCS 
computer 
Fails to operate 
properly 
 
No effect on system performance 
Disk failures are much more complex in 
reality, the root cause of a problem to a 
particular hardware component.[149] 
Built- in software alarms 1 1 1 1 
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Appendix B: The results of RPN method and the proposed approach 
Table 18. Comparison of the results for Raw Service Water System in Support Structure Subsystem by 
RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
1 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
2 2 1 1   2 9   0.938 16  
3 2 1 1   2 9   0.938 16  
4 2 1 5   10 4   0.573 4  
5 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
6 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
7 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
8 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
9 1 2 4   8 5   0.583 5  
10 1 2 3   6 6   0.637 7  
11 2 3 1   6 6   0.805 12  
12 2 3 1   6 6   0.805 12  
13 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
14 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
15 2 1 1   2 9   0.938 16  
16 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
17 1 2 2   4 7   0.729 10  
18 1 2 2   4 7   0.729 10  
19 3 1 1   3 8   0.907 14  
20 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
21 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
22 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
23 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
24 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
25 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
26 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
27 1 2 1   2 9   0.911 15  
28 1 1 1   1 10   1.000 17  
29 1 1 4   4 7   0.671 9  
30 3 1 5   15 3   0.542 3  
31 1 2 1   2 9   0.911 15  
32 1 2 4   8 5   0.583 5  
33 2 1 1   2 9   0.938 16  
34b 2 1 4   8 5   0.609 6  
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Table 18 (Continued).  Comparison of the results for Raw Service Water System in Support Structure 
Subsystem by RPN and the proposed approach methods 
No S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
35 2 1 1   2 9   0.938 16  
36 2 4 1   8 5   0.778 11  
37 2 4 4   32 1   0.450 1  
38 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
39 2 2 4   16 2   0.521 2  
40 2 2 2   8 5   0.667 8  
41 2 2 2   8 5   0.667 8  
42 2 2 2   8 5   0.667 8  
43 2 2 2   8 5   0.667 8  
44 2 2 2   8 5   0.667 8  
45 2 2 2   8 5   0.667 8  
46 2 2 2   8 5   0.667 8  
47 2 2 2   8 5   0.667 8  
48 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
49 2 2 1   4 7   0.849 13  
50 2 2 2   8 5   0.667 8  
51 2 2 2   8 5   0.667 8  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.186 0.266 0.548   80.39%   66.67%  
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Table 19. Comparison of the results for Demineralized Water System in Support Structure Subsystem 
by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
52 2 2 1   4 6   0.777 7  
53 2 2 1   4 6   0.777 7  
54 1 2 2   4 6   0.778 8  
55 1 2 2   4 6   0.778 8  
56 4 1 1   4 6   0.800 9  
57 2 2 1   4 6   0.777 7  
58 2 2 1   4 6   0.777 7  
59 2 2 1   4 6   0.777 7  
60 3 2 1   6 5   0.722 6  
61 3 2 1   6 5   0.722 6  
62 2 2 1   4 6   0.777 7  
63 3 1 1   3 7   0.833 10  
64 2 1 4   8 4   0.690 5  
65 3 1 5   15 3   0.612 3  
66 2 2 1   4 6   0.777 7  
67 2 2 4   16 2   0.578 2  
68 2 2 1   4 6   0.777 7  
69 2 2 4   16 2   0.578 2  
70 2 4 1   8 4   0.688 4  
71 2 4 4   32 1   0.489 1  
72 2 2 1   4 6   0.777 7  
73 2 2 1   4 6   0.777 7  
74 2 2 4   16 2   0.578 2  
75 2 2 4   16 2   0.578 2  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.334 0.334 0.332   70.83%   58.33%  
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Table 20. Comparison of the results for Compressed-Air System in Support Structure Subsystem by the 
RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
79 2 4 1   8 10   0.767 23  
80 2 2 4   16 5   0.542 7  
81 2 2 4   16 5   0.542 7  
82 2 4 4   32 2   0.488 3  
83 2 1 4   8 10   0.611 12  
84 2 3 2   12 7   0.632 14  
85 2 3 2   12 7   0.632 14  
86 2 2 4   16 5   0.542 7  
87 1 2 2   4 12   0.776 24  
88 1 2 4   8 10   0.652 15  
89 1 2 2   4 12   0.776 24  
90 2 3 1   6 11   0.788 25  
91 2 3 1   6 11   0.788 25  
92 2 1 1   2 13   0.890 27  
93 2 1 1   2 13   0.890 27  
94 2 1 5   10 8   0.580 11  
95 2 2 2   8 10   0.667 18  
96 4 2 2   16 5   0.579 10  
97 4 2 2   16 5   0.579 10  
98 5 3 1   15 6   0.678 19  
99 5 3 1   15 6   0.678 19  
100 1 2 4   8 10   0.652 15  
101 1 2 3   6 11   0.699 20  
102 4 3 2   24 3   0.545 8  
103 2 3 2   12 7   0.632 14  
104 2 2 4   16 5   0.542 7  
105 3 2 4   24 3   0.488 2  
106 4 4 4   64 1   0.400 1  
107 4 1 4   16 5   0.523 5  
108 5 2 1   10 8   0.712 21  
109 5 2 1   10 8   0.712 21  
110 2 2 1   4 12   0.822 26  
111 4 2 1   8 10   0.734 22  
112 2 3 1   6 11   0.788 25  
113 1 3 3   9 9   0.664 17  
114 2 2 1   4 12   0.822 26  
115 4 2 1   8 10   0.734 22  
116 2 1 1   2 13   0.890 27  
117 2 1 3   6 11   0.657 16  
118 2 3 4   24 3   0.508 4  
119 1 3 4   12 7   0.618 13  
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Table 21. Comparison of the results for Compressed-Air System in Support Structure Subsystem by the 
RPN and the proposed approach method 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
120 2 2 1   4 12   0.822 26  
121 4 2 1   8 10   0.734 22  
122 2 4 1   8 10   0.767 23  
123 2 4 3   24 3   0.534 6  
124 2 3 1   6 11   0.788 25  
125 2 3 4   24 3   0.508 4  
126 2 3 1   6 11   0.788 25  
127 2 3 1   6 11   0.788 25  
128 2 3 1   6 11   0.788 25  
129 2 2 1   4 12   0.822 26  
130 2 2 1   4 12   0.822 26  
131 2 3 4   24 3   0.508 4  
132 2 3 1   6 11   0.788 25  
133 2 2 4   16 5   0.542 7  
134 2 2 4   16 5   0.542 7  
135 5 2 2   20 4   0.557 9  
136 5 2 2   20 4   0.557 9  
137 5 2 1   10 8   0.712 21  
138 5 2 1   10 8   0.712 21  
139 2 3 4   24 3   0.508 4  
140 2 3 1   6 11   0.788 25  
141 5 2 2   20 4   0.557 9  
142 5 2 2   20 4   0.557 9  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.329 0.205 0.466   79.69 %   57.81 %  
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Table 22. Comparison of the results for Cooling Distribution System in Support Structure Subsystem by the 
RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
143 1 2 4   8 8   0.733 15  
144 1 2 4   8 8   0.733 15  
145 1 2 4   8 8   0.733 15  
146 1 2 4   8 8   0.733 15  
147 1 2 1   2 12   0.959 23  
148 1 2 1   2 12   0.959 23  
149 1 3 1   3 11   0.939 22  
150 1 3 1   3 11   0.939 22  
151 1 2 4   8 8   0.733 15  
152 1 2 4   8 8   0.733 15  
153 1 2 4   8 8   0.733 15  
154 1 2 4   8 8   0.733 15  
155 2 2 1   4 10   0.792 17  
156 2 3 2   12 6   0.646 10  
157 2 3 2   12 6   0.646 10  
158 4 2 1   8 8   0.659 11  
159 4 2 1   8 8   0.659 11  
160 4 1 1   4 10   0.699 13  
161 4 3 1   12 6   0.638 9  
162 1 4 2   8 8   0.801 18  
163 1 4 2   8 8   0.801 18  
164 2 3 2   12 6   0.646 10  
165 2 3 2   12 6   0.646 10  
166 4 2 1   8 8   0.659 11  
167 4 2 3   24 4   0.470 4  
168 1 3 4   12 6   0.713 14  
169 1 3 4   12 6   0.713 14  
170 2 2 1   4 10   0.792 17  
171 2 2 1   4 10   0.792 17  
172 2 1 1   2 12   0.833 20  
173 1 2 4   8 8   0.733 15  
174 1 2 4   8 8   0.733 15  
175 2 2 1   4 10   0.792 17  
176 2 2 1   4 10   0.792 17  
177 2 1 1   2 12   0.833 20  
178 2 1 1   2 12   0.833 20  
179 3 1 5   15 5   0.498 6  
180 5 3 2   30 3   0.479 5  
181 4 3 2   24 4   0.513 7  
182 1 3 2   6 9   0.814 19  
183 1 3 2   6 9   0.814 19  
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Table 22 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Cooling Distribution System in Support Structure 
Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
184 5 2 1   10 7   0.625 8  
185 5 2 1   10 7   0.625 8  
186 1 2 1   2 12   0.959 23  
187 1 2 1   2 12   0.959 23  
188 2 2 2   8 8   0.667 12  
189 2 2 2   8 8   0.667 12  
190 1 3 1   3 11   0.939 22  
191 1 3 1   3 11   0.939 22  
192 5 2 1   10 7   0.625 8  
193 4 2 1   8 8   0.659 11  
194 5 2 1   10 7   0.625 8  
195 4 2 4   32 2   0.432 2  
196 1 2 2   4 10   0.834 21  
197 1 2 2   4 10   0.834 21  
198 1 2 2   4 10   0.834 21  
199 1 2 2   4 10   0.834 21  
200 5 2 1   10 7   0.625 8  
201 5 2 3   30 3   0.437 3  
202 2 2 2   8 8   0.667 12  
203 2 2 2   8 8   0.667 12  
204 4 3 4   48 1   0.412 1  
205 5 2 1   10 7   0.625 8  
206 5 2 1   10 7   0.625 8  
207 4 3 1   12 6   0.638 9  
208 4 3 1   12 6   0.638 9  
209 1 2 3   6 9   0.771 16  
210 1 2 4   8 8   0.733 15  
211 5 2 1   10 7   0.625 8  
212 4 2 3   24 4   0.470 4  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.501 0.122 0.377   82.86 %   67.14 %  
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Table 23. Comparison of the results for Power Distribution System in Support Structure Subsystem by the 
RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
213 2 1 1   2 8   4.000 2  
214 5 1 1   5 6   7.000 4  
215 5 1 1   5 6   7.000 4  
216 5  1   0 9   1.000 1  
217 4 1 1   4 7   6.000 3  
218 5 1 1   5 6   7.000 4  
219 5 1 5   25 1   31.000 9  
220 5  1   0 9   1.000 1  
221 3 1 5   15 3   21.000 7  
222 2 1 1   2 8   4.000 2  
223 2 1 1   2 8   4.000 2  
224 5 1 5   25 1   31.000 9  
225 2 1 1   2 8   4.000 2  
226 2 1 1   2 8   4.000 2  
227 2 1 1   2 8   4.000 2  
228 5 1 5   25 1   31.000 9  
229 4 1 1   4 7   6.000 3  
230 5 1 5   25 1   31.000 9  
231 4 1 1   4 7   6.000 3  
232 4 1 1   4 7   6.000 3  
233 4 1 1   4 7   6.000 3  
234 5 1 5   25 1   31.000 9  
235 4 1 1   4 7   6.000 3  
236 4 1 5   20 2   26.000 8  
237 4 1 1   4 7   6.000 3  
238 5 1 5   25 1   31.000 9  
239 4 1 1   4 7   6.000 3  
240 4 1 1   4 7   6.000 3  
241 4 1 1   4 7   6.000 3  
242 5 1 5   25 1   31.000 9  
243 4 1 1   4 7   6.000 3  
244 5 1 5   25 1   31.000 9  
245 2 1 2   4 7   7.000 4  
246 2 1 5   10 4   16.000 6  
247 4 1 1   4 7   6.000 3  
248 4 1 5   20 2   26.000 8  
249 2 1 1   2 8   4.000 2  
250 4 1 5   20 2   26.000 8  
251 4 1 1   4 7   6.000 3  
252 4 1 5   20 2   26.000 8  
253 2 1 1   2 8   4.000 2  
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Table 23 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Power Distribution System in Support Structure 
Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
254 4 1 5   20 2   26.000 8  
255 4 2 1   8 5   11.000 5  
256 4 2 1   8 5   11.000 5  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.400 0.037 0.563   79.55 %   79.55 %  
 
 
Table 24. Comparison of the results for Water Riser in Receiver Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed 
approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
1 1 2 1   2 12   0.937 13  
2 1 2 1   2 12   0.937 13  
3 1 3 1   3 11   0.906 12  
4 1 3 1   3 11   0.906 12  
5 4 2 2   16 4   0.518 4  
6 4 2 2   16 4   0.518 4  
7 3 4 2   24 3   0.523 5  
8 4 4 2   32 1   0.468 2  
9 4 4 2   32 1   0.468 2  
10 4 2 2   16 4   0.518 4  
11 4 2 2   16 4   0.518 4  
12 4 1 2   8 9   0.581 7  
13 4 1 2   8 9   0.581 7  
14 2 1 5   10 7   0.645 9  
15 1 3 4   12 6   0.754 10  
16 1 3 4   12 6   0.754 10  
17 4 3 2   24 3   0.486 3  
18 5 3 1   15 5   0.534 6  
19 1 3 2   6 10   0.821 11  
20 1 3 4   12 6   0.754 10  
21 5 3 2   30 2   0.449 1  
22 3 3 1   9 8   0.627 8  
23 5 3 2   30 2   0.449 1  
24 1 2 1   2 12   0.937 13  
25 1 2 1   2 12   0.937 13  
26 1 3 4   12 6   0.754 10  
27 1 3 4   12 6   0.754 10  
28 5 3 2   30 2   0.449 1  
29 5 3 2   30 2   0.449 1  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.558 0.189 0.253   58.62 %   55.17 %  
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Table 25. Comparison of the results for Absorber in Receiver Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed 
approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
30 1 2 1   2 10   1.000 12  
31 1 2 1   2 10   1.000 12  
32 1 3 1   3 9   0.967 11  
33 1 3 1   3 9   0.967 11  
34 3 4 4   48 1   0.468 2  
35 3 4 4   48 1   0.468 2  
36 4 3 2   24 6   0.511 6  
37 4 3 2   24 6   0.511 6  
38 5 3 2   30 5   0.472 3  
39 3 4 3   36 3   0.500 5  
40 4 4 2   32 4   0.495 4  
41 4 4 2   32 4   0.495 4  
42 1 3 4   12 7   0.776 9  
43 1 3 4   12 7   0.776 9  
44 5 3 3   45 2   0.419 1  
45 5 3 2   30 5   0.472 3  
46 2 3 5   30 5   0.561 7  
47 5 3 2   30 5   0.472 3  
48 4 3 1   12 7   0.617 8  
49 1 3 2   6 8   0.861 10  
50 1 3 4   12 7   0.776 9  
51 5 3 2   30 5   0.472 3  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.583 0.099 0.318   54.55 %   45.45 %  
 
 
Table 26. Comparison of the results for Panels in Receiver Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed 
approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
52 1 2 1   2 6   1.000 6  
53 1 2 1   2 6   1.000 6  
54 5 4 1   20 1   0.583 4  
55 1 3 1   3 5   1.000 6  
56 1 3 1   3 5   1.000 6  
57 4 1 2   8 3   0.532 2  
58 3 1 1   3 5   0.652 5  
59 3 2 2   12 2   0.474 1  
60 5 1 1   5 4   0.652 5  
61 3 1 1   3 5   0.571 3  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.471 0.400 0.130   40.00 %   40.00 %  
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Table 27. Comparison of the results for Stream Downcomer in Receiver Subsystem by the RPN and the 
proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
62 1 2 2   4 6   0.886 6  
63 1 2 2   4 6   0.886 6  
64 5 2 2   20 2   0.526 2  
65 1 3 4   12 4   0.755 5  
66 1 3 4   12 4   0.755 5  
67 3 3 1   9 5   0.691 4  
68 1 3 1   3 7   0.961 7  
69 1 3 4   12 4   0.755 5  
70 1 3 1   3 7   0.961 7  
71 5 3 2   30 1   0.487 1  
72 3 3 2   18 3   0.577 3  
73 3 3 2   18 3   0.577 3  
74 3 3 2   18 3   0.577 3  
75 1 3 1   3 7   0.961 7  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.539 0.117 0.343   50%   50%  
 
Table 28. Comparison of the results for Support Structure in Receiver Subsystem by the RPN and the 
proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
76 1 3 1   3 7   0.890 6  
77 1 3 1   3 7   0.890 6  
78 1 2 2   4 6   0.911 7  
79 1 2 2   4 6   0.911 7  
80 5 2 1   10 2   0.438 1  
81 5 2 1   10 2   0.438 1  
82 3 2 1   6 4   0.560 5  
83 3 2 1   6 4   0.560 5  
84 5 2 1   10 2   0.438 1  
85 5 2 1   10 2   0.438 1  
86 5 2 1   10 2   0.438 1  
87 3 4 1   12 1   0.502 2  
88 3 4 1   12 1   0.502 2  
89 1 1 1   1 8   1.000 8  
90 5 1 1   5 5   0.511 3  
91 3 3 1   9 3   0.524 4  
92 1 3 1   3 7   0.890 6  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.539 0.117 0.343   52.94%   52.94%  
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Table 29. Comparison of the results for Control component in Receiver Subsystem by the RPN and the 
proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
93 1 3 2   6 6   0.741 8  
94 1 3 2   6 6   0.741 8  
95 1 2 4   8 5   0.719 7  
96 1 2 4   8 5   0.719 7  
97 1 3 1   3 9   0.836 12  
98 1 3 1   3 9   0.836 12  
99 3 3 1   9 4   0.644 3  
100 1 3 1   3 9   0.836 12  
101 3 3 1   9 4   0.644 3  
102 2 2 1   4 8   0.762 9  
103 1 2 1   2 10   0.891 13  
104 1 2 2   4 8   0.795 10  
105 3 2 2   12 2   0.602 2  
106 3 2 2   12 2   0.602 2  
107 3 3 2   18 1   0.548 1  
108 3 3 2   18 1   0.548 1  
109 1 3 2   6 6   0.741 8  
110 1 3 2   6 6   0.741 8  
111 1 2 2   4 8   0.795 10  
112 1 2 2   4 8   0.795 10  
113 3 3 2   18 1   0.548 1  
114 3 3 2   18 1   0.548 1  
115 3 1 2   6 6   0.712 6  
116 3 1 2   6 6   0.712 6  
117 1 1 5   5 7   0.809 11  
118 3 1 2   6 6   0.712 6  
119 3 1 2   6 6   0.712 6  
120 5 1 2   10 3   0.647 4  
121 1 3 2   6 6   0.741 8  
122 1 3 2   6 6   0.741 8  
123 1 2 2   4 8   0.795 10  
124 1 2 2   4 8   0.795 10  
125 3 1 2   6 6   0.712 6  
126 3 1 2   6 6   0.712 6  
127 1 1 5   5 7   0.809 11  
128 3 3 2   18 1   0.548 1  
129 3 3 2   18 1   0.548 1  
130 3 3 2   18 1   0.548 1  
131 3 3 2   18 1   0.548 1  
132 1 3 3   9 4   0.693 5  
133 1 3 3   9 4   0.693 5  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.386 0.327 0.287   75.61 %   68.29 %  
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Table 30. Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Tank Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem by the 
RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
1 5 1 4   20 7   0.509 9  
2 4 1 1   4 17   0.724 27  
3 5 1 4   20 7   0.509 9  
4 4 1 1   4 17   0.724 27  
5 4 2 2   16 9   0.544 10  
6 4 2 2   16 9   0.544 10  
7 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
8 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
9 1 3 2   6 15   0.781 34  
10 1 3 2   6 15   0.781 34  
11 1 2 2   4 17   0.820 37  
12 1 2 2   4 17   0.820 37  
13 3 2 2   12 11   0.590 14  
14 4 3 2   24 6   0.505 7  
15 4 3 2   24 6   0.505 7  
16 4 4 1   16 9   0.585 13  
17 4 4 1   16 9   0.585 13  
18 3 1 2   6 15   0.668 22  
19 3 1 1   3 18   0.770 33  
20 2 1 5   10 12   0.642 19  
21 3 2 2   12 11   0.590 14  
22 3 2 2   12 11   0.590 14  
23 1 3 1   3 18   0.884 39  
24 4 3 1   12 11   0.608 16  
25 3 3 2   18 8   0.551 11  
26 3 3 2   18 8   0.551 11  
27 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
28 3 3 1   9 13   0.654 21  
29 4 4 1   16 9   0.585 13  
30 4 4 1   16 9   0.585 13  
31 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
32 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
33 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
34 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
35 3 2 1   6 15   0.693 24  
36 3 2 1   6 15   0.693 24  
37 3 1 1   3 18   0.770 33  
38 1 3 1   3 18   0.884 39  
39 1 3 1   3 18   0.884 39  
40 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
41 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
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Table 30 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Tank Unit in Thermal Storage 
Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
42 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
43 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
44 4 4 4   64 1   0.400 1  
45 4 4 4   64 1   0.400 1  
46 3 2 2   12 11   0.590 14  
47 3 2 2   12 11   0.590 14  
48 3 3 2   18 8   0.551 11  
49 1 3 2   6 15   0.781 34  
50 3 3 2   18 8   0.551 11  
51 1 3 2   6 15   0.781 34  
52 3 3 2   18 8   0.551 11  
53 1 3 1   3 18   0.884 39  
54 4 3 1   12 11   0.608 16  
55 5 3 2   30 4   0.475 4  
56 4 3 2   24 6   0.505 7  
57 5 2 4   40 2   0.431 2  
58 4 2 2   16 9   0.544 10  
59 4 2 2   16 9   0.544 10  
60 4 3 1   12 11   0.608 16  
61 4 3 1   12 11   0.608 16  
62 4 3 2   24 6   0.505 7  
63 4 3 2   24 6   0.505 7  
64 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
65 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
66 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
67 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
68 1 1 1   1 20   1.000 41  
69 2 1 1   2 19   0.847 38  
70 1 1 1   1 20   1.000 41  
71 2 1 1   2 19   0.847 38  
72 1 3 1   3 18   0.884 39  
73 1 3 1   3 18   0.884 39  
74 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
75 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
76 3 4 1   12 11   0.630 18  
77 1 3 4   12 11   0.699 25  
78 1 3 4   12 11   0.699 25  
79 3 1 1   3 18   0.770 33  
80 1 1 4   4 17   0.815 36  
81 3 4 1   12 11   0.630 18  
82 1 4 4   16 9   0.676 23  
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Table 30 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Tank Unit in Thermal Storage 
Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
83 3 1 1   3 18   0.770 33  
84 1 1 4   4 17   0.815 36  
85 1 1 5   5 16   0.795 35  
86 3 3 1   9 13   0.654 21  
87 1 3 1   3 18   0.884 39  
88 3 1 1   3 18   0.770 33  
89 3 1 1   3 18   0.770 33  
90 3 4 1   12 11   0.630 18  
91 1 4 4   16 9   0.676 23  
92 3 2 1   6 15   0.693 24  
93 1 2 4   8 14   0.738 30  
94 3 1 1   3 18   0.770 33  
95 1 3 2   6 15   0.781 34  
96 1 3 2   6 15   0.781 34  
97 2 3 1   6 15   0.730 29  
98 2 3 1   6 15   0.730 29  
99 3 2 1   6 15   0.693 24  
100 1 2 4   8 14   0.738 30  
101 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
102 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
103 3 2 1   6 15   0.693 24  
104 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
105 1 2 4   8 14   0.738 30  
106 3 2 1   6 15   0.693 24  
107 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
108 1 2 4   8 14   0.738 30  
109 3 3 1   9 13   0.654 21  
110 1 3 1   3 18   0.884 39  
111 3 2 4   24 6   0.508 8  
112 4 2 4   32 3   0.462 3  
113 1 2 4   8 14   0.738 30  
114 1 2 4   8 14   0.738 30  
115 3 2 1   6 15   0.693 24  
116 4 2 3   24 6   0.493 5  
117 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
118 2 2 3   12 11   0.615 17  
119 1 2 3   6 15   0.769 32  
120 2 4 2   16 9   0.605 15  
121 1 4 2   8 14   0.758 31  
122 2 4 2   16 9   0.605 15  
123 1 4 2   8 14   0.758 31  
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Table 30 (Continued).  Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Tank Unit in Thermal Storage 
Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
124 1 2 4   8 14   0.738 30  
125 1 2 4   8 14   0.738 30  
126 3 2 1   6 15   0.693 24  
127 3 2 1   6 15   0.693 24  
128 1 3 1   3 18   0.884 39  
129 1 3 1   3 18   0.884 39  
130 3 2 1   6 15   0.693 24  
131 3 2 1   6 15   0.693 24  
132 3 1 1   3 18   0.770 33  
133 3 1 1   3 18   0.770 33  
134 2 1 5   10 12   0.642 19  
135 1 1 5   5 16   0.795 35  
136 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
137 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
138 3 3 1   9 13   0.654 21  
139 3 3 3   27 5   0.500 6  
140 1 3 3   9 13   0.730 28  
141 3 2 1   6 15   0.693 24  
142 4 2 1   8 14   0.647 20  
143 4 2 1   8 14   0.647 20  
144 4 2 1   8 14   0.647 20  
145 1 3 1   3 18   0.884 39  
146 1 3 1   3 18   0.884 39  
147 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
148 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
149 2 4 1   8 14   0.707 26  
150 2 4 1   8 14   0.707 26  
151 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
152 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
153 1 3 1   3 18   0.884 39  
154 1 3 1   3 18   0.884 39  
155 5 3 1   15 10   0.577 12  
156 3 3 1   9 13   0.654 21  
157 4 2 2   16 9   0.544 10  
158 4 2 4   32 3   0.462 3  
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Table 30 (Continued).  Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Tank Unit in Thermal Storage 
Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
159 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
160 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
161 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
162 1 2 1   2 19   0.922 40  
163 3 2 1   6 15   0.693 24  
164 3 2 1   6 15   0.693 24  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.460 0.233 0.308   87.80 %   75%  
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Table 31. Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem by the RPN 
and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
165 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
166 3 3 3   27 6   0.500 7  
167 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
168 3 2 4   24 7   0.508 8  
169 1 2 3   6 15   0.728 24  
170 1 2 3   6 15   0.728 24  
171 1 2 3   6 15   0.728 24  
172 1 2 3   6 15   0.728 24  
173 1 3 3   9 13   0.683 20  
174 1 3 3   9 13   0.683 20  
175 3 3 2   18 8   0.561 10  
176 3 3 2   18 8   0.561 10  
177 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
178 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
179 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
180 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
181 3 2 4   24 7   0.508 8  
182 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
183 2 3 4   24 7   0.524 9  
184 1 3 4   12 11   0.647 16  
185 5 2 1   10 12   0.667 19  
186 2 2 4   16 9   0.569 11  
187 1 2 4   8 14   0.691 22  
188 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
189 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
190 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
191 3 3 4   36 4   0.463 4  
192 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
193 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
194 1 3 1   3 17   0.866 29  
195 1 3 1   3 17   0.866 29  
196 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
197 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
198 1 2 1   2 18   0.911 31  
199 1 2 1   2 18   0.911 31  
200 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
201 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
202 4 4 4   64 1   0.400 1  
203 4 4 4   64 1   0.400 1  
204 1 3 1   3 17   0.866 29  
205 1 3 1   3 17   0.866 29  
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Table 31 (Continued). Comparison of the results Thermal-Storage Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem by 
the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
206 1 2 4   8 14   0.691 22  
207 1 2 4   8 14   0.691 22  
208 2 4 2   16 9   0.595 13  
209 2 4 2   16 9   0.595 13  
210 2 4 5   40 3   0.473 6  
211 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
212 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
213 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
214 1 3 1   3 17   0.866 29  
215 1 3 1   3 17   0.866 29  
216 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
217 1 2 1   2 18   0.911 31  
218 1 2 1   2 18   0.911 31  
219 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
220 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
221 3 1 5   15 10   0.573 12  
222 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
223 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
224 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
225 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
226 1 2 1   2 18   0.911 31  
227 1 2 1   2 18   0.911 31  
228 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
229 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
230 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
231 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
232 2 1 5   10 12   0.634 15  
233 4 3 1   12 11   0.647 17  
234 4 3 1   12 11   0.647 17  
235 4 2 4   32 5   0.471 5  
236 4 2 4   32 5   0.471 5  
237 4 4 4   64 1   0.400 1  
238 4 4 4   64 1   0.400 1  
239 1 2 1   2 18   0.911 31  
240 1 2 1   2 18   0.911 31  
241 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
242 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
243 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
244 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
245 2 1 5   10 12   0.634 15  
246 4 3 4   48 2   0.427 2  
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Table 31 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem 
by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
247 4 3 4   48 2   0.427 2  
248 4 2 4   32 5   0.471 5  
249 4 2 4   32 5   0.471 5  
250 4 4 4   64 1   0.400 1  
251 4 4 4   64 1   0.400 1  
252 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
253 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
254 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
255 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
256 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
257 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
258 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
259 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
260 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
261 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
262 2 2 4   16 9   0.569 11  
263 1 2 1   2 18   0.911 31  
264 1 2 1   2 18   0.911 31  
265 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
266 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
267 2 1 5   10 12   0.634 15  
268 1 2 3   6 15   0.728 24  
269 1 2 3   6 15   0.728 24  
270 1 1 1   1 19   1.000 32  
271 1 1 1   1 19   1.000 32  
272 4 4 3   48 2   0.437 3  
273 4 4 1   16 9   0.620 14  
274 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
275 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
276 3 4 1   12 11   0.657 18  
277 3 4 1   12 11   0.657 18  
278 1 3 3   9 13   0.683 20  
279 1 3 3   9 13   0.683 20  
280 1 3 1   3 17   0.866 29  
281 4 3 1   12 11   0.647 17  
282 4 1 1   4 16   0.780 27  
283 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
284 4 4 1   16 9   0.620 14  
285 3 4 1   12 11   0.657 18  
286 3 4 1   12 11   0.657 18  
287 1 3 1   3 17   0.866 29  
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Table 31 (Continued).  Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem 
by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
288 1 3 1   3 17   0.866 29  
289 1 2 1   2 18   0.911 31  
290 1 2 1   2 18   0.911 31  
291 2 3 1   6 15   0.744 26  
292 2 3 1   6 15   0.744 26  
293 2 3 1   6 15   0.744 26  
294 2 1 1   2 18   0.878 30  
295 2 1 1   2 18   0.878 30  
296 2 1 5   10 12   0.634 15  
297 1 2 1   2 18   0.911 31  
298 1 2 1   2 18   0.911 31  
299 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
300 2 3 4   24 7   0.524 9  
301 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
302 2 1 3   6 15   0.695 23  
303 2 1 5   10 12   0.634 15  
304 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
305 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
306 3 2 1   6 15   0.728 25  
307 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
308 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
309 3 3 1   9 13   0.683 21  
310 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
311 3 1 1   3 17   0.817 28  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.366 0.267 0.366   87.07 %   78.23%  
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Table 32 Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem by the RPN 
and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
312 3 3 1   9 2   0.613 1  
313 3 3 1   9 2   0.613 1  
314 3 3 1   9 2   0.613 1  
315 3 2 1   6 3   0.782 3  
316 1 2 1   2 5   1.000 5  
317 1 3 1   3 4   0.831 4  
318 1 3 1   3 4   0.831 4  
319 3 2 2   12 1   0.615 2  
320 3 2 2   12 1   0.615 2  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.327 0.338 0.366   44.44 %   44.44 %  
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Table 33 Comparison of the results for Receiver Feed Pump in Electronical Power and Generator 
Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
1 3 3 2   18 7   0.552 11  
2 5 2 2   20 6   0.519 5  
3 1 2 1   2 18   0.918 39  
4 1 2 3   6 14   0.762 34  
5 5 3 1   15 9   0.582 15  
6 2 3 2   12 10   0.625 22  
7 5 3 1   15 9   0.582 15  
8 1 3 1   3 17   0.876 38  
9 1 3 3   9 12   0.721 31  
10 2 4 2   16 8   0.601 18  
11 5 4 1   20 6   0.557 12  
12 5 4 1   20 6   0.557 12  
13 4 2 2   16 8   0.549 10  
14 4 2 2   16 8   0.549 10  
15 3 1 2   6 14   0.675 26  
16 5 1 1   5 15   0.706 30  
17 5 1 1   5 15   0.706 30  
18 2 1 5   10 11   0.645 23  
19 5 3 2   30 3   0.478 3  
20 5 3 2   30 3   0.478 3  
21 1 2 2   4 16   0.814 37  
22 5 2 2   20 6   0.519 5  
23 1 2 4   8 13   0.731 32  
24 1 2 4   8 13   0.731 32  
25 1 3 4   12 10   0.690 27  
26 1 3 4   12 10   0.690 27  
27 2 2 2   8 13   0.667 25  
28 5 2 2   20 6   0.519 5  
29 3 2 1   6 14   0.697 28  
30 3 2 1   6 14   0.697 28  
31 1 3 1   3 17   0.876 38  
32 1 3 1   3 17   0.876 38  
33 1 3 1   3 17   0.876 38  
34 1 3 1   3 17   0.876 38  
35 1 2 1   2 18   0.918 39  
36 1 2 1   2 18   0.918 39  
37 2 3 2   12 10   0.625 22  
38 2 3 2   12 10   0.625 22  
39 2 3 2   12 10   0.625 22  
40 2 3 2   12 10   0.625 22  
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Table 33 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Receiver Feed Pump in Electronical Power and 
Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
41 2 3 2   12 10   0.625 22  
42 3 2 2   12 10   0.593 17  
43 3 2 2   12 10   0.593 17  
44 3 4 2   24 5   0.527 7  
45 1 2 4   8 13   0.731 32  
46 1 2 4   8 13   0.731 32  
47 1 2 4   8 13   0.731 32  
48 1 2 4   8 13   0.731 32  
49 1 2 4   8 13   0.731 32  
50 1 2 4   8 13   0.731 32  
51 4 1 3   12 10   0.579 14  
52 4 1 3   12 10   0.579 14  
53 2 1 5   10 11   0.645 23  
54 5 1 1   5 15   0.706 30  
55 2 1 2   4 16   0.749 33  
56 5 1 2   10 11   0.602 19  
57 2 2 1   4 16   0.770 35  
58 2 2 2   8 13   0.667 25  
59 3 2 3   18 7   0.541 8  
60 3 2 3   18 7   0.541 8  
61 2 1 3   6 14   0.697 29  
62 2 1 3   6 14   0.697 29  
63 2 1 5   10 11   0.645 23  
64 2 3 3   18 7   0.574 13  
65 2 3 3   18 7   0.574 13  
66 2 2 3   12 10   0.615 20  
67 2 2 3   12 10   0.615 20  
68 5 1 2   10 11   0.602 19  
69 5 1 2   10 11   0.602 19  
70 2 1 5   10 11   0.645 23  
71 3 1 2   6 14   0.675 26  
72 3 1 2   6 14   0.675 26  
73 2 1 5   10 11   0.645 23  
74 3 1 2   6 14   0.675 26  
75 3 1 2   6 14   0.675 26  
76 2 1 5   10 11   0.645 23  
77 1 3 2   6 14   0.773 36  
78 1 3 2   6 14   0.773 36  
79 1 2 2   4 16   0.814 37  
80 1 2 2   4 16   0.814 37  
81 2 3 4   24 5   0.542 9  
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Table 33 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Receiver Feed Pump in Electronical Power and 
Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
82 2 3 4   24 5   0.542 9  
83 2 3 4   24 5   0.542 9  
84 2 3 4   24 5   0.542 9  
85 2 2 4   16 8   0.584 16  
86 5 2 1   10 11   0.623 21  
87 5 2 4   40 1   0.436 1  
88 5 1 1   5 15   0.706 30  
89 5 1 1   5 15   0.706 30  
90 5 2 1   10 11   0.623 21  
91 3 3 1   9 12   0.656 24  
92 2 3 5   30 3   0.522 6  
93 4 3 3   36 2   0.456 2  
94 4 3 3   36 2   0.456 2  
95 3 2 3   18 7   0.541 8  
96 3 1 2   6 14   0.675 26  
97 3 3 2   18 7   0.552 11  
98 3 3 2   18 7   0.552 11  
99 3 2 2   12 10   0.593 17  
100 3 2 2   12 10   0.593 17  
101 3 1 2   6 14   0.675 26  
102 3 3 2   18 7   0.552 11  
103 3 3 3   27 4   0.500 4  
104 3 2 2   12 10   0.593 17  
105 3 2 2   12 10   0.593 17  
106 3 1 2   6 14   0.675 26  
107 5 3 2   30 3   0.478 3  
108 5 3 2   30 3   0.478 3  
109 5 2 2   20 6   0.519 5  
110 5 2 2   20 6   0.519 5  
111 5 1 2   10 11   0.602 19  
112 1 2 3   6 14   0.762 34  
113 1 2 3   6 14   0.762 34  
114 1 2 3   6 14   0.762 34  
115 1 2 3   6 14   0.762 34  
116 1 2 4   8 13   0.731 32  
117 1 2 4   8 13   0.731 32  
118 3 3 2   18 7   0.552 11  
119 3 3 2   18 7   0.552 11  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.442 0.247 0.311   84.87%   67.50%  
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Table 34 Comparison of the results for Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed Pump in Electronical Power and 
Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
120 2 2 1   4 11   0.791 21  
121 2 2 1   4 11   0.791 21  
122 1 2 1   2 13   0.888 24  
123 1 2 1   2 13   0.888 24  
124 2 1 2   4 11   0.778 20  
125 2 2 2   8 8   0.667 13  
126 2 2 2   8 8   0.667 13  
127 1 2 1   2 13   0.888 24  
128 1 2 1   2 13   0.888 24  
129 1 2 2   4 11   0.764 19  
130 1 2 4   8 8   0.665 12  
131 2 3 2   12 5   0.611 8  
132 2 3 2   12 5   0.611 8  
133 2 4 2   16 4   0.577 5  
134 2 1 1   2 13   0.902 25  
135 2 1 1   2 13   0.902 25  
136 2 1 5   10 6   0.654 11  
137 2 3 1   6 9   0.735 17  
138 2 3 1   6 9   0.735 17  
139 1 2 1   2 13   0.888 24  
140 3 2 4   24 1   0.519 2  
141 1 2 4   8 8   0.665 12  
142 1 2 3   6 9   0.702 16  
143 1 3 4   12 5   0.609 7  
144 1 3 3   9 7   0.647 10  
145 3 2 2   12 5   0.618 9  
146 3 2 2   12 5   0.618 9  
147 3 1 1   3 12   0.853 23  
148 3 1 1   3 12   0.853 23  
149 2 1 1   2 13   0.902 25  
150 1 2 1   2 13   0.888 24  
151 1 2 1   2 13   0.888 24  
152 1 3 1   3 12   0.832 22  
153 1 3 1   3 12   0.832 22  
154 5 4 1   20 2   0.604 6  
155 5 4 1   20 2   0.604 6  
156 5 4 1   20 2   0.604 6  
157 5 4 1   20 2   0.604 6  
158 2 2 2   8 8   0.667 13  
159 2 2 4   16 4   0.567 4  
160 2 3 2   12 5   0.611 8  
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Table 34 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed Pump in Electronical 
Power and Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
161 2 3 4   24 1   0.512 1  
162 2 1 4   8 8   0.679 14  
163 2 1 2   4 11   0.778 20  
164 2 3 1   6 9   0.735 17  
165 2 2 2   8 8   0.667 13  
166 1 2 1   2 13   0.888 24  
167 1 2 1   2 13   0.888 24  
168 1 3 1   3 12   0.832 22  
169 1 3 1   3 12   0.832 22  
170 3 3 2   18 3   0.562 3  
171 2 3 2   12 5   0.611 8  
172 2 1 1   2 13   0.902 25  
173 2 1 1   2 13   0.902 25  
174 1 1 5   5 10   0.752 18  
175 2 3 1   6 9   0.735 17  
176 2 3 1   6 9   0.735 17  
177 2 3 1   6 9   0.735 17  
178 2 3 1   6 9   0.735 17  
179 2 3 1   6 9   0.735 17  
180 2 1 1   2 13   0.902 25  
181 2 1 1   2 13   0.902 25  
182 2 1 5   10 6   0.654 11  
183 3 3 1   9 7   0.686 15  
184 2 3 1   6 9   0.735 17  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.293 0.335 0.372   80%   62.12%  
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Table 35. Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electronical Power and 
Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
185 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
186 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
187 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
188 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
189 4 1 1   4 20   0.774 54  
190 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
191 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
192 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
193 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
194 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
195 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
196 4 1 2   8 17   0.644 34  
197 4 1 4   16 12   0.540 19  
198 2 1 5   10 15   0.614 28  
199 4 3 2   24 9   0.527 18  
200 4 3 4   48 2   0.423 2  
201 1 2 2   4 20   0.792 55  
202 4 2 4   32 6   0.462 7  
203 2 3 2   12 14   0.628 31  
204 2 3 4   24 9   0.524 17  
205 2 4 2   16 12   0.605 27  
206 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
207 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
208 3 1 2   6 18   0.682 40  
209 3 1 2   6 18   0.682 40  
210 2 1 5   10 15   0.614 28  
211 5 2 2   20 10   0.541 20  
212 5 2 4   40 4   0.437 4  
213 1 3 2   6 18   0.754 51  
214 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
215 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
216 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
217 3 3 4   36 5   0.461 6  
218 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
219 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
220 3 1 4   12 14   0.578 25  
221 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
222 3 3 4   36 5   0.461 6  
223 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
224 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
225 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
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Table 35 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electronical 
Power and Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
226 3 3 4   36 5   0.461 6  
227 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
228 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
229 2 1 4   8 17   0.640 33  
230 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
231 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
232 2 3 2   12 14   0.628 31  
233 1 3 1   3 21   0.883 61  
234 1 3 1   3 21   0.883 61  
235 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
236 1 2 4   8 17   0.688 41  
237 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
238 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
239 2 2 2   8 17   0.667 37  
240 2 2 2   8 17   0.667 37  
241 2 1 2   4 20   0.744 49  
242 2 1 2   4 20   0.744 49  
243 1 1 5   5 19   0.740 48  
244 2 1 2   4 20   0.744 49  
245 2 1 4   8 17   0.640 33  
246 1 1 5   5 19   0.740 48  
247 2 2 2   8 17   0.667 37  
248 2 2 4   16 12   0.563 22  
249 1 4 1   4 20   0.860 58  
250 1 4 4   16 12   0.626 30  
251 1 1 1   1 23   1.000 63  
252 1 1 4   4 20   0.766 53  
253 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
254 1 2 4   8 17   0.688 41  
255 2 3 2   12 14   0.628 31  
256 2 3 2   12 14   0.628 31  
257 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
258 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
259 3 1 2   6 18   0.682 40  
260 3 1 2   6 18   0.682 40  
261 3 1 4   12 14   0.578 25  
262 2 1 5   10 15   0.614 28  
263 1 1 2   2 22   0.870 59  
264 4 1 2   8 17   0.644 34  
265 1 4 2   8 17   0.730 46  
266 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
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Table 35 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electronical 
Power and Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
267 4 3 2   24 9   0.527 18  
268 1 3 1   3 21   0.883 61  
269 1 3 3   9 16   0.689 42  
270 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
271 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
272 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
273 1 2 2   4 20   0.792 55  
274 3 1 2   6 18   0.682 40  
275 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
276 4 2 2   16 12   0.566 24  
277 4 1 2   8 17   0.644 34  
278 4 1 4   16 12   0.540 19  
279 2 1 5   10 15   0.614 28  
280 1 3 2   6 18   0.754 51  
281 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
282 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
283 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
284 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
285 3 1 2   6 18   0.682 40  
286 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
287 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
288 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
289 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
290 3 1 2   6 18   0.682 40  
291 2 3 2   12 14   0.628 31  
292 2 3 4   24 9   0.524 17  
293 1 3 4   12 14   0.650 35  
294 2 3 4   24 9   0.524 17  
295 2 3 4   24 9   0.524 17  
296 3 3 4   36 5   0.461 6  
297 4 3 4   48 2   0.423 2  
298 4 3 4   48 2   0.423 2  
299 5 2 4   40 4   0.437 4  
300 5 2 1   10 15   0.671 38  
301 5 2 4   40 4   0.437 4  
302 5 1 1   5 19   0.749 50  
303 1 2 4   8 17   0.688 41  
304 1 2 4   8 17   0.688 41  
305 3 3 1   9 16   0.695 43  
306 3 3 5   45 3   0.435 3  
307 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
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Table 35 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electronical 
Power and Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
308 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
309 3 1 2   6 18   0.682 40  
310 3 1 2   6 18   0.682 40  
311 2 1 2   4 20   0.744 49  
312 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
313 3 3 4   36 5   0.461 6  
314 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
315 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
316 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
317 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
318 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
319 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
320 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
321 3 1 2   6 18   0.682 40  
322 3 1 2   6 18   0.682 40  
323 2 1 5   10 15   0.614 28  
324 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
325 5 2 3   30 7   0.476 9  
326 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
327 5 3 2   30 7   0.502 14  
328 5 1 2   10 15   0.619 29  
329 5 2 2   20 10   0.541 20  
330 5 2 2   20 10   0.541 20  
331 5 4 2   40 4   0.479 10  
332 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
333 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
334 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
335 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
336 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
337 3 3 4   36 5   0.461 6  
338 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
339 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
340 2 1 4   8 17   0.640 33  
341 1 3 2   6 18   0.754 51  
342 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
343 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
344 4 2 2   16 12   0.566 24  
345 4 2 2   16 12   0.566 24  
346 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
347 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
348 1 1 1   1 23   1.000 63  
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Table 35 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electronical 
Power and Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
349 4 1 1   4 20   0.774 54  
350 4 2 2   16 12   0.566 24  
351 2 3 4   24 9   0.524 17  
352 3 3 4   36 5   0.461 6  
353 2 3 4   24 9   0.524 17  
354 3 3 4   36 5   0.461 6  
355 1 2 4   8 17   0.688 41  
356 1 3 1   3 21   0.883 61  
357 1 3 1   3 21   0.883 61  
358 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
359 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
360 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
361 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
362 4 1 1   4 20   0.774 54  
363 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
364 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
365 3 2 5   30 7   0.474 8  
366 2 2 2   8 17   0.667 37  
367 2 1 2   4 20   0.744 49  
368 3 1 4   12 14   0.578 25  
369 2 2 2   8 17   0.667 37  
370 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
371 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
372 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
373 2 1 2   4 20   0.744 49  
374 3 1 4   12 14   0.578 25  
375 3 1 5   15 13   0.552 21  
376 2 2 2   8 17   0.667 37  
377 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
378 1 2 2   4 20   0.792 55  
379 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
380 1 2 2   4 20   0.792 55  
381 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
382 1 3 2   6 18   0.754 51  
383 1 3 3   9 16   0.689 42  
384 1 2 2   4 20   0.792 55  
385 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
386 1 2 2   4 20   0.792 55  
387 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
388 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
389 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
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Table 35 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electronical 
Power and Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
390 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
391 2 1 1   2 22   0.874 60  
392 2 1 1   2 22   0.874 60  
393 3 1 1   3 21   0.811 57  
394 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
395 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
396 1 2 2   4 20   0.792 55  
397 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
398 1 2 2   4 20   0.792 55  
399 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
400 5 2 4   40 4   0.437 4  
401 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
402 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
403 4 4 2   32 6   0.504 15  
404 4 4 2   32 6   0.504 15  
405 5 1 1   5 19   0.749 50  
406 5 1 4   20 10   0.515 16  
407 5 1 5   25 8   0.489 11  
408 5 3 1   15 13   0.632 32  
409 5 3 1   15 13   0.632 32  
410 5 3 4   60 1   0.398 1  
411 5 2 1   10 15   0.671 38  
412 5 2 4   40 4   0.437 4  
413 5 1 4   20 10   0.515 16  
414 2 1 4   8 17   0.640 33  
415 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
416 2 2 4   16 12   0.563 22  
417 2 3 1   6 18   0.758 52  
418 2 3 1   6 18   0.758 52  
419 2 3 4   24 9   0.524 17  
420 2 1 1   2 22   0.874 60  
421 2 1 1   2 22   0.874 60  
422 1 4 1   4 20   0.860 58  
423 1 4 1   4 20   0.860 58  
424 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
425 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
426 2 3 1   6 18   0.758 52  
427 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
428 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
429 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
430 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
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Table 35 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electronical 
Power and Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
431 2 3 1   6 18   0.758 52  
432 2 3 2   12 14   0.628 31  
433 2 3 1   6 18   0.758 52  
434 2 1 1   2 22   0.874 60  
435 2 1 4   8 17   0.640 33  
436 2 3 1   6 18   0.758 52  
437 2 3 1   6 18   0.758 52  
438 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
439 2 2 4   16 12   0.563 22  
440 4 3 1   12 14   0.657 36  
441 4 3 4   48 2   0.423 2  
442 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
443 4 2 4   32 6   0.462 7  
444 4 1 4   16 12   0.540 19  
445 4 1 1   4 20   0.774 54  
446 4 1 4   16 12   0.540 19  
447 2 1 5   10 15   0.614 28  
448 4 3 1   12 14   0.657 36  
449 4 3 4   48 2   0.423 2  
450 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
451 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
452 3 1 4   12 14   0.578 25  
453 3 1 1   3 21   0.811 57  
454 3 1 4   12 14   0.578 25  
455 1 1 5   5 19   0.740 48  
456 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
457 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
458 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
459 1 2 2   4 20   0.792 55  
460 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
461 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
462 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
463 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
464 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
465 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
466 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
467 4 1 1   4 20   0.774 54  
468 4 1 1   4 20   0.774 54  
469 3 1 1   3 21   0.811 57  
470 3 1 1   3 21   0.811 57  
471 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
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Table 35 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electronical 
Power and Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
472 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
473 3 4 1   12 14   0.672 39  
474 3 1 1   3 21   0.811 57  
475 4 3 1   12 14   0.657 36  
476 4 3 1   12 14   0.657 36  
477 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
478 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
479 4 1 1   4 20   0.774 54  
480 4 1 1   4 20   0.774 54  
481 2 1 5   10 15   0.614 28  
482 4 3 1   12 14   0.657 36  
483 4 3 1   12 14   0.657 36  
484 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
485 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
486 5 2 1   10 15   0.671 38  
487 5 2 4   40 4   0.437 4  
488 5 1 2   10 15   0.619 29  
489 5 1 4   20 10   0.515 16  
490 5 1 5   25 8   0.489 11  
491 5 2 2   20 10   0.541 20  
492 5 2 4   40 4   0.437 4  
493 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
494 3 3 4   36 5   0.461 6  
495 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
496 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
497 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
498 3 3 4   36 5   0.461 6  
499 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
500 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
501 2 1 4   8 17   0.640 33  
502 2 4 4   32 6   0.501 13  
503 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
504 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
505 3 3 4   36 5   0.461 6  
506 3 3 2   18 11   0.565 23  
507 3 2 2   12 14   0.604 26  
508 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
509 3 1 4   12 14   0.578 25  
510 3 4 4   48 2   0.438 5  
511 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
512 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
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Table 35 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electronical 
Power and Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
513 2 3 1   6 18   0.758 52  
514 2 3 4   24 9   0.524 17  
515 3 2 1   6 18   0.734 47  
516 3 2 4   24 9   0.500 12  
517 3 1 1   3 21   0.811 57  
518 3 1 4   12 14   0.578 25  
519 2 1 5   10 15   0.614 28  
520 4 3 2   24 9   0.527 18  
521 4 3 4   48 2   0.423 2  
522 4 3 2   24 9   0.527 18  
523 4 2 2   16 12   0.566 24  
524 4 2 4   32 6   0.462 7  
525 4 1 4   16 12   0.540 19  
526 4 3 2   24 9   0.527 18  
527 4 3 4   48 2   0.423 2  
528 4 2 2   16 12   0.566 24  
529 4 2 4   32 6   0.462 7  
530 4 1 4   16 12   0.540 19  
531 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
532 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
533 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
534 2 3 1   6 18   0.758 52  
535 2 3 1   6 18   0.758 52  
536 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
537 2 1 1   2 22   0.874 60  
538 1 1 1   1 23   1.000 63  
539 1 1 5   5 19   0.740 48  
540 2 2 1   4 20   0.797 56  
541 1 2 1   2 22   0.922 62  
542 1 2 2   4 20   0.792 55  
543 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
544 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
545 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
546 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
547 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
548 4 2 4   32 6   0.462 7  
549 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
550 4 2 1   8 17   0.696 44  
551 3 2 5   30 7   0.474 8  
552 2 3 4   24 9   0.524 17  
553 2 3 4   24 9   0.524 17  
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Table 35 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electronical 
Power and Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
554 2 3 4   24 9   0.524 17  
555 2 3 4   24 9   0.524 17  
556 2 2 4   16 12   0.563 22  
557 1 2 2   4 20   0.792 55  
558 1 2 3   6 18   0.727 45  
559 1 3 2   6 18   0.754 51  
560 4 3 1   12 14   0.657 36  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.377 0.233 0.390   93.88%   83.24%  
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Table 36 Comparison of the results for Turbine Generator in Electronical Power and Generator Subsystem 
by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
561 4 3 1   12 6   0.619 9  
562 4 3 4   48 1   0.431 1  
563 1 2 1   2 12   0.895 24  
564 1 2 3   6 10   0.738 18  
565 2 3 2   12 6   0.614 8  
566 2 3 2   12 6   0.614 8  
567 2 3 2   12 6   0.614 8  
568 4 3 4   48 1   0.431 1  
569 2 1 2   4 11   0.772 20  
570 5 1 4   20 3   0.564 4  
571 1 2 1   2 12   0.895 24  
572 1 2 3   6 10   0.738 18  
573 3 3 1   9 8   0.657 10  
574 3 3 1   9 8   0.657 10  
575 3 2 1   6 10   0.709 14  
576 4 3 2   24 2   0.515 2  
577 3 3 2   18 4   0.552 3  
578 4 1 1   4 11   0.777 21  
579 4 3 1   12 6   0.619 9  
580 3 3 1   9 8   0.657 10  
581 1 2 2   4 11   0.791 22  
582 1 2 2   4 11   0.791 22  
583 1 4 2   8 9   0.707 13  
584 1 4 2   8 9   0.707 13  
585 1 3 2   6 10   0.738 17  
586 1 3 2   6 10   0.738 17  
587 2 2 1   4 11   0.771 19  
588 2 2 1   4 11   0.771 19  
589 4 3 1   12 6   0.619 9  
590 2 3 1   6 10   0.719 16  
591 2 3 1   6 10   0.719 16  
592 2 1 1   2 12   0.876 23  
593 2 1 1   2 12   0.876 23  
594 2 1 5   10 7   0.667 11  
595 1 2 2   4 11   0.791 22  
596 1 2 2   4 11   0.791 22  
597 3 3 1   9 8   0.657 10  
598 2 3 1   6 10   0.719 16  
599 4 2 1   8 9   0.672 12  
600 4 2 1   8 9   0.672 12  
601 1 3 2   6 10   0.738 17  
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Table 36 (Continued). Comparison of the results for Turbine Generator in Electronical Power and 
Generator Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
602 1 3 2   6 10   0.738 17  
603 1 2 2   4 11   0.791 22  
604 1 2 2   4 11   0.791 22  
605 4 1 1   4 11   0.777 21  
606 4 1 1   4 11   0.777 21  
607 2 1 5   10 7   0.667 11  
608 4 1 1   4 11   0.777 21  
609 4 3 1   12 6   0.619 9  
610 4 3 1   12 6   0.619 9  
611 5 3 1   15 5   0.595 5  
612 2 3 2   12 6   0.614 8  
613 3 1 2   6 10   0.709 15  
614 3 1 2   6 10   0.709 15  
615 3 1 5   15 5   0.605 7  
616 3 2 2   12 6   0.605 6  
617 3 2 2   12 6   0.605 6  
618 3 1 2   6 10   0.709 15  
619 3 1 2   6 10   0.709 15  
620 3 1 5   15 5   0.605 7  
621 3 2 2   12 6   0.605 6  
622 3 2 2   12 6   0.605 6  
623 3 1 2   6 10   0.709 15  
624 3 1 2   6 10   0.709 15  
625 3 1 5   15 5   0.605 7  
626 3 2 2   12 6   0.605 6  
627 3 2 2   12 6   0.605 6  
628 3 3 2   18 4   0.552 3  
629 3 3 2   18 4   0.552 3  
630 3 2 2   12 6   0.605 6  
631 3 2 2   12 6   0.605 6  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.372 0.315 0.313   83.10%   66.67%  
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Table 37 Comparison of the results for Master Control Subsystem by the RPN and the proposed approach 
methods 
ID S O D 
  RPN   The proposed approach  
  Value Priority   Value Priority  
1 2 1 1   2 6   0.870 7  
2 2 1 1   2 1   0.870 7  
3 1 1 1   1 1   1.000 8  
4 2 2 1   4 1   0.747 4  
5 3 3 1   9 7   0.638 2  
6 2 1 1   2 7   0.870 7  
7 4 1 1   4 7   0.784 6  
8 1 1 4   4 7   0.755 5  
9 1 1 4   4 7   0.755 5  
10 1 1 4   4 7   0.755 5  
11 2 2 1   4 7   0.747 4  
12 2 2 1   4 7   0.747 4  
13 1 1 4   4 7   0.755 5  
14 1 1 4   4 7   0.755 5  
15 1 1 4   4 7   0.755 5  
16 1 1 4   4 7   0.755 5  
17 1 1 4   4 7   0.755 5  
18 1 1 4   4 7   0.755 5  
19 2 1 1   2 7   0.870 7  
20 2 1 1   2 7   0.870 7  
23 2 1 4   8 7   0.626 1  
24 2 1 4   8 7   0.626 1  
25 2 1 4   8 7   0.626 1  
26 3 2 1   6 7   0.691 3  
27 1 1 1   1 7   1.000 8  
28 1 1 1   1 7   1.000 8  
29 1 1 4   4 7   0.755 5  
30 1 1 1   1 7   1.000 8  
31 1 1 1   1 7   1.000 8  
32 1 1 1   1 7   1.000 8  
33 1 1 1   1 7   1.000 8  
Weight 
S O D  RPN Duplication rate  Proposed Duplication Rate 
0.324 0.309 0.367   77.42%   75%  
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Appendix C: Comparing results between two methods for Prioritization failures 
modes 
Table 37. Prioritization of failure modes for Raw Service Water System in Support Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
37 2 4 4 32 0.450 1 
39 2 2 4 16 0.521 2 
30 3 1 5 15 0.542 3 
4 2 1 5 10 0.573 4 
9 1 2 4 8 0.583 5 
32 1 2 4 8 0.583 5 
34 2 1 4 8 0.609 6 
40 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
41 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
42 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
43 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
44 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
45 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
46 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
47 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
50 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
51 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
36 2 4 1 8 0.778 8 
10 1 2 3 6 0.637 9 
11 2 3 1 6 0.805 10 
12 2 3 1 6 0.805 10 
29 1 1 4 4 0.671 11 
17 1 2 2 4 0.729 12 
18 1 2 2 4 0.729 12 
1 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
5 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
6 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
7 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
8 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
13 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
14 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
16 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
20 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
21 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
22 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
23 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
24 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
25 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
26 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
38 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
48 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
49 2 2 1 4 0.849 13 
19 3 1 1 3 0.907 14 
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Table 38 (Continued).  Prioritization of failure modes for Raw Service Water System in Support Structure 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
27 1 2 1 2 0.911 15 
31 1 2 1 2 0.911 15 
2 2 1 1 2 0.938 16 
3 2 1 1 2 0.938 16 
15 2 1 1 2 0.938 16 
33 2 1 1 2 0.938 16 
35 2 1 1 2 0.938 16 
28 1 1 1 1 1.000 17 
 
 
 
Table 38 Prioritization of failure modes for Demineralized Water system in Support Structure Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
71 2 4 4 32 0.489 1 
67 2 2 4 16 0.578 2 
69 2 2 4 16 0.578 2 
74 2 2 4 16 0.578 2 
75 2 2 4 16 0.578 2 
65 3 1 5 15 0.612 3 
70 2 4 1 8 0.688 4 
64 2 1 4 8 0.690 5 
60 3 2 1 6 0.722 6 
61 3 2 1 6 0.722 6 
52 2 2 1 4 0.777 7 
53 2 2 1 4 0.777 7 
57 2 2 1 4 0.777 7 
58 2 2 1 4 0.777 7 
59 2 2 1 4 0.777 7 
62 2 2 1 4 0.777 77 
66 2 2 1 4 0.777 7 
68 2 2 1 4 0.777 7 
72 2 2 1 4 0.777 7 
73 2 2 1 4 0.777 7 
54 1 2 2 4 0.778 8 
55 1 2 2 4 0.778 8 
56 4 1 1 4 0.800 9 
63 3 1 1 3 0.833 10 
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Table 39 Prioritization of failure modes for Compressed-Air- System in Support Structure Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
106 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
82 2 4 4 32 0.488 2 
105 3 2 4 24 0.487 3 
118 2 3 4 24 0.508 4 
125 2 3 4 24 0.508 4 
131 2 3 4 24 0.508 4 
139 2 3 4 24 0.508 4 
123 2 4 3 24 0.534 5 
102 4 3 2 24 0.545 6 
135 5 2 2 20 0.557 7 
136 5 2 2 20 0.557 7 
141 5 2 2 20 0.557 7 
142 5 2 2 20 0.557 7 
107 4 1 4 16 0.523 8 
80 2 2 4 16 0.542 9 
81 2 2 4 16 0.542 9 
86 2 2 4 16 0.542 9 
104 2 2 4 16 0.542 9 
133 2 2 4 16 0.542 9 
134 2 2 4 16 0.542 9 
96 4 2 2 16 0.579 10 
97 4 2 2 16 0.579 10 
98 5 3 1 15 0.678 11 
99 5 3 1 15 0.678 11 
119 1 3 4 12 0.618 12 
84 2 3 2 12 0.632 13 
85 2 3 2 12 0.632 13 
103 2 3 2 12 0.632 13 
94 2 1 5 10 0.580 14 
108 5 2 1 10 0.712 15 
109 5 2 1 10 0.712 15 
137 5 2 1 10 0.712 15 
138 5 2 1 10 0.712 15 
113 1 3 3 9 0.664 16 
83 2 1 4 8 0.611 17 
88 1 2 4 8 0.652 18 
100 1 2 4 8 0.652 18 
95 2 2 2 8 0.667 19 
111 4 2 1 8 0.734 20 
115 4 2 1 8 0.734 20 
121 4 2 1 8 0.734 20 
79 2 4 1 8 0.767 21 
122 2 4 1 8 0.767 21 
117 2 1 3 6 0.657 22 
101 1 2 3 6 0.699 23 
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Table 40 (Continued). Prioritization of failure modes for Compressed-Air- System in Support Structure 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
90 2 3 1 6 0.788 24 
91 2 3 1 6 0.788 24 
112 2 3 1 6 0.788 24 
124 2 3 1 6 0.788 24 
126 2 3 1 6 0.788 24 
127 2 3 1 6 0.788 24 
128 2 3 1 6 0.788 24 
132 2 3 1 6 0.788 24 
140 2 3 1 6 0.788 24 
87 1 2 2 4 0.776 25 
89 1 2 2 4 0.776 25 
110 2 2 1 4 0.822 26 
114 2 2 1 4 0.822 26 
120 2 2 1 4 0.822 26 
129 2 2 1 4 0.822 26 
130 2 2 1 4 0.822 26 
92 2 1 1 2 0.890 27 
93 2 1 1 2 0.890 27 
116 2 1 1 2 0.890 27 
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Table 40 Prioritization of failure modes for Cooling Distribution System in Support Structure Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
204 4 3 4 48 0.412 1 
195 4 2 4 32 0.432 2 
201 5 2 3 30 0.437 3 
180 5 3 2 30 0.479 4 
167 4 2 3 24 0.470 5 
212 4 2 3 24 0.470 5 
181 4 3 2 24 0.513 6 
179 3 1 5 15 0.498 7 
161 4 3 1 12 0.638 8 
207 4 3 1 12 0.638 8 
208 4 3 1 12 0.638 8 
156 2 3 2 12 0.646 9 
157 2 3 2 12 0.646 9 
164 2 3 2 12 0.646 9 
165 2 3 2 12 0.646 9 
168 1 3 4 12 0.713 10 
169 1 3 4 12 0.713 10 
184 5 2 1 10 0.625 11 
185 5 2 1 10 0.625 11 
192 5 2 1 10 0.625 11 
194 5 2 1 10 0.625 11 
200 5 2 1 10 0.625 11 
205 5 2 1 10 0.625 11 
206 5 2 1 10 0.625 11 
211 5 2 1 10 0.625 11 
158 4 2 1 8 0.659 12 
159 4 2 1 8 0.659 12 
166 4 2 1 8 0.659 12 
193 4 2 1 8 0.659 12 
188 2 2 2 8 0.667 13 
189 2 2 2 8 0.667 13 
202 2 2 2 8 0.667 13 
203 2 2 2 8 0.667 13 
143 1 2 4 8 0.733 14 
144 1 2 4 8 0.733 14 
145 1 2 4 8 0.733 14 
146 1 2 4 8 0.733 14 
151 1 2 4 8 0.733 14 
152 1 2 4 8 0.733 14 
153 1 2 4 8 0.733 14 
154 1 2 4 8 0.733 14 
173 1 2 4 8 0.733 14 
174 1 2 4 8 0.733 14 
210 1 2 4 8 0.733 14 
162 1 4 2 8 0.801 15 
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Table 41 (Continued). Prioritization of failure modes for Cooling Distribution System in Support Structure 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
163 1 4 2 8 0.801 15 
209 1 2 3 6 0.771 16 
182 1 3 2 6 0.814 17 
183 1 3 2 6 0.814 17 
160 4 1 1 4 0.699 18 
155 2 2 1 4 0.792 19 
170 2 2 1 4 0.792 19 
171 2 2 1 4 0.792 19 
175 2 2 1 4 0.792 19 
176 2 2 1 4 0.792 19 
196 1 2 2 4 0.834 20 
197 1 2 2 4 0.834 20 
198 1 2 2 4 0.834 20 
199 1 2 2 4 0.834 20 
149 1 3 1 3 0.939 21 
150 1 3 1 3 0.939 21 
190 1 3 1 3 0.939 21 
191 1 3 1 3 0.939 21 
172 2 1 1 2 0.833 22 
177 2 1 1 2 0.833 22 
178 2 1 1 2 0.833 22 
147 1 2 1 2 0.959 23 
148 1 2 1 2 0.959 23 
186 1 2 1 2 0.959 23 
187 1 2 1 2 0.959 23 
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Table 41 Prioritization of failure modes for Power Distribution in Support Structure Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
219 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
224 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
228 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
230 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
234 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
238 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
242 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
244 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
236 4 1 5 20 0.413 2 
248 4 1 5 20 0.413 2 
250 4 1 5 20 0.413 2 
252 4 1 5 20 0.413 2 
254 4 1 5 20 0.413 2 
221 3 1 5 15 0.481 3 
246 2 1 5 10 0.617 4 
255 4 2 1 8 0.790 5 
256 4 2 1 8 0.790 5 
214 5 1 1 5 0.755 6 
215 5 1 1 5 0.755 6 
216 5 1 1 5 0.755 6 
218 5 1 1 5 0.755 6 
220 5 1 1 5 0.755 6 
217 4 1 1 4 0.796 7 
229 4 1 1 4 0.796 7 
231 4 1 1 4 0.796 7 
232 4 1 1 4 0.796 7 
233 4 1 1 4 0.796 7 
235 4 1 1 4 0.796 7 
237 4 1 1 4 0.796 7 
239 4 1 1 4 0.796 7 
240 4 1 1 4 0.796 7 
241 4 1 1 4 0.796 7 
243 4 1 1 4 0.796 7 
247 4 1 1 4 0.796 7 
251 4 1 1 4 0.796 7 
245 2 1 2 4 0.808 8 
213 2 1 1 2 1.000 9 
222 2 1 1 2 1.000 9 
223 2 1 1 2 1.000 9 
225 2 1 1 2 1.000 9 
226 2 1 1 2 1.000 9 
227 2 1 1 2 1.000 9 
249 2 1 1 2 1.000 9 
253 2 1 1 2 1.000 9 
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Table 42 Prioritization of failure modes for Water Riser in Receiver Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
8 4 4 2 32 0.468 1 
9 4 4 2 32 0.468 1 
21 5 3 2 30 0.449 2 
23 5 3 2 30 0.449 2 
28 5 3 2 30 0.449 2 
29 5 3 2 30 0.449 2 
17 4 3 2 24 0.486 3 
7 3 4 2 24 0.523 4 
5 4 2 2 16 0.518 5 
6 4 2 2 16 0.518 5 
10 4 2 2 16 0.518 5 
11 4 2 2 16 0.518 5 
18 5 3 1 15 0.534 6 
15 1 3 4 12 0.754 7 
16 1 3 4 12 0.754 7 
20 1 3 4 12 0.754 7 
26 1 3 4 12 0.754 7 
27 1 3 4 12 0.754 7 
14 2 1 5 10 0.645 8 
22 3 3 1 9 0.627 9 
12 4 1 2 8 0.581 10 
13 4 1 2 8 0.581 10 
19 1 3 2 6 0.821 11 
3 1 3 1 3 0.906 12 
4 1 3 1 3 0.906 12 
1 1 2 1 2 0.937 13 
2 1 2 1 2 0.937 13 
24 1 2 1 2 0.937 13 
25 1 2 1 2 0.937 13 
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Table 43 Prioritization of failure modes for Absorber in Receiver Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
34 3 4 4 48 0.468 1 
35 3 4 4 48 0.468 1 
44 5 3 3 45 0.419 2 
39 3 4 3 36 0.500 3 
40 4 4 2 32 0.495 4 
41 4 4 2 32 0.495 4 
38 5 3 2 30 0.472 5 
45 5 3 2 30 0.472 5 
47 5 3 2 30 0.472 5 
51 5 3 2 30 0.472 5 
46 2 3 5 30 0.561 6 
36 4 3 2 24 0.511 7 
37 4 3 2 24 0.511 7 
48 4 3 1 12 0.617 8 
42 1 3 4 12 0.776 9 
43 1 3 4 12 0.776 9 
50 1 3 4 12 0.776 9 
49 1 3 2 6 0.861 10 
32 1 3 1 3 0.967 11 
33 1 3 1 3 0.967 11 
30 1 2 1 2 1.000 12 
31 1 2 1 2 1.000 12 
 
 
 
Table 44 Prioritization of failure modes for Panels in Receiver Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
54 5 4 1 20 0.583 1 
59 3 2 2 12 0.474 2 
57 4 1 2 8 0.532 3 
60 5 1 1 5 0.652 4 
61 3 1 1 3 0.571 5 
58 3 1 1 3 0.652 6 
55 1 3 1 3 1.000 7 
56 1 3 1 3 1.000 7 
52 1 2 1 2 1.000 7 
53 1 2 1 2 1.000 7 
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Table 45 Prioritization of failure modes for Steam Downcomer in Receiver Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
71 5 3 2 30 0.487 1 
64 5 2 2 20 0.526 2 
72 3 3 2 18 0.577 3 
73 3 3 2 18 0.577 3 
74 3 3 2 18 0.577 3 
65 1 3 4 12 0.755 4 
66 1 3 4 12 0.755 4 
69 1 3 4 12 0.755 4 
67 3 3 1 9 0.691 5 
62 1 2 2 4 0.886 6 
63 1 2 2 4 0.886 6 
68 1 3 1 3 0.961 7 
70 1 3 1 3 0.961 7 
75 1 3 1 3 0.961 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 46 Prioritization of failure modes for Support Structure in Receiver Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
87 3 4 1 12 0.502 1 
88 3 4 1 12 0.502 1 
80 5 2 1 10 0.438 2 
81 5 2 1 10 0.438 2 
84 5 2 1 10 0.438 2 
85 5 2 1 10 0.438 2 
86 5 2 1 10 0.438 2 
91 3 3 1 9 0.524 3 
82 3 2 1 6 0.560 4 
83 3 2 1 6 0.560 4 
90 5 1 1 5 0.511 5 
78 1 2 2 4 0.911 6 
79 1 2 2 4 0.911 6 
76 1 3 1 3 0.890 7 
77 1 3 1 3 0.890 7 
92 1 3 1 3 0.890 7 
89 1 1 1 1 1.000 8 
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Table 47 Prioritization of failure modes for Control Component in Receiver Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
93 1 3 2 6 0.741 8 
94 1 3 2 6 0.741 8 
95 1 2 4 8 0.719 7 
96 1 2 4 8 0.719 7 
97 1 3 1 3 0.836 12 
98 1 3 1 3 0.836 12 
99 3 3 1 9 0.644 3 
100 1 3 1 3 0.836 12 
101 3 3 1 9 0.644 3 
102 2 2 1 4 0.762 9 
103 1 2 1 2 0.891 13 
104 1 2 2 4 0.795 10 
105 3 2 2 12 0.602 2 
106 3 2 2 12 0.602 2 
107 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
108 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
109 1 3 2 6 0.741 8 
110 1 3 2 6 0.741 8 
111 1 2 2 4 0.795 10 
112 1 2 2 4 0.795 10 
113 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
114 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
115 3 1 2 6 0.712 6 
116 3 1 2 6 0.712 6 
117 1 1 5 5 0.809 11 
118 3 1 2 6 0.712 6 
119 3 1 2 6 0.712 6 
120 5 1 2 10 0.647 4 
121 1 3 2 6 0.741 8 
122 1 3 2 6 0.741 8 
123 1 2 2 4 0.795 10 
124 1 2 2 4 0.795 10 
125 3 1 2 6 0.712 6 
126 3 1 2 6 0.712 6 
127 1 1 5 5 0.809 11 
128 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
129 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
130 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
131 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
132 1 3 3 9 0.693 5 
133 1 3 3 9 0.693 5 
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Table 48 Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Tank Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
44 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
45 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
57 5 2 4 40 0.431 2 
112 4 2 4 32 0.462 3 
158 4 2 4 32 0.462 3 
55 5 3 2 30 0.475 4 
139 3 3 3 27 0.500 5 
116 4 2 3 24 0.493 6 
14 4 3 2 24 0.505 7 
15 4 3 2 24 0.505 7 
56 4 3 2 24 0.505 7 
62 4 3 2 24 0.505 7 
63 4 3 2 24 0.505 7 
111 3 2 4 24 0.508 8 
1 5 1 4 20 0.509 9 
3 5 1 4 20 0.509 9 
25 3 3 2 18 0.551 10 
26 3 3 2 18 0.551 10 
48 3 3 2 18 0.551 10 
50 3 3 2 18 0.551 10 
52 3 3 2 18 0.551 10 
5 4 2 2 16 0.544 11 
6 4 2 2 16 0.544 11 
58 4 2 2 16 0.544 11 
59 4 2 2 16 0.544 11 
157 4 2 2 16 0.544 11 
16 4 4 1 16 0.585 12 
17 4 4 1 16 0.585 12 
29 4 4 1 16 0.585 12 
30 4 4 1 16 0.585 12 
120 2 4 2 16 0.605 13 
122 2 4 2 16 0.605 13 
82 1 4 4 16 0.676 14 
91 1 4 4 16 0.676 14 
155 5 3 1 15 0.577 15 
13 3 2 2 12 0.590 16 
21 3 2 2 12 0.590 16 
22 3 2 2 12 0.590 16 
46 3 2 2 12 0.590 16 
47 3 2 2 12 0.590 16 
24 4 3 1 12 0.608 17 
54 4 3 1 12 0.608 17 
60 4 3 1 12 0.608 17 
61 4 3 1 12 0.608 17 
118 2 2 3 12 0.615 18 
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Table 49 (Continued). Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Tank Unit in Thermal Storage 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
76 3 4 1 12 0.630 19 
81 3 4 1 12 0.630 19 
90 3 4 1 12 0.630 19 
77 1 3 4 12 0.699 20 
78 1 3 4 12 0.699 20 
20 2 1 5 10 0.642 21 
134 2 1 5 10 0.642 21 
28 3 3 1 9 0.654 22 
86 3 3 1 9 0.654 22 
109 3 3 1 9 0.654 22 
138 3 3 1 9 0.654 22 
156 3 3 1 9 0.654 22 
140 1 3 3 9 0.730 23 
142 4 2 1 8 0.647 24 
143 4 2 1 8 0.647 24 
144 4 2 1 8 0.647 24 
149 2 4 1 8 0.707 25 
150 2 4 1 8 0.707 25 
93 1 2 4 8 0.738 26 
100 1 2 4 8 0.738 26 
105 1 2 4 8 0.738 26 
108 1 2 4 8 0.738 26 
113 1 2 4 8 0.738 26 
114 1 2 4 8 0.738 26 
124 1 2 4 8 0.738 26 
125 1 2 4 8 0.738 26 
121 1 4 2 8 0.758 27 
123 1 4 2 8 0.758 27 
18 3 1 2 6 0.668 28 
35 3 2 1 6 0.693 29 
36 3 2 1 6 0.693 29 
92 3 2 1 6 0.693 29 
99 3 2 1 6 0.693 29 
103 3 2 1 6 0.693 29 
106 3 2 1 6 0.693 29 
115 3 2 1 6 0.693 29 
126 3 2 1 6 0.693 29 
127 3 2 1 6 0.693 29 
130 3 2 1 6 0.693 29 
131 3 2 1 6 0.693 29 
141 3 2 1 6 0.693 29 
163 3 2 1 6 0.693 29 
164 3 2 1 6 0.693 29 
97 2 3 1 6 0.730 30 
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Table 49 (Continued). Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Tank Unit in Thermal Storage 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
98 2 3 1 6 0.730 30 
119 1 2 3 6 0.769 31 
9 1 3 2 6 0.781 32 
10 1 3 2 6 0.781 32 
49 1 3 2 6 0.781 32 
51 1 3 2 6 0.781 32 
95 1 3 2 6 0.781 32 
96 1 3 2 6 0.781 32 
85 1 1 5 5 0.795 33 
135 1 1 5 5 0.795 33 
2 4 1 1 4 0.724 34 
4 4 1 1 4 0.724 34 
80 1 1 4 4 0.815 35 
84 1 1 4 4 0.815 35 
11 1 2 2 4 0.820 36 
12 1 2 2 4 0.820 36 
19 3 1 1 3 0.770 37 
37 3 1 1 3 0.770 37 
79 3 1 1 3 0.770 37 
83 3 1 1 3 0.770 37 
88 3 1 1 3 0.770 37 
89 3 1 1 3 0.770 37 
94 3 1 1 3 0.770 37 
132 3 1 1 3 0.770 37 
133 3 1 1 3 0.770 37 
23 1 3 1 3 0.884 38 
38 1 3 1 3 0.884 38 
39 1 3 1 3 0.884 38 
53 1 3 1 3 0.884 38 
72 1 3 1 3 0.884 38 
73 1 3 1 3 0.884 38 
87 1 3 1 3 0.884 38 
110 1 3 1 3 0.884 38 
128 1 3 1 3 0.884 38 
129 1 3 1 3 0.884 38 
145 1 3 1 3 0.884 38 
146 1 3 1 3 0.884 38 
153 1 3 1 3 0.884 38 
154 1 3 1 3 0.884 38 
69 2 1 1 2 0.847 39 
71 2 1 1 2 0.847 39 
7 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
8 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
27 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
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Table 49 (Continued). Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Tank Unit in Thermal Storage 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
31 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
32 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
33 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
34 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
40 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
41 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
42 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
43 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
64 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
65 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
66 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
67 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
74 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
75 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
101 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
102 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
104 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
107 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
117 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
136 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
137 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
147 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
148 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
151 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
152 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
159 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
160 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
161 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
162 1 2 1 2 0.922 40 
68 1 1 1 1 1.000 41 
70 1 1 1 1 1.000 41 
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Table 49 Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Tank in Thermal Storage Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
202 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
203 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
237 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
238 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
250 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
251 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
246 4 3 4 48 0.427 2 
247 4 3 4 48 0.427 2 
272 4 4 3 48 0.437 3 
210 2 4 5 40 0.473 4 
191 3 3 4 36 0.463 5 
235 4 2 4 32 0.471 6 
236 4 2 4 32 0.471 6 
248 4 2 4 32 0.471 6 
249 4 2 4 32 0.471 6 
166 3 3 3 27 0.500 7 
168 3 2 4 24 0.508 8 
181 3 2 4 24 0.508 8 
183 2 3 4 24 0.524 9 
300 2 3 4 24 0.524 9 
175 3 3 2 18 0.561 10 
176 3 3 2 18 0.561 10 
186 2 2 4 16 0.569 11 
262 2 2 4 16 0.569 11 
208 2 4 2 16 0.595 12 
209 2 4 2 16 0.595 12 
273 4 4 1 16 0.620 13 
284 4 4 1 16 0.620 13 
221 3 1 5 15 0.573 14 
184 1 3 4 12 0.647 15 
233 4 3 1 12 0.647 15 
234 4 3 1 12 0.647 15 
281 4 3 1 12 0.647 15 
276 3 4 1 12 0.657 16 
277 3 4 1 12 0.657 16 
285 3 4 1 12 0.657 16 
286 3 4 1 12 0.657 16 
232 2 1 5 10 0.634 17 
245 2 1 5 10 0.634 17 
267 2 1 5 10 0.634 17 
296 2 1 5 10 0.634 18 
303 2 1 5 10 0.634 18 
185 5 2 1 10 0.667 19 
173 1 3 3 9 0.683 20 
174 1 3 3 9 0.683 20 
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Table 50 (Continued). Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Tank in Thermal Storage 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
278 1 3 3 9 0.683 20 
279 1 3 3 9 0.683 20 
165 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
178 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
182 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
190 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
192 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
193 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
196 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
197 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
200 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
201 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
213 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
222 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
223 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
228 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
229 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
241 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
242 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
274 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
275 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
299 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
307 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
308 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
309 3 3 1 9 0.683 21 
187 1 2 4 8 0.691 22 
206 1 2 4 8 0.691 22 
207 1 2 4 8 0.691 22 
302 2 1 3 6 0.695 23 
169 1 2 3 6 0.728 24 
170 1 2 3 6 0.728 24 
171 1 2 3 6 0.728 24 
172 1 2 3 6 0.728 24 
268 1 2 3 6 0.728 24 
269 1 2 3 6 0.728 24 
167 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
179 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
180 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
188 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
189 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
211 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
212 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
216 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
224 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
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Table 50 (Continued). Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Tank in Thermal Storage 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
225 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
255 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
256 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
257 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
258 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
259 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
260 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
261 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
304 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
305 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
306 3 2 1 6 0.728 25 
291 2 3 1 6 0.744 26 
292 2 3 1 6 0.744 26 
293 2 3 1 6 0.744 26 
282 4 1 1 4 0.780 27 
177 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
219 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
220 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
230 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
231 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
243 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
244 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
252 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
253 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
254 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
265 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
266 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
283 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
301 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
310 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
311 3 1 1 3 0.817 28 
194 1 3 1 3 0.866 29 
195 1 3 1 3 0.866 29 
204 1 3 1 3 0.866 29 
205 1 3 1 3 0.866 29 
214 1 3 1 3 0.866 29 
215 1 3 1 3 0.866 29 
280 1 3 1 3 0.866 29 
287 1 3 1 3 0.866 29 
288 1 3 1 3 0.866 29 
294 2 1 1 2 0.878 30 
295 2 1 1 2 0.878 30 
198 1 2 1 2 0.911 31 
199 1 2 1 2 0.911 31 
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Table 50 (Continued). Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Tank in Thermal Storage 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
217 1 2 1 2 0.911 31 
218 1 2 1 2 0.911 31 
226 1 2 1 2 0.911 31 
227 1 2 1 2 0.911 31 
239 1 2 1 2 0.911 31 
240 1 2 1 2 0.911 31 
263 1 2 1 2 0.911 31 
264 1 2 1 2 0.911 31 
289 1 2 1 2 0.911 31 
290 1 2 1 2 0.911 31 
297 1 2 1 2 0.911 31 
298 1 2 1 2 0.911 31 
270 1 1 1 1 1.000 32 
271 1 1 1 1 1.000 32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 50 Prioritization of failure modes for Ullage Maintenance Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
312 3 3 1 9 0.613 1 
313 3 3 1 9 0.613 1 
314 3 3 1 9 0.613 1 
315 3 2 1 6 0.782 3 
316 1 2 1 2 1.000 5 
317 1 3 1 3 0.831 4 
318 1 3 1 3 0.831 4 
319 3 2 2 12 0.615 2 
320 3 2 2 12 0.615 2 
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Table 51 Prioritization of failure modes for Receiver Feed Pump in Electrical Power and Generator 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
87 5 2 4 40 0.436 1 
93 4 3 3 36 0.456 2 
94 4 3 3 36 0.456 2 
19 5 3 2 30 0.478 3 
20 5 3 2 30 0.478 3 
107 5 3 2 30 0.478 3 
108 5 3 2 30 0.478 3 
92 2 3 5 30 0.522 4 
103 3 3 3 27 0.500 5 
44 3 4 2 24 0.527 6 
81 2 3 4 24 0.542 7 
82 2 3 4 24 0.542 7 
83 2 3 4 24 0.542 7 
84 2 3 4 24 0.542 7 
2 5 2 2 20 0.519 8 
22 5 2 2 20 0.519 8 
28 5 2 2 20 0.519 8 
109 5 2 2 20 0.519 8 
110 5 2 2 20 0.519 8 
11 5 4 1 20 0.557 9 
12 5 4 1 20 0.557 9 
59 3 2 3 18 0.541 10 
60 3 2 3 18 0.541 10 
95 3 2 3 18 0.541 10 
1 3 3 2 18 0.552 11 
97 3 3 2 18 0.552 11 
98 3 3 2 18 0.552 11 
102 3 3 2 18 0.552 11 
118 3 3 2 18 0.552 11 
119 3 3 2 18 0.552 11 
64 2 3 3 18 0.574 12 
65 2 3 3 18 0.574 12 
13 4 2 2 16 0.549 13 
14 4 2 2 16 0.549 13 
85 2 2 4 16 0.584 14 
10 2 4 2 16 0.601 15 
5 5 3 1 15 0.582 16 
7 5 3 1 15 0.582 16 
51 4 1 3 12 0.579 17 
52 4 1 3 12 0.579 17 
42 3 2 2 12 0.593 18 
43 3 2 2 12 0.593 18 
99 3 2 2 12 0.593 18 
100 3 2 2 12 0.593 18 
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Table 52(Continued) Prioritization of failure modes for Receiver Feed Pump in Electrical Power and 
Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
104 3 2 2 12 0.593 18 
105 3 2 2 12 0.593 18 
66 2 2 3 12 0.615 19 
67 2 2 3 12 0.615 19 
6 2 3 2 12 0.625 20 
37 2 3 2 12 0.625 20 
38 2 3 2 12 0.625 20 
39 2 3 2 12 0.625 20 
40 2 3 2 12 0.625 20 
41 2 3 2 12 0.625 20 
25 1 3 4 12 0.690 21 
26 1 3 4 12 0.690 21 
56 5 1 2 10 0.602 22 
68 5 1 2 10 0.602 22 
69 5 1 2 10 0.602 22 
111 5 1 2 10 0.602 22 
86 5 2 1 10 0.623 23 
90 5 2 1 10 0.623 23 
18 2 1 5 10 0.645 24 
53 2 1 5 10 0.645 24 
63 2 1 5 10 0.645 24 
70 2 1 5 10 0.645 24 
73 2 1 5 10 0.645 24 
76 2 1 5 10 0.645 24 
91 3 3 1 9 0.656 25 
9 1 3 3 9 0.721 26 
27 2 2 2 8 0.667 27 
58 2 2 2 8 0.667 27 
23 1 2 4 8 0.731 28 
24 1 2 4 8 0.731 28 
45 1 2 4 8 0.731 28 
46 1 2 4 8 0.731 28 
47 1 2 4 8 0.731 28 
48 1 2 4 8 0.731 28 
49 1 2 4 8 0.731 28 
50 1 2 4 8 0.731 28 
116 1 2 4 8 0.731 28 
117 1 2 4 8 0.731 28 
15 3 1 2 6 0.675 29 
71 3 1 2 6 0.675 29 
72 3 1 2 6 0.675 29 
74 3 1 2 6 0.675 29 
75 3 1 2 6 0.675 29 
96 3 1 2 6 0.675 29 
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Table 52(Continued) Prioritization of failure modes for Receiver Feed Pump in Electrical Power and 
Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
101 3 1 2 6 0.675 29 
106 3 1 2 6 0.675 29 
29 3 2 1 6 0.6969 30 
30 3 2 1 6 0.6969 30 
61 2 1 3 6 0.6971 31 
62 2 1 3 6 0.6971 31 
4 1 2 3 6 0.762 32 
112 1 2 3 6 0.762 32 
113 1 2 3 6 0.762 32 
114 1 2 3 6 0.762 32 
115 1 2 3 6 0.762 32 
77 1 3 2 6 0.773 33 
78 1 3 2 6 0.773 33 
16 5 1 1 5 0.706 34 
17 5 1 1 5 0.706 34 
54 5 1 1 5 0.706 34 
88 5 1 1 5 0.706 34 
89 5 1 1 5 0.706 34 
55 2 1 2 4 0.749 35 
57 2 2 1 4 0.770 36 
21 1 2 2 4 0.814 37 
79 1 2 2 4 0.814 37 
80 1 2 2 4 0.814 37 
8 1 3 1 3 0.876 38 
31 1 3 1 3 0.876 38 
32 1 3 1 3 0.876 38 
33 1 3 1 3 0.876 38 
34 1 3 1 3 0.876 38 
3 1 2 1 2 0.918 39 
35 1 2 1 2 0.918 39 
36 1 2 1 2 0.918 39 
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Table 52 Prioritization of failure modes for Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed Pump in Electrical Power and 
Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
161 2 3 4 24 0.512 1 
140 3 2 4 24 0.519 2 
154 5 4 1 20 0.604 3 
155 5 4 1 20 0.604 3 
156 5 4 1 20 0.604 3 
157 5 4 1 20 0.604 3 
170 3 3 2 18 0.562 4 
159 2 2 4 16 0.567 5 
133 2 4 2 16 0.577 6 
143 1 3 4 12 0.609 7 
131 2 3 2 12 0.611 8 
132 2 3 2 12 0.611 8 
160 2 3 2 12 0.611 8 
171 2 3 2 12 0.611 8 
145 3 2 2 12 0.618 9 
146 3 2 2 12 0.618 9 
136 2 1 5 10 0.654 10 
182 2 1 5 10 0.654 10 
144 1 3 3 9 0.647 11 
183 3 3 1 9 0.686 12 
130 1 2 4 8 0.665 13 
141 1 2 4 8 0.665 13 
125 2 2 2 8 0.667 14 
126 2 2 2 8 0.667 14 
158 2 2 2 8 0.667 14 
165 2 2 2 8 0.667 14 
162 2 1 4 8 0.679 15 
142 1 2 3 6 0.702 16 
137 2 3 1 6 0.735 17 
138 2 3 1 6 0.735 17 
164 2 3 1 6 0.735 17 
175 2 3 1 6 0.735 17 
176 2 3 1 6 0.735 17 
177 2 3 1 6 0.735 17 
178 2 3 1 6 0.735 17 
179 2 3 1 6 0.735 17 
184 2 3 1 6 0.735 17 
174 1 1 5 5 0.752 18 
129 1 2 2 4 0.764 19 
124 2 1 2 4 0.778 20 
163 2 1 2 4 0.778 20 
120 2 2 1 4 0.791 21 
121 2 2 1 4 0.791 21 
152 1 3 1 3 0.832 22 
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Table 53(Continued) Prioritization of failure modes for Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed Pump in Electrical 
Power and Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
153 1 3 1 3 0.832 22 
168 1 3 1 3 0.832 22 
169 1 3 1 3 0.832 22 
147 3 1 1 3 0.853 23 
148 3 1 1 3 0.853 23 
122 1 2 1 2 0.888 24 
123 1 2 1 2 0.888 24 
127 1 2 1 2 0.888 24 
128 1 2 1 2 0.888 24 
139 1 2 1 2 0.888 24 
150 1 2 1 2 0.888 24 
151 1 2 1 2 0.888 24 
166 1 2 1 2 0.888 24 
167 1 2 1 2 0.888 24 
134 2 1 1 2 0.902 25 
135 2 1 1 2 0.902 25 
149 2 1 1 2 0.902 25 
172 2 1 1 2 0.902 25 
173 2 1 1 2 0.902 25 
180 2 1 1 2 0.902 25 
181 2 1 1 2 0.902 25 
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Table 53 Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical Power and 
Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
410 5 3 4 60 0.398 1 
200 4 3 4 48 0.423 2 
297 4 3 4 48 0.423 2 
298 4 3 4 48 0.423 2 
441 4 3 4 48 0.423 2 
449 4 3 4 48 0.423 2 
521 4 3 4 48 0.423 2 
527 4 3 4 48 0.423 2 
510 3 4 4 48 0.438 3 
306 3 3 5 45 0.435 4 
212 5 2 4 40 0.437 5 
299 5 2 4 40 0.437 5 
301 5 2 4 40 0.437 5 
400 5 2 4 40 0.437 5 
412 5 2 4 40 0.437 5 
487 5 2 4 40 0.437 5 
492 5 2 4 40 0.437 5 
331 5 4 2 40 0.479 6 
217 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
222 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
226 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
296 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
313 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
337 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
352 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
354 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
494 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
498 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
505 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
202 4 2 4 32 0.462 8 
443 4 2 4 32 0.462 8 
524 4 2 4 32 0.462 8 
529 4 2 4 32 0.462 8 
548 4 2 4 32 0.462 8 
502 2 4 4 32 0.501 9 
403 4 4 2 32 0.504 10 
404 4 4 2 32 0.504 10 
365 3 2 5 30 0.474 11 
551 3 2 5 30 0.474 11 
325 5 2 3 30 0.476 12 
327 5 3 2 30 0.502 13 
407 5 1 5 25 0.489 14 
490 5 1 5 25 0.489 14 
219 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
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Table 54 (Continued) Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical 
Power and Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
224 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
228 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
315 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
339 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
377 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
389 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
401 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
402 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
451 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
496 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
500 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
504 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
508 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
516 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
204 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
292 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
294 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
295 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
351 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
353 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
419 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
514 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
552 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
553 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
554 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
555 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
199 4 3 2 24 0.527 17 
267 4 3 2 24 0.527 17 
520 4 3 2 24 0.527 17 
522 4 3 2 24 0.527 17 
526 4 3 2 24 0.527 17 
406 5 1 4 20 0.515 18 
413 5 1 4 20 0.515 18 
489 5 1 4 20 0.515 18 
211 5 2 2 20 0.541 19 
329 5 2 2 20 0.541 19 
330 5 2 2 20 0.541 19 
491 5 2 2 20 0.541 19 
206 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
207 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
216 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
221 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
225 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
231 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
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Table 54 (Continued) Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical 
Power and Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
237 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
238 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
266 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
281 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
282 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
307 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
308 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
312 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
314 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
316 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
317 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
318 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
326 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
336 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
493 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
497 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
506 3 3 2 18 0.565 20 
197 4 1 4 16 0.540 21 
278 4 1 4 16 0.540 21 
444 4 1 4 16 0.540 21 
446 4 1 4 16 0.540 21 
525 4 1 4 16 0.540 21 
530 4 1 4 16 0.540 21 
248 2 2 4 16 0.563 22 
416 2 2 4 16 0.563 22 
439 2 2 4 16 0.563 22 
556 2 2 4 16 0.563 22 
276 4 2 2 16 0.566 23 
344 4 2 2 16 0.566 23 
345 4 2 2 16 0.566 23 
350 4 2 2 16 0.566 23 
523 4 2 2 16 0.566 23 
528 4 2 2 16 0.566 23 
205 2 4 2 16 0.605 24 
250 1 4 4 16 0.626 25 
375 3 1 5 15 0.552 26 
408 5 3 1 15 0.632 27 
409 5 3 1 15 0.632 27 
220 3 1 4 12 0.578 28 
261 3 1 4 12 0.578 28 
368 3 1 4 12 0.578 28 
374 3 1 4 12 0.578 28 
452 3 1 4 12 0.578 28 
454 3 1 4 12 0.578 28 
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Table 54 (Continued) Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical 
Power and Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
509 3 1 4 12 0.578 28 
518 3 1 4 12 0.578 28 
218 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
223 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
227 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
257 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
258 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
283 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
284 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
319 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
320 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
338 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
370 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
495 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
499 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
503 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
507 3 2 2 12 0.604 29 
203 2 3 2 12 0.628 30 
232 2 3 2 12 0.628 30 
255 2 3 2 12 0.628 30 
256 2 3 2 12 0.628 30 
291 2 3 2 12 0.628 30 
432 2 3 2 12 0.628 30 
293 1 3 4 12 0.650 31 
440 4 3 1 12 0.657 32 
448 4 3 1 12 0.657 32 
475 4 3 1 12 0.657 32 
476 4 3 1 12 0.657 32 
482 4 3 1 12 0.657 32 
483 4 3 1 12 0.657 32 
560 4 3 1 12 0.657 32 
473 3 4 1 12 0.672 33 
198 2 1 5 10 0.614 34 
210 2 1 5 10 0.614 34 
262 2 1 5 10 0.614 34 
279 2 1 5 10 0.614 34 
323 2 1 5 10 0.614 34 
447 2 1 5 10 0.614 34 
481 2 1 5 10 0.614 34 
519 2 1 5 10 0.614 34 
328 5 1 2 10 0.619 35 
488 5 1 2 10 0.619 35 
300 5 2 1 10 0.671 36 
411 5 2 1 10 0.671 36 
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Table 54 (Continued) Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical 
Power and Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
486 5 2 1 10 0.671 36 
269 1 3 3 9 0.689 37 
383 1 3 3 9 0.689 37 
305 3 3 1 9 0.695 38 
229 2 1 4 8 0.640 39 
245 2 1 4 8 0.640 39 
340 2 1 4 8 0.640 39 
414 2 1 4 8 0.640 39 
435 2 1 4 8 0.640 39 
501 2 1 4 8 0.640 39 
196 4 1 2 8 0.644 40 
264 4 1 2 8 0.644 40 
277 4 1 2 8 0.644 40 
239 2 2 2 8 0.667 41 
240 2 2 2 8 0.667 41 
247 2 2 2 8 0.667 41 
366 2 2 2 8 0.667 41 
369 2 2 2 8 0.667 41 
376 2 2 2 8 0.667 41 
236 1 2 4 8 0.688 42 
254 1 2 4 8 0.688 42 
303 1 2 4 8 0.688 42 
304 1 2 4 8 0.688 42 
355 1 2 4 8 0.688 42 
190 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
191 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
346 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
347 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
360 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
361 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
442 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
477 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
478 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
484 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
485 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
543 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
544 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
545 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
546 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
547 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
549 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
550 4 2 1 8 0.696 43 
265 1 4 2 8 0.730 44 
208 3 1 2 6 0.682 45 
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Table 54 (Continued) Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical 
Power and Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
209 3 1 2 6 0.682 45 
259 3 1 2 6 0.682 45 
260 3 1 2 6 0.682 45 
274 3 1 2 6 0.682 45 
285 3 1 2 6 0.682 45 
290 3 1 2 6 0.682 45 
309 3 1 2 6 0.682 45 
310 3 1 2 6 0.682 45 
321 3 1 2 6 0.682 45 
322 3 1 2 6 0.682 45 
195 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
270 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
271 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
287 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
289 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
333 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
335 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
343 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
372 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
379 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
381 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
385 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
387 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
397 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
399 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
558 1 2 3 6 0.727 46 
185 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
186 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
275 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
324 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
363 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
364 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
390 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
395 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
450 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
460 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
465 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
466 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
471 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
472 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
515 3 2 1 6 0.734 47 
213 1 3 2 6 0.754 48 
280 1 3 2 6 0.754 48 
341 1 3 2 6 0.754 48 
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Table 54 (Continued) Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical 
Power and Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
382 1 3 2 6 0.754 48 
559 1 3 2 6 0.754 48 
417 2 3 1 6 0.758 49 
418 2 3 1 6 0.758 49 
426 2 3 1 6 0.758 49 
431 2 3 1 6 0.758 49 
433 2 3 1 6 0.758 49 
436 2 3 1 6 0.758 49 
437 2 3 1 6 0.758 49 
513 2 3 1 6 0.758 49 
534 2 3 1 6 0.758 49 
535 2 3 1 6 0.758 49 
243 1 1 5 5 0.740 50 
246 1 1 5 5 0.740 50 
455 1 1 5 5 0.740 50 
539 1 1 5 5 0.740 50 
302 5 1 1 5 0.749 51 
405 5 1 1 5 0.749 51 
241 2 1 2 4 0.744 52 
242 2 1 2 4 0.744 52 
244 2 1 2 4 0.744 52 
311 2 1 2 4 0.744 52 
367 2 1 2 4 0.744 52 
373 2 1 2 4 0.744 52 
252 1 1 4 4 0.766 53 
189 4 1 1 4 0.774 54 
349 4 1 1 4 0.774 54 
362 4 1 1 4 0.774 54 
445 4 1 1 4 0.774 54 
467 4 1 1 4 0.774 54 
468 4 1 1 4 0.774 54 
479 4 1 1 4 0.774 54 
480 4 1 1 4 0.774 54 
201 1 2 2 4 0.792 55 
273 1 2 2 4 0.792 55 
378 1 2 2 4 0.792 55 
380 1 2 2 4 0.792 55 
384 1 2 2 4 0.792 55 
386 1 2 2 4 0.792 55 
396 1 2 2 4 0.792 55 
398 1 2 2 4 0.792 55 
459 1 2 2 4 0.792 55 
542 1 2 2 4 0.792 55 
557 1 2 2 4 0.792 55 
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Table 54 (Continued) Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical 
Power and Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
230 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
388 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
394 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
415 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
424 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
425 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
427 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
428 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
429 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
430 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
438 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
456 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
457 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
531 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
532 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
533 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
536 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
540 2 2 1 4 0.797 56 
249 1 4 1 4 0.860 57 
422 1 4 1 4 0.860 57 
423 1 4 1 4 0.860 57 
393 3 1 1 3 0.811 58 
453 3 1 1 3 0.811 58 
469 3 1 1 3 0.811 58 
470 3 1 1 3 0.811 58 
474 3 1 1 3 0.811 58 
517 3 1 1 3 0.811 58 
233 1 3 1 3 0.883 59 
234 1 3 1 3 0.883 59 
268 1 3 1 3 0.883 59 
356 1 3 1 3 0.883 59 
357 1 3 1 3 0.883 59 
263 1 1 2 2 0.870 60 
391 2 1 1 2 0.874 61 
392 2 1 1 2 0.874 61 
420 2 1 1 2 0.874 61 
421 2 1 1 2 0.874 61 
434 2 1 1 2 0.874 61 
537 2 1 1 2 0.874 61 
187 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
188 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
192 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
193 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
194 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
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Table 54 (Continued) Prioritization of failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical 
Power and Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
214 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
215 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
235 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
253 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
272 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
286 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
288 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
332 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
334 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
342 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
358 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
359 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
371 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
458 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
461 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
462 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
463 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
464 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
511 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
512 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
541 1 2 1 2 0.922 62 
251 1 1 1 1 1.000 63 
348 1 1 1 1 1.000 63 
538 1 1 1 1 1.000 63 
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Table 54 Prioritization of failure modes for Turbine Generator in Electrical Power and Generator 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
562 4 3 4 48 0.431 1 
568 4 3 4 48 0.431 1 
576 4 3 2 24 0.515 2 
570 5 1 4 20 0.564 3 
577 3 3 2 18 0.552 4 
628 3 3 2 18 0.552 4 
629 3 3 2 18 0.552 4 
611 5 3 1 15 0.595 5 
615 3 1 5 15 0.605 6 
620 3 1 5 15 0.605 6 
625 3 1 5 15 0.605 6 
616 3 2 2 12 0.605 7 
617 3 2 2 12 0.605 7 
621 3 2 2 12 0.605 7 
622 3 2 2 12 0.605 7 
626 3 2 2 12 0.605 7 
627 3 2 2 12 0.605 7 
630 3 2 2 12 0.605 7 
631 3 2 2 12 0.605 7 
565 2 3 2 12 0.614 8 
566 2 3 2 12 0.614 8 
567 2 3 2 12 0.614 8 
612 2 3 2 12 0.614 8 
561 4 3 1 12 0.619 9 
579 4 3 1 12 0.619 9 
589 4 3 1 12 0.619 9 
609 4 3 1 12 0.619 9 
610 4 3 1 12 0.619 9 
594 2 1 5 10 0.667 10 
607 2 1 5 10 0.667 10 
573 3 3 1 9 0.657 11 
574 3 3 1 9 0.657 11 
580 3 3 1 9 0.657 11 
597 3 3 1 9 0.657 11 
599 4 2 1 8 0.672 12 
600 4 2 1 8 0.672 12 
583 1 4 2 8 0.707 13 
584 1 4 2 8 0.707 13 
575 3 2 1 6 0.709 14 
613 3 1 2 6 0.709 15 
614 3 1 2 6 0.709 15 
618 3 1 2 6 0.709 15 
619 3 1 2 6 0.709 15 
623 3 1 2 6 0.709 15 
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Table 55 (Continued) Prioritization of failure modes for Turbine Generator in Electrical Power and 
Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
624 3 1 2 6 0.709 15 
590 2 3 1 6 0.719 16 
591 2 3 1 6 0.719 16 
598 2 3 1 6 0.719 16 
585 1 3 2 6 0.738 17 
586 1 3 2 6 0.738 17 
601 1 3 2 6 0.738 17 
602 1 3 2 6 0.738 17 
564 1 2 3 6 0.738 18 
572 1 2 3 6 0.738 18 
587 2 2 1 4 0.771 19 
588 2 2 1 4 0.771 19 
569 2 1 2 4 0.772 20 
578 4 1 1 4 0.777 21 
605 4 1 1 4 0.777 21 
606 4 1 1 4 0.777 21 
608 4 1 1 4 0.777 21 
581 1 2 2 4 0.791 22 
582 1 2 2 4 0.791 22 
595 1 2 2 4 0.791 22 
596 1 2 2 4 0.791 22 
603 1 2 2 4 0.791 22 
604 1 2 2 4 0.791 22 
592 2 1 1 2 0.876 23 
593 2 1 1 2 0.876 23 
563 1 2 1 2 0.895 24 
571 1 2 1 2 0.895 24 
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Table 55 Prioritization of failure modes for Master Control Unit 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
5 3 3 1 9 0.638 1 
23 2 1 4 8 0.626 2 
24 2 1 4 8 0.626 2 
25 2 1 4 8 0.626 2 
26 3 2 1 6 0.691 3 
4 2 2 1 4 0.747 4 
11 2 2 1 4 0.747 4 
12 2 2 1 4 0.747 4 
8 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
9 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
10 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
13 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
14 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
15 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
16 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
17 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
18 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
29 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
7 4 1 1 4 0.784 6 
1 2 1 1 2 0.870 7 
2 2 1 1 2 0.870 7 
6 2 1 1 2 0.870 7 
19 2 1 1 2 0.870 7 
20 2 1 1 2 0.870 7 
3 1 1 1 1 1.000 8 
27 1 1 1 1 1.000 8 
28 1 1 1 1 1.000 8 
30 1 1 1 1 1.000 8 
31 1 1 1 1 1.000 8 
32 1 1 1 1 1.000 8 
33 1 1 1 1 1.000 8 
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Appendix D: Classification of the most critical and critical failure modes 
Table 56. Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Raw Service Water System in Support 
Structure Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
37 2 4 4 32 0.450 1 
39 2 2 4 16 0.521 2 
30 3 1 5 15 0.542 3 
4 2 1 5 10 0.573 4 
9 1 2 4 8 0.583 5 
32 1 2 4 8 0.583 5 
34 2 1 4 8 0.609 6 
40 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
41 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
42 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
43 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
44 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
45 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
46 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
47 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
50 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
51 2 2 2 8 0.667 7 
Critical failure modes 
36 2 4 1 8 0.778 8 
10 1 2 3 6 0.637 9 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 57 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Demineralized water System in Support 
Structure Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
71 2 4 4 32 0.489 1 
67 2 2 4 16 0.578 2 
69 2 2 4 16 0.578 2 
74 2 2 4 16 0.578 2 
75 2 2 4 16 0.578 2 
65 3 1 5 15 0.612 3 
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Table 58 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Compressed-Air System in Support 
Structure Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
106 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
82 2 4 4 32 0.488 2 
105 3 2 4 24 0.488 3 
118 2 3 4 24 0.508 4 
125 2 3 4 24 0.508 4 
131 2 3 4 24 0.508 4 
139 2 3 4 24 0.508 4 
123 2 4 3 24 0.534 5 
Critical failure modes 
102 4 3 2 24 0.545 6 
135 5 2 2 20 0.557 7 
136 5 2 2 20 0.557 7 
141 5 2 2 20 0.557 7 
142 5 2 2 20 0.557 7 
107 4 1 4 16 0.523 8 
80 2 2 4 16 0.542 9 
81 2 2 4 16 0.542 9 
86 2 2 4 16 0.542 9 
104 2 2 4 16 0.542 9 
133 2 2 4 16 0.542 9 
134 2 2 4 16 0.542 9 
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Table 59 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Cooling Distribution System in Support 
Structure Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
204 4 3 4 48 0.412 1 
195 4 2 4 32 0.432 2 
201 5 2 3 30 0.437 3 
180 5 3 2 30 0.479 4 
167 4 2 3 24 0.470 5 
212 4 2 3 24 0.470 5 
181 4 3 2 24 0.513 6 
179 3 1 5 15 0.498 7 
Critical failure modes 
161 4 3 1 12 0.638 8 
207 4 3 1 12 0.638 8 
208 4 3 1 12 0.638 8 
156 2 3 2 12 0.646 9 
157 2 3 2 12 0.646 9 
164 2 3 2 12 0.646 9 
165 2 3 2 12 0.646 9 
184 5 2 1 10 0.625 10 
185 5 2 1 10 0.625 10 
192 5 2 1 10 0.625 10 
194 5 2 1 10 0.625 10 
200 5 2 1 10 0.625 10 
205 5 2 1 10 0.625 10 
206 5 2 1 10 0.625 10 
211 5 2 1 10 0.625 10 
 
Table 60 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Power Distribution System in Support 
Structure Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
219 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
224 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
228 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
230 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
234 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
238 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
242 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
244 5 1 5 25 0.372 1 
236 4 1 5 20 0.413 2 
248 4 1 5 20 0.413 2 
250 4 1 5 20 0.413 2 
252 4 1 5 20 0.413 2 
254 4 1 5 20 0.413 2 
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Table 61 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Water Riser in Receiver Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
21 5 3 2 30 0.449 1 
23 5 3 2 30 0.449 1 
28 5 3 2 30 0.449 1 
29 5 3 2 30 0.449 1 
8 4 4 2 32 0.468 2 
9 4 4 2 32 0.468 2 
 
Table 62 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Absorber in Receiver Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
44 5 3 3 45 0.419 1 
34 3 4 4 48 0.468 2 
35 3 4 4 48 0.468 2 
Critical failure modes 
38 5 3 2 30 0.472 3 
45 5 3 2 30 0.472 3 
47 5 3 2 30 0.472 3 
51 5 3 2 30 0.472 3 
40 4 4 2 32 0.495 4 
41 4 4 2 32 0.495 4 
39 3 4 3 36 0.500 5 
 
Table 63 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Panels in Receiver Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
54 5 4 1 20 0.402 1 
59 3 2 2 12 0.564 2 
 
 
Table 64 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Steam Downcomer in Receiver 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
71 5 3 2 30 0.487 1 
64 5 2 2 20 0.526 2 
72 3 3 2 18 0.577 3 
73 3 3 2 18 0.577 3 
74 3 3 2 18 0.577 3 
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Table 65 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Support Structures in Receiver 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
80 5 2 1 10 0.438 1 
81 5 2 1 10 0.438 1 
84 5 2 1 10 0.438 1 
85 5 2 1 10 0.438 1 
86 5 2 1 10 0.438 1 
Critical failure modes 
87 3 4 1 12 0.502 2 
88 3 4 1 12 0.502 2 
 
 
Table 66 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Control Components in Receiver 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
107 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
108 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
113 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
114 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
128 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
129 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
130 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
131 3 3 2 18 0.548 1 
105 3 2 2 12 0.602 2 
106 3 2 2 12 0.602 2 
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Table 67 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Tank Unit in Thermal 
Storage Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
44 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
45 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
57 5 2 4 40 0.431 2 
112 4 2 4 32 0.462 3 
158 4 2 4 32 0.462 3 
55 5 3 2 30 0.475 4 
139 3 3 3 27 0.500 6 
116 4 2 3 24 0.493 5 
14 4 3 2 24 0.505 7 
15 4 3 2 24 0.505 7 
56 4 3 2 24 0.505 7 
62 4 3 2 24 0.505 7 
63 4 3 2 24 0.505 7 
111 3 2 4 24 0.508 8 
1 5 1 4 20 0.509 9 
3 5 1 4 20 0.509 9 
25 3 3 2 18 0.551 10 
26 3 3 2 18 0.551 10 
48 3 3 2 18 0.551 10 
50 3 3 2 18 0.551 10 
52 3 3 2 18 0.551 10 
5 4 2 2 16 0.544 11 
6 4 2 2 16 0.544 11 
58 4 2 2 16 0.544 11 
59 4 2 2 16 0.544 11 
157 4 2 2 16 0.544 11 
16 4 4 1 16 0.585 12 
17 4 4 1 16 0.585 12 
29 4 4 1 16 0.585 12 
30 4 4 1 16 0.585 12 
Critical failure modes 
120 2 4 2 16 0.605 13 
122 2 4 2 16 0.605 13 
82 1 4 4 16 0.676 14 
91 1 4 4 16 0.676 14 
155 5 3 1 15 0.577 15 
13 3 2 2 12 0.590 16 
21 3 2 2 12 0.590 16 
22 3 2 2 12 0.590 16 
46 3 2 2 12 0.590 16 
47 3 2 2 12 0.590 16 
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Table 68 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Unit in Thermal Storage 
Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
202 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
203 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
237 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
238 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
250 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
251 4 4 4 64 0.400 1 
246 4 3 4 48 0.427 2 
247 4 3 4 48 0.427 2 
272 4 4 3 48 0.437 3 
210 2 4 5 40 0.473 4 
191 3 3 4 36 0.463 5 
235 4 2 4 32 0.471 6 
236 4 2 4 32 0.471 6 
248 4 2 4 32 0.471 6 
249 4 2 4 32 0.471 6 
166 3 3 3 27 0.500 7 
168 3 2 4 24 0.508 8 
181 3 2 4 24 0.508 8 
183 2 3 4 24 0.524 9 
300 2 3 4 24 0.524 9 
175 3 3 2 18 0.561 10 
176 3 3 2 18 0.561 10 
186 2 2 4 16 0.569 11 
262 2 2 4 16 0.569 11 
208 2 4 2 16 0.595 12 
209 2 4 2 16 0.595 12 
273 4 4 1 16 0.620 13 
284 4 4 1 16 0.620 13 
221 3 1 5 15 0.573 14 
 
 
 
 
Table 69 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Ullage Maintenance Unit in Thermal 
Storage Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
319 3 2 2 12 0.615 1 
320 3 2 2 12 0.615 1 
312 3 3 1 9 0.613 2 
313 3 3 1 9 0.613 2 
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Table 70 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Receiver Feed Pump in Electrical Power 
and Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
87 5 2 4 40 0.436 1 
93 4 3 3 36 0.456 2 
94 4 3 3 36 0.456 2 
19 5 3 2 30 0.478 3 
20 5 3 2 30 0.478 3 
107 5 3 2 30 0.478 3 
108 5 3 2 30 0.478 3 
92 2 3 5 30 0.522 4 
103 3 3 3 27 0.500 5 
44 3 4 2 24 0.527 6 
81 2 3 4 24 0.542 7 
82 2 3 4 24 0.542 7 
83 2 3 4 24 0.542 7 
84 2 3 4 24 0.542 7 
2 5 2 2 20 0.519 8 
22 5 2 2 20 0.519 8 
28 5 2 2 20 0.519 8 
109 5 2 2 20 0.519 8 
110 5 2 2 20 0.519 8 
59 3 2 3 18 0.541 9 
60 3 2 3 18 0.541 9 
95 3 2 3 18 0.541 9 
Critical failure modes 
11 5 4 1 20 0.557 10 
12 5 4 1 20 0.557 10 
1 3 3 2 18 0.552 11 
97 3 3 2 18 0.552 11 
98 3 3 2 18 0.552 11 
102 3 3 2 18 0.552 11 
118 3 3 2 18 0.552 11 
119 3 3 2 18 0.552 11 
64 2 3 3 18 0.574 12 
65 2 3 3 18 0.574 12 
13 4 2 2 16 0.549 13 
14 4 2 2 16 0.549 13 
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Table 71 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed Pump in 
Electrical Power and Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
161 2 3 4 24 0.512 1 
140 3 2 4 24 0.519 2 
154 5 4 1 20 0.604 3 
155 5 4 1 20 0.604 3 
156 5 4 1 20 0.604 3 
157 5 4 1 20 0.604 3 
170 3 3 2 18 0.562 4 
159 2 2 4 16 0.567 5 
133 2 4 2 16 0.577 6 
143 1 3 4 12 0.609 7 
131 2 3 2 12 0.611 8 
132 2 3 2 12 0.611 8 
160 2 3 2 12 0.611 8 
171 2 3 2 12 0.611 8 
Critical failure modes 
145 3 2 2 12 0.618 9 
146 3 2 2 12 0.618 9 
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Table 72 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Receiver Feed Pump in Electrical Power 
and Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
410 5 3 4 60 0.398 1 
200 4 3 4 48 0.423 2 
297 4 3 4 48 0.423 2 
298 4 3 4 48 0.423 2 
441 4 3 4 48 0.423 2 
449 4 3 4 48 0.423 2 
521 4 3 4 48 0.423 2 
527 4 3 4 48 0.423 2 
510 3 4 4 48 0.438 3 
306 3 3 5 45 0.435 4 
212 5 2 4 40 0.437 5 
299 5 2 4 40 0.437 5 
301 5 2 4 40 0.437 5 
400 5 2 4 40 0.437 5 
412 5 2 4 40 0.437 5 
487 5 2 4 40 0.437 5 
492 5 2 4 40 0.437 5 
331 5 4 2 40 0.479 6 
217 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
222 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
226 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
296 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
313 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
337 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
352 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
354 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
494 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
498 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
505 3 3 4 36 0.461 7 
202 4 2 4 32 0.462 8 
443 4 2 4 32 0.462 8 
524 4 2 4 32 0.462 8 
529 4 2 4 32 0.462 8 
548 4 2 4 32 0.462 8 
502 2 4 4 32 0.501 9 
403 4 4 2 32 0.504 10 
404 4 4 2 32 0.504 10 
365 3 2 5 30 0.474 11 
551 3 2 5 30 0.474 11 
325 5 2 3 30 0.476 12 
327 5 3 2 30 0.502 13 
407 5 1 5 25 0.489 14 
490 5 1 5 25 0.489 14 
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Table 72 (Continued). Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Receiver Feed Pump in 
Electrical Power and Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
219 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
224 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
228 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
315 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
339 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
377 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
389 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
401 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
402 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
451 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
496 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
500 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
504 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
508 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
516 3 2 4 24 0.500 15 
204 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
292 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
294 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
295 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
351 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
353 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
419 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
514 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
552 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
553 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
554 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
555 2 3 4 24 0.524 16 
Critical failure modes 
199 4 3 2 24 0.527 17 
267 4 3 2 24 0.527 17 
520 4 3 2 24 0.527 17 
522 4 3 2 24 0.527 17 
526 4 3 2 24 0.527 17 
406 5 1 4 20 0.515 18 
413 5 1 4 20 0.515 18 
489 5 1 4 20 0.515 18 
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Table 73. Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Turbine Generator in Electrical Power 
and Generator Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
562 4 3 4 48 0.431 1 
568 4 3 4 48 0.431 1 
576 4 3 2 24 0.515 2 
570 5 1 4 20 0.564 3 
577 3 3 2 18 0.552 4 
628 3 3 2 18 0.552 4 
629 3 3 2 18 0.552 4 
611 5 3 1 15 0.595 5 
615 3 1 5 15 0.605 6 
616 3 2 2 12 0.605 6 
617 3 2 2 12 0.605 6 
621 3 2 2 12 0.605 6 
622 3 2 2 12 0.605 6 
626 3 2 2 12 0.605 6 
627 3 2 2 12 0.605 6 
630 3 2 2 12 0.605 6 
631 3 2 2 12 0.605 6 
Critical failure modes 
620 3 1 5 15 0.605 7 
625 3 1 5 15 0.605 7 
565 2 3 2 12 0.614 8 
566 2 3 2 12 0.614 8 
567 2 3 2 12 0.614 8 
612 2 3 2 12 0.614 8 
561 4 3 1 12 0.619 9 
579 4 3 1 12 0.619 9 
589 4 3 1 12 0.619 9 
609 4 3 1 12 0.619 9 
610 4 3 1 12 0.619 9 
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Table 74 Results of identifying the most critical failure modes for Master Control Subsystem 
ID S O D RPN Degree of Relation New Priority 
The most critical failure modes 
5 3 3 1 9 0.638 2 
23 2 1 4 8 0.626 1 
24 2 1 4 8 0.626 1 
25 2 1 4 8 0.626 1 
26 3 2 1 6 0.691 3 
4 2 2 1 4 0.747 4 
11 2 2 1 4 0.747 4 
12 2 2 1 4 0.747 4 
Critical failure modes 
8 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
9 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
10 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
13 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
14 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
15 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
16 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
17 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
18 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
29 1 1 4 4 0.755 5 
7 4 1 1 4 0.784 6 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendices                                                                                                                                                              297 
Appendix E: Comparing result of important value for identifying critical 
subcomponent 
Table 75 Summary of percentage of important value for identifying critical subcomponent 
Subsystem Subcomponent Important value 
Support Structure 
Raw service water system 9.68% 
Demineralized water system 5.56% 
Compressed-air system 16.51% 
Cooling Distribution system 21.11% 
Power Distribution system 47.17% 
Receiver 
Water Riser 26.94% 
Absorber 12.95% 
Panels 7.77% 
Steam Downcomer 8.81% 
Support Structure 25.91% 
Control Components 17.62% 
Thermal Storage 
Thermal-Storage Tank Unit 45.80% 
Thermal-Storage Unit 53.05% 
Ullage Maintenance Unit 1.15% 
Electrical power and Generator 
Receiver Feed Pump 16.58% 
Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed 
Pump 
3.35% 
Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump 73.35% 
Turbine Generator 6.71% 
Master Control - 100% 
________________________________________________________________________________________________298                                                                                                                                                                        
Appendices 
Table 76. Comparing result of percentage of important value for Support Structure Subsystem 
Raw service water system Demineralized water system Compressed air system 
Cooling Water 
Distribution System 
Power Distribution System 
ID Relation Priority % ID Relation Priority % ID Relation Priority % ID Relation Priority % ID Relation Priority % 
37 0.450 7 2.86% 71 0.489 12 2.06% 106 0.400 2 3.65% 204 0.412 3 3.49% 219 0.372 1 3.81% 
39 0.521 16 1.43% 67 0.578 20 0.79% 82 0.488 11 2.22% 195 0.432 5 3.17% 224 0.372 1 3.81% 
30 0.542 18 1.11% 69 0.578 20 0.79% 105 0.488 10 2.38% 201 0.437 6 3.02% 228 0.372 1 3.81% 
4 0.573 19 0.95% 74 0.578 20 0.79% 118 0.508 14 1.75% 180 0.479 9 2.54% 230 0.372 1 3.81% 
9 0.583 21 0.63% 75 0.578 20 0.79% 125 0.508 14 1.75% 167 0.470 8 2.70% 234 0.372 1 3.81% 
32 0.583 21 0.63% 65 0.612 23 0.32% 131 0.508 14 1.75% 212 0.470 8 2.70% 238 0.372 1 3.81% 
34 0.609 22 0.48%     139 0.508 14 1.75% 181 0.513 15 1.59% 242 0.372 1 3.81% 
40 0.667 24 0.16%     123 0.534 17 1.27% 179 0.498 13 1.90% 244 0.372 1 3.81% 
41 0.667 24 0.16%             236 0.413 4 3.33% 
42 0.667 24 0.16%             248 0.413 4 3.33% 
43 0.667 24 0.16%             250 0.413 4 3.33% 
44 0.667 24 0.16%             252 0.413 4 3.33% 
45 0.667 24 0.16%             254 0.413 4 3.33% 
46 0.667 24 0.16%                 
47 0.667 24 0.16%                 
50 0.667 24 0.16%                 
51 0.667 24 0.16%                 
9.68% 5.56% 16.51% 21.11% 47.14% 
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Table 77 Comparing result of percentage of important value for Receiver Subsystem 
Water Riser Absorber Panels Steam Downcomer Support Structure Control Components 
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8 0.468 5 4.15% 34 0.468 6 3.63% 54 0.402 1 6.22% 64 0.526 8 2.59% 80 0.438 3 5.18% 105 0.602 12 0.52% 
9 0.468 5 4.15% 35 0.468 6 3.63% 59 0.564 10 1.55% 71 0.487 7 3.11% 81 0.438 3 5.18% 106 0.602 12 0.52% 
21 0.449 4 4.66% 44 0.419 2 5.70%     72 0.577 11 1.04% 84 0.438 3 5.18% 107 0.548 9 2.07% 
23 0.449 4 4.66%         73 0.577 11 1.04% 85 0.438 3 5.18% 108 0.548 9 2.07% 
28 0.449 4 4.66%         74 0.577 11 1.04% 86 0.438 3 5.18% 113 0.548 9 2.07% 
29 0.449 4 4.66%                 114 0.548 9 2.07% 
                    128 0.548 9 2.07% 
                    129 0.548 9 2.07% 
                    130 0.548 9 2.07% 
                    131 0.548 9 2.07% 
26.94% 12.95% 7.77% 8.81% 25.91% 17.62% 
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Table 78 Comparing result of percentage of important value for Thermal-Storage Subsystem 
Thermal-Storage Tank Unit Thermal-Storage Unit Ullage Maintenance Unit 
ID Relation Priority % ID Relation Priority % ID Relation Priority % 
1 0.509 15 1.38% 166 0.500 11 1.84% 312 0.613 24 0.35% 
3 0.509 15 1.38% 168 0.508 13 1.61% 313 0.613 24 0.35% 
5 0.544 17 1.15% 175 0.561 19 0.92% 319 0.615 25 0.23% 
6 0.544 17 1.15% 176 0.561 19 0.92% 320 0.615 25 0.23% 
14 0.505 12 1.73% 181 0.508 13 1.61%     
15 0.505 12 1.73% 183 0.524 16 1.27%     
16 0.585 22 0.58% 186 0.569 20 0.81%     
17 0.585 22 0.58% 191 0.463 6 2.42%     
25 0.551 18 1.04% 202 0.400 1 2.99%     
26 0.551 18 1.04% 203 0.400 1 2.99%     
29 0.585 22 0.58% 208 0.595 23 0.46%     
30 0.585 22 0.58% 209 0.595 23 0.46%     
44 0.400 1 2.99% 210 0.473 8 2.19%     
45 0.400 1 2.99% 221 0.573 21 0.69%     
48 0.551 18 1.04% 235 0.471 7 2.30%     
50 0.551 18 1.04% 236 0.471 7 2.30%     
52 0.551 18 1.04% 237 0.400 1 2.99%     
55 0.475 9 2.07% 238 0.400 1 2.99%     
56 0.505 12 1.73% 246 0.427 2 2.88%     
57 0.431 3 2.76% 247 0.427 2 2.88%     
58 0.544 17 1.15% 248 0.471 7 2.30%     
59 0.544 17 1.15% 249 0.471 7 2.30%     
62 0.505 12 1.73% 250 0.400 1 2.99%     
63 0.505 12 1.73% 251 0.400 1 2.99%     
111 0.508 14 1.50% 262 0.569 20 0.81%     
112 0.462 5 2.53% 272 0.437 4 2.65%     
116 0.493 10 1.96% 273 0.620 26 0.12%     
139 0.500 11 1.84% 284 0.620 26 0.12%     
157 0.544 17 1.15% 300 0.524 16 1.27%     
158 0.462 5 2.53%         
45.80% 53.05% 1.15% 
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Table 79 Comparing result of percentage of important value for Electrical Power and Generator Subsystem 
Receiver Feed Pump 
Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed 
Pump 
Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump Turbine Generator 
ID Relation Priority % ID Relation Priority % ID Relation Priority % ID Relation Priority % ID Relation Priority % 
87 0.436 5 1.36% 161 0.512 21 0.75% 410 0.398 1 1.51% 403 0.504 20 0.79% 562 0.431 3 1.43% 
93 0.456 8 1.24% 140 0.519 23 0.68% 200 0.423 2 1.47% 404 0.504 20 0.79% 568 0.431 3 1.43% 
94 0.456 8 1.24% 154 0.604 36 0.19% 297 0.423 2 1.47% 365 0.474 11 1.13% 576 0.515 22 0.72% 
19 0.478 13 1.06% 155 0.604 36 0.19% 298 0.423 2 1.47% 551 0.474 11 1.13% 570 0.564 32 0.34% 
20 0.478 13 1.06% 156 0.604 36 0.19% 441 0.423 2 1.47% 325 0.476 12 1.09% 577 0.552 30 0.41% 
107 0.478 13 1.06% 157 0.604 36 0.19% 449 0.423 2 1.47% 327 0.502 19 0.83% 628 0.552 30 0.41% 
108 0.478 13 1.06% 170 0.562 31 0.38% 521 0.423 2 1.47% 407 0.489 15 0.98% 629 0.552 30 0.41% 
92 0.522 25 0.60% 159 0.567 33 0.30% 527 0.423 2 1.47% 490 0.489 15 0.98% 611 0.595 35 0.23% 
103 0.500 17 0.90% 133 0.577 34 0.26% 510 0.438 7 1.28% 219 0.500 16 0.94% 615 0.605 38 0.11% 
44 0.527 27 0.53% 143 0.609 39 0.08% 306 0.435 4 1.39% 224 0.500 16 0.94% 616 0.605 37 0.15% 
81 0.542 29 0.45% 131 0.611 40 0.04% 212 0.437 6 1.32% 228 0.500 16 0.94% 617 0.605 37 0.15% 
82 0.542 29 0.45% 132 0.611 40 0.04% 299 0.437 6 1.32% 315 0.500 16 0.94% 621 0.605 37 0.15% 
83 0.542 29 0.45% 160 0.611 40 0.04% 301 0.437 6 1.32% 339 0.500 16 0.94% 622 0.605 37 0.15% 
84 0.542 29 0.45% 171 0.611 40 0.04% 400 0.437 6 1.32% 377 0.500 16 0.94% 626 0.605 37 0.15% 
2 0.519 24 0.64%     412 0.437 6 1.32% 389 0.500 16 0.94% 627 0.605 37 0.15% 
22 0.519 24 0.64%     487 0.437 6 1.32% 401 0.500 16 0.94% 630 0.605 37 0.15% 
28 0.519 24 0.64%     492 0.437 6 1.32% 402 0.500 16 0.94% 631 0.605 37 0.15% 
109 0.519 24 0.64%     331 0.479 14 1.02% 451 0.500 16 0.94%     
110 0.519 24 0.64%     217 0.461 9 1.21% 496 0.500 16 0.94%     
59 0.541 28 0.49%     222 0.461 9 1.21% 500 0.500 16 0.94%     
60 0.541 28 0.49%     226 0.461 9 1.21% 504 0.500 16 0.94%     
95 0.541 28 0.49%     296 0.461 9 1.21% 508 0.500 16 0.94%     
        313 0.461 9 1.21% 516 0.500 16 0.94%     
        337 0.461 9 1.21% 204 0.524 26 0.57%     
        352 0.461 9 1.21% 292 0.524 26 0.57%     
        354 0.461 9 1.21% 294 0.524 26 0.57%     
        494 0.461 9 1.21% 295 0.524 26 0.57%     
        498 0.461 9 1.21% 351 0.524 26 0.57%     
        505 0.461 9 1.21% 353 0.524 26 0.57%     
        202 0.462 10 1.17% 419 0.524 26 0.57%     
        443 0.462 10 1.17% 514 0.524 26 0.57%     
        524 0.462 10 1.17% 552 0.524 26 0.57%     
        529 0.462 10 1.17% 553 0.524 26 0.57%     
        548 0.462 10 1.17% 554 0.524 26 0.57%     
        502 0.501 18 0.87% 555 0.524 26 0.57%     
16.58% 3.35% 73.35% 6.71% 
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Table 80Comparing result of percentage of important value for Master Control Subsystem 
Master control 
ID Relation Priority % 
5 0.638 1 22.22% 
23 0.626 2 16.67% 
24 0.626 2 16.67% 
25 0.626 2 16.67% 
26 0.691 3 11.11% 
4 0.747 4 5.56% 
11 0.747 4 5.56% 
12 0.747 4 5.56% 
100% 
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Appendix F: Summary of the most critical failure most in solar tower power plant 
Table 81 Result of  the most critical  failure modes for Raw Service Water System in Support Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
37 Flow Orifices Reduce flow in the raw/service water pump bypass line Leakage Some less of water; no effect on system performance 32 0.450 1 
39 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation  between pump bypass line and the 
raw-water storage tank 
Leakage 
Some less of water; 
no effect on system performance 
16 0.521 2 
30 Check Valves Prevent backflow in the raw/service water output lines fail to check 
Backflow not prevented; 
may cause bump damage 
15 0.542 3 
4 Check Valve Prevents backflow in pump output line Fails to check 
Backflow would not be prevented, leading to potential 
pump damage;  no effect on system performance 
10 0.573 4 
9 Flow Indicator Measure flow in the raw-water input line Fail output No effect on system performance 8 0.583 5 
32 Shutoff Valves Provide isolation for raw/service water pumps Leakage No effect on system performance 8 0.583 5 
34 Check Valves Prevent backflow in the raw/service water output lines Leakage 
Some less of water; 
no effect on system performance 
8 0.609 6 
40 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation between the raw-water pump house 
and the raw/service water pumps 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to the pump house; 
no effect on system performance 
8 0.667 7 
41 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to the pump house; 
no effect on system performance 
8 0.667 7 
42 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation between the administration building 
and the raw/service water pumps 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to administration building; 
no effect on system performance 
8 0.667 7 
43 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to administration building; 
no effect on system performance1 
8 0.667 7 
44 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation between the TSS service area and 
the raw/service water 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to TSS area; 
no effect on system performance1 
8 0.667 7 
45 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to TSS area; 
no effect on system preformance1 
8 0.667 7 
46 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation between the EPGS area and the 
raw/service water 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to the EPGS area and cooling-tower makeup; 
no effect on system performance1 
8 0.667 7 
47 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to the EPGS are and cooling-tower 
makeup; 
no effect on system performance1 
8 0.667 7 
50 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation between cooling-tower area and the 
raw/service water 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper flow cooling-tower makeup; 
no effect on system performance1 
8 0.667 7 
51 Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to cooling-tower area; 
no effect on system pe4formance1 
8 0.667 7 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
304                                                                                                                                                                              Appendices                               
Table 82 Result of the most critical failure modes for Demineralized Water System in Support Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
71 Flow Orifice Reduces flow in the feed pump bypass line Leakage 
Some less of water; no effect on system 
performance 
32 0.489 1 
67 Shutoff Valve Isolates pump output Leakage 
Loss of proper system water flow; no effect 
on system performance 
16 0.578 2 
69 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation between the feed pump bypass line and 
the demineralized water tank 
Leakage 
Some less of water; no effect on system 
performance 
16 0.578 2 
74 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation between demineralized water tank and 
the mirror washing station 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow for mirror washing; no effect on 
system performance 
16 0.578 2 
75 Leakage 
Loss of flow for mirror washing; no effect on 
system performance 
16 0.578 2 
65 Check Valve Prevents backflow in pump output line Fails to check 
Backflow protection lost; may cause pump 
damage 
15 0.612 3 
 
Table 83 Result of the most critical failure modes for Compressed-Air System in Support Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
106 Trap 
Tube that prevents the loss of compressed air 
to moisture drain 
Leakage 
Loss of compressed air which would lead to 
plant shutdown 
64 0.400 1 
82 Traps 
Tubes that prevent the loss of compressed air 
to moisture drain 
Leakage 
May cause loss of air from one compressor; 
no effect on system performance 
32 0.488 2 
105 
Shutoff 
Valves 
Provide isolation for air-receiver drain trap Leakage May cause loss air 24 0.488 3 
118 Drain Valves Provide isolation for system coalesce air filters Fail to open or remain open 
Failure in a single loop will have no effect on 
system performance 
24 0.508 4 
125 Drain Valves Allow for draining of output air filters Fail to open when required 
Failure in a single loop will have no effect on 
system performance 
24 0.508 4 
131 
Pressure 
Transmitter 
Measures service-air-system output pressure Fails to operate 
May result in false system alarm; no effect on 
system performance 
24 0.508 4 
139 
Pressure 
transmitter 
Measures pressure in instrument air hydrant 
line 
Fails to operate 
May result in false system alarm; no effect on 
system performance 
24 0.508 4 
123 
Coalesce Air 
Filters 
Provide final system filtering fail to operate properly 
Failure in a single loop will have no effect on 
system performance 
24 0.534 5 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendices                                                                                                                                                                               305 
Table 84 Result of the most critical failure modes for Cooling Distribution System in Support Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
204 Chemical Feeder 
Allows for  the introduction of chemicals into 
the cooling-water system 
Fails to operate properly 
Improper injection of chemicals into the 
system leading to potential equipment 
damage and subsequent plant shutdown 
48 0.412 1 
195 Shutoff Valves 
Allow for draining/ venting of cooling-water 
heat exchanger 
Fail to open when required 
Unable to vent/ drain heat exchanger leading 
to possible plant shutdown 
32 0.432 2 
201 Butterfly Valve 
Provides an interface at the cooling-water 
heat-exchanger 
Leakage 
Loss of cooling-water flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
30 0.437 3 
180 Pressure Sensor 
Provides control signal for cooling-water 
pump 
Fails to operate 
Loss of cooling-water flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
30 0.479 4 
167 Butterfly Valve 
Provides an interface at the cooling-water 
surge-tank output 
Leakage 
Loss of cooling flow leading to plant 
shutdown 
24 0.470 5 
212 Shutoff valve 
Provide isolation in the individual air-cooler 
lines 
Leakage 
Loss proper cooling water flow which may 
lead to plant shutdown 
24 0.470 5 
181 Pressure Sensor 
Provides control signal for cooling-water 
pump 
False output 
Improper cooling-water flow which may lead 
to plant shutdown 
24 0.513 6 
179 Check Valves 
Prevent backflow at cooling-water pump 
output 
Fail to check 
Loss of backflow protection; no effect on 
system performance; may cause pump 
damage 
15 0.498 7 
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Table 85 Result of the most critical failure modes for Power Distribution System in Support Subsystem 
No Component Function 
Failure 
mode 
Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
219 Solar One Generator Output Circuit Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
224 4KV Well-water Output Circuit Breaker 
Provides system overvoltage 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
228 
Heliostat Interface Power Cabinet Input 
Circuit Breakers 
Provides system overvoltage 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
230 
Station Service Transfer Input Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
234 
Station Service Transformer Output Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
238 
Cooling tower Transformer Input Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
242 
Cooling Tower Transformer Output Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
244 
Motor Control Centre L Input Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection may result in 
other equipment damage, plant shutdown 
25 0.372 1 
236 Receiver Feed Pump Circuit Breaker 
Provides equipment 
overcurrent protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection at pump input; 
plant shutdown due to tripping other breakers 
20 0.413 2 
248 
Motor Control Centre A Input Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection; plant shutdown 
due to tripping of other circuit breakers 
20 0.413 2 
250 
Motor Control Centre C Input Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection; plant shutdown 
due to tripping of other circuit breakers 
20 0.413 2 
252 
Motor Control Centre B Input Circuit 
Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection; plant shutdown 
due to tripping of other circuit breakers 
20 0.413 2 
254 Receiver PPA Input Circuit Breaker 
Provides system overcurrent 
protection 
Fails to open 
Loss of overcurrent protection; plant shutdown 
due to tripping of other circuit breakers 
20 0.413 2 
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Table 86 Result of the most critical failure modes for Water Riser in Receiver Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
21 Receiver Preheater Panels Provides for initial heating of receiver water Overheating 
Potential permanent damage to panel, resulting in shutdown 
of receiver 
30 0.449 1 
23 Preheater Panel Relief Valves Prevent preheater overpressure Leakage 
Reduced flow of water in system, resulting in shutdown of 
receiver 
30 0.449 1 
28 
Preheater panel Output Valve 
Provides isolation of preheater panels from 
boiler panels 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of receiver water flow, causing shutdown of receiver 30 0.449 1 
29 Leakage 
Loss of receiver water flow to boiler panels, causing 
shutdown of receiver 
30 0.449 1 
8 
Filter Provides filtration of receiver input water 
Clogged 
Loss of input water flow to receiver panels, causing shut 
down2 
32 0.468 2 
9 Leakage 
Loss of input water flow to receiver panels, causing shut 
down2 
32 0.468 2 
 
Table 87 Result of the most critical failure modes for Absorber in Receiver Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
44 Boiler Panel Input Stop Check Valves 
Provides for isolation of boiler 
panels 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of water flow to boiler panel, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver 
45 0.419 1 
34 
Flow Rate Transmitters 
Measures boiler panel input 
water flow rate 
Fails to operate 
Failure of a flow meter will result in an alarm 
and/or RS shutdown 
48 0.468 2 
35 False output 
Failure of a flow meter will result in an alarm 
and/or RS shutdown 
48 0.468 2 
 
Table 88  Result of the most critical failure modes for Panels in Receiver Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
54 Flow Orifices 
Provide flow stability within 
each receiver boiler panel 
Blockage or restricted 
flow of single tube 
Reduced flow of water in system, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver 
20 0.402 1 
59 
Moisture separator to receiver 
Accumulator Input Valve 
Provides for isolation of the 
moisture separator manifold 
Fails to open or remain 
open 
Inability to drain any removed water to the 
accumulator leading to potential low quality 
steam in system 
12 0.564 2 
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Table 89 Result of the most critical failure modes for Steam Downcomer in Receiver Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
71 
Downcomer Manifold Vent 
Valves 
Allows for venting of manifold 
Fails to close or remain 
closed during operation 
Loss of steam flow, resulting in shut down 
of receiver 
30 0.487 1 
64 Receiver controllers 
Controls position by sensing 
temperature of boiler output steam 
Fails to operate properly 
Improper water flow to boiler, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver 
20 0.526 2 
72 
Downcomer Manifold Vent 
Valves 
Allows for venting of manifold 
Fails to open or remain open 
during venting operation 
Unable to vent system in normal manner; 
system can be vented through start-up loop 
18 0.577 3 
73 Downcomer Manifold Relief 
Valves 
Prevent manifold overpressure Leakage 
Loss of flow will be sensed by output 
pressure transmitter 
18 0.577 3 
74 No effect on system performance 18 0.577 3 
 
 
Table 90 Result of the most critical failure modes for Support Structure in Receiver Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
80 
Downcomer Input Valve 
Controls flow of superheated steam 
to downcomer 
Fails to open or remain open 
during venting operation 
Loss of steam flow, resulting in shut down of 
receiver 
10 0.438 1 
81 Leakage 
Loss of steam flow, resulting in shut down of 
receiver 
10 0.438 1 
84 Flash Tank Input Valve 
Controls flow of low-temperature 
steam to flash tank 
Fails to close or remain 
closed during operation 
Reduced steam flow to downcomer, resulting 
in shutdown of receiver 
10 0.438 1 
85 
Flash Tank Input Valve 
Provides low of flow pressure 
differential for control system 
Fails to open or remain open 
during venting operation 
Reduced control of flow to downcomer, 
resulting in shutdown of receiver 
10 0.438 1 
86 
Fails to close or remain 
closed during operation 
Reduced steam flow to downcomer, resulting 
in shutdown of receiver 
10 0.438 1 
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Table 91 Result of the most critical failure modes for Control components in Receiver Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
107 
Control Valve Control nitrogen flow to preheater panels 
Fails to operate when 
required 
Loss of nitrogen backfill capability 18 0.548 1 
108 Leakage 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater panels; this leads to 
potential freezing which causes loss of the receiver 
18 0.548 1 
113 
Control Valve 
Control low-pressure nitrogen flow to the 
receiver preheater panels 
Fails to open or remain open 
during venting operation 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater panels; this leads to 
potential freezing which causes loss of the receiver 
18 0.548 1 
114 Blockage 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater panels; this leads to 
potential freezing which causes loss of the receiver 
18 0.548 1 
128 
Air control valve Controls air to valve operators 
Fails to open or remain open Loss of air flow, resulting in loss of receiver subsystem 18 0.548 1 
129 Leakage Loss of air flow, resulting in loss of receiver subsystem 18 0.548 1 
130 
Check Valves Prevents back flow into air supply 
Fail closed Loss of air flow, resulting in loss of receiver subsystem 18 0.548 1 
131 Leakage Loss of air flow, resulting in loss of receiver subsystem 18 0.548 1 
105 
Pressure Control 
Regulate nitrogen pressure to the receiver 
preheater panels 
Fails closed 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater panels; this leads to 
potential freezing which causes loss of the receiver 
12 0.602 2 
106 Leakage 
Unable to backfill receiver preheater panels; this leads to 
potential freezing which causes loss of the receiver 
12 0.602 2 
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Table 92 Result of the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Tank Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
44 
Flow Rate Transmitters Measure system pressure 
Fail to operate 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in an alarm and 
shutdown 
64 0.400 1 
45 False output 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in an alarm and 
shutdown 
64 0.400 1 
57 
Thermal Storage 
Heaters 
Transfer heat from incoming steam to 
thermal-storage heat transfer fluid 
Structural failure 
Potential safety hazard; reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability 
40 0.431 2 
112 Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation of thermal storage 
unit 
Leakage or 
Blockage 
Loss of thermal-storage oil flow; potential safety hazard 
due to escaping fluid 
32 0.462 3 
158 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for the thermal-
storage heaters 
Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability, 
leading to potential inability to fulfil total energy 
requirements 
32 0.462 3 
55 Relief Valves Provide protection from overpressure 
Fail to operate 
when required 
Potential safety hazard; reduction in thermal-storage 
charging capability 
30 0.475 4 
139 Bypass Control Valve 
Enables cross-over from one charging 
loop to the other 
Leakage or 
Blockage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability, 
leading to possible inability to fulfil total energy 
requirements 
27 0.500 5 
116 Output Valve 
Controls Fluid output of thermal 
Storage unit 
Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage oil flow; potential safety hazard 
due to escaping fluid 
24 0.493 6 
14 
Water-Flow Control 
Valve 
Controls the flow of cooling water to 
the DE superheater 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Inability to reduce steam temperature resulting in 
potential degradation of thermal-storage fluid and or 
damage to thermal storage heaters 
24 0.505 7 
15 Leakage 
Inability to reduce steam temperature resulting in 
potential degradation of thermal-storage fluid and or 
damage to thermal storage heaters 
24 0.505 7 
56 Relief Valves Provide protection from overpressure Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability, 
leading to possible inability to fulfil total energy 
requirement 
24 0.505 7 
62 
Shutoff valves 
Provide for isolation of the thermal-
storage heater 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability, 
leading to possible inability to fulfil total energy 
requirement 
24 0.505 7 
63 Leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability, 
leading to possible inability to fulfil total energy 
requirement 
24 0.505 7 
111 Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation of thermal storage 
unit 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage oil flow 24 0.508 8 
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1 Thermal-Storage unit 
Containment for thermal-energy 
storage media 
Tank rupture Potential safety hazard; loss of thermal capability 20 0.509 9 
3 De-superheater 
Acts  as a buffer to thermal-storage 
subsystem by reducing the temperature 
of the steam being supplied 
Structural failure 
Potential safety hazard; failure would result in loss of 
thermal-storage charging capability 
20 0.509 9 
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Table 94 (Continued). Result of the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Tank Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
25 Steam-Flow Control 
Valve 
Controls flow of receiver steam to DE 
superheater 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage charging capability 18 0.551 10 
26 Leakage Loss of thermal-storage charging capability 18 0.551 10 
48 
Pressure Regulators 
Maintains system in a hot standby 
condition 
Fail to regulate Loss of hot standby capability 18 0.551 10 
50 Fail to closed Loss of hot standby capability 18 0.551 10 
52 Leakage 
Inability to reduce steam temperature resulting in 
potential degradation of thermal-storage fluid and or 
damage to thermal storage heaters 
18 0.551 10 
5 
De-super 
heater Water-input 
shutoff valve 
Provides subsystem isolation 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Inability to reduce steam temperature resulting in 
potential degradation of thermal-storage fluid and or 
damage to thermal storage heaters 
16 0.544 11 
6 Leakage 
Inability to reduce steam temperature resulting in 
potential degradation of thermal-storage fluid and or 
damage to thermal storage heaters 
16 0.544 11 
58 
Thermal Storage 
Heaters 
Transfer heat from incoming steam to 
thermal-storage heat transfer fluid 
Internal leakage 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability; 
potential mixing of heat transfer fluid and steam which 
would result in degradation of the fluid and damage to 
the heater 
16 0.544 11 
59 
Restricted or no 
flow 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability, 
leading to possible inability to fulfil total energy 
requirement 
16 0.544 11 
157 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for the thermal-
storage heaters 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Reduction in thermal-storage charging capability, 
leading to potential inability to fulfil total energy 
requirements 
16 0.544 11 
16 
Flow-Rate Transmitter Measures input-water flow rate 
Fails to operate 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in an alarm and 
shutdown 
16 0.585 12 
17 False output 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in an alarm and 
shutdown 
16 0.585 12 
29 
Flow-Rate Transmitter 
Measure steam flow rate to the DE 
superheater 
Fails to operate 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in an alarm and 
shutdown 
16 0.585 12 
30 False output 
Failure of a flowmeter would result in an alarm and 
shutdown 
16 0.585 12 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendices                                                                                                                                                                               313 
 
Table 93 Result of the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
202 
Flow rate transmitter Measure auxiliary line flow rate 
Fail to operate 
Failure of flowmeter will result in an alarm and 
shutdown 
64 0.400 1 
203 False output 
Failure of flowmeter will result in an alarm and 
shutdown 
64 0.400 1 
237 
Flow rate Transmitters 
Measure superheater bypass line 
flow rate 
Fails to operate Failure will result in an alarm and shut down 64 0.400 1 
238 False output Failure will result in an alarm and shut down 64 0.400 1 
250 
Flow rate Transmitters 
Measure superheater fluid input 
flow rate 
Fails to operate Failure will result in an alarm and shut down 64 0.400 1 
251 False output Failure will result in an alarm and shut down 64 0.400 1 
246 
Pressure Transmitters 
Measure superheater fluid input 
pressure 
Fails to operate Failure will result in an alarm and shut down 48 0.427 2 
247 False output Failure will result in an alarm and shut down 48 0.427 2 
272 Flow Rate Transmitters 
Measure extraction-loop input 
water flow rate 
Fail to operate 
Failure of a flowmeter will result in an alarm and/or 
TSS loop shutdown 
48 0.437 3 
210 Stop Check 
Prevent backflow of fluid in 
auxiliary pump line 
Fail to check 
Would not prevent back flow of fluid in a failure 
condition 
40 0.473 4 
191 Control Valve 
Provides fluid control in auxiliary 
pump line 
Leakage 
Loss of proper flow in auxiliary pump line; could 
result in loss of blanket steam 
36 0.463 5 
235 
Temperature Transmitters 
Measure superheater bypass line 
temperature 
Fails to operate Failure will result in an alarm and shut down 32 0.471 6 
236 False output Failure will result in an alarm and shut down 32 0.471 6 
248 
Temperature Transmitters 
Measure superheater fluid input 
temperature 
Fails to operate Failure will result in an alarm and shut down 32 0.471 6 
249 False output Failure will result in an alarm and shut down 32 0.471 6 
166 
Thermal-Storage Unit 
Fluid-Control Valve 
Controls the flow of thermal-
storage transfer fluid to or from the 
thermal-storage tank 
Leakage 
Loss or reduced thermal-storage charging or 
extraction capability, depending on mode of operation 
27 0.500 7 
168 Shutoff Valve Provides for system isolation Leakage 
Loss or reduced thermal-storage charging or 
extraction capability, depending on mode of operation 
24 0.508 8 
181 Shutoff valve 
Provides for system isolation in 
blacket-steam line 
Leakage when not 
in operation 
Loss of thermal-storage fluid resulting in reduced 
system efficiency 
24 0.508 8 
183 Control valve 
Control fluid in thermal-storage 
tank-bypass line 
Leakage Some loss of thermal-storage fluid 24 0.524 9 
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300 Control Valves 
Provide bypass to flash tank during 
system start up 
Leakage or 
inadvertently open 
Reduction in steam flow to turbine 24 0.524 9 
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Table 95 (Continued). Result of the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
175 
Control Valve 
Controls thermal-storage heater-
fluid return line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage charging capability 18 0.561 10 
176 Leakage Loss of thermal-storage charging capability 18 0.561 10 
186 Shutoff valve 
Allows for dumping of bypassed 
thermal-storage fluid 
Leakage Some loss of fluid when using tank-bypass loop 16 0.569 11 
262 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation of heaters from 
thermal-storage tank 
Leakage 
Some loss of thermal-storage fluid which would lead 
to loop shutdown 
16 0.569 11 
208 
Stop Check 
Prevent backflow of fluid in 
auxiliary pump line 
Fail to remove open Loss of flow in one seal-steam line, no effect on system 16 0.595 12 
209 Leakage Loss of flow in one seal-steam line, no effect on system 16 0.595 12 
273 
Flow Rate Transmitters 
Measure extraction-loop input 
water flow rate 
False output 
Failure of a flowmeter will result in an alarm and/or 
TSS loop shutdown 
16 0.620 13 
284 Blockage 
Unable to dump boiler water to flash tank causing  
shutdown of loop 
16 0.620 13 
221 Stop Check Valves 
Prevent back flow into extraction 
pump 
Fail to check 
Backflow of fluid would not be prevent, could result in 
pump damage 
15 0.573 14 
 
 
 
 
Table 94 Result of the most critical failure modes for Ullage Maintenance Unit in Thermal Storage Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
319 
Shutoff Valves Provide isolation to individual valves and/or skids 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of air flow , resulting in loss of thermal-
storage system 
12 0.615 1 
320 Leakage 
Loss of air flow , resulting in loss of thermal-
storage system 
12 0.615 1 
312 
Air Control Valve Controls air to valve operators 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of air flow , resulting in loss of thermal-
storage system 
9 0.613 2 
313 Leakage 
Loss of air flow , resulting in loss of thermal-
storage system 
9 0.613 2 
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Table 95 Result of the most critical failure modes for Receiver Feed Pump in Electrical Power and Generator 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
87 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for level controllers and 
switches 
Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to controllers or switches; 
because these control a number of plant drains, 
a resulting system shutdown would occur 
40 0.436 1 
93 
Control Valve 
Controls flow from the receiver flash tank 
to high-pressure heater number 2 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Unable to drain receiver flash-tank, leading to 
system shutdown 
36 0.456 2 
94 Leakage 
Unable to maintain proper system flow, 
resulting in system shutdown 
36 0.456 2 
19 
Control Valve 
Controls feed water flow to high-pressure 
heater number 2 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system water flow, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver subsystem 
30 0.478 3 
20 Leakage 
Loss of pepper system water flow, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver subsystem 
30 0.478 3 
107 
Control Valve 
Controls flow from the thermal-storage 
flash tank to the number 2 high-pressure 
heater 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow, resulting in plant 
shutdown due to improper drain control 
30 0.478 3 
108 Leakage 
Unable to maintain proper system flow, 
resulting in plant shutdown 
30 0.478 3 
92 Level Switches 
Provide alarm points for turbine exhaust 
ports 
False alarm 
Unnecessary shutdown of turbine exhaust port; 
system should balance itself, resulting in no 
effect on system performance 
30 0.522 4 
103 Control Valve 
Controls the water flow between high-
pressure heaters and the condenser 
Leakage Unable to maintain proper system flow 27 0.500 5 
44 Flow Orifices 
Restrict flow in the heater return lines to 
condenser 
Blockage or leakage 
Loss of water return to the deaerator, leading to 
improper drain control 
24 0.527 6 
81 
Angle Valve 
Allows flow to high-pressure heater level 
glass 
Fail to remain open 
Loss of flow to level glass; no effect on system 
performance 
24 0.542 7 
82 Leakage 
Loss of flow to level glass leading to heater 
shutdown; heater can be bypassed, resulting in 
no effect on system performance 
24 0.542 7 
83 
3-way Valves 
Allow flow to high-pressure heater level 
glass 
Fail to remain open 
Loss of flow to level glass; no effect on system 
performance 
24 0.542 7 
84 Leakage 
Loss of flow to level glass leading to heater 
shutdown; heater can be bypassed, resulting in 
no effect on system performance 
24 0.542 7 
2 Receiver Feed Pump Provides receiver subsystem water flow Leakage 
Loss of water flow, resulting in shutdown of 
receiver subsystem 
20 0.519 8 
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Table 96 Result of the most critical failure modes for Receiver Feed Pump in Electrical Power and Generator 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
22 Shutoff Valve Provides bypass path around control valve 
Leakage or 
inadvertently open 
Loss of proper system water flow, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver subsystem 
20 0.519 8 
28 Shutoff Valve 
Provides system isolation for high-pressure 
heater number 2 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system water flow, resulting in 
shutdown of receiver subsystem 
20 0.519 8 
109 
Shutoff Valves Provide isolation for flash-tank control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow, resulting in plant 
shutdown due to improper drain control 
20 0.519 8 
110 Leakage 
Unable to maintain proper system flow, 
resulting in plant shutdown 
20 0.519 8 
59 
Input Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation of high-pressure heater 
inputs 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of input, resulting in in proper drain 
control, loss of blanketing capability 
18 0.541 9 
60 Leakage 
Loss of input, resulting in in proper drain 
control, loss of blanketing capability 
18 0.541 9 
95 Shutoff Valve 
Provide isolation for receiver flash-tank 
control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Unable to drain receiver flash-tank 18 0.541 9 
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Table 97 Result of the most critical failure modes for Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed Pump in Electrical Power and Generator 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
161 Control Valve 
Controls water flow to the auxiliary steam 
generator 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam generator, 
resulting in loss of blanket-steam production; no 
effect on system performance 
24 0.512 1 
140 Shutoff Valve 
Provides bypass path around the control 
valve 
Leakage 
Loss of proper flow in auxiliary steam generation 
loop 
24 0.519 2 
154 
Flow Transmitter 
Measure system water flow to thermal 
storage 
Fails to operate System shutdown 20 0.604 3 
155 False output System shutdown 20 0.604 3 
156 
Flow Transmitter 
Measures system water flow to auxiliary 
steam generator 
Fails to operate System shutdown 20 0.604 3 
157 False output System shutdown 20 0.604 3 
170 Relief Valves Prevent system overpressure 
Fail to operate 
when required 
Potential safety hazard due to explosion and/or 
escaping steam 
18 0.562 4 
159 Shutoff Valves 
Provides isolation for auxiliary steam 
generator input control valve 
Leakage 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam generator, 
resulting in loss of blanket-steam production; no 
effect on system performance 
16 0.567 5 
133 Flow Orifice Reduces flow in the deaerator input line 
Leakage or 
blockage 
Loss  of flow to the deaerator; no effect system 
performance 
16 0.577 6 
143 Pressure Transmitter 
Measures pressure in auxiliary steam 
generation loop 
Fails to operate No effect on system performance 12 0.609 7 
131 
Control Valve 
Controls auxiliary steam loop water flow to 
the deaerator 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to the deaerator; no effect on system 
performance 
12 0.611 8 
132 Leakage 
Loss of flow to the deaerator; no effect on system 
performance 
12 0.611 8 
160 Control Valve 
Controls water flow to the auxiliary steam 
generator 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to auxiliary steam generator, 
resulting in loss of blanket-steam production; no 
effect on system performance 
12 0.611 8 
171 Relief Valves Prevent system overpressure Leakage 
Loss of blanket-steam from auxiliary generator; no 
effect on system performance 
12 0.611 8 
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Table 98 Result of the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical Power and Generator 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
410 Control Valve Control recirculation flow to the condenser Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow control resulting in 
plant shutdown 
60 0.398 1 
200 Control Valve 
Controls the output flow from the thermal-
storage feed water pump 
Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage extraction capability 
which could result in plant shutdown 
48 0.423 2 
297 
3-way Valve Allows flow to the deaerator level glass 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of flow to level glass leading to deaerator and 
subsequent plant shutdown 
48 0.423 2 
298 Leakage 
Loss of flow to level glass leading to deaerator and 
subsequent plant shutdown 
48 0.423 2 
441 
Desuperheater Input 
Control Valve 
Controls flow of cooling water to the 
desuperheater from turbine seal valve train 
Leakage 
May cause improper system flows resulting in 
plant shutdown 
48 0.423 2 
449 
Desuperheater Input 
Control Valve 
Controls flow from down comer crossover 
to the desuperheater 
Leakage 
Improper system startup flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
48 0.423 2 
521 Control valve 
Controls flow between thermal-storage flash 
tank and the condenser 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
48 0.423 2 
527 Control Valve 
Controls flow between thermal-storage flash 
tank and the condenser or deaerator 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
48 0.423 2 
510 Flow Orifice Reduces flow in the condenser input line 
Blockage or 
leakage 
Loss of proper system flow control resulting in 
plant shutdown 
48 0.438 3 
306 Level Switches 
Provides alarm points for turbine exaust 
ports 
False alarm 
Unnecessary shutdown of turbine exhaust port; 
system should balance itself, resulting in no effect 
on system performance 
45 0.435 4 
212 
Chemical-Feed 
Shutoff Valves 
Provide interface and isolation from the 
amonia and hydrazine inputs 
Leakage 
Potential safety hazard due to chemical spill; 
unable to properly adjust water quality, resulting 
in plant shutdown 
40 0.437 5 
299 Level Glass Measures water level within the deaerator 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of measurement capability; no effect on 
system performance 
40 0.437 5 
301 Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in deaerator 
desuperheater input line 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 40 0.437 5 
400 Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation from chemical feed 
system 
Fails to open when 
required 
Unable to adjust water purity 40 0.437 5 
412 Shutoff Valve 
Provide isolation for recirculation flow 
control valve 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow control resulting in 
plant shutdown 
40 0.437 5 
487 Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation at the desuperheater 
output 
Leakage 
Loss of proper startup flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
40 0.437 5 
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Table 99 (Continued). Result of the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical Power and Generator 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
492 Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation in the low pressure heater 
to condenser line 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
40 0.437 5 
331 Flow Orifice 
Reduces flow in the low pressure heater 
output line 
Leakage or 
blockage 
Loss of proper system drain control resulting in 
plant shutdown 
40 0.479 6 
217 Control Valve 
Controls drain flow high-pressure heaters to 
the condenser 
Leakage Loss of proper drain control 36 0.461 7 
222 Control Valve 
Controls flow from the high-pressure to low-
pressure heaters 
Leakage Loss of proper drain control 36 0.461 7 
226 Control Valve 
Controls the flow from the high-pressure 
heater to the deaerator 
Leakage Loss of proper drain control 36 0.461 7 
296 Angle Valve Allows flow to the deaerator level glass Leakage Loss of flow to level glass 36 0.461 7 
313 Control valve 
Controls flow from deaetator desuperheater 
to the low pressure heater 
Leakage Loss of proper system drain control 36 0.461 7 
337 Control Valve 
Controls low pressure heater output flow to 
the condenser 
Leakage Loss of proper system drain control 36 0.461 7 
352 Angle Valve 
Allows flow to low pressure heater level 
glass 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 36 0.461 7 
354 3-way Valve 
Allows flow to low pressure heater level 
glass 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 36 0.461 7 
494 Control Valve 
Controls system flow from the receiver flash 
tank to the condenser 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 36 0.461 7 
498 Control Valve 
Controls system liquid flow between the 
receiver flash tank and the condenser 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 36 0.461 7 
505 Control Valve 
Controls flow between thermal storage flash 
tank and the condenser 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of proper system flow control resulting in 
plant shutdown 
36 0.461 7 
202 Shutoff Valve Provides bypass path around control valve Leakage 
Loss of thermal-storage extraction capability 
which could result in plant shutdown 
32 0.462 8 
443 Shutoff Valves 
Provides isolation for the desuperheater 
input control valve 
Leakage 
Improper system startup flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
32 0.462 8 
524 Shutoff Valves 
Provide system isolation for the control 
valve 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
32 0.462 8 
529 Shutoff Valves 
Provide system isolation for the control 
valve 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow resulting in plant 
shutdown 
32 0.462 8 
548 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for condenser level 
switches and controller 
Leakage 
Loss of proper flow to switches and controller 
resulting in plant shutdown 
32 0.462 8 
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Table 99 (Continued). Result of the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical Power and Generator 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
502 Flow Orifice Reduces flow in the condenser input line 
Blockage or 
leakage 
Loss of proper system flow 32 0.501 9 
403 
Flow Rate Transmitter Measures system flow rate 
Fails to operate Improper drain control may shutdown plant 32 0.504 10 
404 False output Improper drain control may shutdown plant 32 0.504 10 
365 Level Controller Provide control of system drain lines False alarm 
Unnecessary shutdown of turbine exhaust port; 
system should balance itself, resulting in no effect 
on system performance 
30 0.474 11 
551 Level Switches 
Provide alarm points for turbine exhaust 
ports 
False alarm Unnecessary shutdown of system 30 0.474 11 
325 Shutoff Valve 
Isolates the low pressure heater from the 
turbine exhaust 
Leakage 
Loss of proper drain control resulting in plant 
shutdown 
30 0.476 12 
327 Relief Valves Prevent low pressure heater overpressure Leakage 
Loss of proper system drain control resulting in 
plant shutdown 
30 0.502 13 
407 Check Valve Prevents backflow from low pressure heater Fails to check 
Backflow not prevented in failure mode condition. 
No effect on system performance 
25 0.489 14 
490 Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in the low pressure heater 
to condenser line 
Fails to check 
Loss of backflow protection. 
No effect on system performance. 
25 0.489 14 
219 Shutoff Valves 
Provide system isolation for high-pressure 
heater to condenser control valve 
Leakage Loss of proper drain control 24 0.500 15 
224 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for high-pressure to low-
pressure heater control valve 
Leakage Loss of proper drain control 24 0.500 15 
228 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for the high-pressure 
heater to deaerator control valve 
Leakage Loss of proper drain control 24 0.500 15 
315 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for deaetator desuperheater 
to low pressure heater control valve 
Leakage Loss of proper system drain control 24 0.500 15 
339 Shutoff Valves 
Provide system isolation for low pressure 
heater to condenser control valve 
Leakage Loss of proper system drain control 24 0.500 15 
377 Shutoff Valves 
Provide system isolation at condensate 
hotwell pump output 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 24 0.500 15 
389 Shutoff Valves Isolate demineralozer input Leakage Loss of proper system flow 24 0.500 15 
401 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides isolation from chemical feed 
system 
Fails to close when 
required or internal 
leakage 
Potential water of improper purity in system. 
Additional system damage may result. 
24 0.500 15 
402 External leakage Potential safety hazard due to chemical spill 24 0.500 15 
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Table 99 (Continued). Result of the most critical failure modes for Thermal-Storage Feedwater Pump in Electrical Power and Generator 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
451 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for condensate tank input 
valve from makeup demineralizer 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of makeup capability only. No effect on 
system performance. 
24 0.500 15 
496 Shutoff Valves 
Provide isolation for receiver flash tank to 
deaerator control valve 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 24 0.500 15 
500 Shutoff Valve 
Provide isolation for receiver flash tank to 
deaerator control valve 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 24 0.500 15 
504 Shutoff Valve 
Provides system isolation in the deaerator to 
condenser input line 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow control resulting in 
plant shutdown 
24 0.500 15 
508 Shutoff Valves 
Provides isolation for condenser input 
control valve 
Leakage 
Loss of proper system flow control resulting in 
plant shutdown 
24 0.500 15 
516 Shutoff Valve Provides system isolation Leakage Loss of proper system flow to the condenser 24 0.500 15 
204 Control Valve 
Controls bypass flow of thermal-storage 
feed water to the deaerator 
Leakage 
Loss of bypass capability to deaerator; no effect 
on system performance 
24 0.524 16 
292 
Control Valve 
Controls flow between the deaerator and 
condenser 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow 24 0.524 16 
294 Leakage Loss of flow to level glass 24 0.524 16 
295 Angle Valve Allows flow to the deaerator level glass 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of flow to level glass. No effect on system 
performance 
24 0.524 16 
351 Angle Valve 
Allows flow to low pressure heater level 
glass 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to level glass. No effect on system 
performance 
24 0.524 16 
353 3-way Valve 
Allows flow to low pressure heater level 
glass 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of flow to level glass. No effect on system 
performance 
24 0.524 16 
419 Control Valve 
Control input flow from makeup 
demineralizer to condensate tank 
External leakage 
Loss of makeup capability. No effect on system 
performance. 
24 0.524 16 
514 Control Valve 
Controls system flow between the high 
pressure heater #1 bypass and the condenser 
Leakage Loss of proper system flow to the condenser 24 0.524 16 
552 
Angle Valve Allows flow to condenser level glass 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of flow to level glass; no effect on system 
performance 
24 0.524 16 
553 Leakage 
Loss of flow to level glass; no effect on system 
performance 
24 0.524 16 
554 
3-way Valve Allows flow to condenser level glass 
Fails to remain 
open 
Loss of flow to level glass; no effect on system 
performance 
24 0.524 16 
555 Leakage 
Loss of flow to level glass; should not affect 
system performance 
24 0.524 16 
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Table 99 Result of the most critical failure modes for Turbine Generator in Electrical Power and Generator 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
562 Control Valves Control turbine exhaust flow to the condenser Leakage 
Loss of proper system drain control leading to 
plant shutdown 
48 0.431 1 
568 Control Valves Control turbine exhaust flow to system heaters Leakage 
Improper system drain control resulting in 
probable plant shutdown 
48 0.431 1 
576 Temperature Equipment Sets turbine alarm point for turbine input steam 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Turbine input port will shutdown 24 0.515 2 
570 Check Valves 
Prevent backflow into individual turbine 
exhaust ports 
Leakage 
Improper system drain control resulting in 
probable plant shutdown 
20 0.564 3 
577 Temperature Equipment Sets turbine alarm point for turbine input steam False output Unnecessary shutdown of turbine input port 18 0.552 4 
628 
Control Valve Controls blanket steam flow to the turbine 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of blanket steam flow; could result in 
turbine damage 
18 0.552 4 
629 Leakage 
Loss of blanket steam flow; could result in 
turbine damage 
18 0.552 4 
611 Relief Valve 
Prevents overpressure in auxiliary boiler 
blanket steam input line 
fails to operate 
when required 
Potential safety hazard and equipment damage 15 0.595 5 
615 Check Valve 
Prevents backflow in auxiliary boiler blanket 
steam line 
Fails to check Loss of backflow protection 15 0.605 6 
616 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system isolation in auxiliary boiler 
blanket steam line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of auxiliary blanket steam flow 12 0.605 6 
617 Leakage Loss of auxiliary blanket steam flow 12 0.605 6 
621 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system isolation in receiver blanket 
steam line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of receiver blanket steam flow 12 0.605 6 
622 Leakage Loss of receiver blanket steam flow 12 0.605 6 
626 
Shutoff Valve 
Provides system isolation in thermal-storage 
blanket steam line 
Fails to open or 
remain open 
Loss of thermal-storage blanket steam flow 12 0.605 6 
627 Leakage Loss of thermal-storage blanket steam flow 12 0.605 6 
630 
Shutoff Valves Provide system isolation for control valve 
Fail to open or 
remain open 
Loss of blanket steam flow; could result in 
turbine damage 
12 0.605 6 
631 Leakage 
Loss of blanket steam flow; could result in 
turbine damage 
12 0.605 6 
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Table 100 Result of the most critical failure modes for Master Control Subsystem 
No Component Function Failure mode Failure effect 
Results 
RPN Proposed Priority 
5 
Operational Control 
System Computer 
Provides central control for entire 
MCS function 
Loss of weather 
data 
Potential for plant unbalance; 
plant can still be operated in a manual mode 
9 0.638 2 
23 
Process Control 
Peripheral Color Graphics 
Allow outputting of data from 
any or all subsystems 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Failure of one unit will have no effect on system 
performance 
8 0.626 1 
24 
Fails to operate 
properly 
Loss of data hiway resulting in 
loss of control from central console 
8 0.626 1 
25 
Data Acquisition 
System Computer 
Provides means for compiling 
plant performance information 
No output 
No effect on system performance; 
data gathering function only 
8 0.626 1 
26 
False or constant 
output 
No effect on system performance; 
data gathering function only 
6 0.691 3 
4 
Operational Control 
System Computer 
Provides central control for entire 
MCS function 
Loss of grid data 
Loss of grid interface information leading to 
possible in ability to bring plant online ; will not 
affect system operation 
4 0.747 4 
11 
Peripheral Control System 
Computer 
Acts as an OCS backup as well as 
providing a general-purpose 
computing function 
No output 
Loss of general-purpose computing and OCS 
backup capability ; no effect on system performance 
4 0.747 4 
12 
False or constant 
output 
Loss of general-purpose computing and OCS 
backup capability ; no effect on system performance 
4 0.747 4 
 
